Can The UK Afford To Develop Its Tempest Optionally-Manned Stealth Fighter?

On the same subject

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  December 19, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  UK: Modernising Defence Programme - Update

  Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson has provided a final update on the Modernising Defence Programme to the House of Commons. In July, I made a statement setting out headline conclusions from six months of work on the Modernising Defence Programme (MDP). Since then, work has continued apace. Firstly, I would like to welcome the extra £1.8 billion of funding for Defence, including the additional £1 billion that was in last month's Budget. Today, I want to provide an update on the MDP, and set out the work that will be ongoing. I have placed a full report on the MDP in the library of the House. First, I should put the MDP into context. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review was the right plan for Defence at that time. The Government put the Defence budget on a firmer footing, increasing throughout the life of the Parliament. Defence is much stronger as a result of that. NATO is growing in strength and the UK is a leader. More allies are meeting the 2 per cent spending guideline, or have developed plans to do so. We are the second largest defence spender in NATO, one of only a small number of allies to spend 2 per cent of our GDP on defence, and invest 20 per cent of that in upgrading equipment. We can be proud of what we have achieved since 2015. But we have to also be vigilant. National security challenges have become more complex, intertwined and dangerous since 2015 and these threats are moving much faster than anticipated. Persistent, aggressive state competition now characterises the international security context. In response to the growing threats the MDP was launched in January. And, in the last year, our Armed Forces have demonstrated their growing capability, engaged globally, and supported the prosperity of the UK. The Royal Navy has increased its mass and points of presence around the world. We have taken steps to forward base the Army, enhancing our global posture. The Royal Air Force has continued to innovate, and has celebrated a proud past its RAF100 years since its creation. Progress has also made in cyber and space, as the changing character of warfare makes both domains increasingly important. We have reinforced the UK's position as a leading voice in NATO and on European security. And, our Armed Forces have led the way for Global Britain, tackling our adversaries abroad to protect our security at home and nurturing enduring relationships with our allies and partners. Through the work over the past year the MDP has identified three broad priorities, supported by the additional £1.8 billion invested in Defence. Firstly, we will mobilise, making more of what we already have to make our current force more lethal and better able to protect our security. The UK already has a world-leading array of capabilities. We will make the most effective use of them. We will improve the readiness and availability of a range of key Defence platforms: major warships, attack submarines, helicopters and a range of ISTAR platforms. We are adjusting our overseas training and deployments to increase our global points of presence, better to support allies and influence adversaries. To improve the combat effectiveness of our Force, we will re-prioritise the current Defence programme to increase weapon stockpiles. And we are accelerating work to assure the resilience of our Defence systems and capabilities. We can mobilise a full spectrum of military, economic and soft power capabilities. And, where necessary and appropriate we will make sure we are able to act independently. We will also enhance efforts with our allies and partners, aligning our plans more closely with them, acting as part of combined formations, developing combined capabilities, and burden-sharing. And we continue to invest in, and grow, our global network of Defence personnel and the education and training we offer in the UK and overseas. Secondly, we will modernise, embracing new technologies to assure our competitive edge Our adversaries and competitors are accelerating the development of new capabilities and strategies. We must keep pace, and conceive of our joint force as consisting of five domains, air, land, sea, cyber and space, rather than the traditional three. We must modernise, targeting priority areas. A major new step will involve improved Joint Forces Command that will be in a better position so that defence can play a major role in preventing conflict in the future and improve our cyber operations and capabilities across the armed forces but also across government as well. This year Defence's Innovation Fund put £20 million towards projects in areas including unmanned air systems, virtual reality training, and enhanced digital communications for the Future Commando Force. The fund will grow to £50 million next financial year, increasing the scope, ambition and value of the projects it can support. We will launch new ‘Spearhead' innovation programmes that will apply cutting-edge technologies to areas including sub-surface threats to our submarines, our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability, and command and control in the Land Environment as well. And to drive innovation and change through the Department I am launching a Transformation Fund. Next year, I will ring-fence £160 million of MOD's budget to create this fund available for innovative new military capabilities. I will look to make a further £340 million available as part of the Spending Review. This fund will be available for new innovative military capabilities which allows us to stay one step ahead of our adversaries. Together these and other steps will enable the acceleration of our modernisation plans. Thirdly, we will transform, radically changing the way we do business in Defence. We need to improve markedly the way we run Defence. To sustain strategic advantage in a fast-changing world, we must be able and capable of continuous and timely adaptation. We will embrace modern business practices and establish a culture that nurtures transformation and innovation. We also need to create financial headroom for modernisation. Based on our work to date, we expect to achieve over the next decade the very demanding efficiency targets we were set in 2015, including through investment in a programme of digital transformation. We will develop a comprehensive strategy to improve recruitment and retention of talent, better reflecting the expectations of the modern workforce. We will access more effectively the talents of our ‘Whole Force' across all three Services, Regulars, Reserves, Civil Service and industrial partners. Looking ahead, dealing effectively with persistent conflict and competition will increasingly hinge on smarter, better informed long-range strategy. To help achieve these goals we will establish a permanent Net Assessment Unit, as well as a Defence Policy Board of external experts, to bring challenge to Defence policy and to Defence strategy. Our achievements under the MDP have made Defence stronger. The capability investments and policy approaches set out, with the £1.8 billion worth of Defence funding, will help us keep on track to deliver the right UK Defence for the challenging decade ahead. Without a shadow of a doubt, there is more work to be done as we move towards next year's Spending Review. We must sustain this momentum if we are to realise our long-term goals of increasing the lethality, reach and mass of our Armed Forces. I will do everything within my power to make sure that the UK remains a Tier-One military power in the decade ahead, and that we continue to deliver the strong defence and security that has been the hallmark of the government. I commend this statement to the House. The Modernising Defence Programme https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/modernising-defence-programme-update

