Leidos awarded $72.8M for Navy's TRAPS sub detection system

On the same subject

• 

  March 19, 2021 | International, Aerospace

  Estimated development costs for the F-35′s modernization program increased by $1.9B in a year

  Block 4 development costs will reach an estimated $14.4 billion, the Government Accountability Office found.

• 

  January 15, 2019 | International, Naval

  An ocean apart: Few naval vendors manage to pierce US and European protectionism

  By: Tom Kington , Andrew Chuter , and Sebastian Sprenger ROME, LONDON and COLOGNE, Germany — The U.S. and European shipbuilding industries lead largely separate lives against the backdrop of a massive Asian naval buildup, but some trans-Atlantic projects still manage to thrive. The building of warships has always been a prime example of nations nurturing a highly specialized industry deemed so crucial that outside economic forces cannot be allowed to intervene. And while some European nations have begun to think about pooling shipbuilding forces on the continent, analysts and industry executives in Europe say the wall separating the U.S. and European naval markets remains high. Barring missile launchers and the Aegis combat management system, U.S. firms have not grabbed a large slice of naval work in Europe, and no change is on the horizon, according to Peter Roberts, director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute in London. “Warships are historically linked to national power, and if you stop building them you are no longer seen as a great power — you are at the bidding of others,” Roberts said. “The Spanish, the British, the French — they haven't given up shipbuilding, even if they were better off buying off the shelf, and we are unlikely to see a reduction of yards in Europe,” he added. At the same time, the U.S. market has been relatively closed off to European shipbuilders, though there is a chance that could change somewhat with the Navy's Future Frigate program. “It's a bit like two different planets,” said Sebastian Bruns, head of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University in northern Germany. The reflex to buy only American-made warships is especially strong in the current political climate, he added. The sheer number of ships needed on each side of the Atlantic creates a natural differentiator, according to Bruns, who spent time working U.S. naval policy as a House staffer on Capitol Hill. He said the Navy tends to prefer no-frills designs made for maximum war-fighting power in a great powers competition, while Europeans have taken to building vessels with a kind of peace-maintenance role in mind, affording a greater level of automation and comfort for the crew, for example. One British naval executive, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the lack of trans-Atlantic industrial touch points wasn't limited to market access, arguing that cost-effectiveness was also an issue. “Despite the problems we have and the programs that don't go exactly according to plan ton for ton and capability for capability, the U.K. manages to build and deliver surface ships at a much lower cost than the United States,” he said. “The U.S. shipyards know they would have difficulty competing in the region, particularly if you are talking about yards that have built a good track record. Naval Group, Fincantieri, Damen Shipyards, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems — these are yards that have been competitive and build with export experience behind them. They are already ahead of the game and I do think it comes back to the cost base, I think it is difficult for the United States to build as cost-effectively as the Europeans,” the executive argued. Full article: https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/01/14/an-ocean-apart-few-naval-vendors-manage-to-pierce-us-and-european-protectionism

• 

  July 31, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Guam’s air defense should learn lessons from Japan’s Aegis Ashore

  By: Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said last week his top priority is establishing an Aegis Ashore system on Guam by 2026. New air defenses will help protect U.S. citizens and forces in Guam; but as Japan's government found, Aegis Ashore may not be the best option to protect military and civilian targets from growing and improving Chinese and North Korean missile threats. Guam is pivotal to U.S. and allied military posture in the Western Pacific. Home to Andersen Air Force Base and Apra Harbor, it is far enough from adversaries like China and North Korea to negate the threat from more numerous short-range missiles but close enough to support air and naval operations throughout the Philippine Sea and South and East China seas. Although the current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery on Guam can defend against some ballistic missiles, its single AN/TPY-2 radar is vulnerable and cannot provide 360-degree coverage. Moreover, THAAD's focus on high altitudes makes it a poor fit to defeat lower-flying aircraft or cruise missiles that would likely be used by China's military against Guam. The island needs a new air defense architecture. Aegis Ashore is highly capable, but has its own limitations. Designed primarily to counter small numbers of ballistic missiles, its fixed missile magazine and radar would be vulnerable to attack and would fall short against the bombardment possible from China. Instead of installing one or more Aegis Ashore systems on Guam, a more effective air and missile defense architecture would combine the latest version of the Aegis Combat System with a disaggregated system of existing sensors, effectors, and command-and-control nodes. A distributed architecture would also be scalable, allowing air and missile defenses to also protect U.S. citizens and forces operating in the Northern Marianas. Guam's geography enables longer-range sensing than would be possible from a ship or a single Aegis Ashore radar. Fixed, relocatable and mobile radio frequency sensors should be positioned around the island's perimeter, such as compact versions of SPY-6 or Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor radars and the passive Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance system. During periods of heightened tension, passive and active radio frequency and electro-optical/infrared sensors could also be deployed on unmanned aircraft and stratospheric balloons to monitor over-the-horizon threats. This mixed architecture would provide better collective coverage and be more difficult to defeat compared to one or two fixed Aegis Ashore deckhouses. To shoot down enemy missiles and aircraft, the architecture should field mobile, containerized launchers for long-range interceptors like the SM-6 and SM-3 rather than Aegis Ashore's finite and targetable in-ground vertical launch magazines. They should be complemented by medium- to short-range engagement systems to protect high-value targets such as the Patriot, the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System or the Army's planned Indirect Fire Protection Capability, as well as non-kinetic defenses such as high-powered microwave weapons and electronic warfare systems that could damage or confuse the guidance systems on incoming missiles. Today, destroyers patrol the waters around Guam to provide ballistic missile defense capacity beyond that available with THAAD. A new distributed architecture would place more capacity ashore to free surface combatants from missile defense duty. In a crisis or conflict, the architecture could add capacity with surface action groups and combat air patrols capable of intercepting threats at longer ranges. Instead of Aegis Ashore's large, single C2 node, a distributed architecture would virtualize the Aegis Combat System to allow multiple facilities or mobile vehicles to serve as miniature air operations centers. The mobility of sensors, effectors and C2 nodes in this architecture would enable the employment of camouflage, concealment and deception, including decoys, to complicate enemy targeting and increase the number of weapons needed to ensure a successful attack. INDOPACOM's plan for implementing new Guam air defenses should also apply lessons from Japan's aborted Aegis Ashore program, whose accelerated timeline contributed to the selection of the least expensive and technically risky option — two fixed Aegis Ashore systems — and the discounting of alternatives. Adm. Phil Davidson's 2026 goal of improving Guam's defenses faces a similar risk. Bound by an iron triangle, Guam's air and missile defenses can be good, fast or cheap — but not all three. If 2026 is held as a rigid constraint, the only solution able to meet the schedule and requirements may be the familiar, and ineffective, fixed Aegis Ashore architecture. Compared to one or two Aegis Ashore sites, a distributed architecture may require slightly more time to develop or funds to field. But a phased approach could introduce new systems as funding becomes available and allow expanding the system's capability to meet the evolving threat. For example, SPY-6 radars, C2 bunkers and composite THAAD-Patriot-NASAMS batteries could be fielded before 2026, quickly followed by the introduction of mobile assets. Guam and the Northern Marianas are essential to U.S. strategy and operations in the Western Pacific. Their defenses have long been ignored, and Adm. Davidson should be lauded for charting a path forward. A disaggregated architecture, however, will be more likely to realize INDOPACOM's vision of resilient and scalable air and missile defense. Timothy A. Walton is a fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, where Bryan Clark is a senior fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/30/guams-air-defense-should-learn-lessons-from-japans-aegis-ashore/