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  November 13, 2019 | International, Naval

  Report slams Norwegian Navy for training, safety shortfalls in the run-up to frigate sinking

  By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON – The bridge watch team on the stricken Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad was distracted, inadequately trained and failed to take adequate precautions while transiting close to land, according to an accident report released Friday by the Norwegian government. The watch standers on Helge Ingstad, which collided with the Maltese-flagged tanker Sola TS and subsequently sunk outside Sture Terminal near the mouth of the North Sea, were busy conducting a watch turnover and attempting to conduct training during the navigation in the channel, which it was conducting at 17-18 knots. “The Navy lacked competence requirements for instructors. The Navy had assigned the officer of the watch a role as instructor which the officer of the watch had limited competence and experience to fill,” the report reads. “Furthermore, the Navy had not given the officer of the watch assistant sufficient training and competence to operate important bridge systems while training the officer of the watch assistant trainee at the same time.” The Norwegian publication VG reported last December that the ship's captain, Capt. Preben Østheim, was asleep in his cabin during the transit through the strait near Sture, which is less than three miles across at its narrowest point. The report, which also faulted the tanker for failing to mitigate potential risks and the vessel traffic control service for inadequate monitoring, takes special aim at the Navy for a lack of qualified navigators, and for short-changing the training of junior officer, leaving bridge watch teams underqualified. “As a consequence of the clearance process, the career ladder for fleet officers in the Navy and the shortage of qualified navigators to man the frigates, officers of the watch had been granted clearance sooner, had a lower level of experience and had less time as officer of the watch than used to be the case,” the report found. “This had also resulted in inexperienced officers of the watch being assigned responsibility for training. The level of competence and experience required for the lean manning concept (LMC), was apparently not met.” The accident report shows that the bridge team confused the Sola TS for a stationary object on land, and because the watch standers were distracted with training, they were not fully engaged with monitoring the communications on the radio. “A more coordinated bridge team with more information sharing would have been more capable of detecting the tanker sooner,” the report said. “Achieving good teamwork is particularly challenging in the case of bridge teams whose members are constantly being replaced. “Furthermore, the bridge team was part of a culture characterized by great confidence in each other's skills, and this may have contributed to the perception of them being in full control of the situation and thus less vigilant and sensitive to weak signals of danger.” The report is part one of a two-part report and only encompasses the actions that led to the collision. Further findings about the actions after the collision will be released as part of a second report to be released later. ‘Not Particularly Demanding' According to the report, the transit through the body of water known as the Hjeltefjord “was not considered particularly demanding, as the fairway is open and offers a good view all around,” the report found, which likely contributed to a sense of complacence among the crew. That echoes the sentiments of the Capt. Østheim, who told VG he didn't think he needed to be on the bridge during that transit. “After 12 years at sea, I know the coast as my own pocket, so I know exactly when I need to be on the bridge and when I can rest,” Østheim told VG. There is generally little traffic through the channel and there is no traffic separation scheme. The Sola TS, which the report said was likely creating some visual confusion for Ingstad's watchstanders because of its illuminated deck lights at night, announced it was underway on the radio during the exact time that Ingstad's watchstanders were turning over, likely causing them to miss the transmission, the report reads. “At the same time as Sola TS notified of her departure from the Sture Terminal, the watch handover between the officers of the watch started on HNoMS Helge Ingstad, while the officer of the watch trainee continued to navigate the frigate,” the report reads. “During the watch handover, the officer of the watch being relieved and the relieving officer of the watch observed an object at the Sture Terminal, to starboard of the frigate's course line. The ‘object' was observed both visually and on the radar display in the form of a radar echo and AIS symbol. The two officers of the watch discussed, but did not clarify, what the ‘object' might be. “Both officers of the watch had formed the clear perception that the ‘object' was stationary near the shore and thus of no risk to the frigate's safe passage.” The situation was made even more perilous by the fact that Ingstad did not have its Automatic Identification System on, which would have notified traffic service and Sola TS of Ingstand's location. Traffic Service lost track of Ingstad because operators had their displays zoomed in too far, the report found. Collision As the Ingstad came closer to the terminal, the Sola TS, which the officer was convinced was a stationary object by the terminal, was appearing on radar to have made some distance between the pier and the water, but the officer was still not sure it wasn't a stationary object becoming more clear on the radar screen because Ingstad was closer to it. “A more experienced officer of the watch would probably have had greater capacity to pick up on weak signals of danger and be better equipped to suspect that his/her own situational awareness suffered from misconceptions,” the report read. “The officer of the watch thought, however, that the course had to be adjusted slightly to port to increase the passing distance to the ‘object'.” In the minutes before the collision, the Sola TS established contact with Ingstad's officer of the watch to get them to take an avoidance maneuver by turning to starboard. But the watch still thought that the Sola was a stationary object and that turning to starboard would run into it. “When HNoMS Helge Ingstad did not alter course, the master on Sola TS ordered ‘stop engines' and, shortly afterwards, the pilot ordered full speed astern on the engines,” the report read. “These two measures were carried out only short time before the collision, and were therefore without material effect. “When the officer of the watch on HNoMS Helge Ingstad understood that the ‘object' giving off light was moving and on direct course to collide, it was too late to avoid the collision.” ‘I don't feel shame' The decision of the captain to not be on the bridge or, at the very least, to have posted a special navigation detail with the ship so close to land is perplexing, said retired U.S. Navy cruiser skipper Capt. Rick Hoffman, a career surface warfare officer. “If I'm within five miles of land I'm going to have some kind of navigation detail posted,” which in the U.S. Navy means a team of more qualified watch standers, extra lookouts and more than likely either the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer or both, would be on the bridge overseeing the watch. It's further perplexing as to why the officer of the deck, or officer of the watch, was conducting training during a transit so close to land, Hoffman said. “[The officer of the deck should be] looking out the window and completely focused on the transit,” he said. “We would not use that as a training opportunity. The OOD and the Conning Officer has no other task.” However, Østheim told VG in December he has no regrets about his actions, though he accepts that he was overall responsible for the ship. “I don't feel any shame,” he said. “As the ship's chief, I of course have the overall responsibility for the ship and its crew. It's extremely sad that this happened. It's an accident that should not happen, but I don't feel any shame.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/11/12/safety-report-slams-the-norwegian-navy-for-training-safety-shortfalls-in-the-runup-to-frigate-sinking/

