March 3, 2021 | International, Aerospace
Electronic warfare system production starts for U.S. Air Force F-15s
The all-digital EPAWSS enables pilots to monitor, jam, and deceive threats in contested airspace
September 1, 2020 | International, Aerospace
New and old aircraft programs could get axed as top US Air Force general seeks ‘ruthless prioritization’ of capabilities
By: Valerie Insinna
WASHINGTON — With stagnant budgets on the horizon, the U.S. Air Force is hurtling toward “the most difficult force structure decisions in generations” and must cancel programs and sacrifice some of its existing aircraft inventory to prepare for a potential fight against Russia or China, the service's top general said Monday.
A future war with either country could entail combat losses on par with those of a major conflict like World War II, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown wrote in a paper titled “Accelerate Change or Lose,” which outlines his vision as the service's new top uniformed leader. Brown became chief of staff of the Air Force on Aug. 6.
Although the Defense Department has focused on war with an advanced, near-peer nation since 2016, Brown raised concerns that the Air Force's sense of urgency is not strong enough and warned of potential mission failure unless the service accelerates the pace of change.
A “ruthless prioritization” of the service's requirements is in order, he said.
“We must reframe platform-centric debates to focus instead on capabilities to execute the mission relative to our adversaries,” he wrote. “Programs that once held promise, but are no longer affordable or will not deliver needed capabilities on competition-relevant timelines, must be divested or terminated. Cost, schedule, and performance metrics alone are no longer sufficient metrics of acquisition success.”
The Air Force must be responsive to the actions of its adversaries, pivoting when necessary to stay ahead and creating technologies that can be cost-effectively operated and maintained, Brown added.
“Capabilities must be conceived, developed, and fielded inside competitors' fielding timelines — knowing we will need to adapt and adjust over time. Innovative ideas from our Airmen need viable sustainment pathways. If we are to beat our competitors in conflict, we must also beat them in development and fielding of capability,” he said.
It's unclear what existing capabilities could be on the chopping block, but more details on the Air Force's path forward are expected. During a Aug. 31 roundtable, Brown told reporters that the service is working on action orders associated with his strategic vision that will be unveiled at the Air Force Association's conference during the week of Sept. 14.
Brown's call for rapid change could pave the way for another bloody budget rollout when the Air Force's plan for fiscal 2022 is revealed next year.
During its FY21 budget deliberations, service leaders alluded to “controversial changes” such as fleetwide divestments, but ultimately the Air Force proposed retiring handfuls of older platforms rather than entire aircraft types.
Congress has attempted to curtail some of those changes, putting strict limits on the amount of tankers and bombers permitted to be retired each year.
Brown acknowledged that if he's to make radical changes to force structure, he will need to have tough conversations with other Air Force and Pentagon leaders, Congress, and industry to determine where risk can be taken.
“When we work in various silos, we're all trying to make our particular program or platform as capable as we can be. But we can't afford all of those,” he said. The difficulty is getting “the right set of full programs” and not “a number of broken programs” that “balance the checkbook at the expense of our capability.”
Brown's priorities for the Air Force extend beyond changes to existing force structure and modernization plans. Like his predecessor, Gen. Dave Goldfein, Brown stressed the importance of the military's Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept, as well as increased interoperability and data sharing with allies.
Brown also hinted that a restructure of the Air Force could be forthcoming, and that the creation of the Space Force provides an opportunity to review the roles and missions of his service.
“Sometimes the model we use in the deployed environment is different than the model we use at home,” he said. “You want to train like you're going to fight. From that aspect, we've got to take a look at ourselves.”
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September 19, 2024 | International, Aerospace
Air Force’s information warfare hub seeks high-tech sensors, AI tools
The Air Force’s information warfare organization, 16th Air Force, has been working over the last year to ramp up its sensor and AI capabilities.
