September 22, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security, Other Defence
COLOGNE, Germany — Time is ticking for Germany to find a compromise on letting American, British and other non-European Union countries tap into the bloc's emerging defense cooperation scheme.
The government of Chancellor Angela Merkel has taken on the task of sorting out the issue by the end of the year, when Germany's six-month term at the helm of the European Council concludes.
“It is an important issue to solve, particularly for close NATO partners,” Karl-Heinz Kamp, special envoy of the political director at the German Ministry of Defence, said during a panel discussion at the annual Defense News Conference this month.
The challenge is to find common ground between two camps within the EU: member states seeking ties with outsiders, and those countries who prefer treating the nascent defense agenda as a members-only affair.
Poland, Sweden and the Netherlands are leading a group of nations advocating for openness. But France, for example, is pursuing a more restrictive stance, especially toward Turkey and the United States.
From the beginning, the Trump administration has eyed the EU's creation of a defense cooperation mechanism, dubbed PESCO, and the proposed multibillion-dollar European Defence Fund with a degree of mistrust. The efforts run the risk of undermining NATO if America and its powerful defense companies are kept out, Washington claims.
The tone has softened more recently, however, as officials on both sides of the Atlantic try to broker a compromise.
“One of the things that COVID-19 has really brought into sharp focus is the significance of our integrated defense industrial base,” said Gregory Kausner, executive director for international cooperation, who works in the Pentagon for acquisition chief Ellen Lord.
At NATO headquarters in Brussels, leaders are striking a similar chord.
“We welcome the EU's effort to invest in defense, and I think altogether this is a good-news story. In a way, the more money put into defense, including by EU institutions, the better,” said Camille Grand, the alliance's assistant secretary general for defense investment.
“Then there is a second point: that it is important those projects are allowed as full as possible [the] involvement of non-EU allies. Because the reality is indeed that those non-EU allies have strong connections with the European defense market, with the European defense industry,” Grand added.
German officials have been optimistic about reaching a compromise since they took on the third-country challenge this summer. That is because their proposal piggybacks on a paper by the previous, Finnish-run presidency that was only narrowly rejected last year. A few modifications would be enough to clinch a deal.
According to a German MoD spokesman, officials aim to present a workable solution to defense ministers at an EU foreign affairs council meeting slated for Nov. 20.
Poisoned politics
The current political context hasn't exactly been helpful for forging a deal.
For one, there is the frosty climate between Germany and United States that stems from President Donald Trump's testy relationship with the country, and his assertion that the EU is taking advantage of American taxpayers on trade and defense. That rift makes the proposition of importing the powerful American defense industrial base into the bloc's defense cooperation calculus an uphill battle, especially in the European Parliament, a Brussels-based analyst argued.
And Turkey, which is part of NATO but not the EU, is creating the perfect case study against allowing nonmembers into the inner workings of European defense cooperation because of its dispute with Greece and Cyprus over gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.
“The German government is fairly optimistic that we will be able to find a compromise. The problem is that currently neither the Turkish policy nor the U.S. policy terribly helps to find such a consensus,” Kamp said.
“We have a severe problem in NATO with its internal cohesion because some allies have issues with other allies,” he added. “We have a Turkish-French dispute in the Mediterranean and we have a Greek-Turkish dispute. Turkey is not always behaving in — let me say — in the way of an ideal NATO ally, and that just makes things a little bit more difficult.”
At the same time, the flareup has yet to touch the ongoing third-party access negotiations, according to officials and analysts.
“Concerns over dependencies, intellectual property and security predate the standoff between Greece and Turkey," said Yvonni-Stefania Efstathiou, a Greece-based defense analyst.
Meanwhile, Pentagon officials have begun diving into a set of case studies designed to help them think through the nitty-gritty involved in setting up future cooperative programs under an EU umbrella, according to Kausner. “Those case studies illuminate the potential challenges on things such as intellectual property and re-transfer that we feel are still problematic,” the Defense Department official said.
Another avenue to glean lessons for a wider EU application lies in the so-called European Defence Industrial Development Programme, or EDIDP, which aims to boost the bloc's defense industry cooperation through all manners of military technology. In June, the European Commission announced 16 projects eligible for funding from a two-year, €500 million (U.S. $593 million) pot.
The selection includes “four participants controlled by entities from Canada, Japan and the United States,” the commission statement read. In theory, those projects “demonstrate the possibility to involve EU-based subsidiaries controlled by third countries or third country entities provided they fulfill appropriate security-based guarantees approved by Member States,” the statement noted.
The commission has yet to say which participants hail from North America and Japan, and what roles they play, which suggests their integration into the project structure remains unfinished.
As officials continue to sort out the details on intellectual property rights, liabilities and consortium structures, for example, a few principles are beginning to take shape. For one, the four non-EU countries in the European Free Trade Association — Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland — stand to get rights to partake in EU defense projects similar to member states.
