From the Spider to the Griffo, Leonardo launches radar and comms systems

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  May 15, 2023 | International, Aerospace

  Macron: France open to training Ukraine fighter jet pilots

  French President Emmanuel Macron said in an interview with France's TF1 television on Monday that France is open to training Ukrainian fighter jet pilots in France and that those training programmes could start right away.

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  June 8, 2020 | International, C4ISR, Security

  GAO Chides DoD For Absence Of Cybersecurity Requirements

  Overall, costs of major DoD acquisition programs have grown by 54 percent over their lifetimes and schedule delays average two years, GAO's annual report finds. By THERESA HITCHENS WASHINGTON: Five years after the Pentagon demanded every weapon system include the requirement that it be able to fight through Russian and Chinese cyber attacks expected on future battlefields, DoD “does not often include cybersecurity” in key performance parameters (KPP) for major programs, says GAO in its annual defense acquisition review. Of the three services, the Air Force is the worst at fulfilling two of the three best cybersecurity practices, the report says. The congressional watchdog found “inconsistent implementation of leading software practices and cybersecurity measures” among high-dollar “major defense acquisition programs” (MDAPs) — 85 programs worth $1.80 trillion at the end of 2019. “This included longer-than-expected delivery times for software and delays completing cybersecurity assessments— outcomes disruptive to DOD's efforts to keep pace with warfighters' needs for enhanced, software-dependent capabilities and protect weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cybersecurity threats,” GAO said in the June 3 report. Cybersecurity KPPs Left Out The GAO report explains that KPP “are considered the most critical requirements by the sponsor military organization, while key system attributes (KSA) and other performance attributes are considered essential for an effective military capability.” In 2015, DOD modified its main requirements policy—the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual (JCIDS) rules on “survivability” requirements to include the ability to operate in a “degraded cyber environment.” Yet, GAO found that, at the end of 2019, 25 of the 42 major acquisition programs reviewed regarding cybersecurity practices failed to include cybersecurity as a parameter in their KPPs; “even more programs reported that their KSAs did not address cybersecurity.” GAO has targeted cybersecurity, software development and DoD-wide information technology (IT) improvement programs in its recent annual reviews because DoD weapon systems “are more networked than ever before — a change that while providing benefits for the warfighter also “has come at a cost” because “more weapon components can now be attacked using cybersecurity capabilities,” GAO explains. “Further, networks can be used as a pathway to attack other systems.” The watchdog has found consistently that failing to bake in cybersecurity requirements to system design and development ends up costing more money and time when program offices struggle to re-engineer systems once they hit production. This is a problem that affects most types of software development; and similarly trying to upgrade or replace software to improve cybersecurity often proves impossible. The 2019 report thus “looked at DOD's progress with developing: (1) strategies that help ensure that programs are planning for and documenting cybersecurity risk management efforts (cybersecurity strategies), (2) evaluations that allow testers to identify systems' weaknesses that are susceptible to cybersecurity attacks and that could potentially jeopardize mission execution (cybersecurity vulnerability evaluations), and (3) assessments that evaluate the ability of a unit equipped with a system to support assigned missions (cybersecurity assessments).” Most of the 38 MDAPs reviewed reported creation of cybersecurity strategies. However, of the 19 major programs that require cybersecurity vulnerability evaluations — under regulations set by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord — 11 have not completed them or failed to do so on time. Another three said they didn't have a schedule yet for doing so; and one — an unnamed Air Force program — told GAO it actually didn't know if it had undertaken the required evaluation. Indeed, the Air Force had the worst record on the evaluations, with none of its six programs having completed the evaluation processes. Of the 42 programs, 14 told GAO they had not finished their cybersecurity assessments. GAO also “found variation among the military departments in the rates they had completed these assessments. Specifically, among