FAA banning drone flights over New Jersey, New York sites

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  April 28, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  What the Pentagon should (and should not) get in the next stimulus bill

  By: Mackenzie Eaglen As Washington begins to draft another stimulus spending bill to combat coronavirus, the Pentagon needs a new plan to articulate its needs to lawmakers. Simply submitting unfunded lists whole cloth comes across as tone deaf and opportunistic. A better plan would be to focus on the health, safety and continuity of all the Pentagon's workforce: uniformed, civilian and contractor. Capitol Hill is (virtually) busy as ever these days, completing another injection of funds into the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act last week. Congress and the White House will now begin formulating a phase 4 bill. President Donald Trump and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi have indicated they would both like to see domestic infrastructure spending inside. Negotiations are just beginning, but this bill will open the spending aperture compared to the CARES Act. For national defense, this legislation must focus on taking care of people and protecting jobs. Even as the U.S. military mobilizes to support the fight against COVID-19, the disease is hitting the Defense Department and its workforce much the same as the rest of America. The first order of business is for the Pentagon to ensure health and wellness for service members, their families, civilians and contractors by encouraging safe and flexible work policies. The Pentagon will need additional funding to pay for COVID-19 support deployments, mitigate the effects of stop-movement orders, increase the availability of personal protective equipment and sanitation, and expand its IT infrastructure for telework. Second, Congress and the Pentagon should provide financial assistance to the thousands of small businesses, subcontractors and suppliers to defense contractors building weapons, conducting maintenance or developing classified software. The defense-industrial base is built for maximum efficiency, not resiliency. Even seemingly minor production pauses of weeks are combining with broader quarantine restrictions to wreak havoc on program schedules. While the Pentagon has many tools at its disposal — accelerating awards and progress payments as well as lifting contracting restrictions — the acquisition team simply cannot respond to this crisis without more resources available. Absent additional liquidity, contractors face the impossible choice between letting workers go or facing the reality that they will have no jobs to return to. Small businesses and subcontractors are particularly vulnerable, as they have far less slack to respond to crises. Many live contract to contract, as indicated by a 2018 Department of Defense report on industrial base fragility. These small firms providing needed materials, labor and technology to companies designated as “essential” are struggling with COVID like everyone else. Their employees are either afraid to come to work out of fear of contraction and contagion, or they're sick with the virus. The vicious cycle — where people want to work but can't — means schedules slip. If there is no work, there is no revenue, which means layoffs. Already around the country, a major defense contractor had to shut down two plants; a shipbuilder is struggling to get employees to show up; another defense firm has laid off employees; and still others can't get to work because classified spaces are off limits. To ensure workforces remain intact, lawmakers need to move quickly to pay contractors who cannot work because of COVID-19 effects, as delays are now averaging three months. Fixing this is as simple as measuring the impact of COVID-19 on contracts and ensuring a reasonable payment for that delay, which will be billions of dollars, according to acquisition czar Ellen Lord. It's no different than legal remedies for “acts of God.” Also, the DoD can consider a subset of its unfunded priorities list to get projects on contract that are executable very quickly and inject liquidity into the defense contractor workforce. These unfunded priorities run the gamut, from weapons production to software development. Similarly, there are always “incremental” projects that can be accelerated, like facilities sustainment and depot maintenance. Using unfunded priorities to inject liquidity into the defense-industrial base isn't the ideal tool, but all options must be brought to bear to deal with this crisis. The majority of defense dollars allocated to the big prime contractors go back out the door to their suppliers and vendors — many of which are small businesses. While many of the easiest financial levers to pull involve getting contracts to primes, Congress and the Pentagon need to emphasize that this money — whether it be new contracts, accelerated contracts or increased progress payments — must be passed on to major suppliers and subcontractors. If the behemoths of defense industry don't share the wealth and take care of their supply chain, there won't be more money, contracts or authority for additional progress payments from Congress. Contractor leadership must take care of workers — including those of its vendors. Lastly, Congress can provide Defense Production Act Title III funding to directly target injections of cash to the emergent needs of small businesses and subcontractors, including many up-and-coming innovative firms and single-source suppliers. So far, DPA funding has been focused on contracting for additional personal protective equipment, but the DPA was equally built to protect the defense-industrial base. The industrial base was already hurt by the Budget Control Act, and it's been busy rebuilding under Trump, only to get whacked again by COVID-19. Employees need to know the work is there, their safety is a priority and their jobs are safe. If the Pentagon and primes don't take care of their suppliers and subcontractors, the defense-industrial base will contract again, losing crucial skills and talents permanently — and possibly seeing those companies bought up by China. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/27/what-the-pentagon-should-and-should-not-get-in-the-next-stimulus-bill/