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  March 6, 2024 | International, Land

  Spain's Indra sees revenue, profit soaring on European defence spending

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  October 25, 2018 | International, Naval

  To combat Russian subs, NATO allies are teaming up to develop unmanned systems at sea

  By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. and its NATO allies are teaming up to more closely cooperate on the development and fielding of unmanned maritime systems, according to an agreement signed by the defense heads of 13 NATO allies. During the July summit, the powers signed onto a plan to jointly pursue technologies aimed at mine and sub hunting, according to an October news release making the agreement public. “The use of unmanned systems is a potentially game changing leap forward in maritime technology,” the release read. “Working alongside traditional naval assets, these unmanned systems will increase both our situational awareness and our control of the seas.” The release, while short on details, seems to open up the possibility that development of underwater and surface drones could be even more lucrative for companies involved, as it hints at the alliance seeking common, interoperable systems. That means a proven drone might be competing for business in 13 markets simultaneously instead of just one. “Through this initiative, Allies will also be able to exploit economies of scale to reduce costs, allowing increasing defence budgets to go even further,” the release said. The countries involved in the agreement are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. For NATO watchers, the agreement is the latest sign of just how seriously the alliance is taking the threat from Russian submarines. “NATO members are alarmed by the growing threat from Russian submarines, and are investing more resources to deal with it,” said Jorge Benitez, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council who previously served as the lead on NATO issues for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Under [President Vladimir] Putin, Russia has deployed new, stealthier submarines in the north Atlantic that are much harder for NATO navies to track. “This new multinational cooperation in undersea drones is the most recent example that NATO is taking the Russian threat in the north Atlantic much more seriously than it has in the past quarter century.” Expanding role The agreement also reflects the ever-expanding role of unmanned systems in the underwater domain, which countries are banking on to offset the ever-quieter and more advanced submarines. As the U.S. submarine fleet has dipped to 56 attack and guided-missile boats, and the Navy projects that number is slated to further drop to 42 by 2028 and hold below 48 boats through 2032, according to a recent Congressional Research Service report. The Navy's 2019 30-year shipbuilding plan shows the number of attack submarines dropping precipitously in the mid-2020s, something CRS has warned about for years as the Los Angeles-class boats begin to retire in numbers. That shortfall is prompting an all-out push on developing unmanned systems that can perform some functions to free up the big hunters for missions where they are more needed. When it comes to cooperating in development of drones, monitoring the littorals in and around the Baltic — and in the Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom gap — is an area where this kind of cooperation could be helpful, said Bryan Clark, a retired submariner and analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The Battle of the Atlantic The renewed threat from Russian submarines has triggered what the U.S. Navy's Europe commander, Adm. James Foggo, has dubbed “The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic,” harkening back to the fight with German U-boats in World War I, World War II and the standoff with Russia in the Cold War. But with the expansion of NATO to former Soviet satellite states, the Battle of the Atlantic will sprawl from the Eastern Seaboard all the way to the Baltic and Black seas, areas that Russia has fortified with anti-access, area denial weapons and other capabilities in recent years. That battlespace, however, extends not only to the undersea domain but all the way to the ocean floor, which is home to everything from pop-up mines to undersea internet