the three military departments, the Army reported the best rate for programs conducting cybersecurity assessments, while the Air Force had the lowest rate.” IT and Software Problems Plague Programs “Over the years, weapon acquisition program officials, through their responses to our questionnaires, have consistently acknowledged software development as a risk item in their efforts to develop and field capabilities to the warfighter, and this year is no different,” GAO reported somewhat wryly. GAO found that more than a quarter of the 42 MDAPs reviewed reported cost growth from software changes but admitted that “details are limited” in DoD reporting. Part of that uncertainty might be due to the fact that GAO found a number of major programs are transitioning to commercial approaches to software development, such as “agile development” that involves introducing incremental improvements over time. However, GAO found, “deliveries often lag behind industry standards.” Indeed, Air Force acquisition czar Will Roper told a webinar yesterday sponsored by Dcode, a tech innovation hub connecting commercial industry to government agencies, that while the Air Force can't go back and re-do old programs, “every new contract we do has to include DevSecOps.” “We are all in,” he added, “it's going to change the world.” DevSecOps stands for “development, security and operations,” and is a framework and tools for “designing in” software and cybersecurity. Roper long has been a key champion within DoD for moving to commercial practices and has repeatedly said he wants the Air Force to become a “software company.” GAO said that officials from 26 of the MDAPs regarding software development reported that software concerns had created risks at some point during their program's history. The biggest problem faced was — you guessed it — changes necessitated to ensure cybersecurity. The second biggest program was that the software development simply was “more difficult than expected.” Hardware design changes also played a big role in creating software problems, requiring subsequent changes in software configurations. Interestingly, while often bemoaned as a cause for program delays, requirements changes came in at the low of end of the reported issues troubling software development. Of the 15 major DoD IT programs reviewed, worth $15.1 million, 10 had delays in their original baseline schedules. But on the bright side, 11 showed decreased life cycle cost estimates. Further, all 15 have cybersecurity strategies as required by DoD regulations, and most reported having undertaken in 2019 at least one operational cybersecurity test. That said, “less than half reported conducting developmental cybersecurity testing,” GAO found. And according to DoD's own “Cybersecurity Testing and Evaluation Guidebook,” GAO scolds, “not conducting developmental cybersecurity testing puts programs at an increased risk of cost and schedule growth and poor program performance. Cost and Schedule Growth Stabilizes As it does every year, GAO also reviewed all 85 MDAPs for cost and schedule growth, and on that front the news is good: GAO found that the programs DoD Overview “have generally stabilized non-quantity related — (i.e. meaning not related to buy more stuff) — cost growth and schedule growth.” “Between 2018 and 2019, total acquisition cost estimates for DoD's 85 current MDAPs grew by a combined $64 billion (a 4 percent increase), growth that was driven by decisions to increase planned quantities of some weapon systems,” GAO found. “For example, DoD more than doubled in the past year the total number of missiles it plans to acquire through the Air Force's Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program.” And some programs actually lowered their year-average costs. GAO found that 55 MDAPs (more than half) “had lower average procurement unit costs since last year. Examples of programs with lower unit costs include the Navy's Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (16 percent decrease) and the Air Force's F-22 Increment 3.2B Modernization (15 percent decrease).” “Also between 2018 and 2019, capability delivery schedules for MDAPs increased, on average, by just over 1 month (a 1 percent increase),” GAO said. However, the report cautioned that cost/schedule performance looks “less encouraging as measured against their original approved program baselines.” The report found that the major acquisition programs “have accumulated over $628 billion (or 54%) in total cost growth since program start, most of which is unrelated to the increase in quantities purchased. Additionally, over the same time period, time required to deliver initial capabilities has increased by 30%, resulting in an average delay of more than two years. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/major-dod-acquisition-programs-flounder-on-cybersecurity-gao

