Marines 3-D print replacement parts for F-35, unmanned ground vehicle

On the same subject

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  August 17, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Europe’s next-gen fighter club faces a dilemma: Who else can join?

  By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — With mainland Europe and the United Kingdom pursuing their own sixth-generation fighter programs, differing views have started to emerge about how many nations should partake in the action. At issue is whether the British Tempest and the German-French-Spanish Future Combat Air System can coexist in the long run without cannibalizing the continent's defense budget. What's more, while leaders in the U.K. have openly advertised their appetite to pick up partner countries for Tempest, Paris and Berlin are divided about admitting additional members, besides Spain, for fear of slowing down their effort. German defense officials early this year told Bundestag lawmakers they consider it risky to keep the circle of participants too small because team Tempest could go around snagging up contributors, though that concern has yet to bear out. To Dirk Hoke, the CEO of Airbus Defence and Space, the issue comes down to the budget. His company is the co-lead for the FCAS program along with France's Dassault Aviation. Notably, the French have the lead for the Next-Generation Fighter, envisioned as the central aircraft for the larger program of supporting drones and command-and-control equipment. “Europe can't afford two new systems,” Hoke said in a virtual panel discussion organized by a German defense industry lobbying association. That is especially the case, he argued, because a competition between the U.K. and members of the European Union would reinforce the perception that Britain's divorce from the bloc has weakened the intra-continental defense alliance — a notion that leaders on both sides of the Channel have been trying to dispel. Finding a way to merge FCAS and Tempest should become a top priority for decision-makers once a Brexit agreement on future trade and defense relations is in the bag, according to Hoke. Until then, he said, “we simply have to be patient.” In order to be prepared for “an opportunity to negotiate at eye level,” both projects should continue to work through their technology development so that eventual touchpoints for cooperation are already far along, he explained. In contrast, Dassault Aviation CEO Eric Trappier has urged caution when it comes to broadening the FCAS circle too soon. “I don't know if there won't be some new partners in the future,” he said during a company earnings call late last month. “We must not exclude them.” Noting that Spain already was admitted to the program after Germany and France had kicked it off, Trappier said the companies involved were still learning to work together. “We have to get to know each other and share our work together,” he said. “If we change partners every six months, I can tell you that we will not reach 2040,” he added, referring to the envisioned in-service date for the futuristic weapon. The next big milestone for the program is fielding a demonstrator aircraft in 2026. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/08/17/europes-next-gen-fighter-club-faces-a-dilemma-who-else-can-join

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  October 13, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Land

  Army aviation chief: Programs may need to sacrifice perfect solutions

  As the Army looks to field future aviation programs, it should think more holistically about those efforts, the service's program executive officer for aviation said Tuesday.

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  July 6, 2018 | International, Aerospace

  Study finds these gaps in Army’s small unit counter-drone capabilities

  Army units at and below the battalion level are unprepared to defeat aerial drones and current plans can't keep up with rapidly evolving technology, according to a recent study. Back in 2016, the Army Research Office asked an outside organization, The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, to evaluate their counter drone capabilities for battalion and below operations. The report they published earlier this year notes some significant gaps and threats to soldiers with this technology. “Contrary to the past, when U.S. warfighters may have found (improvised explosive devices), now the IEDs will find our warfighters,” according to the report. While the Army and Marine Corps, which also included representatives in the study, are throwing resources at the small drone problem, they are not keeping pace with the threat. “Army time frames are significantly out of sync with the rapidly advancing performance capabilities of individual (small Unmanned Aerial Systems) and teams of sUASs,” according to the report. The report noted that most of the service's counter drone asset work was focused on heavy vehicle platforms or on fixed sites, which leaves smaller units most likely to first encounter the threat more exposed. “Significant quantities of man-portable” counter-drone systems have been fielded, Army spokesman Maj. Chris Ophardt told Army Times in an email. The Army will continue to pursue those capabilities based on emerging threats. Based on his response, which did not include details of capabilities, the Army is pursuing other ways to defeat drones. A large portion of the study was classified, due to operational security concerns. “Future Army C-UAS systems will encompass a variety of potential platforms to include fixed, mobile, and Soldier-portable capabilities,” Ophardt wrote. But beyond the types of systems employed, what they're targeting or attacking also came under fire in the report. The Army and other branches have invested significantly in counter-drone technology, “often focusing on detecting radio frequency transmissions and GPS signals of individual sUASs. However, today's consumer and customized sUASs can increasingly operate without radio frequency (command and control) links.” Drones now available can use automated target recognition, tracking, obstacle avoidance and other software-enabled activities instead of traditional RF and GPS. Ophardt did not divulge specifics of how the Army is addressing this, but responded that the service's counter drone capabilities, “include multiple methods in order to detect, identify and defeat enemy UAS.” A new school began last month at Fort Benning, Georgia to give basic trainees familiarity with small drones. The drone school gives infantry and scouts the ability to fill out a seven-line report when they encounter a drone then relay that info to their headquarters. The students use both fixed-wing and helicopter small drones. They also learn defensive tactics such as how to use dispersal and hiding tactics to minimize casualties from drone-coordinated fires, according to an Army release. Those introductory tactics can help even brand-new soldiers start thinking about how to deal with drone threats. But, at the same time, the low-level tactics currently used for counter drone work have tried to use “kinetic effects,” basically shooting down the drone by interfering with its signals or overheating its circuits. The report noted that method isn't practical on a wide scale for large numbers of troops, especially dismounted units. That path only adds more gear from the equipment to the batteries, to an already overloaded soldier, not to mention the “cognitive load” of training and using another piece of equipment, according to the report. Ophardt responded that the Army's counter-drone strategy included “multiple methods” to detect, identify and defeat” enemy drones. The major provided a similar response when asked about Army efforts at counter-drone tactics, capabilities against swarming drones and collaboratively acting drone groups, which the report remarks will be more prevalent and sophisticated as soon as 2025. Report authors urge Army leaders to adjust their timelines for matching tech development, which are woefully inadequate for the exponential changes in software, hardware and drone capabilities. Current Army time frames consider near-term planning to run from now until 2025; mid-term planning in the 2026 to 2035 window and far-term at the 2036 to 2050. Those efforts mirror vehicle acquisition strategy timelines, not the drone arena. The report pushes for a near-term planning of one to two years, mid-term at the three- to five-year level and far term in drone tech at the six- to eight-year range. The advances are happening so quickly, authors point out, that it is “impossible to predict performance capabilities beyond eight years.” https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/07/05/study-finds-these-gaps-in-armys-small-unit-counter-drone-capabilities