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February 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace
The drive to advance missile defense is there, but there must be funding
By: Richard Matlock Over the past five years, missile threats have evolved far more rapidly than conventional wisdom had predicted. Best known is North Korea's accelerated development and testing of sophisticated, road-mobile ballistic missiles. But the U.S. National Defense Strategy requires renewed focus on greater powers. China has adopted an anti-access strategy consisting of new offensive missiles, operational tactics and fortifications in the South China Sea. Russia, too, has developed highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles specifically designed to defeat today's defenses. Grappling with these sobering realities demands change. The 2019 Missile Defense Review called for a comprehensive approach to countering regional missiles of all kinds and from whatever source, as well as the increasingly complex intercontinental ballistic missiles from rogue states. But programs and budgets have not yet aligned with the policy. The upcoming defense budget submission presents an important opportunity to address these new and complex challenges. The Missile Defense Agency's current top three goals are sustaining the existing force, increasing capacity and capability, and addressing more advanced threats. The first two are necessary but insufficient. The third goal must be elevated to adapt U.S. missile defense efforts to the geopolitical and technological realities of our time. For the last decade, less than 2 percent of MDA's annual funding has been dedicated to developing advanced technology, during which time our adversaries have begun outpacing us. As President Donald Trump said last January, we “cannot simply build more of the same, or make incremental improvements.” Adapting our missile defense architecture will require rebalance, discipline and difficult choices. Realigning resources to develop advanced technologies and operational concepts means investing less in single-purpose systems incapable against the broader threat. It also requires we accept and manage new kinds of risk. Indeed, meeting the advanced threat may, in the short term, require accepting some strategic risk with North Korea. The beginning of this rebalance requires more distributed, elevated and survivable sensors capable of tracking advanced threats. The most important component here is a proliferated, globally persistent space layer in low-Earth orbit consisting of both passive and active sensors. MDA may be the missile defense-centric organization best suited to developing and integrating this capability into the architecture, but there is considerable opportunity for partnering with others to move out smartly, as recently urged by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten. Partnerships with the Space Development Agency and the Air Force can be supplemented by collaborative efforts with commercial space companies. We need not do this all at once. Space assets could be fielded in phases, with numbers, capability (sensors, interceptors, lasers), missions, and orbits evolving over time. MDA demonstrated a similar paradigm with the Delta experiments, Miniature Sensor Technology Integration series and the Near Field Infrared Experiment in the past. Meanwhile, other sensors could alleviate the cost of building new, billion-dollar radar on islands in the Pacific Ocean — efforts which continue to suffer delay. Adding infrared tracking sensors to high-altitude drones, for instance, has already been demonstrated experimentally in the Indo-Pacific theater with modified Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles. These need not be dedicated assets. Sensor pod kits could be stored in theater to be deployed aboard Reapers or other platforms during heightened tensions. We must revisit boost-phase defenses and directed energy. In 2010, the Airborne Laser program demonstrated that lasers could destroy missiles in the boost phase, but deploying toxic chemical lasers aboard large commercial aircraft was fiscally and operationally untenable. Fortunately, considerable operational promise exists with recently developed solid-state lasers (the cost of which is around $2 of electricity per shot). We must move these systems out of the laboratory and build and test operational prototypes. Near-term actions to better manage risk against the rogue-state ballistic missile threat must not overtake the pursuit of these larger goals. Although the Pentagon is currently considering a 10-year, $12 billion program for a next-generation interceptor, nearer-term, cheaper options are available. Replacing each existing kill vehicle on the Ground-Based Interceptors with several smaller kill vehicles would multiply each interceptor's effectiveness dramatically. The U.S. has been developing this technology since 2006, including a “hover” flight test in 2009. Affordable solutions like this must be found. Missile defense cannot do it all. Denying, degrading and destroying enemy missile systems prior to launch must be part of the mix. But left-of-launch activities can be expensive and difficult, and reliance on a cyber magic wand carries risk, too. We need to broaden our approach to attack all parts of our adversary's kill chain. The National Defense Strategy urges that we contend with the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be — or as it previously was. To meet the threats of today and tomorrow, we must radically transform our U.S. missile defenses. It falls to the 2021 budget to do so. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/31/the-drive-to-advance-missile-defense-is-there-but-there-must-be-funding/