Here’s how much one future TF-X fighter jet will cost Turkey

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  January 10, 2020 | International, C4ISR, Security

  How tensions with Iran could test a new cyber strategy

  Mark Pomerleau In 2018, the Department of Defense began following a new philosophy for cyber operations to better protect U.S. networks and infrastructure. Known as “defend forward,” the approach allows U.S. cyber forces to be active in foreign network outside the United States to either act against adversaries or warn allies of impending cyber activity that they've observed on foreign networks. After the U.S. military killed an Iranian general in a Jan. 2 drone strike and after national security experts said they expect Iran might take some retaliatory action through cyber operations, the specter of increased cyber attacks against U.S. networks puts Cyber Command and its new approach front and center. “This Iran situation today is a big test of the ‘defend forward' approach of this administration,” James Miller, senior fellow at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and former undersecretary of defense for policy, said at a Jan. 7 event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations. “Will [Cyber Command] take preventative action? Will they do it in a way that our allies and partners support and that can be explained to the public?” While Iran fired several missiles Jan. 7 at a base in Iraq where U.S. troops lived as an initial response to the drone strike, many national security experts expect Iran could continue cyber actions as further retaliation for the strike. Iran could also ratchet up its cyber operations in the United States following the collapse of portions of the 2015 nuclear deal between the United States, Iran and five other nations to curb Iran's nuclear weapons capability in return for sanctions relief. Over the past 12 months, the White House and Congress streamlined many of the authorities used to conduct cyber operations to help cyber forces to get ahead of threats in networks around the world. One such provision in last year's annual defense policy bill provides the Pentagon with the authority to act in foreign networks if Iran, among other named nations, is conducting active, systematic and ongoing campaigns of attacks against the U.S. government or people. Cyber Command declined to comment on what, if anything, they were doing differently since the drone strike. Some experts, however, have expressed caution when assessing how well this defend forward approach has worked thus far given it is still relatively new. “The jury is very much still out here,” Ben Buchanan, assistant professor and senor faculty fellow at Georgetown University, said at the same event. “We don't have a lot of data, there's been a lot of hand-wringing ... about these authorities and about how Cyber Command may or may not be using them. I just don't think we've seen enough to judge whether or not ... [it is] meaningfully changing adversary behavior.” Others have also expressed reservations about how effective Iran can even be in cyberspace toward U.S. networks. “Iran is a capable cyber actor, Iran is a wiling cyber actor. That means Iran will conduct cyberattacks,” said Jacquelyn Schneider, Hoover fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. “It's not like they have this capability and they've been deterred in the past and maybe now they're going to turn it on. I think they've been trying this entire time.” Complicating matters further could be other actors trying to take advantage of U.S.-Iran imbroglio for their own interests. Priscilla Moriuchi, senior principal researcher and head of nation-state research at threat intelligence firm Recorded Future, said over the past several months, there have been reports of Russian state-affiliated actors hijacking Iranian cyber infrastructure to conduct operations masquerading as Iranians. “That creates its own uncertainty,” she said at the same event. “Another level of potential what we call inadvertent escalation if a country perceives that they are attacked by Iran but in reality, it” wasn't. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2020/01/09/how-tensions-with-iran-could-test-a-new-cyber-strategy/

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  June 27, 2024 | International, Aerospace

  Impact of Gaza aid pier to be investigated by Pentagon watchdog

  The humanitarian mission has faced a number of problems since it first anchored off the coast of Gaza in May.

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  August 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Potential defense budget cuts demand a new calculus

