JLOTS, an obscure Army-Navy capability, arrives in Gaza

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  May 12, 2020 | International, Naval

  Build a fleet, not a constituency

  By: Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton The U.S. Navy's long-awaited award of a contract to design and build a new class of frigates has brought with it calls to dramatically expand the planned class of 20 ships to a fleet of 70 or more hulls. Like recent congressional efforts to build more of today's amphibious ships or destroyers, these recommendations risk putting the Navy on an unsustainable path and could fail to influence Chinese or Russian adversaries the U.S. fleet is intended to help deter. The Navy clearly needs guided-missile frigates. By bringing comparable capability with less capacity, frigates will provide a less expensive alternative to Arleigh Burke destroyers that are the mainstay of today's U.S. surface fleet. Freed of the requirement to conduct almost every surface combatant operation, destroyers would have more time to catch up on maintenance and training or be available to conduct missions demanding their greater missile capacity like Tomahawk missile strikes or ballistic missile defense. However, the frigate's size — less than a destroyer, more than a littoral combat ship or corvette — also limits its ability to support U.S. Navy wartime operations. Frigates like the Franco-Italian FREMM can conduct the full range of European navy operations such as local air defense, maritime security and anti-submarine warfare, or ASW. But the American FREMM variant will not have enough missile capacity for large or sustained attacks like those conducted by the U.S. Navy during the last several years in the Middle East, or like those that would be likely in a conflict with China. And although they could defend a nearby ship from air attack, the planned U.S. frigates could not carry enough longer-range surface-to-air interceptors to protect U.S. carrier and amphibious groups, or bases and population centers ashore. Proponents argue frigates' capacity limitations could be mitigated by buying more of them, better enabling distributed maritime operations and growing naval presence in underserved areas like the Caribbean and Arctic. In a post-COVID-19 employment environment, accelerating frigate construction could also create jobs by starting production at additional shipyards. Although they cost about $1 billion each to buy, the money to buy more frigates — at least initially — could be carried in the wave of post-pandemic economic recovery spending. But after a few years, that spigot will likely run dry, leaving the Navy to decide whether to continue spending about half the cost of a destroyer for a ship that has only a third as many missiles and cannot conduct several surface warfare missions. The more significant fiscal challenge with buying more frigates is owning them. Based on equivalent ships, each frigate is likely to cost about $60 million annually to operate, crew and maintain. That is only about 25 percent less than a destroyer. For the U.S. Navy, which is already suffering manning shortages and deferring maintenance, fielding a fleet of 70 frigates in addition to more than 90 cruisers and destroyers will likely be unsustainable. Instead of simply building more frigates to create jobs and grow the Navy, Department of Defense leaders should determine the overall number and mix of ships it needs and can afford within realistic budget constraints. The secretary of defense recently directed such an effort, which continues despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This commentary's authors are participating in the study. As recommended in a recent study, instead of buying more frigates to expand the fleet's capacity, the Navy would be better served by adding missile-equipped corvettes like those in European or Asian navies. These ships could carry as many missiles as the Navy's planned frigate but would not incorporate capabilities for area air defense or ASW. The smaller size and reduced capability of corvettes would reduce their sticker price to about one-third that of a frigate, and their sustainment cost to about a quarter that of destroyers. The lower price for corvettes would allow more of them to be built and deployed, where they could team with other surface forces to provide additional missile magazines that could be reloaded by rotating corvettes to rear areas. In peacetime, corvettes would enable the Navy to expand presence and maritime security to underserved regions and provide more appropriate platforms for training and cooperation. Frigates will still be needed, even with a new corvette joining the U.S. fleet. Frigates would replace destroyers in escort operations to protect civilian and noncombatant ships, like supply vessels. They would also conduct maritime security operations in places such as the Persian Gulf or South China Sea, where piracy, trafficking and paramilitary attacks occur. Most importantly, frigates would lead ASW operations, where their towed sonar systems could be more capable than the systems used by current destroyers. Although ASW is an important naval mission, buying more frigates than planned to expand the Navy's ASW capacity is unnecessary and counterproductive. The Navy could gain more ASW capacity at lower cost and with less risk to manned ships by complementing its planned 20 frigates with unmanned systems including fixed sonars like SOSUS, deployable sonar systems that sit on the ocean floor, unmanned surface vessels that tow sonars and trail submarines, and unmanned aircraft that can deploy and monitor sonobuoys or attack submarines to suppress their operations or sink them. The U.S. Navy is at the beginning of a period of dramatic change. New technologies for autonomy, sensing, weapons and networking are enabling new concepts for naval missions at the same time fiscal constraints and pressure from great power competitors are making traditional approaches to naval operations obsolete or unsustainable. The Navy's frigate award is a great start toward the future fleet, but the Navy needs to take advantage of this opportunity and assess the best mix of ships to field the capabilities it needs within the resources it is likely to have. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where Timothy A. Walton works as a fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/11/build-a-fleet-not-a-constituency/

