Back to news

July 27, 2020 | International, C4ISR

Memes, the pandemic and the new tactics of information warfare

WASHINGTON — The COVID-19 pandemic is evidence that Russia and China have accelerated adoption of their age-old influence and disinformation tactics to the modern era, national security experts and military leaders said.

Those countries are leveraging U.S. laws, social media platforms and divisions within society to their larger strategic advantage and as a way to weaken the United States.

“This pandemic crisis has made it very, very clear that Russia, China and others intend to strategically use cyber-enable information operations against the U.S.,” Lt. Gen. Mary O'Brien, deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and cyber effects operations, said during a Joint Service Academy Cybersecurity Conference webinar June 11.

“They're injecting disinformation, which is not a new concept in itself, but now by incorporating cyber means, they're reaching millions of people to exacerbate existing tensions within the U.S. and between us, our allies and partners.”

She said these efforts include spreading conspiracy theories and confusing messages about the virus such as its origins and risks.

Such tactics are here to stay.

“Our adversaries have made it very clear that this aspect of strategic competition will be enduring,” O'Brien added.

These tactics, which include waging influence campaigns below the threshold of armed conflict, have forced the military, and U.S. government more broadly, to rethink its strategies and views toward conflict. Traditionally, the United States government has taken a binary view of war and peace, while adversaries such as Russia in particular have viewed conflict on a perpetual continuum.

“In many ways, we have trained ourselves as a service at every Red Flag we've gone to that conflict begins when two fighters engage or we find a target on the battlespace. So we've really trained ourselves that conflict begins at that moment,” Lt. Gen. Timothy Haugh, commander of 16th Air Force, the service's first information warfare command, said at a July 15 Mitchell Institute webcast. Red Flag is the Air Force's premier tactical training event.

“Was the first element really when we got into conflict in the information environment ... the first day that one of our companies was hacked that the intellectual property theft of one of our weapon systems stole?” he said. “Was that really when conflict began? Was it the day that Russian hackers hacked into the DNC? Was that really the day that conflict began for our nation and how we should be thinking about it when the adversaries went to another level of using some level of malign activity that is outside of things that we would consider norms.”

As such, the military is looking at ways to expose this activity abroad when it can.

“Sixteenth Air Force units are focused on developing tactics, techniques and procedures and they're looking to identify, expose and when directed, countering the threat from the state sponsored disinformation campaigns,” O'Brien said. “This is continuing, I think we'll see it again as we address the racial discrimination.”

Adversaries have exploited U.S. laws and principles, such as the freedom of speech with online platforms, which makes outright banning accounts difficult. They've also targeted existing divisions within society such as protests over police tactics and racial equality.

“[Adversaries] also are in a position where they can take advantage of a lot of the disinformation/misinformation that's created right here at home in the United States by actual Americans who understand the language in a way Moscow couldn't at a native level,” Cindy Otis, vice president of analysis at Alethea Group, a start-up that counters disinformation and social media manipulation. told C4ISRNET.

Experts explained that adversaries in many cases don't have to create content, although many choose to.

“At the end of the day they're really just amplifying our existing social divisions. We suspect, especially lately, that they've really done enough amplification that they're just kind of allowing things to snowball now ...There's enough existing division that it really only requires tiny nudges at this point to amplify,” Maj. Jessica Dawson, research lead for information warfare and an assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute, told C4ISRNET.

One way they do this is called memetic warfare, which involves sharing memes on various social media platforms to stoke a particular reaction from various groups.

“When we think about memetic warfare, what's really happening is we're taking these sort of deep seeded emotional stories and we're collapsing them down into a picture, usually it's something that has a very, very quick emotional punch,” she said. “They're collapsing these narratives down into images that are often not attributed, that's one of the things about memes is they really aren't, someone usually isn't signing them, going ‘I'm the artist.' There [are] these really emotional punches that are shared very, very quickly, they're self replicating in a lot of ways because you see it, you react and then you immediately pass it on.”

While many experts noted that these tactics are nothing new, the difference is the internet.

