NATO to increase targets for ammunition stockpiles as war depletes reserves

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  September 29, 2021 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR

  Space Force awards $88 million in contracts for launch system prototyping

  The contracts will help launch providers develop transformational capabilities, according to the Space Force.

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  November 14, 2018 | International, Aerospace

  The US military’s chaff and flare industry is on fragile ground

  By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The two companies responsible for producing chaff and flares for U.S. military aircraft could be poised for a major shakeup, and the Pentagon and congressional critics have begun sounding the alarm about this small, vulnerable segment of the defense-industrial base. In an October report to the White House on the health of the defense-industrial base, the Pentagon relayed concerns about the small number of domestic chaff and flare producers, and stated that weakened demand — especially for flares — could leave companies little incentive to make internal investments. Only one producer of chaff exists in the United States: Esterline Defense Technologies, also known as Armtec. Esterline, which also makes flares, is joined by one other domestic flare manufacturer: Kilgore Flares Co., a part of Chemring Countermeasures USA, which itself is a subsidiary of a firm based in the United Kingdom. This already precarious industrial situation may be further rattled by TransDigm Group Inc.'s proposed acquisition of Esterline, two lawmakers said. In an Oct. 29 letter to Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, Reps. Jackie Speier, D-Calif., and Walter Jones, R-NC, called on the Defense Department to block the deal until its inspector general completed an investigation into TransDigm's business practices. The letter was first reported by The Capitol Forum. “TransDigm has repeatedly purchased companies that are the sole providers of Department of Defense items and engaged in price gouging,” Speier and Jones wrote. “The abuses have been sufficiently common and severe enough to warrant a DoD inspector general investigation. Unsurprisingly, Esterline is the sole DoD chaff provider and one of two flare providers. The alarm bells should be ringing.” The industrial base issues, however, extend far beyond TransDigm's proposed acquisition. A small but critical market Chaff and flare are countermeasures used by military planes and helicopters to help evade a missile attack by an enemy aircraft. For the non-stealthy fourth-generation assets that make up the bulk of the services' inventory, these systems are pivotal to that aircraft's defense. Chaff — which comprises “millions of tiny aluminum or zinc-coated fibers” — is stored onboard an aircraft in tubes and ejected behind the plane to confuse radar-guided missiles, the Pentagon's defense-industrial base report stated. Meanwhile, flares distract heat-seeking, infrared-guided missiles “by ejecting magnesium pellets from tubes to ignite in the wake behind an aircraft,” the report states. Those pellets are so hot — more than 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit — that the temperature exceeds that of the aircraft's engine or exhaust, tricking an infrared-guided missile about the path of the aircraft. According to the industrial base report, “defense unique requirements and decreasing DoD demand drove out other suppliers, leaving a single qualified source for chaff.” Peter Navarro, the White House's director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, called attention to the fragile chaff supply base during a Nov. 9 speech at the Center of Strategic and International Studies, calling it a “single point of failure.” Meanwhile, the outlook for flare companies seems even more grim, with the report noting a number of explosions that had plagued both Esterline and Kilgore over the past several years, often leading to factorywide shutdowns that delayed deliveries of product to the Defense Department. “Both companies have experienced quality and delivery problems since the accidents,” the report stated. “As program offices look to improve quality and cost, they are beginning to look offshore at more modern facilities, where there are fewer quality and safety concerns.” One of the biggest problems facing chaff and flare manufacturers is the fluctuating demand signal from the Defense Department — their only customer for the product — based on the military's operational needs, the Association of Old Crows, a professional organization centered on electronic warfare and other countermeasures, said in a statement to Defense News. “Spending on countermeasures flares in the U.S. and among several NATO allies surged during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and then dropped sharply as these conflicts reduced their operations tempo or wound down,” the organization stated. “The industrial base is small, yet it must be able to meet big fluctuations in customer demand. This creates a tremendous challenge that could be managed more successfully with better coordination among U.S. military customers or even between NATO partners." A history of safety issues and scandal Though chaff and flare companies usually fly under the radar of the defense trade press, when they do appear in the media, it's usually related