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  January 31, 2023 | International, Land

  US Army goes virtual to help Ukraine maintain weapons

  The Army is realizing the value of remote maintenance, now used to help Ukraine, for future sustainment in highly contested environments.

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  May 22, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Will COVID-19 Kill The Liberal World Order?

  By JAMES KITFIELDon May 22, 2020 at 4:01 AM For a brief moment it seemed that the worst global pandemic in a century might lead to increased comity between the United States, China and Russia after years of geopolitical eye-gauging. As the virus spread there were early signs of a pause in the escalating cycle of military brinksmanship, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and trade wars that has badly shaken the rules-based international order in this era of great power competition. Beijing seemed to initially embrace a spirit of cooperation when it donated protective gear and testing equipment to hard hit countries in Europe. President Trump for months was uncharacteristically effusive in his praise of Chinese President Xi Jinping's efforts to combat the virus. Russian President Vladimir Putin got into the soft power act in early April when he dispatched an An-124 military transport to New York filled with donated masks and ventilators. (Of course, you can also argue it was a highly effective information operation designed to undermine U.S. standing in the world.) That moment was short lived. “Unfortunately, this crisis is likely to unfold in three consecutive waves, with a public health crisis followed by an economic crisis, quite possibly followed by a security crisis,” said David Kilcullen, author of the recent book “The Dragons and Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West,” and a former special adviser to Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq, and the U.S. Secretary of State. The United States is already experiencing high levels of domestic unrest at a time of paralyzing partisan rancor, he noted, and the discord will certainly increase as the presidential election nears in November. Adding to that combustible mixture is likely to be a second wave of the virus expected to hit in the fall, and foreign actors like Russian and China determined to use disinformation to stoke domestic divisions during the election. “Given the likelihood of internal instability and anti-government anger here and around the world, there will be a huge incentive for leaders who personalize politics like Trump, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and [Chinese President] Xi Jinping to look for external scapegoats for their domestic troubles, which has already started to happen,” said Kilcullen. “This crisis also comes at a point when the international system that we've known since the end of World War II was already rotting and weaker than it appears. It may only take one big shock to bring that whole structure down, and, if we're not very careful, the pandemic could be that shock. So this is the most dangerous geopolitical dynamic I have seen in my entire career.” As it became clear the Chinese Communist Party covered up the initial outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan, wasting precious time and allowing it to blossom into a global pandemic, Beijing launched a campaign of intimidation and economic threats to mute international criticism. Borrowing a page from Russian disinformation operations, Beijing posited the conspiracy theory that the virus originated with the U.S. military. Both China and Russia pushed alarmist narratives about the pandemic on social media to sow division and panic inside the United States. Much of the protective equipment Beijing “donated” to the West carried a price tag and turned out to be defective. In his own campaign of blame shifting and heated rhetoric, President Donald Trump accused China of being responsible for an attack on the United States that “is worse that Pearl Harbor,” and “worse than the World Trade Center” that fell in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Chinese incompetence in dealing with the virus, Trump tweeted this week, is responsible for “mass Worldwide killing!” Trump darkly hinted in mid-April that he had information that a virology lab in Wuhan played an important role in the virus' creation, even though the U.S. Intelligence Community consensus was that the virology lab in Wuhan had nothing to do the virus' creation or origins. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insisted there is “enormous evidence” the coronavirus originated in that lab. “We greatly underestimated the degree to which Beijing is ideologically and politically hostile to free nations,” Pompeo told reporters this week, after sending a rare, high-level message of congratulations to recently reelected Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, who has rejected the “one country, two systems” construct that has kept the peace between China and Taiwan for nearly half a century. As the Trump administration weighs retribution against China, it has continued to ratchet up the rhetoric and provocations, angering and worrying allies by cutting critical funding to the World Health Organization (WHO) in the midst of the pandemic, and boycotting a virtual meeting of G-20 nations that attempted to coordinate an international response to the crisis, leaving a leadership gap that China was happy to help fill. Meanwhile, populist leaders and autocratic regimes around the world are using the threat of the pandemic to assume extraordinary