“The major change throughout history is today they're able to spread and amplify and reach people where they are all over the world in a way that was never possible before,” Otis, who previously was a CIA analyst, said.

Previously, nations such as the Soviet Union had to prop up media outlets and place stories in newspapers around the world hoping they'd be picked up in English language outlets. Now, they just have to tweet.

In some cases, they are overt social media channels and actors might not even hide their origin, but other more covert cases, states might use certain influencers or cut outs to do their bidding.

What's the point?

The goal of these operations varies slightly, but experts said they serve the ultimate purpose of put down the United States compared to their own nations.

“For Russia it all goes back to the desire to undermine United States' global credibility but also show their own population ‘hey, you know that democracy you want, it's actually not a great thing ... look how it's turning out for the United States,‘” Otis said.

She added that Russia tries to undermine the credibility of the United States on issues such as human rights, something the United States is active in promoting on the world stage, by highlighting social divisions such as potential police brutality and racial injustice.

Dawson noted this can also distract from what Russia is doing abroad.

Russia also wants to discourage citizens from voting, Otis said by making large swaths of the population feel disenfranchised. Often times, these actors will play both sides of an issue to maximize reach and discord.

When it comes to China, Dawson noted that they are trying to appear more benevolent on the world stage to present itself as a world power, which is much harder. They are also good at making information disappear online, she said, citing information on the Tiananmen Square massacre.

Otis pointed to Chinese benevolent efforts such as providing medical aid to nations such as Italy during the ongoing pandemic.

Combating these efforts, including those focused internally at domestic populations and undermining government, can be difficult given the existing divisions within society and the broad speech freedoms guaranteed.

Otis explained that the government can sometimes be mired in its own bureaucratic processes, noting it can be its own worst enemy.

She provided the example of Taliban forces in Afghanistan publishing in their media channels that the United States and NATO forces bombed a school killing scores of children. Those stories would go viral in their circles and sometimes make their way to mainstream outlets. When questioned about those claims by reporters, U.S. officials would explain they have to conduct an investigation, which could take months. By the time the investigation is concluded and the claim is found to hold no truth, the damage is already done and the Taliban have successfully recruited against it.

Dawson noted that one way to begin combating disinformation is building trust from the local to the national level while also addressing the underlying domestic problems adversaries are exploiting from abroad.

https://www.c4isrnet.com/smr/information-warfare/2020/07/23/memes-the-pandemic-and-the-new-tactics-of-information-warfare/

On the same subject

  • MDA Embarks On A New Generation Of Missile Defense

    February 24, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    MDA Embarks On A New Generation Of Missile Defense

