May 7, 2019 | International, Naval, Security
By: Jeff Martin and Geoff Ziezulewicz
From home port inspections to transiting the Taiwan Strait, down to Antarctica and through riverine waterways, the Coast Guard has arguably the most diverse mission set of the armed services.
But despite these responsibilities, the Coast Guard remains a red-headed stepchild of sorts, a military branch that falls under the Department of Homeland Security.
That designation resulted in a lack of payment for Coasties during the 35-day government shutdown of December 2018 and January 2019.
But in a chat during the 2019 Sea-Air-Space conference, Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Karl Schultz said his service is back on track, even as it grapples with the same readiness challenges faced by other services. He also opined on why the Arctic matters more than ever, as well as the difference between the current heavy icebreaker and the coming polar security cutter.
The Coast Guard was hit hard during the government shutdown. What is the service doing to recover?
The shutdown was a shutdown. Obviously going 35 days without pay was tough on our members. Not having appropriations challenged us from a readiness standpoint. I think we have recovered.
Some of the things like boat maintenance periods, dry dock availabilities, we lost some calendar days on that. That's tough. But going forward, the Coast Guard's ready to do the nation's business.
What's the main message you try to convey to lawmakers on Capitol Hill regarding the last shutdown's impact on the Coast Guard?
I've been on the same message since I did my Hill visits before my confirmation hearing in April 2018. The Coast Guard's challenge is readiness. In a budgeting environment we've been flatlined for the good part of eight-plus years. The president rolled out a conversation about national security. It's fantastic and good for [the Department of Defense], they got a 12 percent [funding] bump in 2018.
Being in DHS, we weren't part of that conversation. We are a capital-intensive organization like the other armed forces, and we've got some bills. We've got some maintenance we've been kicking the can on, so since before I even assumed the duties of commandant I've been having this conversation about the readiness of the Coast Guard and testified recently about being at a readiness tipping point. We just need to enhance the understanding, the fact that it's a readiness conversation. We need to take ownership of it, and I need to convince folks that this is important for the nation.
Your predecessor hammered the need for icebreaker capacity. Where is the Coast Guard at regarding its next icebreaker?
Two weeks ago today, we award the contract to [VT Halter Marine] down in Mississippi to build the first polar security cutter. We used to talk about heavy icebreakers, now we talk about a polar security cutter. We just rolled out in April what we call the Arctic Strategic Outlook. It's a refresh on what was our Arctic strategic plan in 2013.
We talk about the Arctic through a different lens now. We talk about the Arctic as a competitive space. We've seen China, we see Russia investing extensively. China built icebreakers in the time since we updated our strategy. China's been operating off the Alaskan Arctic for a good part of the last six years on an annual basis. We're championing increased capabilities in the Arctic, we're championing better communications, better domain awareness, we're talking about innovation, we're talking about resiliency, we're talking about rule-based order. I want to see the Arctic remain a peaceful domain. China's a self-declared Arctic state. They're not one of the eight Arctic nations, so for me, for the service, its presence equals influence.
Right now, with one 43-year-old heavy icebreaker, Polar Star, that ship is basically a one-trick pony. It goes down to [McMurdo Station, the U.S. scientific outpost in Antarctica] every year and does the breakout, so the National Science Foundation can maintain their operations down there. The first polar security cutter, which probably hits the waterfront late 2023, 2024, is going to be almost a one for one. It's when we get to the second or third polar security cutter that we start to have some capacity. And again, presence equals influence. I'd like to see us in the Arctic, I'm not saying a fully annual basis, but on a lot more persistent presence up there. That's where we need to be as a nation.
What's the difference between today's heavy icebreaker and the future polar security cutter?
It's a designation change, it's the lexicon of adding “security” to the title. We thought it was more artful to capture the reflecting reality in how we talk about that ship. I think that narrative helped raise the bar in understanding.
April 24, 2022 | International, Land
Up to 40 vehicles are needed in the long term, and could come from either from New Zealand or other countries where they're available, according to military sources in Chile.
