August 28, 2021 | International, C4ISR, Security
2 companies win contracts to research cyber protections for military aircraft
The Air Force Research Lab awarded two $200 million contracts for cybersecurity research.
April 21, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
The DoD Small Business and Technology Partnerships Office announces the pre-release of the following Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) and Commercial Solutions Openings (CSOs):
• DoD Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) BAA 21.2
• DoD Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) BAA 21.B
• Air Force CSO X21.2
• Air Force CSO X21.B
IMPORTANT DATES:
• April 21, 2021: Pre-release begins
• May 19, 2021: BAA opens, begin submitting proposals in DSIP
• June 3, 2021: Topic Q&A closes to new questions at 12:00 p.m. ET
• June 17, 2021: BAA closes, full proposals must be submitted in DSIP no later than 12:00 p.m. ET
The instructions and topics for these BAAs and CSOs are available on DSIP at https://www.dodsbirsttr.mil/submissions/login and at https://rt.cto.mil/rtl-small-business-resources/sbir-sttr/.
Updated DoD SBIR/STTR Program & Proposal Requirements
The following requirements are in place for all SBIR and STTR proposal submissions. Details on these requirements can be found in section 5.0 of the 21.2 SBIR and 21.B STTR BAAs and relevant attachments can be found in both BAAs and CSOs.
1. Foreign Ownership Disclosure Requirement
• Any offeror submitting a proposal under these BAAs and CSOs will be required to disclose via self-report any foreign ownership or control. Proposers must review Attachment 2: Foreign Ownership or Control Disclosure to determine applicability. Offerors shall also require any proposed subcontractors included in their proposal under this BAA to disclose via self-report any foreign ownership or control. If applicable, an authorized firm representative must complete the Foreign Ownership or Control Disclosure (attached to both 21.2 SBIR and 21.B STTR BAAs). The completed and signed disclosure must be uploaded to Volume 5 of the proposal submission.
2. Contractor Certification Regarding Provision of Prohibited Video Surveillance and Telecommunications Services and Equipment
• DoD must comply with Section 889(a)(1)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019; therefore, all proposals must include certifications in Federal Acquisition Regulation clauses 52.204-24, 52.204-25, and 52.204-26, executed by the proposer's authorized company representative. The Federal Acquisition Regulation clauses may be found as attachments to both 21.2 SBIR and 21.B STTR BAAs and will be available to download during proposal submission and uploaded to Volume 5: Supporting Documents.
3. Company Commercialization Report (Volume 4)
• The Company Commercialization Report (CCR) will be required for all proposal submissions. Proposers must complete the CCR by logging into their account at https://www.sbir.gov/, downloading a PDF copy of the CCR, and uploading the PDF to the DSIP proposal submission.
• WARNING: Uploading a new Company Commercialization Report (CCR) under the Firm Information section of DSIP or clicking “Save” or “Submit” in Volume 4 of one proposal submission is considered a change for ALL proposals under any open BAAs or CSOs. If a proposing firm has previously certified and submitted any Phase I or Direct to Phase II proposals under any BAA or CSO that is still open, those proposals will be automatically reopened. Proposing firms will have to recertify and resubmit such proposals. If a proposing firm does not recertify or resubmit such proposals, they will not be considered fully submitted and will not be evaluated.
4. Fraud, Waste and Abuse Training (Volume 6)
• The Fraud, Waste and Abuse (FWA) training is required for all proposal submissions. This training can be accessed in the Volume 6 section of the DSIP proposal submission. The training material must be thoroughly reviewed once per year. Plan ahead and leave ample time to complete the training based on the proposal submission deadline.
In addition to the proposal requirements above, the BAAs and CSOs have been updated to reflect applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and/or Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clauses that will be included in SBIR and STTR contracts. Proposers are encouraged to thoroughly review the BAAs/CSOs to remain apprised of programmatic and contractual changes.
Topic Q&A
Topic Q&A is now available on the Topics and Topic Q&A page in DSIP. Proposers may submit technical questions through the Topic Q&A page at https://www.dodsbirsttr.mil/submissions/login.
During pre-release, proposers can contact TPOCs directly or submit questions via Topic Q&A. Once DoD begins accepting proposals on May 19, 2021, no further direct contact between proposers and topic authors is allowed. All questions and answers are posted electronically for general viewing. Topic Q&A will close to new questions on June 3, 2021 at 12:00 p.m. ET, but will remain active to view questions and answers related to the topics until the BAA close.