    Jen DiMascio The Pentagon is in the midst of a massive upgrade of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, designed to protect the U.S. against an attack by an ICBM. The new Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI) would modernize GMD, arming it with an all-up round that can counter more sophisticated ICBMs. In pursuing the new program, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will end the planned purchase of 20 current-generation GMD Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), after already having canceled a key aspect of that system, the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV). While it works on NGI, the MDA also intends to supplement its defense of the U.S. against ICBMs with shorter-range interceptors that provide regional defense. The change in course will not be cheap. GMD itself has cost more than $68 billion over its lifetime. In its fiscal 2021 budget request, the MDA is asking for $664 million in fiscal 2021 for NGI and another $4.3 billion through fiscal 2025.It is an amount that will grow over time and that some worry could pull funding from other urgent priorities, as the type and number of missile threats from other countries evolves to include more sophisticated ballistic missiles and hypersonic weaponry. The MDA is poised to issue a classified request for proposals to sponsor two contractors through a preliminary design review (PDR) of a new interceptor and kill vehicle—the part of the interceptor that defeats an incoming missile while in space. MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill says the agency plans to award contracts by the end of 2020, with the intention of starting testing in the mid-2020s and putting NGIs in silos by 2027, 2028 or beyond. “Right now we're funded through PDR, and you know there's plenty of arguments out there that you [have] got to go all the way to the [critical design review (CDR)]. We'll have that conversation when the time is right,” says Hill. The release of the budget solidifies a plan that has been slowly percolating in the background. Last March, Boeing was put on notice after the RKV—a projectile launched by the GBI booster that is tasked with locating and defeating the incoming ICBM in space—did not meet the needs of its CDR. The Government Accountability Office noted problems with the program meeting its cost and schedule goals “with no signs of arresting these trends.” By August 2019, Mike Griffin, the Pentagon's top research and engineering official, stopped work on the RKV after the MDA had spent more than $1 billion to develop it, as it was not proving to be reliable. These RKVs were to ride atop the next 20 GBIs, a project overseen and integrated by Boeing, which Congress had approved in 2018 after a spate of North Korean missile tests. In concert with ending the RKV, Congress rerouted that funding to the NGI, and the MDA conducted a review of options for the interceptor. Coming out of that assessment, budget officials say they will not buy the 20 new GBIs as the military embarks on NGI development. New NGIs are so far being planned to be placed in silos that were to be inhabited by GBIs, according to Hill. “The current intention is for the Next-Generation Interceptors to be able to work with both current and future sensor systems,” says MDA spokesman Mark Wright. From a security standpoint, existing GBIs will still protect the U.S. from foreign missile threats, says Hill, but he adds that over time their reliability will begin to fall off. While the NGI program works its way through development, the MDA plans to supplement GMD with a layered network of theater-range systems—the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) and the Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block 2A—to fill any gaps in defending the U.S. from North Korean missile attacks. “What this budget really does for us is it starts to say, ‘Let's take advantage of these regional systems that have been so successful and are very flexible and deployable,'” Hill says. In 2020, the MDA will test the SM-3 Block 2A missile against an ICBM. “When we prove that we can take out an ICBM with an Aegis ship or an Aegis Ashore site with an SM-3 Block 2A, then you want to ramp up the evolution of the threat on the target side, right? We'll want to go against more complex threats,” Hill says. That will require upgrading the combat system used by Aegis ships so it can process data from new sensors and engage with a missile. Adding the ability to launch SM-3 Block 2A missiles on ships or from Aegis Ashore sites will give combatant commanders the additional flexibility they have sought, he adds. A future commander could then choose to launch a GBI, THAAD, SM-3 or, when it is ready, NGI. Such an interim solution using regional systems is still far from a reality. The Pentagon is requesting $139 million in its fiscal 2021 budget to “initiate the development and demonstration of a new interceptor prototype to support contiguous U.S. defense as part of the tiered homeland defense effort,” the MDA's budget materials state. That involves developing hardware and software and conducting demonstrations leading to a flight test in fiscal 2023. One other potential gap in the missile defense architecture is in Pacific-based radars that would have cued GBIs to protect against an attack on Hawaii. The “Pacific radar is no longer in our budget,” Hill says. Today, forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 radars and a deployable (sea-based X-band) radar work with the GMD system in that region. Plus, Aegis ships can be repositioned, he adds. “We realize we need to take another look at that architecture,” he says, which will focus on the Pacific region. Missile defense experts are not unsupportive of the effort to build a new NGI. But they do question whether the cost will leach funding for other important priorities. Frank Rose, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, points out that GBIs are built using 1990s technology and as a development prototype tasked for an operational mission. That means that requirements such as reliability, survivability and suitability were afterthoughts. Despite the sound logic involved in moving toward a new interceptor, “I see a couple of challenges,” he says. That includes that the Pentagon's budget request was flat for fiscal 2021, a trend likely to continue. In the years ahead, the military will have big bills for its nuclear modernization budget and to recapitalize its conventional forces, which will hit about the time budgets for NGI would need to swell to support procurement of the system. Meanwhile, in the near-to-midterm, the U.S. is likely to be dealing with a limited North Korean threat. Over time, the threats will grow in number and sophistication. Given challenges with the budget—not to mention technical challenges with developing a successful kill vehicle—Rose wonders if that money could be applied elsewhere. Kingston Reif, director of disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association, is skeptical the MDA can deliver an NGI on its current timeline. “Congress must be extremely wary of allowing the Pentagon to repeat the mistakes that have plagued the GMD system in the past,” he says. “In particular, the development, procurement and fielding of the NGI should not be schedule-driven but based on the maturity of the technology and successful testing under operationally realistic conditions. Accelerating development programs risks saddling them with cost overruns, schedule delays, test failures and program cancellations—as has been the case with the GMD program and other missile defense programs to date.” The expansion of U.S. homeland missile defense may be viewed as a provocation by Russia and China “and likely prompt them to consider steps to further enhance the survivability of their nuclear arsenals in ways that will undermine the security of the United States and its allies,” Reif says. “The costs and risks of expanding the U.S. homeland defense footprint in this way greatly outweigh the benefits.” But like all proposals, it will be up to lawmakers to decide and is likely to be a point of interest in the year ahead. “This is the single biggest muscle movement in the 2021 budget proposal, and Congress will be scrutinizing carefully whether the administration has a compelling vision and realistic funding stream for the short, medium and long term,” says Tom Karako, director of the missile defense project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-embarks-new-generation-missile-defense