  By: Lt. Gen. David Deptula (ret.) and Douglas A. Birkey With the U.S. election around the corner and the economic impact of COVID-19 mounting, calls for defense spending cuts are on the rise. The practicality of reductions is questionable given the scale and scope of the threat environment, the reality that key elements of the military are decaying, and that defense jobs represent one bright spot in an otherwise bleak economy. If cuts are coming, it is crucial to execute them in a fashion that prioritizes the most effective, efficient and valuable capabilities within the Department of Defense. This requires a new approach to assessing weapon systems' value. Defense programs are traditionally measured in a service-centric fashion based primarily upon two metrics: unit cost, and individual operating and support costs. Think about this in the context of buying a car and expenses associated with gas and maintenance. However, not all vehicles are created equal, with a compact car far different than a large SUV. Relative capabilities are essential when understanding how to best meet mission goals effectively and efficiently. To this point, when it comes to military systems, a much more relevant determination of merit is “cost per effect” — measuring the expense associated with achieving desired mission results. These sorts of comparisons are far from theoretical. On the first night of Desert Storm, it took 41 non-stealth aircraft to hit one target. At the same time, 20 F-117 stealth fighters struck 28 separate targets. Without the protection afforded by stealth, it took a large airborne team to protect the eight bomb-carrying aircraft striking one target. This gets to the crux of the cost-effectiveness challenge. Even though the non-stealth aircraft each cost less from an individual unit aircraft perspective, the F-117s yielded far more mission results at less risk for far less enterprise cost. However, during the last few budget downturns, decision-makers too often cut weapon systems that appeared “expensive” on a spreadsheet but actually delivered far greater effects for less cost. This year saw the Air Force seeking to retire 17 of its B-1 bombers even though a single B-1 can deliver as much or more ordnance than an entire aircraft carrier air wing, depending on the operational realities of range and payload. Production lines for the B-2 and F-22 — respectively the most advanced and capable bomber and fighter ever built — were terminated well before their validated military requirement was filled. Cost-per-effect analysis would have yielded very different determinations. These decisions continue to have very significant consequences. The security environment today is much more dangerous than at any time since the end of the Cold War, and U.S. forces are stretched thin. Smart investments are essential to yield necessary mission results. The U.S. military no longer has the capacity to bludgeon its way to victory through mass as it did in World War II. This is exactly why military leaders are embracing the need to harness information in their future war-fighting construct. Joint All-Domain Command and Control centers around understanding the battlespace in a real-time fashion to seek favorable pathways to achieve mission objectives, minimize the dangers posed by enemy threats and collaboratively team weapon systems to yield enhanced results. This is an incredibly smart approach. However, it is also wholly incongruous, with analysis centered around unit cost and individual operating expenses. If victory is going to be secured through the sum of parts, then we need to stop focusing on unilateral analysis absent broader context. Cost per effect can be applied to any mission area — the measurement points simply need to be tailored to relevant data sets. Accordingly, if we look at high-end air superiority and strike missions, it is important to consider the ability to net results in a precise fashion. This is simple — not only does “one bomb or missile, one target” save money, but it also frees up forces to execute other tasks. It is also important to consider survivability. Large, self-protecting, non-stealth strike packages akin to the Desert Storm example are incredibly expensive. Replacing a plane and pilot is not cheap. Additionally, losses reduce the force employment options available to commanders. Fifth-generation technology attributes are also crucial — the combination of stealth, sensors, processing power, fusion engines, and real-time command-and-control links to penetrate defended adversary regions and understand how best to attain desired effects, while minimizing vulnerability. Finally, range and payload are also very important — a single aircraft able to fly farther and carry more missiles or bombs drives effectiveness and efficiency. Assessing these attributes — all of which are measurable — validate precisely why aircraft like the F-35 and B-21 are so important. Nor should these assessments be restricted within a service. That is not how combat commanders fight. They focus on missions, not service ownership. If cuts to defense are coming, then it is crucial that the DoD maintain the most effective, efficient options, regardless of service. If past DoD budget cuts are any indicator, DoD budget “experts” will once again resort to their traditional monetary spreadsheets focused on unit cost and service-focused budget columns. Leadership from the very highest levels is crucial to ensure the very best options are preserved and prioritized. Joint cost-per-effect analysis is what will ensure a given amount of money will yield the most value at a time when it matters the most. Retired U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula is dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Power Studies. He has more than 3,000 flying hours under his belt, and he planned the Desert Storm air campaign and orchestrated air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan. Douglas A. Birkey is the executive director of the Mitchell Institute, where he researches issues relating to the future of aerospace and national security. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/31/potential-defense-budget-cuts-demand-a-new-calculus/