Rheinmetall’s Skymaster to bolster Austrian drone, missile defenses

On the same subject

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  December 2, 2020 | International, C4ISR

  5 questions with the deputy director of DISA’s contracting arm

  WASHINGTON — Mass telework brought on by the coronavirus pandemic has made 2020 a busy year for the Defense Information Systems Agency. Throughout the year, the Pentagon's top IT organization has had a hand in the department's Commercial Virtual Remote Environment, which provides collaboration tools for more than 1 million users. DISA has also helped set up IT capabilities for the Navy's two hospital ships as they docked in New York City and Los Angeles to assist with the COVID-19 response. As a result, it has also been a busy year for Debra Daniels, DISA's vice procurement services executive and deputy director of the Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization. Daniels started at DISA in March, right as workers were being sent home. She joined from the Small Business Administration after about 30 years with the Army and now helps oversee a $17 billion portfolio at DISA. C4ISRNET interviewed Daniels about her new position, the unexpected tool she uses to communicate and meeting small business goals. This interview has been edited for length and clarity. What is it like to take over a massive IT portfolio during a pandemic? It makes you think differently and do things differently. It definitely increases communication as DISA provides IT and cybersecurity support. One of the most basic things that I use to make sure to communicate and get on board is the telephone. It works well on picking up and introducing yourself to not only the workforce but the mission partners themselves, stakeholders, small business, in order to do the job. It just makes you reach out more. But I'm going to tell you: DISA has all of the tools in place that allow us to stay in and keep connected so far. DISA never shut down during the pandemic. We just moved from a federal workspace to our own home workspaces and kept going. And what I can say about the contracting force is they never lost momentum, they never lost focus on the priorities at all in doing that. How have your first six months gone? As our contracting operations moved to a home space, it never shut down, never closed, it never lost a beat. I would say probably the momentum increased with the contracting force on just what they were doing in reaching out, making sure that the war fighter had the capability. I'm proud of the fact that, again, we definitely met or exceeded our small business goals. [Specifically], there's about five new records that were [recently] set that continue to build the small business industrial base. This fiscal year, we did $7.6 billion in obligations, which was about a billion dollars more than they did in FY19, I would say just with increasing requirements in the need for the IT and cyber solutions across the Department of Defense but also probably related to some of the pandemic-related urgent and emerging requirements that we provided in that. This is a very difficult time for small business. What should small businesses expect when interacting with your office? What I would want small businesses to know is they're definitely vital to us meeting our goals and our demands and capabilities for the war fighter. And they help us meet those demands. More often, as you know, we get great support — even greater support from them. We could not do it without them. So for industry I would like to say they always want to know how can they participate in the request for information. I would definitely say to continue to reach out, but I would ask them [to] definitely do [your] homework [related to] whatever product or solution they're seeking to provide to make sure that it fits within DISA's capability and its needs. We also partner right now in contracting; definitely a key member at the table at the beginning of acquisition planning is our Office of Small Business Programs here in DISA. Definitely reach out to them, I would say, particularly if [you] want to partner with us to be invited to one of the DISA one-on-one small business orientation offerings that says how you can partner with us. I'll also say that as we get ready in this season to prepare for the DISA Forecast to Industry virtual conference, we will give our industry partners, particularly to include small business, our forecasts. I would say if you want to, you can probably see on the DISA website the forecast from fiscal 2019, and we actually updated that forecast of offerings for the upcoming years. We posted that earlier this summer. So you get an indication of what we're looking for. I would also say a biggie for industry to participate with us is answer requests for information and attend the industry days so you can definitely learn about DISA's mission and what it's seeking, particularly war fighter-specific [needs] and the capability we're looking for. What do small businesses need to know about the cybersecurity requirements at DISA? That is one of the main focuses of DISA as the premier IT support agency and [a trusted provider that] connects and protects the war fighter in cyberspace. So cybersecurity is very important to us, and also should be important to our industry and our small business partners. I think they want to protect their intellectual property and capital just as much as we do. So if you're wanting to work with DISA and the DoD, be accountable also for cybersecurity throughout the life cycle of the capability you're providing. What is DISA doing in relation to the new Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification — the new cybersecurity audit standards? As we're tracking right now, we do have new requirements that are coming out [because of] the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification in the DoD. So as that starts in its implementation process, the Procurement Services Directorate is definitely working to understand these new interim rules — and following [those rules] so we can implement that cybersecurity process once we have the application and accreditation requirements. So we definitely know it will impact all of our industry partners. It will not impact or affect our cybersecurity posture. So if you're going to work with us, cybersecurity is definitely a key. There's a perception that we want to prioritize speed of delivery in deployment over cybersecurity. No. In DISA, in the department — again, I can't harp on [enough] — cybersecurity is one of our utmost priorities, and that is something that we will not diminish or lower the standard on. So it's important that while we deliver with speed and relevance to meet the needs, we're also maintaining our cybersecurity. https://www.c4isrnet.com/show-reporter/disa-forecast-industry/2020/12/01/5-questions-with-the-deputy-director-of-disas-contracting-arm