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  August 14, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  Four rocket companies are competing for Air Force funding, and it is war

  By ERIC BERGER Monday marked the deadline for four US rocket companies to submit bids for Air Force contracts, encompassing all national security launches from 2022 to 2026. This is a hugely consequential and much-contested bid process that has implications for the American aerospace industry for the next decade and beyond. The Air Force is seeking two providers for about two dozen launches. The prime contractor will receive 60% of the launches while the secondary contractor claims the remaining 40%. As the US military pays a premium for launch contracts to its nine reference orbits, this guaranteed revenue is extremely valuable to US companies aspiring to run a profitable launch business. The lead-up to Monday's deadline has included heavy political lobbying from the four companies: United Launch Alliance, SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Northrop Grumman. As a result of this, Congress is considering some changes to the Air Force's procurement policy, including an on-ramp for a third provider during the 2022 to 2026 period. But so far, the Air Force is resisting this. Here's a look at the four bidders and what is at stake for each of them. United Launch Alliance United Launch Alliance—a joint venture between Boeing and Lockheed Martin that enjoyed a monopoly on national security launches before the emergence of SpaceX—may be bidding for its life. To wean itself off its costly Delta boosters (as well as the Russian rocket engines that go with its workhorse Atlas V rocket), ULA has been developing the Vulcan rocket to cut costs while maintaining performance. The company says the Vulcan will be ready for its first flight in 2021. "Vulcan Centaur will provide higher performance and greater affordability while continuing to deliver our unmatched reliability and orbital accuracy precision from our treasured cryogenic Centaur upper stage," ULA's chief, Tory Bruno, said in a news release Monday. "ULA is the best partner for national security space launch, and we are the only provider to demonstrate experience flying to all orbits including the most challenging heavy-class missions, providing the bedrock foundation for the lowest risk portfolio of two launch service providers for the US Air Force." With increasing competition from SpaceX, Europe's Arianespace, Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Russian launch vehicles, ULA has been unable to capture much of the commercial market for satellite launches in the last decade. Therefore, it has largely been reliant on government business, mostly from the military. But ULA also relies on NASA through its science missions and lifting cargo and crew missions to the International Space Station. If the company does not emerge victorious from this competition, it faces an uncertain future unless Vulcan can become commercially viable. Moreover, ULA will lose out on hundreds of millions of dollars in government money to finalize Vulcan if it does not receive an award. Historically, Boeing and Lockheed have been stingy parents, and whether or not they would pay to complete Vulcan is unclear. One intriguing twist with ULA's bid is that its Vulcan rocket will use the BE-4 rocket engine, which is being developed and manufactured by Blue Origin—one of the four competitors in the Air Force bidding process. Blue Origin has said the Air Force competition was designed to unfairly benefit ULA. SpaceX The Hawthorne, California-based rocket company is the only bidder proposing to use rockets that are already flying—the Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy boosters. This family of rockets has had a string of 49 successful launches since a static fire accident in September 2016, and according to SpaceX, it can meet all of the Air Force's desired orbits and payload specifications. "SpaceX means to serve as the Air Force's long-term provider for space launch, offering existing, certified, and proven launch systems capable of carrying out the full spectrum of national security space-launch missions and requirements," said the company's president and chief operating officer, Gwynne Shotwell. Since the Air Force agreed to admit SpaceX to the national security launch competition in 2015, the company has won several contracts for key missions and begun flying them for the military. These include the National Reconnaissance Office Launch 76, Orbital Test Vehicle 5, Global Positioning System III-2, and STP-2 flights. SpaceX also likely will offer the government the lowest price on service to orbit. However, in its criteria for awarding missions, the Air Force listed price among the last of its considerations. Due to its lower price point, especially with is reusable Falcon 9 rocket, SpaceX has considerable commercial business to offset the loss of Air Force contracts. But it would hurt financially, all the same. Blue Origin Jeff Bezos' rocket company has bid its very large New Glenn rocket for the Air Force missions. However, when this rocket will begin flying is not entirely clear, as there are questions about whether it will be ready by the beginning of the 2022 contracting period. What is clear is that Blue Origin does not believe the US Air Force has created a fair bidding process. Already, the company has filed a "pre-award" protest with the US Government Accountability Office. "The Air Force is pursuing a flawed acquisition strategy for the National Security Space Launch program," Blue Origin said, according to SpaceNews. The Air Force decision to award contracts to just two companies creates a "duopoly," Blue Origin says, and it limits commercial development of strategic US assets such as rocket engines and boosters. Bezos has been investing about $1 billion a year of his own money into Blue Origin, which has largely been used to support development of the BE-4 engine and New Glenn rocket. He is likely to continue development of the New Glenn rocket without Air Force funding, but company officials say it is not fair to hold their wealthy founder against their bid. Northrop Grumman Northrop has been developing the Omega rocket for this competition since at least 2016. The Omega vehicle differs from the other entrants in the competition as its first and second stages, as well as side-mounted boosters, are powered by solid-rocket motors rather than liquid-fueled engines. The bet by Northrop is that the US military, through its national security launch contract, would want to support one of the nation's most critical suppliers of solid-rocket motors for intercontinental ballistic missiles. Northrop officials have not said whether they would continue development of the Omega rocket if Northrop were to lose out on the Air Force contract. Northrop's bid suffered a setback in May when an "anomaly" occurred during test firing of its solid-propellant Castor 600 rocket motor, the Omega rocket's first stage. From a video provided by the company, a major part of the rocket's large nozzle appeared to break apart, blasting debris around the area. Afterward, a Northrop vice president, Kent Rominger, called the test a success. "It appears everything worked very, very well on this test," he said. "And at the very end when the engine was tailing off, we observed the aft exit cone, maybe a portion of it, doing something a little strange that we need to go further look into." Nevertheless, the test cannot have instilled absolute confidence in the Air Force. https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/08/four-rocket-companies-are-competing-for-air-force-funding-and-it-is-war/