March 16, 2021 | International, Land
US increases dominance of global arms exports
America now accounts for 37 percent of global arms exports, almost double that of its closest competitor Russia, according to new information from SIPRI.
September 13, 2019 | International, Aerospace
Massive simulation shows the need for speed in multi-domain ops
FORT BENNING, Ga. – The Army tested its current and future equipment and warfighting methods for the potential next war in a massive, weeks-long simulated experiment that wrapped up recently.
The Unified Challenge 19.2 experiment in August involved more than 400 participants working with 55 formations, 64 concepts and 150 capabilities, said Col. Mark Bailey, chief of the Army's Futures and Concepts Center's Joint Army Experimentation Division. The exercise ran Aug. 5-23.
The simulation allowed Army leaders to “understand some of the complex patterns” that come out of the very complex systems that the United States and its adversaries are using, or developing to use, in future scenarios, Bailey told reporters this week.
Much of what was tested couldn't be done in the real world because it hasn't been invented yet.
For example, the Army's priorities in the Cross Functional Teams, from Future Vertical Lift to the Next Generation Combat Vehicle, are years away from fielding their platforms to the force, but through mathematical models and algorithms, researchers can plug in the day and play out a very detailed set of events.
And the scope of the experiment dove deeper than what a typical tabletop exercise or wargaming scenario might.
It allowed experimenters to see down to the small unit level and all the way up to the division and corps level what would likely play out if those formations collided with a near-peer competitor on foreign turf in a battle for territory.
Chris Willis, the chief of the Maneuver Battle Lab's Model and Simulations Branch, said that for the first time, experimenters were able to use “nonlethal effects” in a simulation — electronic jamming, cyber-attacks and other methods — to support maneuver warfighting.
That helped them gather data on concepts that Army leaders have been considering and theorizing about for years.
But the multi-domain operations tools that were used in simulation were not being flung about the simulated battle space by random privates.
Currently, the experiments look at having commanders below the brigade level aware of what MDO tools are at their disposal and how to get access to them when needed from higher echelons, which would likely house them.
“The brigade would get access to some effects but those wouldn't rest inside of the brigade proper,” said Col. Chris Cassibry, director of the Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate's Concepts Development Division.
Cassibry emphasized that at this stage it's more important for the brigade commander to understand what's happening across the battlefield and use those effects to execute maneuver.
For instance, the idea is that by enabling space and cyber assets, ground forces can have more freedom to maneuver. That was assumed to be the case but the complex simulation has put some data behind the concept for researchers to now analyze.
A lot of what presented challenges that will consume commanders of the future was creating “windows of domain superiority,” Bailey said.
Converging effects
The basic plan is to converge effects, fires or non-kinetic or other types, which create that window. Commanders can plan for that and they do.
But to do that at the speed that leaders believe MDO will unfold presents a whole other set of challenges.
“Things happen so fast you must have this flexibility to do that in a moment's notice so that when you identify a target on a battlefield and don't have the artillery tube in range you have to quickly identify what else you have in range to hit that target,” Bailey said.
And also, to understand that even if you switch “guns” quickly enough to another asset, drone, missile, electronic warfare, that means the new tool you've chosen will now not be used on another quickly emerging target or threat.
That's where artificial intelligence must fill the gap, by offering up those menus of options for commanders and identifying the targets so that the human can then fire.
Unified Challenge is a twice a year event; this was the second. Though it provides a lot of data, it's not something easily replicable. That means that in the near term, smaller experiments will unfold using some of the lessons learned from the larger experiment, further refining concepts and next steps on many of the ways in which the Army goes after MDO.
The next step will be for the Futures and Concepts Center to compile a report of lessons learned and recommendations moving forward with some of the platforms, capabilities and doctrine.
That will be delivered to the center director in the coming months, and once approved, spread across the Army to inform smaller scale experiments with portions of the larger effort to develop MDO doctrine and materiel, Bailey said.
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January 24, 2020 | International, Land
Bradley Replacement: Did Army Ask For ‘Unobtainium’?