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  January 17, 2019 | International, C4ISR, Security

  DARPA Explores New Computing Architectures to Deliver Verifiable Data Assurances

  Program seeks to create new software and hardware architectures that provide physically provable assurances around data security and privacy Whether a piece of information is private, proprietary, or sensitive to national security, systems owners and users have little guarantees about where their information resides or of its movements between systems. When a user enters information on a phone, for example, it is difficult to provably track that the data remains on the phone or whether it is uploaded to a server beyond the device. The national defense and security communities are similarly left with few options when it comes to ensuring that sensitive information is appropriately isolated, particularly when it's loaded to an internet-connected system. “As cloud systems proliferate, most people still have some information that they want to physically track – not just entrust to the ether,” said Walter Weiss, DARPA program manager. “Users should be able to trust their devices to keep their information private and isolated.” Keeping a system completely disconnected from all means of information transfer is an unrealistic security tactic. Modern computing systems must be able to communicate with other systems, including those with different security requirements. Today, commercial and defense organizations often leverage a series of air-gaps, or breaks between systems, to keep the most sensitive computing devices and information secure. However, interfaces to such air-gapped systems are typically added in after the fact and are exceedingly complex, placing undue burden on systems operators as they implement or manage them. To create scalable solutions that provide safe, verifiable methods of tracking information and communications between systems, DARPA launched the Guaranteed Architecture for Physical Security (GAPS) program. The goal of GAPS is to develop hardware and software architectures that can provide physically provable guarantees around high-risk transactions, or where data moves between systems of different security levels. DARPA wants to ensure that these transactions are isolated and that the systems they move across are enabled with the necessary data security assertions. The intended outputs of this program are hardware and software co-design tools that allow data separation requirements to be defined during design, and protections that can be physically enforced at system runtime. GAPS is divided into three research areas that will address: 1) the creation of hardware components and interfaces; 2) the development of software co-design tools; and, 3) the integration of these components and tools, as well as their validation against exemplar Department of Defense (DoD) systems. The new hardware components and interfaces are designed to provide system designers with a library of hardware tools to securely isolate data during transactions. The software co-design tools could someday allow developers to easily employ GAPS hardware components without requiring changes to their existing development processes and frameworks. Finally, the integration and validation of the hardware and software architectures on DoD systems could be used to demonstrate the capability and maturity of the GAPS approach for the kinds of problems DoD system integrators currently face, and expect to see in the future. Commercializing the resulting technologies is also an objective of the program. The verifiable security properties created under GAPS may also help create safer commercial systems that could be used for preserving proprietary information and protecting consumer privacy. GAPS is part of the second phase of DARPA's Electronics Resurgence Initiative (ERI) - a five-year, upwards of $1.5 billion investment in the future of domestic, U.S. government and defense electronics systems. Under ERI Phase II, DARPA is exploring the development of trusted electronics components, including the advancement of electronics that can enforce security and privacy protections. GAPS will help address the DoD's unique requirements for assured electronics while helping to move forward ERI's broader mission of creating a more robust, secure and heavily automated electronics industry. DARPA will hold a Proposers Day on January 23, 2019 from 9:00am to 2:30pm (EST) at the DARPA Conference Center, located at 675 North Randolph Street, Arlington, Virginia 22203, to provide more information about GAPS and answer questions from potential proposers. For details on the event, including registration requirements, please visit: http://www.cvent.com/events/gaps-proposers-day/event-summary-34cbadc0ab2248bb860db3df8223a2f6.aspx. A Broad Agency Announcement that fully describes the GAPS program structure and objectives can be found here: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=cfecfe762954149924ec59c95ec6a7b8&tab=core&_cview=1. https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-01-16

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  November 13, 2019 | International, Naval

  Report slams Norwegian Navy for training, safety shortfalls in the run-up to frigate sinking