In addition, officials consider it easier to include British or American companies in projects when they are removed from immediate funding through the European Defence Fund. While European companies have their eyes on possible subsidies from the fund whenever they enter into PESCO agreements, there may not be an automatic funding eligibility for outside participants.
February 28, 2023 | International, Aerospace
The U.S. Air Force plans to buy 26 Boeing Co E-7A airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) planes to replace its ageing fleet of E-3s, the Department of the Air Force said on Tuesday, as it announced a contract worth up to $1.2 billion.
June 11, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
By: Laicie Heeley As the host of a national security podcast literally named “Things That Go Boom,” I spend a lot of my time thinking about what keeps us safe. And usually these thoughts are pretty focused on big, obvious threats — things like bombs. But with the world seemingly imploding, a global pandemic spreading, nationwide protests against police brutality erupting and world economies tanking, it's clearer than ever that we've been preparing for the wrong crisis. You could say we were preparing for World War III, when we got hammered by World War C. Staying safe means recognizing what threats we're facing — the ones we're expecting and the ones that might catch us off guard. But we didn't do that. Instead we invested hundreds of billions of dollars in weapons and wars while the coronavirus slipped silently and invisibly across our borders, into our homes and even onto our military aircraft carriers. The greatest threats of the past decade have come in the form of a deadly virus, climate-related natural disasters, economic meltdowns, and attacks on free and fair elections. So why are expensive weapons systems and massive military installations still a foregone conclusion? America spends over $700 billion a year on our national defense. That's about a sixth of our overall budget and more than health care, education and all the rest of our discretionary spending combined. And the money is solid, meaning that most of the time, it's not subject to normal swings in the economy. Things are bad? We can't let the military feel the pain. Things are good? The military has to prepare for the next big threat. Bad or good, it's always a great time to invest. You can't put a price tag on security, they say. And they don't. According to the Watson Institute's Costs of War Project, America's war on terror — which now spans more than 80 countries — has cost taxpayers over $6 trillion since 2001, with no signs of slowing down. And in its latest budget proposal, the Trump administration proposed spending $20 billion more on military programs than on all other federal programs combined. Conversely, in 2018, the Trump administration cut the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's budget by 80 percent, forcing it to scale back its efforts to prevent epidemics in 39 of 49 countries, including China. These and other major cuts to global health spending left the U.S. unprepared for the crisis we're facing now. As vital American businesses — from my son's preschool to our friends' farm — struggle to survive, the defense industry has unsurprisingly had no such problem. In late April, for example, some contractors received a windfall of business when the State Department approved over $2 billion in weapons sales to repressive regimes like India, Morocco and the Philippines, with more supposedly on the way. The defense industry is doing so well in fact that it is showing up on investment lists as an example of one of the best places to “hedge in hard times.” Despite their already deep financial pockets, Congress decided to give these huge contractors billions of dollars in coronavirus relief funds. This comes as a bit of a surprise when you consider that the Pentagon just recently diverted $13.3 billion in unused funds for the construction of the president's border wall. And the first-ever audit of the Department of Defense revealed that it failed to spend almost $28 billion from 2013-2018, all the while asking for more funding. Unfortunately, experts believe this money, which is supposed to be used to help keep workers safe and employed, will instead only help make the companies' executives richer. We're already seeing this play out. Deemed “essential workers” due to the pending arms sales, workers in these manufacturing plants recently went on strike after they were forced to go to work even as a number of their colleagues tested positive for coronavirus. Flush with additional resources from a growing military budget, and as other departments' budgets have been cut, the Pentagon has also become deeply embedded in domestic affairs. Last year, Defense Secretary Mark Esper went so far as to proclaim election security a core part of the Pentagon's mission, despite the hesitance of past officials to allow such forms of military creep. The separation of the civilian and the military is one of the hallmarks of our democracy. The breakdown of these norms isn't good for our country, and it isn't good for the Pentagon, which has already sounded the alarm on what the military can — and cannot — do to deal with the pandemic. What's more, the migration of funds to the Pentagon saps other agencies of vital and limited resources. By many accounts, it also makes us worse at winning wars, as the Pentagon foregoes more focused and essential strategic planning in favor of a do-it-all, buy-it-all reality. Consider that some estimates put the annual cost of eradicating homelessness in the United States at about $20 billion, and the cost of eradicating hunger in America at about $26 billion. And consider, in the midst of an outbreak, that we could buy 2,200 ventilators for the price of one F-35. It doesn't have to be this way. While some may see the Pentagon budget as a sacred cow, it's not. Reconsidering our spending to invest more heavily in the programs that really keep us safe is not only possible, but long overdue. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/10/we-prepared-for-war-but-should-have-spent-our-money-elsewhere/
November 1, 2022 | International, Aerospace
31 octobre 2022, par Arnaud. L'Élysée semble vouloir aller vite sur ce dossier, quitte à bousculer un peu les habitudes françaises. Lors d'une réunion avec de nombreux