Questions submitted through the Topic Q&A are limited to technical information related to improving the understanding of a topic's requirements. Any other questions, such as those asking for advice or guidance on solution approach, or administrative questions, such as SBIR or STTR program eligibility, technical proposal/cost proposal structure and page count, budget and duration limitations, or proposal due date WILL NOT receive a response. Refer to the Component-specific instructions given at the beginning of that Component's topics for help with an administrative question.
Proposers are advised to monitor Topic Q&A during the BAA period for questions and answers and frequently monitor DSIP for updates and amendments to the topics.
Learning & Support
Visit the Learning & Support section for Job Aids and Help Videos to guide you through submitting and viewing questions and answers in the Topic Q&A, preparing and submitting your proposal in DSIP, and more: https://www.dodsbirsttr.mil/submissions/learning-support/training-materials
Questions
Email the DSIP Help Desk at DoDSBIRSupport@reisystems.com for assistance with using DSIP. Questions regarding DSIP can be emailed to the DSIP Help Desk and will be addressed in the order received, during normal operating hours (Monday through Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. ET).
General questions pertaining to a particular DoD Component and the Component-specific BAA instructions should be submitted in accordance with the instructions given at the beginning of that Component's topics.
Thank you for your interest in the DoD SBIR/STTR Program.
DoD SBIR/STTR Support Team
August 28, 2021 | International, C4ISR, Security
The Air Force Research Lab awarded two $200 million contracts for cybersecurity research.
December 5, 2019 | International, Aerospace
by Sebastien Roblin Key point: Paris wants new planes, but it has no plans to build or buy its own stealth fighters. In January 2019, French Defense Minister Florence Parly announced France would commit $2.3 billion to develop an F4 generation of the Dassault Rafale twin-engine multirole fighter. This would include production in 2022–2024 of the last twenty-eight of the original order of 180 Rafales, followed by the purchase of an additional thirty Rafales F4.2s between 2027–2030, for a total of 210. Since 2008, France has deployed land- and carrier-based Rafales into combat in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Syria. In January 2019, French Defense Minister Florence Parly announced France would commit $2.3 billion to develop an F4 generation of the Dassault Rafale twin-engine multirole fighter. This would include production in 2022–2024 of the last twenty-eight of the original order of 180 Rafales, followed by the purchase of an additional thirty Rafales F4.2s between 2027–2030, for a total of 210. Since 2008, France has deployed land- and carrier-based Rafales into combat in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Syria. The Rafale is much more agile than the F-35, with superior climb rate, sustained turn performance, and ability to super-cruise (maintain supersonic flight without using fuel-gulping afterburners) at Mach 1.4 while carrying weapons. The Rafale's all-moving canards—a second set of small wings near the nose—give the Rafale excellent lift and low-altitude speed and performance, as you can see in this majestic airshow display. However, compared to larger fourth-generation twin-engine jets like the Su-35 or F-15, the Rafale can't fly quite as high (service-ceiling of 50,000 instead of 60,000 ft), and has a lower maximum speed (only Mach 1.8 compared to Mach 2-2.5). The Rafale's agility won't help as much if it is engaged at long distances by enemy surface-to-air missiles and stealth jets. To compensate, the Rafale boasts an advanced Spectra electronic warfare system that supposedly can reduce the Rafale's cross-section several times over—it is rumored by reflecting back signals using ‘active canceling.' Spectra also incorporates powerful jammers and flare and chaff dispensers, provides 360-degree early-warning, and can even assist Rafale pilots in targeting weapons to retaliate against attackers. Spectra's capabilities reportedly allowed Rafales to deploy on raids over Libyan airspace in 2011 before air defense missiles had been knocked out. Other key capabilities include sensor fusion of the Rafale's RBE-2AA Active Electronically Scanned Array multi-mode radar, which can track numerous targets over 124 miles away, with its discrete OSF infrared-search and track system, which has an unusually long range of sixty-two miles. Rafale pilots also benefit from uncluttered instrumentation combining voice command with flat-panel touch screens. The multirole jet carries a punchy thirty-millimeter revolver cannon and up to twenty-one thousand pounds of weapons on fourteen hardpoints, making it a versatile air-to-ground platform. Because Paris requires expeditionary capability in Africa, the Rafale can refuel in flight and carry up to five fuel tanks for very long transits, and can be operated from relatively unprepared airfields, unlike most high-performance jets. What's new in the Rafale F4? Dassault produces three basic types of Rafales: the single-seat Rafale-C, the two-seat Rafale-B (the additional weapon systems officer being preferred for strike and reconnaissance missions) and the carrier-based single-seat Rafale-M, which has an arrestor hook, reinforced landing gear and buddy-refueling pod capability. Each type has evolved in common generations designated F1, F2, F3 and F3R. The F4 generation introduces additional network-centric warfare