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  April 14, 2020 | International, Naval

  US Navy should turn to unmanned systems to track and destroy submarines

  By: Bryan Clark Anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, is one of a navy's most difficult missions. Sonars detect submarines with only a fraction of the range and precision possible using radars or visual sensors against ships above the water. Submarines can carry missiles able to hit targets hundreds of miles away, requiring searches to cover potentially vast areas. And the torpedoes that aircraft and surface ships use to sink submarines need to be dropped right on the submarine to have any chance of sinking it. These challenges led the Cold War-era U.S. Navy to rely on a sequential approach for tracking enemy submarines. Electronic or visual intelligence sources would report when an opposing sub was leaving port, and it would hopefully get picked up by sound surveillance, or SOSUS — sonar arrays on the sea floor — as it entered chokepoints, like that between Iceland and the United Kingdom. Patrol aircraft would then attempt to track the submarine using sonar-equipped buoys, or sonobuoys, and eventually turn it over to a U.S. nuclear attack submarine, or SSN, for long-term trail. The U.S. ASW model broke down, however, in the decades following the Cold War as U.S. submarine and patrol aircraft fleets shrank, the Chinese submarine fleet grew, and Russian submarines became quieter. Today, the U.S. Navy devotes enormous effort to tracking each modern Russian submarine in the western Atlantic. During the 2000s, the strategy of full-spectrum ASW started an essential shift in goals, from being able to sink submarines when needed to being able to defeat submarines by preventing them from accomplishing their mission. Full-spectrum ASW and other current concepts, however, still rely on aircraft, ships and submarines for sensing, tracking and attacking enemy submarines to bottle them up near their own coasts or sink them in the open ocean. Although SOSUS has improved since the Cold War and is joined by a family of new deployable seabed arrays, the next link in the U.S. ASW chain is still a P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, or a U.S. SSN. These platforms are in short supply around the world, cost hundreds of millions to billions of dollars to buy and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars a day to operate. With defense budgets flattening and likely to decrease in a post-COVID-19 environment, the U.S. Navy cannot afford to continue playing “little kid soccer” in ASW, with multiple aircraft or ships converging to track and destroy submarines before they can get within missile range of targets like aircraft carriers or bases ashore. The Navy should instead increase the use of unmanned systems in ASW across the board, which cost a fraction to buy and operate compared to their manned counterparts. Unmanned aircraft could deploy sonobuoys or stationary sonar arrays, and unmanned undersea or surface vehicles could tow passive sonar arrays. Unmanned surface vehicles could also deploy low-frequency active sonars like those carried by U.S. undersea surveillance ships that can detect or drive off submarines from dozens of miles away. Although autonomous platforms will not have the onboard operators of a destroyer or patrol aircraft, improved processing is enabling small autonomous sensors to rapidly identify contacts of interest. Line-of-sight or satellite communications can connect unmanned vehicles and sensors with operators ashore or on manned ASW platforms. A significant shortfall of today's ASW concepts is “closing the kill chain” by attacking enemy submarines. Air- or surface-launched weapons have short ranges and small warheads that reduce their ability to sink a submarine, but their cost and size prevents them from being purchased and fielded in large numbers. Unmanned systems could address this shortfall in concert with a new approach to ASW that suppresses enemy submarines rather than destroying them. During World War II and the Cold War, allied navies largely kept submarines at bay through aggressive tracking and harassing attacks, or by forcing opposing SSNs to protect ballistic missile submarines. The modern version of submarine suppression would include overt sensing operations combined with frequent torpedo or depth-bomb attacks. Although unmanned vehicles frequently launch lethal weapons today under human supervision, the small weapons that would be most useful for submarine suppression could be carried in operationally relevant numbers by medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs or medium unmanned surface vessels. Moreover, the large number and long endurance of unmanned vehicles would enable the tracking and suppressing of many submarines over a wide area at lower risk than using patrol aircraft or destroyers. Today the U.S. Navy uses unmanned systems in ASW primarily to detect submarines. To affordably conduct peacetime surveillance and effectively defeat submarines in wartime, the Navy should increase the role of unmanned systems. Using manned platforms to conduct command and control, and unmanned vehicles to track, deter and engage submarines, could significantly reduce the costs of ASW operations and enable the Navy to scale its ASW efforts to match the growing threat posed by submarine fleets. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is an expert in naval operations, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, military competitions and war gaming. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/13/us-navy-should-turn-to-unmanned-systems-to-track-and-destroy-submarines/

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  March 13, 2024 | International, Aerospace

  US-South Korea defense talks on track, but November not a hard deadline-US official