to life-threatening accidents at manufacturing facilities or the like. In May 2016, Esterline was forced to temporarily halt operations at its plant in East Camden, Arkansas, after an explosion injured two employees. Local newspaper El Dorado News Times reported that one of the victims suffered “a blast to the face,” which left burns on the hands, chest and face, and took shrapnel to the elbow, according to a Facebook post by the victim's relative. Kilgore Flares also sustained several high-profile accidents in recent years, most notably a 2014 explosion that killed one employee at its factory in Toone, Tennessee. The same plant was the site of a 2016 explosion where no one was injured, according to WBBJ 7 Eyewitness News. According to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration investigation of the 2014 incident, the worker had been removing residual flare materials that ignited, prompting the explosion. “The investigation identified noncompliance in process safety information, process hazard analysis and ... operating procedures. The employee suffered severe burns on multiple areas of his body and was transported to a hospital, where he received medical treatment and burn therapy, but died from his injuries,” the administration had said. Kilgore also came under the scrutiny of the U.S. Justice Department in 2016 for selling the Army flares made with magnesium that a supplier — ESM Group Inc. — illegally imported from China. The company was fined $8 million for violating a requirement that all magnesium used to make flares be sourced from American or Canadian suppliers, reported the Memphis-based CBS affiliate WREG. Kilgore and Esterline did not respond to multiple requests for comment. Pat Kumashiro, former head of the maintenance division for the Air Force's Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection Directorate and currently director of the Air Force market at LMI, said China is paying attention to weaknesses in the American defense-industrial base. “They are pretty savvy as it relates to understanding global supply chains, and when they have opportunities to buy mineral rights — and you see them doing a lot of work and being very aggressive in Africa — they are doing it for a reason,” he said. If an adversary such as Russia or China identifies that there are a limited number of sources for chaff and flare, they can find ways to impact U.S. suppliers — which in turn degrades the mission capability of fourth-generation planes, Kumashiro said. “Operational pilots are not going to go into harm's way without an operational chaff [and] flare system,” he said. The evolving landscape for chaff and flare Big changes appear to be coming down the pipeline for both Esterline and Kilgore Flares. For the former, the question is whether the Defense Department allows TransDigm to acquire Esterline. "Our general goal in this area is to promote competition among contractors but also ensure that DoD is paying fair prices for the best, most usable products that it can get,” a staff member of Rep. Speier told Defense News. But Speier and his colleague Jones believe TransDigm could artificially inflate prices by claiming there is a commercial market for those products, which would limit the ability of Defense Department procurement officers to have full access to pricing data, the staffer said. Should the Defense Department decide to allow the TransDigm deal to go forward, Speier may push to add language to next year's defense authorization bill that would pose additional limitations on what products are deemed “commercial,” or it could call on the Pentagon to study the level of competition throughout the industrial base, the staffer said. For Kilgore Flares, the changes appear to be more conventionally positive. This May, Chemring Group said it would spend $40 million to expand Kilgore's production facility in Toone and grow the plant's employment numbers from about 280 to 375 people. From 2018-2022, the company plans to improve existing facilities, construct new buildings and buy modern equipment, including a new flare extruder and assembly facility, the company said in a news release. In total, those expenditures will triple the plant's production capacity. Kilgore's investment may indicate that chaff and flare manufacturers see some relief on the horizon. Industry officials who spoke to Defense News about this sector said they were hopeful the Defense Department's industrial base report could indicate a heightened level of Pentagon interest. The department already has certain levers it can pull to address problems in its supply base. One such effort, called the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program, involves targeted investments to sustain certain manufacturers who produce a critical capability. Another resource is the Defense Production Act Title III program, which offers grants, purchase commitments, loans or loan guarantees to portions of the industrial base that are weakening. The Defense Department called for an expansion of those programs in recommendations to the White House submitted as part of the industrial base report. A classified annex also includes detailed fixes for certain critical industries. So far, however, it's unclear what assistance could be coming down the pipeline for the chaff and flare industry. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/11/13/the-militarys-chaff-and-flare-industry-is-on-fragile-ground

