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October 15, 2023 | International, Naval

Fearing China, South Korea targets firms building Taiwan navy submarines | Reuters

South Korean authorities cited the risk of Chinese economic retaliation when they charged marine technology firm SI Innotec last year with violating trade laws for its work on Taiwan's new military submarine program, according to a police document seen by Reuters and two people familiar with the matter.

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/fearing-china-south-korea-targets-contractors-taiwan-navy-submarines-2023-10-16/

On the same subject

  • GAO backs use of commercial satellites to host military payloads

    July 31, 2018 | International, Aerospace

    GAO backs use of commercial satellites to host military payloads

    by Sandra Erwin “Using hosted payloads may help facilitate a proliferation of payloads on orbit, making it more difficult for an adversary to defeat a capability." WASHINGTON — The Pentagon should use commercial satellites as host platforms for military sensors and communications packages, says a new Government Accountability Office report released on Monday. GAO auditors investigated the pros and cons of “hosted payloads” and agreed with what private satellite operators have been saying for years: The military can save money and get capabilities on-orbit faster by hitching rides on commercial satellites. The industry has been building huge spacecraft that have extra carrying capacity, and hosting national security payloads is viewed as a profitable business that also helps the military fill a need. The report says there are national security benefits to deploying military payloads on commercial satellites. “Using hosted payloads may also help facilitate a proliferation of payloads on orbit, making it more difficult for an adversary to defeat a capability.” Since 2009, DoD has used three commercially hosted payloads, with three more missions planned or underway through 2022. In 2011, the Air Force created a Hosted Payload Office to provide expertise and other tools to facilitate matching government payloads with commercial hosts. GAO found that defense programs using hosted payloads are not required and generally do not provide cost and technical data, or lessons learned, to the Hosted Payload Office. Having that information would “better position DoD to make informed decisions when considering acquisition approaches for upcoming space system designs.” The Pentagon has not been too keen on hosted payloads for several reasons, GAO noted. There is a perception among some defense officials that matching government payloads to commercial satellites is too difficult. Another concern is that DoD's knowledge on using hosted payloads is “fragmented, in part because programs are not required to share information.” DoD officials who spoke with GAO identified “logistical challenges to matching government payloads with any given commercial host satellite.” For example, they cited size, weight and power constraints as barriers to using hosted payloads. Some individual DoD offices have realized cost and schedule benefits, but “DoD as a whole has limited information on costs and benefits of hosted payloads,” said the report. Officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense told GAO that “matching requirements between government payloads and commercial satellites is typically too difficult for programs to overcome.” DoD's Hosted Payload Office is “developing tools designed to help address these challenges,” said the report. Defense officials also argued that budget and planning processes are a hurdle. “This can complicate alignment with commercial timelines because the development of a government sensor would need to be underway well in advance of a decision to fund a commercially hosted payload approach.” Officials told GAO that it is possible to align government and commercial timelines. For example, the Missile Defense Agency adopted the commercial host's schedule to ensure its Space Based Kill Assessment payload was ready for integration and launch without delaying the host satellite or missing its ride to space. Similarly, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has been able to align acquisition and development schedules with the commercial host. In its written comments in the report, DoD concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted that the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center had initiated a major reorganization and that under the new organization, the Hosted Payload Office had changed and may not be the appropriate office for centralizing DoD-wide hosted payload knowledge. Language in the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act directs the Pentagon to seize oversight of military investments in hosted payloads. https://spacenews.com/gao-backs-use-of-commercial-satellites-to-host-military-payloads/

  • U.S. Security Requires Multiple Elements of Deterrence

    July 4, 2019 | International, Security, Other Defence

    U.S. Security Requires Multiple Elements of Deterrence

    BY C. TODD LOPEZ In the context of U.S. defense policy, "deterrence" is typically understood to mean "nuclear." And America's nuclear triad — ground-based missiles, air-delivered bombs, and submarine-launched missiles — serves as America's biggest form of deterrence, which underwrites everything its men and women in uniform do. But according to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John M. Richardson, nuclear weapons are just one of multiple elements of deterrence the U.S. must consider either for itself, or for being aware that other nations might be using them. During a July 2 breakfast presentation hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in Washington, Richardson laid out five such elements of deterrence already in use or that must be considered more deeply. Nuclear "It's an incredibly powerful military capability where potentially everybody gets destroyed," Richardson said. "We must maintain our ability to be competitive and relevant in this domain ... [and] strike back at anybody who can pose an existential nuclear threat to the homeland." The triad itself includes ground-based missiles — commonly referred to as intercontinental ballistic missiles; submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and air-launched cruise missiles dropped from bomber aircraft. In all three areas the U.S. is underway with modernization efforts. But the nuclear environment globally is changing, Richardson said. "More nations are seeking to join the club," he said. Some of those nations can bring high-tech weapons, while some are using low-tech, including dirty bombs and systems that can be manufactured with 3-D printers. Additionally, not all nuclear weapons are "strategic" in nature. Some are smaller "tactical" weapons. "The nuclear element of this mix remains very relevant, very active, and deserves a lot more attention in my mind," Richardson said. Cyber Richardson said when it comes to cyber as a deterrent, the U.S. can't maintain only defensive capabilities. "We have to have an ability for offensive cyber to truly achieve a sense of deterrence there," he said. Recent cyber provocations, he said, are "multidimensional in ways that may or may not have been expected." Included there, he said, are theft of intellectual property, invasion of privacy, invasion of identity, distortion of identity, "and most recently, perception management. This perception management idea ... might be kind of our new Sputnik moment." Space "The competition is absolutely heating up in space," Richardson said. "Of these elements that are going to constitute a tailored strategic deterrent approach, space has got to be one of those." Richard posited that in space, it might become apparent that, using directed energy weapons, it proves far easier to destroy something in space than it is to put something back up into space. "These things operate really fast ... and space goes away as an asset," he said. "You can see kind of a mutually assured destruction scenario in space pretty easily. Have we thought about that going forward?" Chemical, Biological Capabilities Increasingly, Richardson said, chemical and biological deterrence will come into the mix, especially as technologies such as CRISPR — a genome editing tool — allow for more tailored capabilities. "One of the self-deterrent aspects of chemical/biological is that it's very hard to control. It goes viral, if you will," he said. "But with these tailoring things, you can get a lot more specific. It becomes a lot more targetable. And so, it's something we have to mind." Conventional Weapons U.S. deterrence advantages in conventional weapons have relied, so far, on superior targeting ability, Richardson said. But that may become less important. "We have better sensors, better satellites, better ways to connect that data with our command and control systems, our targeting systems," he said. "We had an advantage in terms of precision." Now, he said, such sensors are ubiquitous, and commercial and military sensors are going up into space. There are cameras everywhere. "This idea of being able to locate things with precision is becoming more ubiquitous," he said. "It's less of an advantage. It's really the team that can manage that information better that's going to achieve the advantage." https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1896147/us-security-requires-multiple-elements-of-deterrence/

  • Analysis: how good is Challenger 3, the British Army’s new main battle tank? - Army Technology

    April 18, 2024 | International, Land

    Analysis: how good is Challenger 3, the British Army’s new main battle tank? - Army Technology

    The Challenger 3 main battle tank will be the British Army's central armoured element through to 2040, and perhaps beyond.

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