September 7, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR
By Dean Cheng The Department of Defense has released the latest edition of its report on Chinese military and security developments. Mandated in the fiscal 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, the annual report is an important source of regular updates regarding China's growing military capabilities and its expanding range of security-related activities. Since the People's Republic of China halted the publication of its biennial defense white papers in 2015, there are few other good sources of information on one of the world's largest militaries. An important element of this year's report is the expanded discussion of China's security-related activities, providing a broader, fuller assessment. There is an extensive discussion of China's Belt and Road Initiative, its array of investment projects previously known as the “One Belt, One Road Initiative,” stretching from China to Europe, into the Indian Ocean to Africa, and even across the Pacific to South America. The report discusses the security implications of the Belt and Road Initiative, even though it is primarily a set of economic and political initiatives with limited direct military impact. Ad Feedback This more comprehensive analysis is important, as it captures the Chinese whole-of-society approach to national security. To understand Beijing's challenge to the U.S., it is vital to incorporate not only concerns about the People's Liberation Army and the Chinese government, but also consideration of its diplomatic and economic engagement globally. This year's report also exemplifies why issuing an annual report is important. It highlights the various changes that have been undertaken since the announcement in December 2015 of a series of fundamental overhauls and reforms of the People's Liberation Army. It thus provides a new snapshot of the various improvements and changes in the Chinese military as it continues to modernize all of its services. Much discussed, for example, has been the steady extension of the People's Liberation Army's reach. News reports emphasized that it is acquiring systems that will allow it to strike the United States. The report also notes that “one of the most significant [Navy] structural changes in 2017” has been the tripling of the size of the Chinese marine corps. Coupled with China's first official overseas military base (in Djibouti), it is clear that China is expanding its force-projection capacity. As important, however, have been the changes in the People's Liberation Army's organization and doctrine. This year's report devotes substantial discussion to the evolving organization of PLA Army forces, as well as changes in the Central Military Commission, which manages the overall military. These changes are fundamental, but have taken the past two years to become much more visible. The shift from divisions as the cornerstone of China's ground forces to brigades had long been discussed, but only now is there sufficient evidence to gauge Beijing's progress. The changes in the Central Military Commission structure have been even more complex. When the changes were first announced, the commission initially appeared to be expanding from four general departments to 15 departments, commissions, and offices. It is now clear, however, that in fact the commission has shrunk, with only seven members, rather than the pre-reform 10. Of particular note is the removal of the Logistics Work and Equipment Development departments from the main Central Military Commission structure. Full article: https://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/dean-cheng/pentagon-report-shows-chinas-continually-modernizing-and-growing-military
June 21, 2018 | International, C4ISR
Mark Pomerleau   With cyber playing a critical role in conflict going forward, the Army has begun to recognize the need to have organic cyber planners within a brigade's staff to offer commanders options related to cyber as well as electronic warfare. Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities, or CEMA cells, have been stood up in each brigade acting as planners to provide targeting options and capabilities to get at commander objectives just as an artillery planner would offer the commander choices related to their field for a pending operation. At the tactical level, these two disciplines – cyber and electronic warfare – have become intertwined. “When I talk to Army commanders and staffs, I try to make the point that I want you to worry less about whether it's a cyber or EW effect,” Lt. Col. Christopher Walls, deputy director for strategy and policy, at the Army's Cyber Directorate within the G-3/5/7, said at the C4ISRNET Conference in May. For example, Walls said for a river crossing mission, a commander might say he needs to buy a few hours to get a battalion across. The CEMA cell, in turn, would look across the capability sets in its portfolio and come up with a course of action. These cells potentially have the ability to allow the commander to target local internet service providers or local routers and prevent opposing forces from using them. The teams may also have an electronic warfare capability that can jam local area network protocols. Finally, these teams might know where mobile switching centers are by digitally geolocating them allowing physical strikes to take them out, Walls said. “I don't want the commander to worry about which of those three things, I just want him to talk to me in terms of desired objective and effects and then us, along with the staff, will determine which capability makes sense,” Walls said. “That's kind of the way we're thinking about the tactical fight.” The best choice comes down to understanding the commander's objectives and intent in order to offer the best solution. “What I would do is understand his intent, what effect he wants and what I'll do is submit that in a formal request and I'll let the higher echelons determine if they can provide that effect,” Capt. Daniel Oconer, brigade CEMA officer, told C4ISRNET during a recent visit to the National Training Center. “In general, all I really need to know for my planning processes is understand what the maneuver force wants to do,” he added. “How do tanks and Bradleys [move], how are the troops on the ground moving. Then, what is their mission? What is their objective? What is the commander's intent? Once I understand that I throw some CEMA flavor, so to say, onto it and then enable them to accomplish their mission.” Oconer is currently billeted as a 29 series electronic warfare officer. The Army will begin to transition these individuals into the cyber branch, or 17 series, so they will all eventually be cyber planners in the CEMA cell. “The way that we're transforming our electronic warfare professionals is they will become cyber operators. They will be the face inside our brigade combat teams and our maneuver formations for cyber operational planning,” Maj. Gen. John Morrison, commander of the Cyber Center of Excellence, said during a May speech. “They're complimentary. You cannot look at electronic warfare professionals and cyber operators in isolation.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/electronic-warfare/2018/06/20/how-the-army-will-plan-cyber-and-electronic-warfare-operations/