  • https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/swiss-weapons-exports-plunge-neutral-stance-hurts-trade-2024-03-05/
  • US to offer cyberwar capabilities to NATO allies

    October 3, 2018 | International, C4ISR

    US to offer cyberwar capabilities to NATO allies

    By LOLITA C. BALDOR BRUSSELS (AP) — Acting to counter Russia's aggressive use of cyberattacks across Europe and around the world, the U.S. is expected to announce that, if asked, it will use its formidable cyberwarfare capabilities on NATO's behalf, according to a senior U.S. official. The announcement is expected in the coming days as U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis attends a meeting of NATO defense ministers on Wednesday and Thursday. Katie Wheelbarger, the principal deputy assistant defense secretary for international security affairs, said the U.S. is committing to use offensive and defensive cyber operations for NATO allies, but America will maintain control over its own personnel and capabilities. The decision comes on the heels of the NATO summit in July, when members agreed to allow the alliance to use cyber capabilities that are provided voluntarily by allies to protect networks and respond to cyberattacks. It reflects growing concerns by the U.S. and its allies over Moscow's use of cyber operations to influence elections in America and elsewhere. “Russia is constantly pushing its cyber and information operations,” said Wheelbarger, adding that this is a way for the U.S. to show its continued commitment to NATO. She told reporters traveling to NATO with Mattis that the move is a signal to other nations that NATO is prepared to counter cyberattacks waged against the alliance or its members. Much like America's nuclear capabilities, the formal declaration of cyber support can help serve as a military deterrent to other nations and adversaries. The U.S. has, for some time, considered cyber as a warfighting domain, much like air, sea, space and ground operations. In recent weeks the Pentagon released a new cybersecurity strategy that maps out a more aggressive use of military cyber capabilities. And it specifically calls out Russia and China for their use of cyberattacks. China, it said, has been “persistently” stealing data from the public and private sector to gain an economic advantage. And it said Russia has use cyber information operations to “influence our population and challenge our diplomatic processes.” U.S. officials have repeatedly accused Moscow of interfering in the 2016 elections, including through online social media. “We will conduct cyberspace operations to collect intelligence and prepare military cyber capabilities to be used in the event of a crisis or conflict,” the new strategy states, adding that the U.S. is prepared to use cyberwarfare along with other military weapons against its enemies when needed, including to counter malicious cyber activities targeting the country. The document adds that the Pentagon will “work to strengthen the capacity” of allies and partners. NATO has moved cautiously on offensive cyber capabilities. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, allies recognized cyberspace as a warfighting domain. It has said that a computer-based attack on an ally would trigger NATO's commitment to defend its members. And last year the alliance agreed to create a new cyber operations center. But the focus has always been on defending NATO networks and those of its members, not offensive cyberwar. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Tuesday that the defense ministers will have a working session this week to address cyber and other risks, and how allies can cooperate to counter such threats. He did not provide details. https://www.apnews.com/292c4d08912c4e3f8ae29973e0ecfbbc/US-to-offer-cyberwar-capabilities-to-NATO-allies

All news