  By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON – The bridge watch team on the stricken Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad was distracted, inadequately trained and failed to take adequate precautions while transiting close to land, according to an accident report released Friday by the Norwegian government. The watch standers on Helge Ingstad, which collided with the Maltese-flagged tanker Sola TS and subsequently sunk outside Sture Terminal near the mouth of the North Sea, were busy conducting a watch turnover and attempting to conduct training during the navigation in the channel, which it was conducting at 17-18 knots. “The Navy lacked competence requirements for instructors. The Navy had assigned the officer of the watch a role as instructor which the officer of the watch had limited competence and experience to fill,” the report reads. “Furthermore, the Navy had not given the officer of the watch assistant sufficient training and competence to operate important bridge systems while training the officer of the watch assistant trainee at the same time.” The Norwegian publication VG reported last December that the ship's captain, Capt. Preben Østheim, was asleep in his cabin during the transit through the strait near Sture, which is less than three miles across at its narrowest point. The report, which also faulted the tanker for failing to mitigate potential risks and the vessel traffic control service for inadequate monitoring, takes special aim at the Navy for a lack of qualified navigators, and for short-changing the training of junior officer, leaving bridge watch teams underqualified. “As a consequence of the clearance process, the career ladder for fleet officers in the Navy and the shortage of qualified navigators to man the frigates, officers of the watch had been granted clearance sooner, had a lower level of experience and had less time as officer of the watch than used to be the case,” the report found. “This had also resulted in inexperienced officers of the watch being assigned responsibility for training. The level of competence and experience required for the lean manning concept (LMC), was apparently not met.” The accident report shows that the bridge team confused the Sola TS for a stationary object on land, and because the watch standers were distracted with training, they were not fully engaged with monitoring the communications on the radio. “A more coordinated bridge team with more information sharing would have been more capable of detecting the tanker sooner,” the report said. “Achieving good teamwork is particularly challenging in the case of bridge teams whose members are constantly being replaced. “Furthermore, the bridge team was part of a culture characterized by great confidence in each other's skills, and this may have contributed to the perception of them being in full control of the situation and thus less vigilant and sensitive to weak signals of danger.” The report is part one of a two-part report and only encompasses the actions that led to the collision. Further findings about the actions after the collision will be released as part of a second report to be released later. ‘Not Particularly Demanding' According to the report, the transit through the body of water known as the Hjeltefjord “was not considered particularly demanding, as the fairway is open and offers a good view all around,” the report found, which likely contributed to a sense of complacence among the crew. That echoes the sentiments of the Capt. Østheim, who told VG he didn't think he needed to be on the bridge during that transit. “After 12 years at sea, I know the coast as my own pocket, so I know exactly when I need to be on the bridge and when I can rest,” Østheim told VG. There is generally little traffic through the channel and there is no traffic separation scheme. The Sola TS, which the report said was likely creating some visual confusion for Ingstad's watchstanders because of its illuminated deck lights at night, announced it was underway on the radio during the exact time that Ingstad's watchstanders were turning over, likely causing them to miss the transmission, the report reads. “At the same time as Sola TS notified of her departure from the Sture Terminal, the watch handover between the officers of the watch started on HNoMS Helge Ingstad, while the officer of the watch trainee continued to navigate the frigate,” the report reads. “During the watch handover, the officer of the watch being relieved and the relieving officer of the watch observed an object at the Sture Terminal, to starboard of the frigate's course line. The ‘object' was observed both visually and on the radar display in the form of a radar echo and AIS symbol. The two officers of the watch discussed, but did not clarify, what the ‘object' might be. “Both officers of the watch had formed the clear perception that the ‘object' was stationary near the shore and thus of no risk to the frigate's safe passage.” The situation was made even more perilous by the fact that Ingstad did not have its Automatic Identification System on, which would have notified traffic service and Sola TS of Ingstand's location. Traffic Service lost track of Ingstad because operators had their displays zoomed in too far, the report found. Collision As the Ingstad came closer to the terminal, the Sola TS, which the officer was convinced was a stationary object by the terminal, was appearing on radar to have made some distance between the pier and the water, but the officer was still not sure it wasn't a stationary object becoming more clear on the radar screen because Ingstad was closer to it. “A more experienced officer of the watch would probably have had greater capacity to pick up on weak signals of danger and be better equipped to suspect that his/her own situational awareness suffered from misconceptions,” the report read. “The officer of the watch thought, however, that the course had to be adjusted slightly to port to increase the passing distance to the ‘object'.” In the minutes before the collision, the Sola TS established contact with Ingstad's officer of the watch to get them to take an avoidance maneuver by turning to starboard. But the watch still thought that the Sola was a stationary object and that turning to starboard would run into it. “When HNoMS Helge Ingstad did not alter course, the master on Sola TS ordered ‘stop engines' and, shortly afterwards, the pilot ordered full speed astern on the engines,” the report read. “These two measures were carried out only short time before the collision, and were therefore without material effect. “When the officer of the watch on HNoMS Helge Ingstad understood that the ‘object' giving off light was moving and on direct course to collide, it was too late to avoid the collision.” ‘I don't feel shame' The decision of the captain to not be on the bridge or, at the very least, to have posted a special navigation detail with the ship so close to land is perplexing, said retired U.S. Navy cruiser skipper Capt. Rick Hoffman, a career surface warfare officer. “If I'm within five miles of land I'm going to have some kind of navigation detail posted,” which in the U.S. Navy means a team of more qualified watch standers, extra lookouts and more than likely either the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer or both, would be on the bridge overseeing the watch. It's further perplexing as to why the officer of the deck, or officer of the watch, was conducting training during a transit so close to land, Hoffman said. “[The officer of the deck should be] looking out the window and completely focused on the transit,” he said. “We would not use that as a training opportunity. The OOD and the Conning Officer has no other task.” However, Østheim told VG in December he has no regrets about his actions, though he accepts that he was overall responsible for the ship. “I don't feel any shame,” he said. “As the ship's chief, I of course have the overall responsibility for the ship and its crew. It's extremely sad that this happened. It's an accident that should not happen, but I don't feel any shame.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/11/12/safety-report-slams-the-norwegian-navy-for-training-safety-shortfalls-in-the-runup-to-frigate-sinking/