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February 11, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - February 10, 2020

NAVY

Carahsoft Technology Corp., Reston, Virginia, is one of eight companies to be awarded a multiple-award, firm-fixed-price Department of Defense (DoD) Enterprise Software Initiative (ESI) blanket purchase agreement (BPA) in accordance with the firms' General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule contracts. This agreement is being awarded as part of a multi-reseller/multi-software publisher software category management award for commercial-off-the-shelf information technology asset management software; software maintenance support; information technology professional services; and related services in support of DoD ESI and under the direction of Office of Management and Budget, Enterprise Software Category. The software publisher under this agreement is Splunk. The BPA provides for the purchase of Splunk products and services by the DoD, U.S. intelligence community, and the Coast Guard. The overall potential value of this category of BPAs is $820,450,000. The ordering period will be for a maximum of 10 years from Feb. 10, 2020, through July 13, 2029. This BPA is issued under DoD ESI in accordance with the policy and guidelines in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Section 208.74. This BPA will not obligate funds at the time of award. Funds will be obligated as task orders using operations and maintenance (DoD) funds. Requirements will be competed among the awardees in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 8.403-3(c)(2), and the successful contractor will receive firm fixed-price orders. This BPA was competitively procured via the GSA E-Buy web site among 679 vendors. Eight offers were received and eight were selected for award. Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific, San Diego, California, is the contracting activity (N66001-20-A-0022).

Orion Construction Corp., Vista, California (N62473-18-D-5860); Bilbro Construction Co., Inc.,* Escondido, California (N62473-18-D-5861); Reyes Construction Inc., Pomona, California (N62473-18-D-5862); M. A. Mortenson Co., doing business as Mortenson Construction, Minneapolis, Minnesota (N62473-18-D-5863); Baldi Bros. Inc.,* Beaumont, California (N62473-18-D-5864); Granite Construction Co., Watsonville, California (N62473-18-D-5865); and Hal Hays Construction Inc., Riverside, California (N62473-18-D-5866), are awarded $91,000,000 to increase the aggregate capacity of the previously-awarded suite of firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, multiple award construction contracts. The maximum dollar value including the base year and four option years for all seven contracts combined is increased from $249,000,000 to $340,000,000. The contracts are for new construction, renovation, and repair of various heavy horizontal and civil engineering construction projects at various government installations within the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Southwest area of operations. All work will be performed in California (90%); Arizona (6%); Colorado (1%); Nevada (1%); New Mexico (1%); and Utah (1%). No funds are being obligated on this award. No funds will expire. Future task orders will be primarily funded by military construction, Navy; operations and maintenance (O&M), Navy; O&M, Marine Corps; and Navy working capital funds. The original contract was competitively procured via the Navy Electronic Commerce Online website, with 18 proposals received. The NAVFAC Southwest, San Diego, California is the contracting activity.

The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri, is awarded $22,200,000 for ceiling-priced delivery order N00383-20-F-0A30 under previously-awarded basic ordering agreement N00383-17-G-A301 for the procurement of trailing edge flaps in support of the F/A-18 C-D aircraft. Work will be performed in Emmen, Switzerland (60%); and St. Louis, Missouri (40%). Work will be completed by February 2023 with no option periods. Switzerland funds in the amount of $10,878,000 will be obligated at the time of award and funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Switzerland (100%) funds will be used under the Foreign Military Sales program. One company was solicited for this sole-sourced requirement under authority 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c)(4) and in accordance with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 206.302-4, with one offer received. Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity.

Doyon Management Services LLC,* Federal Way, Washington, was awarded a $7,898,803 firm-fixed-price contract for the retrofit and upgrade of Substation 1, Building 5100 at Naval Base Kitsap. The work to be performed provides for the retrofit of 15 kV vacuum breakers, installation of new 15 kV vacuum breakers in Substation 1, as well as upgrades, switchgear door replacements, new protective relays, protective device coordination, installation of raceways, wire, fiber optic, cabling systems and battery replacements. Work will be performed in Silverdale, Washington, and is expected to be completed by September 2021. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance, Navy contract funds in the amount of $7,898,803 are obligated on this award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured via the Navy Electronic Commerce Online website with two proposals received. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Northwest, Silverdale, Washington, is the contracting activity (N44255-20-C-5001). (Awarded Feb. 7, 2020)

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc., Poway, California, is awarded a $7,826,673 modification (P00005) to a previously-awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-18-C-1063). This modification provides for Group 5 unmanned air system intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance services. These services are in support of outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) Task Force Southwest and U.S. Marine Corps operations utilizing contractor-owned/contractor-operated MQ-9 unmanned air systems. Work will be performed in Yuma, Arizona (35%); Poway, California (15%); and various OCONUS locations (50%), and is expected to be completed in May 2020. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance overseas contingency operations (Navy) funds in the amount of $7,826,673 will be obligated at time of award, all of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

ARMY

Capital Currency Team, Washington, District of Columbia, was awarded a $100,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for multi-discipline architectural engineering services. Bids were solicited via the internet with seven received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 5, 2030. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Baltimore, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W912DR-20-D-0007).

