Raytheon unit wins $583 million contract for US Army navigation

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  June 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  COVID-19 Infects Defense Industry With F-35 Production Slowdown

  Steve Trimble May 27, 2020 This was supposed to be a relatively easy year for Lockheed Martin's F-35 production. As 2020 began, the stealth fighter program's three-year growth spurt had subsided after annual deliveries more than doubled between 2017 and 2019. Lockheed planned to deliver 141 F-35s in 2020, only seven more than in 2019. But the F-35 supply chain is not immune from the global disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. After signaling during a first quarter earnings call in April that a production slowdown was likely, Lockheed confirmed the impact on May 19. The company issued a new forecast of 117-124 F-35 deliveries this year. If Lockheed is unable to recover in the second half, the slowdown would mark the first year-over-year decrease in F-35 deliveries since the program began. “However, we will accelerate production when we return to pre-COVID-19 conditions and could see this number decrease,” the company says. The company's new financial guidance reflects the lower F-35 delivery total, with net sales for the year falling to a range of $62.25-64 billion from $62.75-64.25 billion. Other large F-35 suppliers include Northrop Grumman (center fuselage, radar), Raytheon Technologies (engine, distributed aper-ture system) and BAE Systems (aft fuselage, electronic warfare suite). It was not immediately clear which customers and variants would be affected by the potential shortfall of 18-24 F-35 deliveries in 2020. The Defense Department is closely watching the F-35, its single-largest production system. So far, senior acquisition officials expect the overall impact of the novel coronavirus on weapon system production to be manageable. But the Pentagon leadership considers the military aircraft industry an exception. Although demand and domestic U.S. military spending remain intact, the military aviation supply chain's links to the collapsing commercial aircraft market is causing delays. “I think [military] aviation has had a more acute sensitivity to supplier disruptions, largely driven by the massive upheaval in the commercial aviation market,” said James Geurts, assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition. “Many of the aerospace companies were blended between military and commercial, and with commercial just falling through the floor, their abilities to stay open and keep their workforce has been a little bit more challenged.” Another sector Geurts is watching is the market for command, control, communications and computers and intelligence (C4I). “We're trying to track all of it,” he says. “But the most immediate impact we've seen has been on aviation.” Lockheed's F-35 assembly line in Fort Worth was hit hard by the COVID outbreak in mid-April. One employee, Claude Daniels, died after reporting COVID-19-related symptoms to a supervisor. Another F-35 employee, who survived, broadcast a Facebook Live video from his hospital bed, pleading with his unionized co-workers to sanitize their workspaces even if it is not in their job description. The company's management has said that the F-35 assembly line adopted new protocols in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which included regularly sanitizing equipment and quarantining employees exposed by co-workers or others to the virus. The COVID-19 response is not the only pressure on the F-35's production system. Lockheed exceeded the overall delivery target by three aircraft in 2019, but slower production of the less mature F-35C airframe nearly caused the company to miss the annual goal. To compensate, Lockheed moved up deliveries of four F-35As originally scheduled for 2020 to the end of 2019, allowing the company to beat the delivery target by three aircraft instead of missing it by one. Before the impact of the virus, the F-35's global supply chain was already strained by the three-year production ramp-up from 2017 to 2019. Late part deliveries jumped to 10,000 in 2019 from 2,000 in 2017, according to a May report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Monthly parts shortages, meanwhile, leaped to 8,000 in July 2019 from 875 a year before, the GAO says. The shortages represent a fraction of the 300,000 parts in each F-35, but the trend offered a glimpse of the pressure on the supply chain to meet demand during the ramp-up. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/supply-chain/covid-19-infects-defense-industry-f-35-production-slowdown

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  June 9, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

  By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/

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  October 3, 2018 | International, Security

  China Cancels High-Level Security Talks With the U.S.

  By Jane Perlez BEIJING — China canceled an important annual security meeting planned for mid-October with Defense Secretary Jim Mattis in Beijing, saying a senior Chinese military officer would not be available to meet him, an American official said on Sunday. The decision to withdraw from the high-level encounter, known as the diplomatic and security dialogue, was the latest sign of bad blood between China and the United States, and capped a week of tit-for-tat actions by both nations as they settled into a newly chilly relationship. The cancellation of the dialogue, an event that China until recently had advertised as a productive way for the two sides to talk, showed how quickly the tensions over an escalating trade war have infected other parts of the relationship, particularly vital strategic concerns including Taiwan, arms sales and the South China Sea. A senior American foreign policy official summarized the administration's attitude to China last week, telling a crowd at the celebration of national day at the Chinese Embassy in Washington that the United States was intent on competing with China — brittle language that is usually absent from formal events. Full article: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/world/asia/china-us-security-mattis.html