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  June 15, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  U.S. Military Turns To Remote Pilot Training

  Lee Hudson June 11, 2020 Once the global coronavirus pandemic hit the U.S., the military moved to ramp up remote pilot training options. But it is unclear if the trend will continue after the contagion passes. Before COVID-19, the Air Force was developing immersive training devices that would help instruct students remotely as part of Air Education and Training Command's Pilot Training Next program, says Lt. Col. Ryan Riley, commander of Detachment 24. Instead of the pupil coming into the office, receiving an in-person brief, locating a training device and executing a mission, Riley's team was looking at how to conduct those events with both the student and instructor at separate locations. Army pauses to assess training options Air Force and Navy immediately pivot to remote instruction “What we wanted to see, prior to COVID-19, was how far [we could] push the bounds of remote instruction,” Riley says. The pandemic turned that desire into a need to provide students the same level of instruction remotely as they would in person. The Air Force and training companies were already working to develop virtual training systems when COVID-19 struck, and the pandemic seems to have accelerated adoption. “There are only so many places to train,” says Todd Probert, defense and security group president at CAE. Though the military was once reluctant to fully tap into distance training, the question has become: “Is there a way to centralize that instruction?” he says. Pilots more than 100 mi. from a training base would be required to quarantine for two weeks once they arrived. The technology, however, was “very glitchy,” Riley says. The main problem was latency. So the team got to work, disassembling hardware and issuing the newest equipment to students and some of the instructor corps. Another issue was the fact that the detachment's home-use devices were running off a laptop. The team discovered that various software programs such as remote screen-sharing were taxing the central processing unit (CPU) heavily, overwhelming laptops, says Lt. Col. Robert Knapp, Detachment 24 operations officer. “No matter how good a laptop you buy, they're just never going to run at the same speed as a desktop computer,” Knapp says. “We took some of our older desktop computers that were in the building and sent those home with students to replace the laptops, which opened up a lot more CPU bandwidth.” The students also were asked to plug their devices into their routers instead of using wireless home internet, which reduced latency and resulted in a more streamlined, less glitchy process. Meanwhile, the Army was tackling similar challenges at Fort Rucker in Dale County, Alabama, where the service produces pilots to fly the Boeing AH-64 Apache and CH-47 Chinook and Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk. In addition to training its own pilots at Fort Rucker, the service also assists with the training of foreign military aviators from as many as 47 countries annually at the base. The Army established a virtual instructor's course so that the instructor pilots could learn how to teach using a digital platform, says Maj. Gen. David Francis, U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Rucker commanding general. “COVID-19 has enabled us to really take a look at ourselves and how we're delivering training,” he says. Francis envisions a blend of in-person and virtual training once the crisis passes. As the pandemic took hold, the Navy, too, set up remote instruction with unprecedented speed. With 45 students per class, the service would not have been able to comply with social distancing guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, according to Lt. Tim Benoit, aviation preflight indoctrination instructor at Naval Aviation Schools Command located in Pensacola, Florida. So in just five days, the Navy created a digital classroom and launched classes for its student Coast Guard, Marine Corps and Navy pilots. Benoit had selected flight instructors to test the new digital system, and the next day he prepared a presentation to train the rest of the instructors. “We were able to adapt to this without missing any productivity targets,” Benoit says. The Navy does not plan to employ remote instruction after the COVID-19 crisis but views the technology as an alternative when a natural disaster such as a hurricane hits. The service is recognizing the advantages of remote learning, however, which include saving time and money. Students have access to each session's recording and associated course materials, and the technology would allow students not in Pensacola to take the courses. “It can also be used in conjunction with in-person training to prep students . . . and it's been used to enable guest speakers” in another city, Benoit says. “Those are some things that I think may persist beyond the pandemic.” https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/us-military-turns-remote-pilot-training

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  August 16, 2022 | International, Land

  The U.S. Marine Corps has awarded BAE Systems a contract to build multiple ACV-30 Production Ready Test Vehicles (PRTVs)

  Once delivered, the PRTVs will undergo a period of testing prior to a full-rate production decision.