Defense firm Leidos raises annual revenue outlook on weapons demand

On the same subject

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  May 8, 2019 | International, Land, C4ISR

  The Army looks to build up its cyber arsenal

  By: Mark Pomerleau The Army is building a new tactical cyber force and it's going to need an arsenal. Immediately stocking one is another story, however, because “offensive cyber” tools are currently developed and owned by U.S. Cyber Command for the joint mission, so the Army is working on how to best equip its teams' specific needs. The Army's 915th Cyber Warfare Support Battalion (CWSB) will be capable of conducting localized cyber effects through the electromagnetic spectrum, rather than the IP-based operations conducted by Cyber Command, though it might have a tie-in with these forces and capabilities. The CWSB will operate as an Army Cyber Command asset. It will live at the division level with 12 expeditionary cyber teams, each consisting of 45-person detachment-sized elements that will be in support of brigade combat teams and arrayed over that brigade's battlespace on the ground. They will likely operate alongside companies. In order to prepare these new cyber teams, the Army will have to work through the Joint Cyber Warfighter Architecture (JCWA), a singular approach to tools and platforms for high-end, remote cyber operators established by Cyber Command. “By defining that architecture, then Cyber Command encourages the service cyber components with their acquisition entities to propose capabilities that would meet that architecture,” Ronald Pontius, deputy to the commanding general at Army Cyber Command, told Fifth Domain on the sidelines of an industry conference May 1. “Cyber Command should lead the architecture and standards, then they should be looking to the services to actually build the capability.” The JCWA is intended to guide capability development across all the services, as Cyber Command doesn't want capabilities designed and used by one service. How that translates into equipping these Army-specific entities requires working out “synergies” between that tactical force and the larger force, so determining what common and custom tools the CWSB uses will be in concert with the joint Cyber Command forces. “It all has to be integrated from top to bottom,” Kenneth Strayer, deputy program manager for electronic warfare and cyber at Program Executive Office-Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors, told Fifth Domain. “All the way from sanctuary through developing capabilities to delivering capabilities. This all has to be integrated and it's all nested on Cyber Command and ARCYBER, [which] is a component, and the tactical units are all nested under ARCYBER.” Strayer added that he wouldn't separate them, but obviously the needed capabilities will be different depending on the placement of units, either in the close fight on the ground or in remote sanctuary. Questions Army Cyber Command leaders will have to wrestle with regarding using tools from the joint force at the tactical level include what infrastructure forces will operate on, and whether the tool will be attributable or not. Pontius said generally tools should be 100-percent attributable in the tactical space [letting victims know the United States is attacking them as a deterrent of further action], while that is not always the case in the joint environment. Having the CWSB in Army Cyber Command and not distributed throughout the service, he added, aids in answering these questions, optimizing tool development, and keeping the force trained and certified much more efficiently than if members of this force were spread out across different Army entities. One way the Army is potentially benefiting the CWSB separate from the joint mission is a recent $1 billion contract for research and development work in support of the cyber mission. Contractors awarded are tasked with providing research into cyber and electromagnetic activities (CEMA) capabilities. The contract currently is not asking for any materiel development. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/army/2019/05/06/the-army-looks-to-build-up-its-cyber-arsenal/

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  July 24, 2020 | International, Naval