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  July 31, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Guam’s air defense should learn lessons from Japan’s Aegis Ashore

  By: Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said last week his top priority is establishing an Aegis Ashore system on Guam by 2026. New air defenses will help protect U.S. citizens and forces in Guam; but as Japan's government found, Aegis Ashore may not be the best option to protect military and civilian targets from growing and improving Chinese and North Korean missile threats. Guam is pivotal to U.S. and allied military posture in the Western Pacific. Home to Andersen Air Force Base and Apra Harbor, it is far enough from adversaries like China and North Korea to negate the threat from more numerous short-range missiles but close enough to support air and naval operations throughout the Philippine Sea and South and East China seas. Although the current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery on Guam can defend against some ballistic missiles, its single AN/TPY-2 radar is vulnerable and cannot provide 360-degree coverage. Moreover, THAAD's focus on high altitudes makes it a poor fit to defeat lower-flying aircraft or cruise missiles that would likely be used by China's military against Guam. The island needs a new air defense architecture. Aegis Ashore is highly capable, but has its own limitations. Designed primarily to counter small numbers of ballistic missiles, its fixed missile magazine and radar would be vulnerable to attack and would fall short against the bombardment possible from China. Instead of installing one or more Aegis Ashore systems on Guam, a more effective air and missile defense architecture would combine the latest version of the Aegis Combat System with a disaggregated system of existing sensors, effectors, and command-and-control nodes. A distributed architecture would also be scalable, allowing air and missile defenses to also protect U.S. citizens and forces operating in the Northern Marianas. Guam's geography enables longer-range sensing than would be possible from a ship or a single Aegis Ashore radar. Fixed, relocatable and mobile radio frequency sensors should be positioned around the island's perimeter, such as compact versions of SPY-6 or Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor radars and the passive Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance system. During periods of heightened tension, passive and active radio frequency and electro-optical/infrared sensors could also be deployed on unmanned aircraft and stratospheric balloons to monitor over-the-horizon threats. This mixed architecture would provide better collective coverage and be more difficult to defeat compared to one or two fixed Aegis Ashore deckhouses. To shoot down enemy missiles and aircraft, the architecture should field mobile, containerized launchers for long-range interceptors like the SM-6 and SM-3 rather than Aegis Ashore's finite and targetable in-ground vertical launch magazines. They should be complemented by medium- to short-range engagement systems to protect high-value targets such as the Patriot, the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System or the Army's planned Indirect Fire Protection Capability, as well as non-kinetic defenses such as high-powered microwave weapons and electronic warfare systems that could damage or confuse the guidance systems on incoming missiles. Today, destroyers patrol the waters around Guam to provide ballistic missile defense capacity beyond that available with THAAD. A new distributed architecture would place more capacity ashore to free surface combatants from missile defense duty. In a crisis or conflict, the architecture could add capacity with surface action groups and combat air patrols capable of intercepting threats at longer ranges. Instead of Aegis Ashore's large, single C2 node, a distributed architecture would virtualize the Aegis Combat System to allow multiple facilities or mobile vehicles to serve as miniature air operations centers. The mobility of sensors, effectors and C2 nodes in this architecture would enable the employment of camouflage, concealment and deception, including decoys, to complicate enemy targeting and increase the number of weapons needed to ensure a successful attack. INDOPACOM's plan for implementing new Guam air defenses should also apply lessons from Japan's aborted Aegis Ashore program, whose accelerated timeline contributed to the selection of the least expensive and technically risky option — two fixed Aegis Ashore systems — and the discounting of alternatives. Adm. Phil Davidson's 2026 goal of improving Guam's defenses faces a similar risk. Bound by an iron triangle, Guam's air and missile defenses can be good, fast or cheap — but not all three. If 2026 is held as a rigid constraint, the only solution able to meet the schedule and requirements may be the familiar, and ineffective, fixed Aegis Ashore architecture. Compared to one or two Aegis Ashore sites, a distributed architecture may require slightly more time to develop or funds to field. But a phased approach could introduce new systems as funding becomes available and allow expanding the system's capability to meet the evolving threat. For example, SPY-6 radars, C2 bunkers and composite THAAD-Patriot-NASAMS batteries could be fielded before 2026, quickly followed by the introduction of mobile assets. Guam and the Northern Marianas are essential to U.S. strategy and operations in the Western Pacific. Their defenses have long been ignored, and Adm. Davidson should be lauded for charting a path forward. A disaggregated architecture, however, will be more likely to realize INDOPACOM's vision of resilient and scalable air and missile defense. Timothy A. Walton is a fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, where Bryan Clark is a senior fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/30/guams-air-defense-should-learn-lessons-from-japans-aegis-ashore/