By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. WASHINGTON: For the third time in 11 years, the Army's attempt to replace the 1980s-vintage M2 Bradley ran afoul of the age-old tradeoff between armor and mobility, several knowledgeable sources tell Breaking Defense. The General Dynamics prototype for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle – the only competitor left after other companies bowed out or were disqualified – was too heavy to meet the Army's requirement that a single Air Force C-17 cargo jet could carry two complete OMFVs to a war zone, we're told. But the vehicle had to be that heavy, GD's defenders say, to meet the Army's requirement for armor protection. Now, the Army hasn't officially said why it cancelled the current OMFV contract. Senior leaders – Chief of Staff, Gen. James McConville; the four-star chief of Army Futures Command, Gen. Mike Murray; and the civilian Army Acquisition Executive, Assistant Secretary Bruce Jette – have all publicly acknowledged that the requirements and timeline were “aggressive.” (Yes, all three men used the same word). Jette was the most specific, telling reporters that one vendor – which, from the context of his remark, could only be GD – did not meet all the requirements, but he wouldn't say which requirements weren't met. So, while we generally avoid writing a story based solely on anonymous sources, in this case we decided their track records (which we can't tell you about) were so good and the subject was so important that it was worth going ahead. “Industry told the Army the schedule was ‘unobtainium,' but they elected to proceed anyway,” one source told us: That's why the other potential competitors dropped out, seeing the requirements as too hard to meet. In particular, the source said, “industry needs more time to evaluate the trade [offs] associated with achieving the weight requirement.” With more time, industry might have been able to refine the design further to reduce weight, redesign major components to be lighter, or possibly – and this one is a stretch – even invent new stronger, lighter materials. But on the schedule the Army demanded, another source told us, reaching the minimum allowable protection without exceeding the maximum allowable weight was physically impossible. Why This Keeps Happening The Army's been down this road before and stalled out in similar ways. The Ground Combat Vehicle was too heavy, the Future Combat Systems vehicles were too light; “just right” still seems elusive. In 2009, Defense Secretary Bob Gates cancelled the Future Combat Systems program, whose BAE-designed Manned Ground Vehicles – including a Bradley replacement – had been designed to such strict weight limits that they lacked adequate armor. The Army had initially asked for the FCS vehicles to come in under 20 tons so one could fit aboard an Air Force C-130 turboprop transport. After that figure proved unfeasible, and the Air Force pointed out a C-130 couldn't actually carry 20 tons any tactically useful distance, the weight crept up to 26 tons, but the added armor wasn't enough to satisfy Gates' concerns about roadside bombs, then taking a devastating toll on US soldiers in Iraq. Four years later, amidst tightening budgets, the Army itself gave up on the Ground Combat Vehicle, another Bradley replacement, after strict requirements for armor protection drove both competing designs – from General Dynamics and BAE Systems – into the 56-70 ton range, depending on the level of modular add-on armor bolted onto the basic chassis. (A much-publicized Governmental Accountability Office study claimed GCV could reach 84 tons, but that was a projection for future growth, not an actual design). Not quite nine months ago, after getting initial feedback from industry on the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, the Army made the tough call to reduce its protection requirements somewhat to make it possible to fit two OMFVs on a C-17. If our sources are correct, however, it didn't reduce the armor requirement enough for General Dynamics to achieve the weight goal. One source says that two of the General Dynamics vehicles would fit on a C-17 if you removed its modular armor. The add-on armor kit could then be shipped to the war zone on a separate flight and installed, or simply left off if intelligence was sure the enemy lacked heavy weapons. But the requirements didn't allow for that compromise, and the Army wasn't willing to waive them, the source said, because officers feared a vehicle in the less-armored configuration could get troops killed. Other Options Now, there are ways to protect a vehicle besides heavy passive armor. Some IEDs in Iraq were big enough to cripple a 70-ton M1 Abrams. Russian tanks get by with much lighter passive armor covered by a layer of so-called reactive armor, which explodes outwards when hit, blasting incoming warheads before they can penetrate. Both Russia and Israel have fielded, and the US Army is urgently acquiring, Active Protection Systems that shoot down incoming projectiles. The problem with both reactive armor and active protection is that they're only proven effective against explosive warheads, like those found on anti-tank missiles. They're much less useful against solid shells, and while no missile ever fielded can use those, a tank's main gun can fling solid shot with such force that it penetrates armor through sheer concentrated kinetic energy. (Protecting against roadside bombs and land mines is yet another design issue, because they explode from underneath, but it's no longer the all-consuming question