Pentagon to identify next Replicator capability set this summer

On the same subject

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  August 5, 2019 | International, Naval

  U.S. Navy Commissions Littoral Combat Ship 15 (Billings)

  KEY WEST, Fla., Aug. 3, 2019 /PRNewswire/ -- The U.S. Navy commissioned USS Billings (LCS 15) – the nation's eighth Freedom-variant Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – in Key West, Florida. This milestone places the ship, built by the Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) -led team into active service. "Billings was designed to operate and adapt to a rapidly changing environment," said Joe DePietro, vice president of Small Combatants and Ship Systems at Lockheed Martin. "She is equipped and ready for today's threats and easily modifiable to meet the threats we may not even be aware of yet. Our team is confident Billings will be what the Navy needs when the fleet needs it." Unique among combat ships, LCS is designed to complete close-to-shore missions and is a growing and relevant part of the Navy's fleet. It is fast — capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots. It is automated — with the most efficient staffing of any combat ship. It is lethal — standard equipped with Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) and a Mark 110 gun, capable of firing 220 rounds per minute. It is flexible — with 40 percent of the hull easily reconfigurable, integrating capabilities like the Longbow Hellfire Missiles, 30mm guns, and manned and unmanned vehicles targeted to meet today's and tomorrow's missions. "Having now commanded two freedom class LCS variants, I would like to report that these ships are truly impressive and will fit well in the niche they have been designed for," said LCS 15's Commanding Officer, Commander Nathan Rowan. "They are fast, maneuverable, and their weapon systems are some of the most accurate I've witnessed on any platform of which I've previously served." There are seven ships in various stages of production and test at Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Wisconsin, where the Freedom-variant LCS is built. The next Freedom-variant in the class is LCS 17, the future USS Indianapolis, which was delivered in late July. "On behalf of the proud 2,000 men and women who transform flat steel into a fast, agile surface combatant," said Jan Allman, CEO of Fincantieri Marinette Marine, "we are honored to support the U.S. Navy, and we congratulate the outstanding crew of the USS Billings." Multimedia assets are available here: Social media video: https://vimeo.com/351803068 B-roll: https://vimeo.com/351805414 Photos: https://www.flickr.com/photos/143371902@N04/albums/72157710070352016 For more information, visit www.lockheedmartin.com/lcs. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2019-08-03-U-S-Navy-Commissions-Littoral-Combat-Ship-15-Billings

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  January 17, 2019 | International, C4ISR, Security

  DARPA Explores New Computing Architectures to Deliver Verifiable Data Assurances

  Program seeks to create new software and hardware architectures that provide physically provable assurances around data security and privacy Whether a piece of information is private, proprietary, or sensitive to national security, systems owners and users have little guarantees about where their information resides or of its movements between systems. When a user enters information on a phone, for example, it is difficult to provably track that the data remains on the phone or whether it is uploaded to a server beyond the device. The national defense and security communities are similarly left with few options when it comes to ensuring that sensitive information is appropriately isolated, particularly when it's loaded to an internet-connected system. “As cloud systems proliferate, most people still have some information that they want to physically track – not just entrust to the ether,” said Walter Weiss, DARPA program manager. “Users should be able to trust their devices to keep their information private and isolated.” Keeping a system completely disconnected from all means of information transfer is an unrealistic security tactic. Modern computing systems must be able to communicate with other systems, including those with different security requirements. Today, commercial and defense organizations often leverage a series of air-gaps, or breaks between systems, to keep the most sensitive computing devices and information secure. However, interfaces to such air-gapped systems are typically added in after the fact and are exceedingly complex, placing undue burden on systems operators as they implement or manage them. To create scalable solutions that provide safe, verifiable methods of tracking information and communications between systems, DARPA launched the Guaranteed Architecture for Physical Security (GAPS) program. The goal of GAPS is to develop hardware and software architectures that can provide physically provable guarantees around high-risk transactions, or where data moves between systems of different security levels. DARPA wants to ensure that these transactions are isolated and that the systems they move across are enabled with the necessary data security assertions. The intended outputs of this program are hardware and software co-design tools that allow data separation requirements to be defined during design, and protections that can be physically enforced at system runtime. GAPS is divided into three research areas that will address: 1) the creation of hardware components and interfaces; 2) the development of software co-design tools; and, 3) the integration of these components and tools, as well as their validation against exemplar Department of Defense (DoD) systems. The new hardware components and interfaces are designed to provide system designers with a library of hardware tools to securely isolate data during transactions. The software co-design tools could someday allow developers to easily employ GAPS hardware components without requiring changes to their existing development processes and frameworks. Finally, the integration and validation of the hardware and software architectures on DoD systems could be used to demonstrate the capability and maturity of the GAPS approach for the kinds of problems DoD system integrators currently face, and expect to see in the future. Commercializing the resulting technologies is also an objective of the program. The verifiable security properties created under GAPS may also help create safer commercial systems that could be used for preserving proprietary information and protecting consumer privacy. GAPS is part of the second phase of DARPA's Electronics Resurgence Initiative (ERI) - a five-year, upwards of $1.5 billion investment in the future of domestic, U.S. government and defense electronics systems. Under ERI Phase II, DARPA is exploring the development of trusted electronics components, including the advancement of electronics that can enforce security and privacy protections. GAPS will help address the DoD's unique requirements for assured electronics while helping to move forward ERI's broader mission of creating a more robust, secure and heavily automated electronics industry. DARPA will hold a Proposers Day on January 23, 2019 from 9:00am to 2:30pm (EST) at the DARPA Conference Center, located at 675 North Randolph Street, Arlington, Virginia 22203, to provide more information about GAPS and answer questions from potential proposers. For details on the event, including registration requirements, please visit: http://www.cvent.com/events/gaps-proposers-day/event-summary-34cbadc0ab2248bb860db3df8223a2f6.aspx. A Broad Agency Announcement that fully describes the GAPS program structure and objectives can be found here: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=cfecfe762954149924ec59c95ec6a7b8&tab=core&_cview=1. https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-01-16