  US Navy makes progress on aircraft carrier Ford’s bedeviled weapons elevators

  By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy is over the halfway mark in certifying the new aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford's 11 advanced weapons elevators, which have been at the center of an ongoing controversy over delays in getting the Navy's most expensive-ever warship ready for its first deployment. In a news release Thursday, the Navy announced it had certified Lower Stage Weapons Elevator 1, the sixth certified working elevator. LSWE 1 moves bombs from the forward magazine up to a staging area beneath the flight deck, where the weapons are armed and sent to the upper-stage weapons elevators that go to the flight deck. Crews had already certified the elevator that brings bombs from the aft magazine to the staging area. The elevators are designed to reduce the time it takes to get bombs armed and to the flight deck to mount on aircraft. “LSWE 5 has given us the capacity to move ordnance from the aft magazine complex deep in the ship through the carrier to the flight deck with a speed and agility that has never been seen before on any warship,” Rear Adm. James Downey, program executive officer for aircraft carriers, said in a statement. “LSWE 1 doubles-down on that capability and ramps up the velocity of flight deck operations. LSWEs 1 and 5 will now operate in tandem, providing a dramatic capability improvement as we proceed toward full combat system certification aboard Ford.” The remaining five weapons elevators are on track for certification by the time the ship goes to full-ship shock trials in the third quarter of 2021. The weapons elevators became the center of a firestorm last year and contributed to the firing of former Navy Secretary Richard Spencer. In January 2019, Spencer announced he'd told the president that if the weapons elevators aren't functioning by midsummer, then the president should fire him. But within months Spencer had to admit that the weapons elevators would not be finished until the end of 2021 or maybe 2022, which he blamed on Huntington Ingalls Industries for a lack of adequate communication. Turnover The Ford has had a witch's brew of technical problems and delays since construction of the ship began in 2005. The latest hiccup came in June in the form of a fault in the power supply system to the electromagnetic aircraft launch system, which is replacing the steam catapult system on Nimitz-class carriers. The fault curtailed flight operations on the ship for several days while the crew and contractors tried to identify the issue. In the wake of that incident, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition James Geurts fired Capt. Ron Rutan as Ford's program manager, citing “performance over time.” Geurts installed Capt. Brian Metcalf as program head. Making the Ford deployment ready was a focus of former acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly, who likened the ship to an albatross around the Navy's neck. “The Ford is something the president cares a lot about, it's something he talks a lot about, and I think his concerns are justified,” Modly said. “It's very, very expensive, and it needs to work. “And there is a trail of tears that explains why we are where we are, but right now we need to fix that ship and make sure it works. There is nothing worse than having a ship like that, our most expensive asset, being out there as a metaphor for why the Navy can't do anything right.” Conceived in an era when the Defense Department was looking to make giant steps forward in military technology while it had no direct peer competitors, the lead ship was packed with at least 23 new technologies. Those included a complete redesign of the systems used to arm, launch and recover the ship's aircraft. All those systems have, in their turn, caused delays in getting the Navy's most expensive-ever warship to the fleet, which was originally to have deployed in 2018, but now will likely not deploy until 2023. The Ford cost the Navy roughly $13.3 billion, according to the latest Congressional Research Service report on the topic. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/23/the-us-navy-is-making-progress-on-the-carrier-fords-bedeviling-weapons-elevators/

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  May 19, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Huge Deficit = Defense Budget Cuts? Maybe Not

