German firm sees U.S. getting lion's share of 100 billion euro military fund

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  September 21, 2020 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR, Security

  Short-range air defense is making a comeback

  Brig. Gen. Shachar Shohat (ret.) Recent events in the Middle East have led some to wonder how countries, including Israel, can protect their own strategic installations. Israel's adversaries, such as Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, have threatened to strike sensitive Israeli targets. Saudi Arabia absorbed a painful strike in September 2019 when an Iranian drone swarm combined with cruise missiles struck oil fields, causing heavy damage. The attack on Saudi Arabia is the latest tangible example of the evolving threat: precision-guided, sophisticated enemy air attacks. Each country designates its own strategic sites for special defense. They range from nuclear power plants to air force bases to Olympic stadiums. And the hardening of defenses around strategic sites was especially prominent until around three decades ago. At that time, attackers using close-range munitions had to approach a given site in order to attack it. Visual contact was often required, and simple air-to-ground munitions would suffice for an attack. Defense systems of that time were similarly simplistic. Air force bases might be protected by a 40mm anti-aircraft cannon, for example, in order to prevent a direct attack on a runway. That same concept would be applied to any sites deemed critical by a state. In addition to being limited in range, though, such defenses required many munitions and high numbers of personnel. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a revolution in the world of weaponry. Precision, long-range (standoff) munitions entered the battle arenas, and close-range air defenses became largely obsolete. Once attackers no longer needed proximity to their targets, close-range defenses could neither hit the longer-range munitions nor their launchers. But over the past decade, we have seen the addition of GPS-guidance systems to those munitions. The advent of this technology, combined with the overall revolution of the '80s and '90s, has heightened the need for states to return to close-range air defenses — but in a new configuration. Additional systems are now in the pipeline. Small, affordable interceptor missiles and laser beam defenses are the answers to the new categories of close-range threats seen around the world, including gliding bombs, cruise missiles and drones. In 2019, the Iranians proved that if they have intelligence on their target and the ability to send munitions to the “blind spot” of radars, attacks can be successful. That attack should serve as a “wake-up call” for countries around the world. If states want to protect strategic sites, radars that look in every direction, 360 degrees, 24 hours a day, are needed. Effective new defense systems must now be multidirectional in their detection of incoming threats, a response to the enemy's ability to turn, steer and evade radar coverage and detection. That coverage must be combined with multiple layers of defense, including defense mechanisms very close to the asset being defended. Examples of what is now needed for strategic sites' defenses are already evident in the realm of military vehicles. The Israel Defense Forces installed the Trophy defense system on a growing number of tanks and armored personnel carriers as a result of a series of incidents in Lebanon and Gaza. Airframes also need such systems, as the downing of an Israeli transport helicopter by Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War demonstrated, as do ships — and so too do strategic assets. The age-old military axiom asserts that lines of defense will always be breached. As such, we must develop the maximum number of opportunities for interception possible. Longer-range air defense systems, such as the Patriot, David's Sling or the S-400 can intercept threats at tens or hundreds of kilometers away. But today, because state enemies can bypass long-range defenses, countries must always have the ability to directly intercept the actual munitions. Without close-defense capabilities forming part of a country's multilayer defense systems, strategic sites are simply not adequately protected. In the context of multilayer defense development and deployment around strategic sites and sensitive targets, Israel has taken on the role of global leader. In 2020, short-range air defenses are making a comeback, and this time they are set to remain as a permanent fixture. Retired Brig. Gen. Shachar Shohat served as a chief commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces and a publishing expert at The MirYam Institute. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/09/18/short-range-air-defense-is-making-a-comeback/

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  May 6, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Expand missile defenses during the pandemic, don’t cut them