capabilities and data-logistics similar to those on the F-35 Lightning, enabling Rafales on patrol to build a more accurate picture of the battlespace by pooling their sensors over a secure network, and even exchange data using new satellite communications antenna. The pilots also benefit from improved helmet-mounted displays. The Spectra defensive system will receive more powerful jammers and new threat libraries tailored to meet the improving capabilities of potential adversaries. Furthermore, Dassault seeks to use “Big Data” technology to develop a predictive maintenance system reminiscent of the F-35's troubled ALIS system to cost-efficiently implement preventative repairs. Other systems to be tweaked include the air-to-ground mode of the RBE-2AA radar, the M88 turbofan's digital computers, and a new AI-system for its reconnaissance and targeting pod allowing it to rapidly analyze and present information to the pilot. Rafale-Ms will also receive a new automated carrier landing system. New weapons set for integration most notably an improved model of the Mica short-to-medium range air-to-air missile, which has a range of forty-nine miles. The Mica can be launched without initially being locked and guided remotely by a data link on the fighter before engaging either an infrared or AESA radar seeker to close in for the kill, using a vector-thrust motor to pull off tight maneuvers. Because both the Rafale and the Mica missile can employ passive infrared targeting without using an indiscrete active-radar for guidance, the MICA can be launched with little warning for the target. The Mica-NG model will incorporate new infrared-matrix sensors for better performance versus stealth fighters, carry additional propellant for longer range, and integrate internal sensors to reduce maintenance costs. Its dual pulse motor will allow it to accelerate just prior to detonation for a greater probability of achieving a kill. For longer range engagements, newer Rafales F3Rs and F4s can launch British Meteor missiles which can sustain Mach 4 speeds. Another weapon set for integration is heavier 2,200-pound variants of the AASM HAMMER, a guidance kit similar to the U.S. JDAM. Previously, the Rafale could only carry 485-pound variants of the weapon which can use either GPS-, laser- or -infrared guidance to deliver precise strikes. Unlike the JDAM, the HAMMER also incorporates a rocket-motor, allowing it to hit targets up to thirty-seven miles away when released at high altitude. The Rafale will also be modified to integrate future upgrades of the French SCALP-EG stealthy subsonic cruise missile and the supersonic ASMP-A cruise missile which carries a 300-kiloton-yield nuclear warhead. Reportedly France may develop a hypersonic AS4NG variant increasing range from 300 miles to over 660 miles. Currently, the French Armée de l'Aire has three Rafale multi-role squadrons and two nuclear-strike squadrons based in Mont-de-Marsan (south-western France), Saint-Dizier (north-eastern France) and al-Dhafra in the UAE. There are also an operational conversion unit and a testing and evaluation squadron. The French Navy has three Rafale-M squadrons which rotate onboard France's nuclear-powered carrier Charles de Gaulle. In 2018, a squadron of Rafale-Ms proved their capability to operate from the U.S. carrier George H. W. Bush. The forthcoming Rafale F4s will progressively replace France's fourth-generation Mirage 2000s, over 110 of which remain in service today. French periodical Le Figaro claims that older Rafales will also eventually be updated to the F4 standard. Abroad, Dassault is finish delivery of orders from Egypt (twenty-four), Qatar (thirty-six) and India (thirty-six). All three countries may order additional Rafales, though the price of its initial Rafale order has caused a political scandal in New Delhi. As France must wait nearly two decades before a European stealth fighter can enter service, its armed forces are betting that in the interim adding networked sensors and weapons to the Rafale's superior kinematic performance and powerful electronic warfare systems will keep the agile jet relevant in an era of proliferating stealth aircraft and long-range surface-to-air missiles. Sébastien Roblin holds a master's degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared early in June 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/no-f-35-you-french-air-forces-new-rafale-fighter-wont-be-stealthy-101722
May 22, 2020 | International, Aerospace
By: Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould WASHINGTON — The Trump administration has made a final decision to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, sources confirmed to Defense News on Thursday. The news was confirmed by U.S. President Donald Trump midday, followed by a formal announcement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that the administration will make a formal notification on Friday, kicking off a six-month clock before a formal exit occurs. “We may, however, reconsider our withdrawal should Russia return to full compliance with the Treaty,” Pompeo said in a statement. What “full compliance” means, however, is unclear. Chris Ford, assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, told reporters there are “many variables” as to what that would entail, particularly as a number of American complaints about Russian activities involve behaviors that, Ford acknowledged, are “not in fact violations of the treaty.” As an example of the latter, Ford pointed to restrictions on flights over Kaliningrad. Russia has in the past restricted the length of flights over the city, which is not a direct violation but