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December 29, 2024 | International, Aerospace

Israel and Slovakia sign €560m defence contract for BARAK MX system

The International Defense Cooperation Directorate of the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD), SIBAT, has concluded a defence deal with Slovakia.

https://www.army-technology.com/news/israel-slovakia-barak-mx-system/

On the same subject

  • Build a fleet, not a constituency

    May 12, 2020 | International, Naval

    Build a fleet, not a constituency

    By: Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton The U.S. Navy's long-awaited award of a contract to design and build a new class of frigates has brought with it calls to dramatically expand the planned class of 20 ships to a fleet of 70 or more hulls. Like recent congressional efforts to build more of today's amphibious ships or destroyers, these recommendations risk putting the Navy on an unsustainable path and could fail to influence Chinese or Russian adversaries the U.S. fleet is intended to help deter. The Navy clearly needs guided-missile frigates. By bringing comparable capability with less capacity, frigates will provide a less expensive alternative to Arleigh Burke destroyers that are the mainstay of today's U.S. surface fleet. Freed of the requirement to conduct almost every surface combatant operation, destroyers would have more time to catch up on maintenance and training or be available to conduct missions demanding their greater missile capacity like Tomahawk missile strikes or ballistic missile defense. However, the frigate's size — less than a destroyer, more than a littoral combat ship or corvette — also limits its ability to support U.S. Navy wartime operations. Frigates like the Franco-Italian FREMM can conduct the full range of European navy operations such as local air defense, maritime security and anti-submarine warfare, or ASW. But the American FREMM variant will not have enough missile capacity for large or sustained attacks like those conducted by the U.S. Navy during the last several years in the Middle East, or like those that would be likely in a conflict with China. And although they could defend a nearby ship from air attack, the planned U.S. frigates could not carry enough longer-range surface-to-air interceptors to protect U.S. carrier and amphibious groups, or bases and population centers ashore. Proponents argue frigates' capacity limitations could be mitigated by buying more of them, better enabling distributed maritime operations and growing naval presence in underserved areas like the Caribbean and Arctic. In a post-COVID-19 employment environment, accelerating frigate construction could also create jobs by starting production at additional shipyards. Although they cost about $1 billion each to buy, the money to buy more frigates — at least initially — could be carried in the wave of post-pandemic economic recovery spending. But after a few years, that spigot will likely run dry, leaving the Navy to decide whether to continue spending about half the cost of a destroyer for a ship that has only a third as many missiles and cannot conduct several surface warfare missions. The more significant fiscal challenge with buying more frigates is owning them. Based on equivalent ships, each frigate is likely to cost about $60 million annually to operate, crew and maintain. That is only about 25 percent less than a destroyer. For the U.S. Navy, which is already suffering manning shortages and deferring maintenance, fielding a fleet of 70 frigates in addition to more than 90 cruisers and destroyers will likely be unsustainable. Instead of simply building more frigates to create jobs and grow the Navy, Department of Defense leaders should determine the overall number and mix of ships it needs and can afford within realistic budget constraints. The secretary of defense recently directed such an effort, which continues despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This commentary's authors are participating in the study. As recommended in a recent study, instead of buying more frigates to expand the fleet's capacity, the Navy would be better served by adding missile-equipped corvettes like those in European or Asian navies. These ships could carry as many missiles as the Navy's planned frigate but would not incorporate capabilities for area air defense or ASW. The smaller size and reduced capability of corvettes would reduce their sticker price to about one-third that of a frigate, and their sustainment cost to about a quarter that of destroyers. The lower price for corvettes would allow more of them to be built and deployed, where they could team with other surface forces to provide additional missile magazines that could be reloaded by rotating corvettes to rear areas. In peacetime, corvettes would enable the Navy to expand presence and maritime security to underserved regions and provide more appropriate platforms for training and cooperation. Frigates will still be needed, even with a new corvette joining the U.S. fleet. Frigates would replace destroyers in escort operations to protect civilian and noncombatant ships, like supply vessels. They would also conduct maritime security operations in places such as the Persian Gulf or South China Sea, where piracy, trafficking and paramilitary attacks occur. Most importantly, frigates would lead ASW operations, where their towed sonar systems could be more capable than the systems used by current destroyers. Although ASW is an important naval mission, buying more frigates than planned to expand the Navy's ASW capacity is unnecessary and counterproductive. The Navy could gain more ASW capacity at lower cost and with less risk to manned ships by complementing its planned 20 frigates with unmanned systems including fixed sonars like SOSUS, deployable sonar systems that sit on the ocean floor, unmanned surface vessels that tow sonars and trail submarines, and unmanned aircraft that can deploy and monitor sonobuoys or attack submarines to suppress their operations or sink them. The U.S. Navy is at the beginning of a period of dramatic change. New technologies for autonomy, sensing, weapons and networking are enabling new concepts for naval missions at the same time fiscal constraints and pressure from great power competitors are making traditional approaches to naval operations obsolete or unsustainable. The Navy's frigate award is a great start toward the future fleet, but the Navy needs to take advantage of this opportunity and assess the best mix of ships to field the capabilities it needs within the resources it is likely to have. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where Timothy A. Walton works as a fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/11/build-a-fleet-not-a-constituency/

  • Space Force awards $88 million in contracts for launch system prototyping

    September 29, 2021 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR

    Space Force awards $88 million in contracts for launch system prototyping

    The contracts will help launch providers develop transformational capabilities, according to the Space Force.