  By: Rebeccah L. Heinrichs Rogue states are taking advantage of the American preoccupation with the COVID-19 pandemic. North Korea may test another long-range missile according to the head of U.S. Northern Command, Gen. Terrence O'Shaughnessy. He warned Congress in March that the North Korean regime is still a serious threat and is improving its missile program. And last week, Iran's Revolutionary Guard successfully launched a satellite into space. This was the first for the terrorist paramilitary group, though not the first for the regime. The pandemic is likely to prompt Congress to reassess, cut and redirect spending, but safeguarding the American people from missile attack is an essential service the government cannot afford to scale back. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Rob Soofer said at a recent Hudson Institute event: “[T]oday we are in an advantageous position vis-a-vis North Korea. Forty-four ground-based interceptors. Gen. O'Shaughnessy has complete confidence that the system will work and we can address the threat. Then the question is: Can we wait until 2028?” The Trump administration intends to deploy in 2028 the Next Generation Interceptor, or NGI, meant to handle far more complicated missile threats than what the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, system was initially designed to do. Still, as Dr. Soofer explained, threats develop at an unpredictable pace, and so the Pentagon is pushing for initiatives to bolster defense in the meantime. Those initiatives will require serious bipartisan cooperation while concurrently developing the NGI and pursuing other advanced capabilities meant to dramatically increase the ability of the missile defense architecture. It's a tall order, but critical, nonetheless. First, and to be clear, the Pentagon has not yet embraced this step due to its determination to focus on NGI. But Congress should invest in more than just sustaining the current GMD system; it should improve it by adding 20 GBIs to the already fielded 44. The silos will be prepared for the additional numbers since, in 2017, President Donald Trump called for adding more deployed GBIs considering the heightened North Korea missile threat. The Pentagon began work on preparing for their delivery but never emplaced GBIs into those silos because Pentagon officials canceled the Redesigned Kill Vehicle. The Pentagon had anticipated the Redesigned Kill Vehicle for the nation's new GBIs. After evaluating the resources and time it would take to restart the production line of the Capability Enhancement II interceptors or to rapidly develop an improved kill vehicle that leverages new technology, the Pentagon should choose the most cost-effective solution. Recall, the Capability Enhancement II was the kill vehicle that performed well in the last complex flight test, which was the first salvo engagement of a threat-representative intercontinental ballistic missile target by GBIs. Regardless of the option the Pentagon would choose, the result would be a near-term enhanced capability by either increased capacity at a minimum, or an increased capacity with improved kill vehicles on 20 of the 64 at best. Either would be a much better scenario than keeping the backbone of homeland defenses stagnant while we anticipate the NGI in 2028. But that is not all the country should do. It should also move forward with steps the Pentagon has embraced. Those steps include improving the discrimination radar capability in the next few years so GMD can better detect and characterize the evolving threat, and deploying other existing systems to bolster GMD. Utilizing current systems with impressive testing records against missiles shorter than ICBM range as part of a layered homeland defense is called the “underlay.” As a key component of the underlay, Congress has directed the Pentagon to test the Aegis SM-3 IIA interceptor against an ICBM target. Unfortunately, because of the pandemic, the Missile Defense Agency's planned flight tests will be delayed, including for the SM-3 IIA. The threats facing the country will not wait for the end of the pandemic, and the Pentagon should reconsider that delay. As soon as the country can test the system, and if it is a success, it would be wise to prepare to deploy Aegis SM-3 IIA as the threat requires. If there is an ICBM attack against the U.S. homeland, a GBI would have the first shot at the incoming missile while it's in its midcourse phase of flight; and if an enemy missile gets through, and the Aegis SM-3 IIA is positioned correctly, it could have another shot at the missile as it begins its descent. There has been some concern about whether Russia or China have legitimate claims that bolstering homeland defense in this way is destabilizing. But no evidence supports these claims, and, as Dr. Jim Miller, an Obama-era undersecretary of defense for policy, said at a recent Hudson event: “We cannot and must not give Russia or China a veto over the United States' ability to defend ourselves from North Korea and Iran. That is an absolute no-go for any administration.” Another system that is a natural candidate for the underlay is the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense air defense system. Embracing that concept as well, Dr. Miller said: “It makes sense for certain contexts. And if you're looking at a shorter-range missile and a relatively small footprint of coverage, THAAD has a real chance to contribute in that. To me, that's certainly the case for Guam and Hawaii.” But what about cost? That's the $10 billion question — a question that happens to be valued at more than the current president's budget requires for the Missile Defense Agency. The budget request that Congress is currently considering for the MDA is roughly $9.2 billion, noticeably less than previous years, even as the role of missile defense is supposed to be expanding in the country's National Security Strategy. There is no margin for cutting the budget. Congress should rally around this mission and budget, and it should increase funding to sufficiently make these necessary improvements in the near term without paying for them by sacrificing investments like NGI for the not-so-distant future. It can do that without tipping the scale much more than $10 billion this year. That is eminently reasonable given the pressure every government department will feel after the sudden spending splurge due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Rebeccah L. Heinrichs is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute where she specializes in nuclear deterrence and missile defense. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/05/expand-missile-defenses-during-the-pandemic-dont-cut-them/

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  January 10, 2019 | International, C4ISR

  U.S. Air Force Contracts Lockheed Martin To Continue GPS Ground Control System Sustainment

  COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo., January 9, 2019 – The U.S. Air Force awarded Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) the GPS Control Segment Sustainment II (GCS II) contract to continue to sustain and further modernize the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation's ground control system through 2025. This is the follow-on contract to Lockheed Martin's current GCS contract awarded in 2013. Under the GCS II contract, the continued upgrade of the GPS Architecture Evolution Plan Operational Control Segment (AEP OCS) will allow GPS' legacy ground control system to support GPS III satellite on-orbit operations, developed under the GPS III Contingency Operations (COps) program. COps will enable the AEP OCS to support the positioning, navigation and timing missions of the Air Force's new GPS III satellites, which began launching in 2018. In addition, GCS II will sustain the operational M-code capability being deployed in 2020 that is in development under the M-code Early Use (MCEU) contract. Operational M-code is a critical warfighter capability to support missions in contested environments. Under the GCS contract, Lockheed Martin executed numerous engineering modifications to the OCS, including the COTS Upgrade 3(CUP3)/Ground Antenna Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) Interface Technology Refresh (GAITR) upgrade, the Remote Site COTS Network (RSCN) project, the GPS Information Protection Reinforcement (GIPR) project, the COTS Upgrade #2 (CUP2) project, and Red Dragon Cybersecurity Suite (RDCSS). These projects modernized the infrastructure, improved the cyber posture and added mission capability. The GCS II contract continues that commitment to evolving the OCS to address today's mission needs. Under GCS II, LM will continue to manage the technical baselines for the OCS and GPS Information Network (GIN) and regularly procure, develop, fabricate, integrate, test, and install software and hardware modifications into the GPS operational baseline. Focus areas will be performing a technical refresh of the GIN and increasing the resiliency of the OCS. “Lockheed Martin's experience integrating GCS projects as well as the system engineering and software integration performed on GPS III Contingency Operations (COps) and M-Code Early Use (MCEU) position us well to deliver GCS II,” says Maria Demaree, VP/GM Mission Solutions for Lockheed Martin Space. “We look forward to supporting the Air Force as it deploys the next generation GPS III satellites and their new capabilities for our warfighters.” For additional GPS Ground Control System information, photos and video visit: https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/gps.html. About Lockheed Martin Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed Martin is a global security and aerospace company that employs approximately 100,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/news-releases?item=128657