cables that transmit the vast majority of the world's data. That means the alliance will need to know more than ever about what's on the sea floor, a job that simply can't be done with the declining number of attack submarines needed to shadow nuclear missile subs and conduct high-risk intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions around the globe. In that arena, experts say that underwater systems — be it drones or stationary systems — will be necessary to monitor crucial chokepoints. "We don't have to know everything everywhere,” retired Vice Adm. Michael Connor, former head of American's submarine forces, told the House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee in a 2015 hearing. “But there are places where you would like to have very good knowledge. We have critical things we want to protect, like some of the undersea infrastructure that is so critical to our economy. “There may be places we decide we want to have some volume of systems and that relatively small area around that infrastructure where you would have sufficient vehicles to obtain perfect knowledge.” Pawns Developing and using autonomous underwater unmanned vehicles has proven to be a challenge. The issues are multifarious, but they boil down to three core problems: communications, navigation and endurance. Communicating underwater is a challenge in the best of circumstances, and surveillance drones aren't worth much if they can't tell others what they find. To that end, they must either have a home base to which they can navigate and upload data, or they need to surface and transmit, said Clark, the CSBA analyst. A second challenge is navigating around obstacles. Fish, which know quite a bit about navigating underwater, have trouble avoiding commercial fishing nets that are common in sea lanes. Likewise, drones have issues finding and avoiding them, and that's just one example. Endurance is another challenge. Some of the best underwater drones in the U.S. Navy's inventory, under ideal usage conditions, last a day underwater, Clark said. “UUVs can only go a few knots, and that's of limited duration,” he said. Underwater drones are showing promise in the areas of mine hunting and mine sweeping, but perhaps even more promising — in terms of becoming an adequate stand-in for an attack boat — are some of the surface drones in development. Clark said programs such as the Sea Hunter, a medium-displacement unmanned surface vessel, could be a huge leap forward for monitoring chokepoints. Developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel, or ACTUV, was designed to track enemy subs while avoiding collisions and abiding by the rules of the road. The first Sea Hunter was christened in 2016, and in January the project transitioned to the Office of Naval Research for further development. The idea behind Sea Hunter is that one can field a multitude to cover a lot of area at a fraction of the cost of a frigate of destroyer. “ACTUV represents a new vision of naval surface warfare that trades small numbers of very capable, high-value assets for large numbers of commoditized, simpler platforms that are more capable in the aggregate,” Fred Kennedy, head of DARPA's Tactical Technology Office, said in a January news release. “The U.S. military has talked about the strategic importance of replacing ‘king' and ‘queen' pieces on the maritime chessboard with lots of ‘pawns,' and ACTUV is a first step toward doing exactly that.” Other technologies have also shown promise. Liquid Robotics' Wave Glider, which uses ocean current and solar panels to power itself, can stay at sea for months at a time and provide persistent surveillance for anywhere from $250,000 to $300,000 a unit, a company representative told Defense News last year. The agreement reached by 13 NATO powers is just the latest indication of how countries see unmanned systems impacting the future of warfare. “It's an important statement that NATO allies and partners are thinking seriously about these emerging capabilities — and they need to think about them,” said Michael Horowitz, a political science professor at the University of Pennsylvania whose research has centered on unmanned systems. “It's a reflection of how they see these systems impacting the maritime domain.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/10/21/to-combat-russian-subs-nato-allies-are-teaming-up-to-develop-unmanned-systems-at-sea/