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  June 12, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval

  The US Navy is seeking upgrades for the F-35 radar’s sea-search mode

  By: David B. Larter and Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy wants more from the F-35 jet's radar, which in sea-search mode is limited to what is directly in front of the aircraft, according to documents exclusively obtained by Defense News. According to the documents, the radar, Northrop Grumman's AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array radar, can either hone in on a sector based on a specific point on the ground, or work in what is commonly known as “snowplow mode,” which, as the name suggests, searches everything in front of the aircraft. The Navy wants to be able to scan a wider area when in sea-search mode, something that the radar is currently not set up for, according to officials who spoke to Defense News. Officials also said the problem is on track for a solution, but may not be implemented until as late as 2024 with the Block 4 upgrades, notably adding that a solution will not be in place before a full-rate production decision on the F-35 this year. Ultimately, giving the Navy what it wants will be a matter of boosting computing power and upgrading software, officials explained. The issue is listed as a category 1 deficiency, according to the documents, which further define the limitation as something that means “adequate performance [is] not attainable to accomplish the primary or alternate mission(s).” The issue dates back to 2012, according to the documents. In this scale, category 1 represents the most serious type of deficiency. It's unclear why the issue is listed as a deficiency. The system is working in accordance with design specifications, according to both the documents and a statement from a Lockheed Martin executive. “The F-35's current radar sea search function meets the enterprises' expressed required specification," said Greg Ulmer, Lockheed Martin's general manager of the company's F-35 program. “As we modernize the F-35, we are bringing enhanced search capabilities, which represent an increase from the original requirements, and we stand ready to integrate the upgrade in the future, based on customer priorities and direction.” In an interview with Defense News, the head of the Pentagon's F-35 program office, Vice Adm. Mat Winter, said the issue was being resolved by software and computing upgrades, and there would be no requirement for a new radar. “We're not mechanically scanning, we're electronically scanning,” Winter said. “And being able to accurately scan the maritime environment, it just takes increased computing power, and that's what we're doing. ... It's a software fix, and then an allocation of computing power.” Winter may be referring to a planned bundle of computer upgrades called Tech Refresh 3, where the jet will get more modern computing systems that will increase the jet's processing power and memory. According to one document obtained by Defense News, TR3 is a prerequisite for a future radar fix. Those TR3-equipped jets won't roll off the production line until 2023. Defense News submitted written questions to the Defense Department's F-35 program office concerning these and other deficiencies, but it did not respond by press time, despite multiple follow-ups over a period of months. A retired fighter pilot, who reviewed the documents for Defense News and agreed to speak on condition of anonymity, agreed with Winter's assessment that the fix was likely software-based. Early on in the F/A-18's APG-79 AESA radar, there were glitches in the operation, but software updates smoothed out the system. Fixing the APG-81 should follow a similar track as the aircraft progresses, the pilot explained. “As long as the array itself is technically sound, I suspect over time they'll be able to find ways to continue to build out capability through software updates,” the retired fighter pilot said. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/hidden-troubles-f35/2019/06/12/the-us-navy-is-seeking-upgrades-for-the-f-35-radars-sea-search-mode/