July 15, 2024 | International, Aerospace
The signature air-power program aims to be first such effort with artificial intelligence fully baked into every aspect.
June 20, 2023 | International, Naval
Elta and Atlas are joining underwater drones with an anti-submarine warfare sensor suite, though it's unclear whether the Germany Navy will spring for it.
June 12, 2020 | International, Aerospace
By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The Senate Armed Services Committee wants to give the Air Force more F-35 fighter jets and drones, but the panel's version of the 2021 defense policy bill leaves many questions open about the future of the service's legacy aircraft. In the Air Force's fiscal 2021 budget request, the service proposed retiring a number of its B-1 bombers, A-10 Warthog attack planes, RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drones, KC-135 and KC-10 tankers, and C-130H planes. Air Force leaders said the reductions were necessary to free up money needed for key investments in future technology areas like space and joint all-domain command and control. However, the proposed version of the FY21 National Defense Authorization Act passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 10 puts some limits on those proposed cuts. Instead of mandating the Air Force to retain a certain number of specific types of aircraft, SASC's defense bill “establishes a minimum number of aircraft for each major mission area ... and prohibits the divestment of aircraft until the minima are reached to ensure that Air Force can meet [National Defense Strategy] and combatant command requirements,” SASC said in a summary of the bill. But with only a summary of the bill available, it's unclear how that compares with the Air Force's planned inventory reductions and whether any retirements will be permitted at all. According to a committee staffer, the numbers proposed by SASC include a “primary mission aircraft inventory” of 1,182 fighters, 190 drones, 92 bombers, 412 tankers, 230 tactical airlift platforms, 235 strategic airlift platforms, 84 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, and 106 combat search-and-rescue aircraft. Specifically, the bill blocks the retirement of three A-10 Warthog squadrons, limits F-15C divestment, and delays the retirements of KC-10 and KC-135 tankers until after the KC-46's technical challenges are resolved. The Air Force had planned to retire 13 KC-135s and 16 KC-10s in FY21. The summary of the bill makes it clear the SASC is concerned that the Air Force's plan to trade existing aircraft for future capabilities could lead to a drop in near-term readiness as well as an scenario where legacy aircraft are never actually replaced. The bill “requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual aviation procurement plan across all services,” the summary stated. It includes language that cements the Air Force's aspiration to field 386 combat squadrons as a requirement, although one staffer clarified that the provision is more a goal than a mandate, and that there is no timeline associated with it. SASC's legislation is far from set in stone. The bill will move to the Senate floor for debate, but its House counterpart is working on its own version of the defense authorization bill, and both chambers will have to agree on a final bill. Where's the money going? The House and Senate Armed Services committees make funding recommendations, which are then used by congressional budgeteers in the appropriations committees to draw up the final funding bills. Nonetheless, SASC made a number of key funding authorizations that could mean major increases for certain aircraft programs. Unsurprisingly, it recommended a major increase for Lockheed Martin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, approving the purchase of 60 F-35A conventional-takeoff-and-landing models, 12 F-35B short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing variants, and 23 F-35C carrier-takeoff-and-landing aircraft. That's a net increase of 16 aircraft: 12 F-35As, two F-35Bs and two F-35Cs. General Atomics was another major beneficiary of the legislation. SASC authorized $165 million for additional MQ-1 Predator drones for the Army and $170.6 million for MQ-9 Reaper drones for the Air Force, which will keep the production line going ahead of a replacement program. It adds an extra $128 million for additional XQ-58 Valkyrie drones from Kratos. The Valkyrie is a low-cost combat drone currently being tested by the Air Force as part of the Low Cost Attritable Aircraft Technology effort, which seeks a “loyal wingman” aircraft that can penetrate contested environments and take on more risk than manned planes. The committee also calls for an LCAAT operational test plan and utility evaluation. It fully funded the Air Force's KC-46 tanker program and B-21 bomber program, according to SASC Chairman Jim Inhofe, R-Okla. The bill also “increases funding for critical capabilities that will help the United States maintain air superiority in contested environments, including Systems of Systems Technology Integration Tool Chain for Heterogeneous Electronic Systems (STITCHES) and advanced air-to-air weapons” https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/11/senate-defense-bill-puts-limits-on-planned-air-force-aircraft-retirements/
March 18, 2020 | International, C4ISR, Security
Mark Pomerleau The Department of Defense has not consistently mitigated cyber vulnerabilities identified in a 2012 report, according to the department's inspector general. The DoD IG issued a follow-on report to its 2012 report, issued March 13 and made public March 17, that determined cyber red teams didn't report the results of assessments to organizations and components didn't effectively correct or mitigate the identified vulnerabilities. The new report discovered that components didn't consistently mitigate or include unmitigated vulnerabilities identified in the prior audit and during this audit by red teams during combatant command exercises, operational testing assessments and agency-specific assessments in plans of action and milestones. “Ensuring DoD Components mitigate vulnerabilities is essential to achieve a better return on investment,” the report stated. “In addition, we determined that the DoD did not establish a unified approach to support and prioritize DoD Cyber Red Team missions. Instead, the DoD Components implemented Component-specific approaches to staff, train and develop tools for DoD Cyber Red Teams, and prioritize DoD Cyber Red Team missions.” The report found that DoD didn't establish a unified approach because it didn't assign an organization with responsibility to oversee and synchronize red team activity based on priorities, it didn't assess the resources needed for each red team and identify requirements to train them to meet priorities and it didn't develop baseline tools to perform assessments. “Without an enterprisewide solution to staff, train and develop tools for DoD Cyber Red Teams and prioritize their missions, DoD Cyber Red Teams have not met current mission requests and will not meet future requests because of the increased demands for DoD Cyber Red Team services,” the report said. “Until the DoD assigns an organization to assess DoD Cyber Red Team resources, it will be unable to determine the number of DoD Cyber Red Teams and staffing of each team to support mission needs, which will impact the Do D's ability to identify vulnerabilities and take corrective actions that limit malicious actors from compromising DoD operations.” The DoD IG issued seven recommendations the secretary of defense assign an organization responsibility for. They include: Review and assess red team reports for systemic vulnerabilities and coordinate the development and implementation of enterprise solutions to mitigate them; Ensure components develop and implement a risk-based process to assess the impact of identified vulnerabilities and prioritize funding for corrective actions for high-risk vulnerabilities; Ensure components develop and implement processes for providing reports with red team findings and recommendations to organizations with responsibility for corrective actions; Develop processes and procedures to oversee red team activities, including synchronizing and prioritizing red team missions, to ensure activities align with priorities; Perform a joint DoD-wide mission-impact analysis to determine the number of red teams, minimum staffing levels of each team, the composition of the staffing levels needed to meet current and future mission requests; Assess and identify a baseline of core and specialized training standards, based on the three red team roles that team staff must meet for the team to be certified and accredited; and Identify and develop baseline tools needed by red teams to perform missions. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2020/03/17/the-pentagon-is-handling-cyber-vulnerabilities-inconsistently/