  The congressional calendar and strategic inertia may come together to keep the defense budget relatively high. The calendar helps because the fiscal 2021 defense budget will likely be passed while Congress is in a free-spending mood. By MARK CANCIAN The current Washington consensus sees deep defense budget cuts in the face of soaring deficits driven by the emergency legislation to stabilize the American economy as it reels from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. It may be wrong. The congressional calendar and strategic inertia may come together to keep the defense budget relatively high. The calendar helps because the fiscal 2021 defense budget will likely be passed while Congress is in a free-spending mood. The next administration — Republican or Democratic — will develop budgets beyond that, but the constraints of long-standing strategy will prevent major changes to force structure and acquisition that would drive deep budget cuts. The Challenge The conventional narrative holds that the defense budget will be squeezed as the debt level rises, and the public focuses inward on rebuilding the country's health and economic position. These are reasonable concerns. The deficit in fiscal 2020, initially projected to be about one trillion dollars ― itself getting into record territory without emergency spending― is now projected to be $3.7 trillion, and Congress is not finished spending. Debt held by the public will rise to 101 percent of GDP, a level not seen since World War II. Even if the world is willing to take US debt, rising interest payments will squeeze the rest of the budget. Simultaneously, the electorate is likely to focus inward. The pandemic is already the leading popular concern, not surprisingly. The economic devastation caused by restrictions on normal commercial activities has produced the greatest downturn since the Great Depression. It would be reasonable to put these factors together and project a substantially reduced defense budget. However, the congressional calendar and the inertia of a long-held strategy will likely mitigate any downturn. The Calendar The calendar will help because Congress is likely to pass the 2021 appropriation this fall, when the government will still be operating under emergency conditions. Congress has already passed four bills for pandemic response and economic stimulus and is developing another in the multi-trillion range. There are a few voices for fiscal constraint, but they are overwhelmed by a sentiment to “do more.” Indeed, some lawmakers and commentators are proposing increases to the defense budget to stimulate the economy, enhance deterrence of China, or protect the defense industrial base. Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has indicated his reluctance to do more than protect the industrial base, but a future stimulus bill could include such enhancements as part of a bipartisan deal. Finally, last year's bipartisan budget agreement set levels for defense and domestic spending in fiscal 2021. Undoing that agreement would be a major lift, requiring a bipartisan consensus that does not seem to be occurring. Even if the Democratic left wanted to make such cuts, defense hawks in the House and Senate could block them. Thus, in the near-term proposals for enhancements seem to be offsetting thoughts about cuts. As both the House and Senate consider their authorization acts, they seem to be aiming at roughly the level of the president's proposal and the bipartisan budget agreement. Strategic Inertia The United States has had some variation of the same national security strategy since the end of the Second World War (or perhaps more accurately, since the Korean War and publication of NSC 68, which enshrined a long term competition with the Soviet Union). That strategy involves global engagement, forward-deployed forces, alliances to offset global competitors, and commitment to maintaining an international system of free trade, human rights and secure borders. Scholars can argue about the details and how well the United States has implemented such a strategy, but the major elements have been constant. President Trump has chafed at many of these elements but has generally gone along, however reluctantly. One would expect such reluctant continuity in a second Trump administration, should that occur One would also expect strategic continuity in a Biden administration. Biden was, after all, vice president during the Obama administration, which, after the shocks of 2014, laid out a strategy of confronting five threats: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism. One would expect Biden to implement something like that strategy if he were in office. That does not mean that a Biden administration would do everything a Trump administration would do. The left-wing of the Democratic party would push some level of cuts, perhaps 5 percent, and take aim particularly at nuclear modernization, foreign arms sales, and Middle East conflicts. But this longstanding strategy of global engagement will put a floor on defense cuts. Remaining engaged with NATO, supporting our Asian allies like Japan and South Korea, and maintaining some presence in the Middle East, even if scaled back, takes a lot of forces. These need to be at a relatively high level of readiness to deploy globally and be credible. The all-volunteer force needs to maintain compensation and benefits at a sufficient level to compete for labor in a market economy. Competing with China and Russia requires investment in a wide variety of high technology―and costly―new systems, as well as the R&D foundation to support these innovations. Other strategies are certainly possible. Members of the Democratic left and Republican right, as well as some elements of the academic and think tank community, have proposed strategies of “restraint”, whereby the United States would significantly scale back overseas engagements. Such strategic change would produce a substantial cut in the defense budget. However, neither major candidate has supported such a change, and the national security policy community (aka “the blob”) is adamantly opposed. Despite this relatively optimistic assessment, the future is still cloudy. The president's budget proposal forecasts a level budget in constant dollars. That meant that the defense buildup was over, even if Republicans continued in office. Such budgets do not come close to the 3 to 5 percent real growth that defense officials had talked about to implement the National Defense strategy and would entail choices between readiness, force structure and modernization. A Democratic administration, with a notional 5 percent cut in the defense budget, would not constitute the deep cut that a Sanders or Warren administration might have entailed, but the $35 billion that a 5 percent cut would entail is still a lot of money. Forces would get smaller, likely wiping out all the recent force expansion, and new programs would be delayed. Bottom line: Defense may not be heading into a budget hurricane, but it is not heading into sunlight either. It faces the friction that occurs when expensive plans collide with constrained resources. Mark Cancian, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, was a Marine colonel and senior official at the Office of Management and Budget before he joined CSIS. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/huge-deficit-defense-budget-cuts-maybe-not/