contradicts the confidence-building nature of the agreement, Ford said. That Russia will sometimes loosen those restrictions, such as earlier this year for an Open Skies flyover by Estonian, Lithuanian and American observers, is proof that the Kremlin “clearly regards its Open Skies legal obligations as something akin more to guidelines, or options, for them,” he argued. “It's the combination of all those things that has led to this decision. And so were Russia to return to compliance, we would have to presumably make that decision at the time about what to do with it, do in response to that, on the basis of the circumstances that have changed at that time,” Ford said. “Just as our decision now has many variables, we have to sort of see what the net impact of Russian behavior at that time in the world is. But that's a conversation we would very much like to have, if Russia would give the world the opportunity to see that happen.” In a statement released online, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the move “very regrettable" and hit at the Trump administration's “general policy” of going after arms control agreements. International discussions The administration Thursday morning began informing the other 34 members in the agreement, which allows mutual reconnaissance flights over the member nations, including Russia. An emergency meeting of NATO members is scheduled for Friday in Brussels, per multiple reports. The move, first reported Thursday by The New York Times, was not a surprise, as administration officials signaled to European allies toward the end of last year that unless major changes were made to the overflight agreement, the U.S. would consider withdrawing. However, there had been little movement in the months since, giving advocates hope that a decision to exit the treaty had not been finalized. “It was pretty clear from meetings that it was basically a done deal and it was just a matter of when,” one European source said. Allies generally argue the treaty is a valuable channel for transparency and dialogue between Russia and the United States, the world's top two nuclear superpowers. Critics of the treaty have argued that the U.S. gets better intelligence from satellite systems and that the funding to replace the aging OC-135 aircraft can be spent elsewhere. A second European source acknowledged that Russia has not always complied with the treaty, but said there was a sense that those issues could be resolved. The source predicted that those NATO members who are also part of the treaty will remain, but was unclear what Russia will do next. “If you're Russia, you can stay in and take the moral high ground, say, ‘We still honor international treaties, even if America doesn't,' or you can say the treaty is diminished beyond usefulness and you pull out. I don't know which they'll do, but neither is good for NATO," the source said. The source added that while it is true the U.S. gets its best intelligence from its satellites as opposed to OC-135 flights, focusing entirely on that is “selfish” because “a lot of NATO allies rely on Open Skies for visibility into what goes on in Russia.” The Pentagon released a statement late on Thursday, saying “The United States has been in close communication with our Allies and partners regarding our review of the Treaty and we will explore options to provide additional imagery products to Allies to mitigate any gaps that may result from this withdrawal.” Key Democrats and arms control advocates quickly denounced the administration's withdrawal plans as dangerous and destabilizing to America's relationships with allies, with former CIA director Michael Hayden, a frequent Trump critic, decrying the move as “insane.” Conservative voices applauded the move as Trump standing up to Russia's violations of the treaty. Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., expressed his belief the funding that would have gone into repairing the OC-135 should now go toward broader nuclear modernization. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., and House Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Jim Cooper, D-Tenn., blasted the administration for defying a requirement in the 2020 defense policy law that Trump first give Congress 120 days' notice. Multiple communications with Congress on the issue had “gone unanswered,” they said. “The Administration's decision to withdraw the United States from the Open Skies Treaty is a slap in the face to our allies in Europe, leaves our deployed forces in the region at risk, and is in blatant violation of the law,” they said in a joint statement. “This decision weakens our national security interests, isolates the United States since the Treaty will continue without us, and abandons a useful tool to hold Russia accountable." When signing the defense policy legislation into law, Trump indicated he didn't consider himself bound by the requirement, citing his executive powers. “I reiterate the longstanding understanding of the executive branch that these types of provisions encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent with the President's exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs," the president's Dec. 20 signing statement read. Throughout its term, the Trump administration has been skeptical of arms control agreements. The U.S. and Russia walked away from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty last August, and officials have expressed skepticism about renewing the New START nuclear agreement with Russia, which expires in 2021. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/05/21/trump-admin-to-withdraw-from-open-skies-treaty/