powers and crack down on their political opposition in what the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Counterterrorism and Human Rights called an “an epidemic of authoritarianism,” according to the The New York Times. Shaky World Order Even before the pandemic the post-WW II international order that the United States constructed and led for more than half a century was on shaky ground. The global institutions, alliances and rules governing international relations has been challenged by assertive autocratic regimes like China and Russia, and eroded from within by inward-looking nationalist-populists movements spreading throughout the Western democracies. The liberal international order has also been largely abandoned by its leader as Donald Trump's administration retreats further into “America First” isolationism. The Trump doctrine in international affairs actively seeks to undermine the institutions of global order, whether it's the World Health and Trade Organizations, the UN, the European Union or NATO. The administration has rejected or abolished all manner of multilateral agreements and treaties designed to peacefully constrain international rivalries, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, and quite possibly next year the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). A Dark History History is rife with cautionary examples of natural disasters or economic crises conflating with geopolitical tensions, with cataclysmic results. The catastrophic 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which killed more than 20 million victims worldwide, was accelerated and spread by troop movements during World War I. With many Americans disillusioned by the war and loss, the United States turned insular and isolationist during the 1920s, rejecting the League of Nations, dramatically curtailing immigration and erecting steep tariff barriers to trade. Much of the rest of the world followed suit. The U.S. stock market crash of 1929 was compounded the next year by one of the worst droughts in history. When the Japanese invaded China two years later, and Adolf Hitler became German chancellor soon after, there was no League of Nations nor stabilizing trading systems to contain the war fever that swept the globe and became World War II. “When you think back to 1918 and the Spanish flu, it's worth remembering that more people died in the second wave than the first, and the Great Depression and the 1930s taught us that bad economic conditions can be transformative,” said Joseph Nye, a professor emeritus and former Dean of the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, speaking recently on a videoconference organized by The National Interest. “The point is, in the current pandemic we're likely only in Act 1 of a multi-act play.” Combustible Leadership The very real potential for the pandemic crisis to propel the major powers towards outright military conflict was noted recently by the Chinese Ministry of State Security, Beijing's top intelligence agency. In a report for Xi Jinping and the senior Chinese leadership it reportedly concluded that global anti-China sentiment being stoked by the Trump administration has reached its highest peak since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, and as a result China needs to be prepared for a worst-case scenario of armed confrontation with the United States. Despite the warnings, Xi Jinping has doubled down in recent months on provocative military maneuvers in its neighboring seas, sending its Liaoning carrier battle group and military flights off the coast of Taiwan; conducting anti-submarine exercises in contested areas of the South China Sea; ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat near the disputed Paracel Islands; dispatching a fishing boat “militia” to harass Philippine counterparts near the contested Spratly Islands; and harassing a Malaysian drillship. Some analysts see those moves as an attempt by Xi Jinping to show strength and bolster his image at home among a Chinese populace wearied by the pandemic shutdowns and economic disruptions. Those provocations are exactly the kind of saber-rattling that can escalate dangerously in a time of crisis. George Beebe is a former director of the CIA's Russia analysis section, and author of the book “The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Catastrophe.” “My concern is that the major power leaders Putin, Xi and Trump all tend to personalize international relations and politics. They are all going through severe economic and political distress. Each of them is convinced that their rivals are trying to exploit the pandemic crisis, and not one of them is dealing from a position of strength and confidence,” he told me. Putin has long felt betrayed and threatened by the United States, Beebe noted, and Xi Jinping is convinced that America is trying to thwart China's rise. One of the few constants in Trump's worldview is the conviction that China has taken advantage of the United States with trade going back decades. “So there's a lot of fear and emotion and very little trust in the relationships between these leaders during a time of great strain, and their communications and diplomatic mechanisms to manage a crisis if one occurs have atrophied,” said Beebe. “Given that personalities and personal relationships among national leaders are far more important in international affairs than a lot of people appreciate, I do worry that we're entering a very dangerous period when cooler heads may not prevail among the great power leaders.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/will-covid-19-kill-the-liberal-world-order