September 21, 2020 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR, Security
Brig. Gen. Shachar Shohat (ret.)
Recent events in the Middle East have led some to wonder how countries, including Israel, can protect their own strategic installations. Israel's adversaries, such as Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, have threatened to strike sensitive Israeli targets. Saudi Arabia absorbed a painful strike in September 2019 when an Iranian drone swarm combined with cruise missiles struck oil fields, causing heavy damage.
The attack on Saudi Arabia is the latest tangible example of the evolving threat: precision-guided, sophisticated enemy air attacks.
Each country designates its own strategic sites for special defense. They range from nuclear power plants to air force bases to Olympic stadiums. And the hardening of defenses around strategic sites was especially prominent until around three decades ago.
At that time, attackers using close-range munitions had to approach a given site in order to attack it. Visual contact was often required, and simple air-to-ground munitions would suffice for an attack. Defense systems of that time were similarly simplistic.
Air force bases might be protected by a 40mm anti-aircraft cannon, for example, in order to prevent a direct attack on a runway. That same concept would be applied to any sites deemed critical by a state. In addition to being limited in range, though, such defenses required many munitions and high numbers of personnel.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a revolution in the world of weaponry. Precision, long-range (standoff) munitions entered the battle arenas, and close-range air defenses became largely obsolete. Once attackers no longer needed proximity to their targets, close-range defenses could neither hit the longer-range munitions nor their launchers.
But over the past decade, we have seen the addition of GPS-guidance systems to those munitions. The advent of this technology, combined with the overall revolution of the '80s and '90s, has heightened the need for states to return to close-range air defenses — but in a new configuration.
Additional systems are now in the pipeline. Small, affordable interceptor missiles and laser beam defenses are the answers to the new categories of close-range threats seen around the world, including gliding bombs, cruise missiles and drones.
In 2019, the Iranians proved that if they have intelligence on their target and the ability to send munitions to the “blind spot” of radars, attacks can be successful.
That attack should serve as a “wake-up call” for countries around the world. If states want to protect strategic sites, radars that look in every direction, 360 degrees, 24 hours a day, are needed.
Effective new defense systems must now be multidirectional in their detection of incoming threats, a response to the enemy's ability to turn, steer and evade radar coverage and detection. That coverage must be combined with multiple layers of defense, including defense mechanisms very close to the asset being defended.
Examples of what is now needed for strategic sites' defenses are already evident in the realm of military vehicles. The Israel Defense Forces installed the Trophy defense system on a growing number of tanks and armored personnel carriers as a result of a series of incidents in Lebanon and Gaza.
Airframes also need such systems, as the downing of an Israeli transport helicopter by Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War demonstrated, as do ships — and so too do strategic assets.
The age-old military axiom asserts that lines of defense will always be breached. As such, we must develop the maximum number of opportunities for interception possible.
Longer-range air defense systems, such as the Patriot, David's Sling or the S-400 can intercept threats at tens or hundreds of kilometers away. But today, because state enemies can bypass long-range defenses, countries must always have the ability to directly intercept the actual munitions.
Without close-defense capabilities forming part of a country's multilayer defense systems, strategic sites are simply not adequately protected. In the context of multilayer defense development and deployment around strategic sites and sensitive targets, Israel has taken on the role of global leader.
In 2020, short-range air defenses are making a comeback, and this time they are set to remain as a permanent fixture.
Retired Brig. Gen. Shachar Shohat served as a chief commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces and a publishing expert at The MirYam Institute.
June 9, 2023 | International, Aerospace
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July 2, 2019 | International, Aerospace
RACHEL S. COHEN Several Air Force installations with strategic assets are now armed with systems to protect against small unmanned aircraft that might loiter nearby. Steve Wert, the Air Force's digital program executive officer helping to roll out counter-UAS systems, said the service had fielded initial capabilities to an undisclosed number of US Strategic Command and Air Force Global Strike Command sites. Speaking at an Air Force Life Cycle Management Conference recently in Dayton, Ohio, Wert described the new systems as “a command-and-control capability integrated with some detection and some jamming,” but did not mention kinetic attacks. “Much more work to do,” he said. “We're finding the typical problems you will find on some bases. In order to have a radar providing detection, you actually have to build a tower. Building towers is hard because you have to do environmental assessments.” The systems provide “a composite suite of options” to sense and defeat drones attempting to enter restricted airspace around nuclear, space, electronic warfare, long-range strike, and missile defense resources, Air Force spokeswoman Laura McAndrews said. “The concept of ‘tailored and layered defense' provides the ability to execute kinetic solutions, such as traditional ballistic rounds and capture nets, coupled with other countermeasures that disrupt the operator's ability to navigate drones in our restricted airspace,” she said. The Air Force and Army are also collaborating on using 40 mm ammunition with nets that deploy and wrap around the drones to bring them down. “We've had some recent success working with the Army on kinetic defeat, successful test round firings,” Wert said. “The idea of a net round is probably a good solution, but that system's becoming accurate enough where the training rounds are directly hitting UAVs, so very good results there.” In May, Pentagon acquisition chief Ellen Lord told reporters Defense Department officials were concerned that military personnel weren't aware of their options for addressing UAVs and the services weren't sharing their ideas. Combatant command representatives and acquisition officials meet each month to discuss the right way forward. That's generated a list of counter-UAS systems in the DOD with details on their maturity, how many are deployed, and how they are used, Lord said. The Air Force is also working toward laser and microwave weapons for that purpose. The FAA already regulates how and where small UAS are allowed to fly, though those rules are evolving in collaboration with the Pentagon, which called the issue a high priority earlier this year. “I really do think of these UAVs as something that's low-cost, it's easy to manipulate,” then-acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan told the Senate Appropriations Committee in May. “We need to develop the capabilities and the rules because, quite frankly, this airspace is shared by so many different authorities, so it's as much about rules to operate in space as it is the technologies to defeat them.” Over the past few years, Defense Department officials have pointed to instances of enemy combatants dispatching small drones for strike and intelligence-gathering in the Middle East and of unmanned aerial vehicles lingering near high-end aircraft. US Strategic Command did not answer how many little aircraft have been spotted lately or if the number is growing. "So far, they've been incidental activities,” STRATCOM boss Gen. John Hyten said at a 2017 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. "But the fact that they're occurring, and then if you watch what is happening overseas in the [US Central Command theater] with the use of lethal UAVs and the use of UAVs for surveillance on the part of a terrorist adversary, I'm very concerned that those same kind of UAVs could be employed against our weapon storage facilities, especially on the nuclear weapon storage facilities." Air Combat Command chief Gen. Mike Holmes in 2017 also noted two incidents that interfered with operations on the same day and required reports to Air Force leadership. Conventional military assets need similar policies and protections as STRATCOM has put in place over the past few years, allowing workers to track and engage drones when needed, he argued. "At one base, the gate guard watched one fly over the top of the gate shack, tracked it while it flew over the flight line for a little while, and then flew back out and left," Holmes said. "The other incident was an F-22 . . . had a near collision with a small UAS, and I don't have anything that I can do about it." http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2019/July%202019/Strategic-Air-Bases-Receive-First-Counter-UAS-Systems.aspx
June 9, 2021 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR, Security
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