ECS Federal LLC, Fairfax, Virginia, was awarded an $85,422,289 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for research and development of artificial intelligence algorithms. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed in Fairfax, Virginia, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 26, 2023. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds, Army in the amount of $85,422,289 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W911QX-20-C-0019).

Kentucky Office of Vocational Rehabilitation Division of Blind Services, Frankfort, Kentucky, was awarded a $59,677,871 firm-fixed-price contract for full food services at Fort Knox. Bids were solicited via the internet with five received. Work will be completed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 6, 2025. Field Directorate Office Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is the contracting activity (W9124J-20-D-0007).

Accura Engineering and Consulting Services Inc.,* Atlanta, Georgia (W91278-20-D-0012); ACT Services LLC,* Columbia, Maryland (W91278-20-D-0013); Health Facility Solutions Co.,* San Antonio, Texas (W91278-20-D-0014); Moca Systems Inc.,* Boston, Massachusetts (W91278-20-D-0015); Parsons Government Services Inc., Washington, District of Columbia (W91278-20-D-0016); Thompson Engineering Inc., Mobile, Alabama (W91278-20-D-0017); and Wood Environment & Infrastructure Solutions Inc., Blue Bell, Pennsylvania (W91278-20-D-0018), will compete for each order of the $49,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for architect and engineering services to support the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction Management Program. Bids were solicited via the internet with 46 received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 10, 2025. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

Cape Fox Facilities Services LLC, Manassas, Virginia, was awarded a $22,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for behavioral health support services. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 9, 2025. U.S. Army Health Contracting Activity, San Antonio, Texas, is the contracting activity (W81K04-20-D-0004).

TSAY/Ferguson-Williams,* San Juan Pueblo, New Mexico, was awarded an $8,903,544 cost-plus-award-fee contract for base operations and maintenance services at Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Air Field. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed at Fort Stewart, Georgia, with an estimated completion date of July 31, 2020. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $8,903,544 were obligated at the time of the award. Mission and Installation Contracting Command, Fort Stewart, Georgia, is the contracting activity (W9124M20C0003). (Awarded Feb. 8, 2020)

AIR FORCE

SigmaTech Corp., Colorado Springs, Colorado, has been awarded a hybrid labor hour and firm-fixed-price with cost reimbursement elements task order under General Services Administration One Acquisition Solution for Integrated Services (OASIS) Small Business Pool 5B indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (SAF/SP) systems, engineering, and technical assistance (SETA). The base period total award amount is $14,440,691. The total amount for the base period and four one-year periods is $74,386,746. This task order provides SAF/SP technical, acquisition-related, and support advisory and assistance services in support of space activities. This task order shall also be utilized to focus on the following categories: business and staff support, secretariat and fusion, policy and integration, space control, programs and analysis, architectures and space support, and program management. Work will be primarily done in the Washington, District of Columbia, area, specifically the Pentagon and within the National Capitol Region, and is expected to be complete by Feb. 23, 2025. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $9,271,413 are being obligated at time of award. The Air Force District of Washington, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, is the contracting activity (FA7014-20-F-0028).

Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Clearfield, Utah, has been awarded a $9,900,000 indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for F-5 aircraft parts. This contract provides F-5 aircraft parts for Foreign Military Sales support. Work will be performed in Clearfield, Utah, and is expected to be complete by Oct. 22, 2023. This award is the result of a sole source acquisition. Fiscal 2020 Foreign Military Sales funds in the amount of $5,700,000 are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, is the contracting activity (FA8220-20-D-0001).

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

Aerojet Rocketdyne Inc., Huntsville, Alabama, was awarded a $12,131,241 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the base period of the Glide Breaker program. Work will be performed in Huntsville, Alabama (46%); Sacramento, California (29%); Orange, Virginia (14%); Healdsburg, California (8%); and Sunnyvale, California (3%), with an expected completion date of February 2021. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation funding in the amount of $12,131,241 are being obligated at the time of award. This contract is a competitive acquisition in accordance with the original broad agency announcement, HR001119S0008. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia, is the contracting activity (HR001120C0030).

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Aegis Power Systems Inc., Murphy, North Carolina, has been awarded a maximum $7,000,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the production of the power supply in support of the AN/TSQ-232 family of command post platforms. This was a sole-source acquisition using justification 41 U.S. Code 1901(e), as stated in Federal Acquisition Regulation 13.501. This is a five-year base contract with no option periods. Location of performance is North Carolina, with a Feb. 10, 2025, performance completion date. Using military service is Army. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2025 Army working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Land and Maritime, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (SPRBL1-20-D-0024).

*Small business

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2080211/source/GovDelivery/

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