it once ways. Advances in suspension, blast-deflecting hull shapes, and shock absorption for the crew have made even the four-wheeled Joint Light Tactical Vehicle remarkably IED-resistant and pretty comfortable). If the Army were willing to take the risk of relying more on active protection systems, or give industry more time to improve active protection technology, it could reduce its requirements for heavy passive armor. Or the Army could remove the soldiers from its combat vehicles entirely and operate them with a mix of automation and remote control, which would make crew protection a moot point. In fact, the service is investing in lightly-armored and relatively expendable Robotic Combat Vehicles – but it still sees those unmanned machines as adjuncts to humans, not replacements. As long as the Army puts soldiers on the battlefield, it will want the vehicles that carry them to be well-protected. Alternatively, the Army could drop its air transport requirements and accept a much heavier vehicle. Israel has already done this with its Namer troop carrier, a modified Merkava heavy tank, but then the Israel army doesn't plan to fight anywhere far away. The US, by contrast, routinely intervenes overseas and has dismantled many of its Cold War bases around the world. Air transport is a limited commodity anyway, and war plans assume most heavy equipment will either arrive by sea or be pre-positioned in warehouses on allied territory. But the Army really wants to have the option to send at least some armored vehicles by air in a crisis. If the Army won't give ground on either protection or transportability, then it faces a different dilemma: They need to either give industry more time to invent something revolutionary, or accept a merely evolutionary improvement. “We're going to reset the requirements, we're going to reset the acquisition strategy and timeline,” Gen. McConville said about OMFV on Tuesday. But, when he discussed Army modernization overall, he repeatedly emphasized that “we need transformational change, not incremental improvements. “Transformational change is how we get overmatch and how we get dominance in the future,” the Chief of Staff said. “We aren't looking for longer cords for our phones or faster horses for our cavalry.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/bradley-replacement-did-army-ask-for-unobtainium
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January 31, 2019 | International, Aerospace
US Air Force’s light-attack experiment could mix in drones and helos
By: Jeff Martin WASHINGTON —The U.S. Air Force's light-attack experiment is set to get a lot bigger, with the service considering adding drones, helicopters and more sophisticated aircraft to the mix in the future, the service's top general told Defense News. “What is the right mix of fixed wing, rotary wing, manned and unmanned that can do the business of light attack?” Goldfein said in an exclusive Jan. 26 interview. “What is the right mix and how do we bring allies and partners in right now with us — not just periodically parachute in — but how do we expand this experiment to bring them into the tent with us?” While the Air Force is still finalizing its strategy on light attack, Goldfein's comments hint that a lack of interest by partner nations may have shaped the decision not to press aheadwith a program of record late last year. The Air Force was set to issue a request for proposals in December for a light-attack platform. The competition would been open to only the Embraer-Sierra Nevada Corp. A-29 Super Tucano and the Textron AT-6 Wolverine, two fixed-wing turboprops that the service said were best suited to meet the needs of the program. But now, other aircraft could be joining them. Goldfein said the Air Force chose not to release that RFP for two reasons: ongoing budget uncertainty and the desire to expand the parameters of what the service is seeking. “For us to issue an RFP when we didn't [know] what the budget was ... and setting an expectation that we're ready to go into source selection when we're still working our way through the strategy, in my mind, would have been irresponsible," Goldfein said. “I've talked to both of the CEOs involved, and we want to make sure we strengthen the partnership and build it as we go forward.” Goldfein added that light attack was not something that was central to what the Air Force needed, saying that it would only be funded if the money is available in upcoming budgets. Increasing interoperability has been a longtime goal of the light-attack experiments, but it appears to have taken on new importance as the experiment potentially moves forward. Goldfein and other Air Force officials have spoken at length about the potential benefit of a common, off-the-shelf attack aircraft that could be purchased by countries that can't afford the F-16, but still want to deepen ties with the U.S Air Force. Over the course of the effort, foreign delegations have been invited to observe flight demonstrations of the A-29, AT-6 and other previous contenders at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. However, not all nations could want a turboprop aircraft like the A-29 or AT-6. “Some countries, it actually would be better to have an unmanned option. Some countries, [it] would be better to have a rotary-wing option," Goldfein said. “Some countries would do fixed wing, but [only with a] turbojet [engine]" instead of a turboprop. https://www.defensenews.com/newsletters/2019/01/30/the-air-forces-light-attack-experiment-could-be-expanded-to-feature-drones-helicopters-and-more-aircraft/