  • A la recherche de l'IA hybride

    April 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    A la recherche de l'IA hybride

    Vice-président recherche, technologie, innovation du groupe Thales, David Sadek intervenait jeudi 24 octobre à Toulouse au Forum Innovation IA, un événement organisé par Sciences et Avenir pour le groupe Challenges. Explicabilité, validité, intégrité... " Pour une IA de confiance " : c'était l'intitulé de l'intervention de David Sadek, le vice-président recherche, technologie, innovation du groupe Thales. "Nous aimerions tous pouvoir toujours faire confiance à tous nos outils technologiques. Mais en réalité tout dépend du contexte. Dans le cas des outils reposant sur l'IA, si Netflix me recommande un film que je trouve détestable, ce n'est pas bien grave, on s'en remettra. Mais dans le cas des systèmes critiques tels que l'on en conçoit régulièrement chez Thales pour des applications défense, espace et aéronautique, la question de la confiance est primordiale". David Sadek énonce trois impératifs, qui sont autant d'axes stratégiques de la feuille de route IA chez Thales, pour aller vers cette " IA de confiance ". Pour qu'une application de l'IA soi digne de confiance, il faut d'abord qu'elle soit capable d'expliquer. Si elle se contente de proposer ou décider sans être capable de dire pourquoi et comment elle est arrivée à cette proposition ou décision, la défiance s'installera. Elle doit donc être capable de répondre à la question : " Pourquoi ? ". "Si par exemple un copilote IA recommande au pilote humain de virer à 45°, et que ce dernier demande " pourquoi ", le copilote doit pouvoir répondre par exemple : " parce qu'il y a un problème météo (ou une menace ...) droit devant ". Il ne s'agit pas de simplement tracer la décision, de pouvoir indiquer à ses concepteurs quels neurones, quelles couches de neurones, ont fait pencher la balance dans un sens ou un autre, mais bien d'expliquer dans une langue compréhensible immédiatement par le pilote". Ce qui indique qu'à l'aspect intelligence artificielle s'ajoute celui de " l'interaction homme-machine ". IA connexionniste et IA symbolique Cela implique, en restant sur cet exemple, une capacité de compréhension et de génération du langage naturel. Mieux, le pilote appréciera de pouvoir dialoguer dans un langage mixte, reposant sur l'oral et le geste (pour désigner un point sur une carte, etc.). Deuxième impératif selon David Sadek : il faut pouvoir démontrer la validité d'une application de l'IA. C'est-à-dire sa conformité aux spécifications. "Le système développé doit faire tout ce l'on attend de lui et rien que ce que l'on attend de lui. Ce qui suppose que l'on sache spécifier très proprement". On connait l'exemple d'un jeu de bataille navale, un " serious game " destiné à former des officiers de la marine, qui gagnait à tous les coups, parce qu'il sacrifiait systématiquement chaque vaisseau touché, pour ne pas ralentir la flotte. Aucune règle ne prévoyait, n'interdisait ce cas de figure, passablement inacceptable. Troisième impératif pour une " IA de confiance ", selon David Sadek, la responsabilité des systèmes reposant sur l'IA. C'est-à-dire leur conformité aux cadres légaux, réglementaires et moraux. On connait le tendon d'Achille des réseaux de neurones : ce sont des boîtes noires, on voit ce qui entre et ce qui sort, mais on ne sait pas (trop) ce qu'il se passe à l'intérieur. C'est pourquoi David Sadek insiste sur le fait qu'il faut s'intéresser aussi à " l'autre IA ", l'IA symbolique, celle qui repose sur des règles et des raisonnements et qui s'oppose à l'IA connexionniste des réseaux de neurones. Cette IA symbolique, qui fait moins les gros titres, qui n'a pas connu les progrès fulgurants de l'IA des réseaux de neurones, est plus à même de répondre à ces trois exigences : expliquer, valider, responsabilité. C'est pourquoi la réponse à cette triple exigence passe sans doute, entre autres, par " l'IA hybride ", une IA tirant parti de ces deux branches de l'intelligence artificielle. Par Pierre Vandeginste https://www.sciencesetavenir.fr/high-tech/intelligence-artificielle/ia-pvdg_138526

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