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July 30, 2020 | International, Aerospace

Can The UK Afford To Develop Its Tempest Optionally-Manned Stealth Fighter?

Seventy-six years after higher-performing Tempest fighters joined the Royal Air Force's Hawker Typhoons in harrying Nazi air and ground forces during World War II, the United Kingdom is once again counting on a warplane called the Tempest to replace succeed its Typhoons.

London has big ambitions for its Team Tempest program kicked off in 2018, which aims to develop a sixth-generation optionally-manned stealth fighter (ie. it can fly without an onboard pilot if necessary) to enter service around 2040 to replace its current fleet of Eurofighter Typhoon jet fighters.

Unfortunately, those ambitions may simply not square with the money available for “Combat Air” programs in the British defense budget according to a new paper published by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the UK's premier defense think tank.

The author of Combat Air Choices for the UK Government, defense analyst Justin Bronk, argues that putting U.K's strategic goals in line with its available financial means may require procuring more stealth jets in the short term, while in the long term reconceiving the optionally-manned Tempest as a more affordable unmanned (drone) combat systems.

British Combat Air Power, circa 2020

Today's Royal Air Force draws its primary combat strength from a projected fleet of 145 Eurofighter Typhoon fighters deployed in seven operational squadrons concentrated in two lightly-defended airbases, as well as a testing and training squadron each.

Developed by a British/German/Italian consortium (BAE/Airbus/Leonardo respectively), the Typhoon is an advanced 4.5-generation fighter originally focused on a high-speed and high-altitude air-to-air combat, but which has since integrated short- and long-range precision ground attack capabilities.

The RAF plans to further upgrade its Typhoons with an advanced CAPTOR-E active electronically scanned array radar which will substantially improve the type's reconnaissance, air-to-air, air-to-ground and self-defense capabilities.

But because the Typhoon isn't a stealth aircraft, it can't safely penetrate airspace interdicted by long-range surface-to-air missiles like Russia's S-400 system until those systems are suppressed or destroyed.

That job is set aside for 48 Lockheed F-35B Lightning II stealth jump jets shared by the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Air Force, of which 35 have been delivered so far.

Though less agile than the Typhoon, the Lightning's low radar cross-section allows it to penetrate hostile airspace in comparative safety, while its powerful networked sensors enable it to locate and destroy air defense batteries and other key targets—or shuffle targeting data to non-stealth platforms a safe distance away to execute a strike

Unfortunately, as discussed in this article by David Axe, 48 F-35s may not be enough to perform the anti-air defense mission in a hypothetical high-intensity conflict with Russia, particularly when the Royal Navy will want a significant chunk of those jets deployed on its Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to support naval operations.

Lastly, the UK is finishing procurement of sixteen MQ-9B Protector drones which can cost-efficiently perform long-endurance surveillance and on-call strike missions in a counter-insurgency context. However, the MQ-9B lacks the stealth or agility to survive in a high-intensity conflict.


The Tempest, not by Shakespeare

In July 2018, the UK launched Team Tempest, a project to develop an optionally-manned sixth-generation stealth fighter that could replace the Typhoons as they age out of service in 2040.

A mockup of a sleek twin-tail stealth design was unveiled at the Farnborough Airshow in July 2018, as well as a presentation highlighting concepts including adaptive cycle turbofans built by Rolls-Royce, revolutionary electrical power generation capabilities, integration of directed-energy (ie. lasers or microwaves) and hypersonic weapons, AI that could assist the pilot or even fly the plane without one, and control of swarms of supporting drones.

London has committed £2 billion ($2.6 billion) in initial funding to Tempest, and Italy and Sweden have joined in as partners via companies Leonardo and Saab. Involvement of the Netherlands has also been rumored. In 2020, the British government announced it had recruited seven more companies into the program, and that the number of persons working on Team Tempest would increase from 1,800 to 2,500 by 2021.

Tempest is implicitly a rival to the French-German-led Airbus/Dassault Future Combat Air System project which also includes Spain, though there has been tentative suggestions that FCAS and Tempest could be merged.

According to Bronk, because modern combat aircraft have grown so immensely expensive to develop, and retaining a core of specialized engineering expertise is so vital, the fate of the Tempest program may determine the future of the UK's military aviation sector, which currently counts 46,000 jobs.

“Tempest is the only way that the UK can retain a national combat aircraft design and manufacturing capability, and is currently the assumed source of a replacement capability for Typhoon by 2040... A failure of Tempest to generate significant airframe production contracts would also all but guarantee the demise of UK defence industry combat aircraft design and manufacturing capacity.”

In other words, a failed Tempest project could relegate British companies to building components for other jets like the F-35 instead of for domestic jet fighter designs.


The Budgetary Crunch

Unfortunately, based on other stealth fighter programs abroad, completing development of an optionally-manned Tempest fighter would likely cost at least £25 billion ($32.5 billion) according to Bronk.

Already, he writes there is “no headroom” to develop Tempest in the £18 billion set aside in the defense budget for Combat Air over the next decade, nor even to acquire more than 48 F-35s.

The paper outlines some ways the Ministry of Defense could reallocate funds, arguing the RAF should do a “large-scale culling” of capabilities that wouldn't be survivable in a conflict with Russia, namely slow-moving intelligence/surveillance aircraft (ISTARs) and transport planes and helicopters. Additional F-35 purchases could be of the cheaper land-based F-35A model, which besides has superior performance. And older, more limited-capability Typhoon Tranche 1 aircraft could be retired early in the late 2020s.

Nevertheless, completing Tempest would still likely require a large injection of funds outside of the regular defense budget.

Instead, the report argues Tempest would likely become much more affordable as a stealth unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV). Indeed, analysts are debating whether even the United States should choose to go that route for its next generation fighter.

Removing a pilot achieves major weight savings as cockpit, ejection and life support systems can be trimmed away. The UK has already developed the Taranis stealth UCAV prototype, showing it already has a knowledge base with such technology.

Furthermore the paper argues that unlike manned aircraft, closer to 100% of drones can remain available for operational missions. This is because pilots can do all of their training in simulators and units don't need to be rotated out of the line to rest and recover. That would mean both that a smaller number of UCAVs would need to be procured than jet fighters, and fewer personnel would be required to maintain them.

“Cost savings derive from the significantly reduced airframe complexity, fleet size, training, testing and certification requirements compared to a piloted aircraft development effort... Without the need to rotate squadrons, airframes and personnel for training, maintenance, deployment and rest cycles, UCAVs offer significantly more operationally ready airframes from a given fleet size.”

Admittedly, a Tempest UCAV would be less profitable for British defense industry.

“The lower production volumes and rates which make UCAVs attractive from a military capability standpoint also greatly reduce potential profits per customer for industry,” Bronk concedes.

Making the leap from manned to unmanned combat aircraft comes with other challenges. One is the need to harden UCAVs against hostile cyber- and electronic-warfare that could disrupt the command link. That likely includes building in autonomous AI capability so that UCAV can complete missions without relying on human direction.

Especially in lower-intensity conflicts, it may be preferable to have a human pilot who can judge better from context whether a target is civilian or military. And air forces led by fighter pilots may resist the idea of replacing manned aircraft with unmanned ones.

Regardless of whether one agrees with the RUSI report's recommendations, it seems clear that London will need to make some difficult choices in the years ahead as it balances the desired to field an effective air force today with investing in new technologies for tomorrow.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/07/30/can-the-uk-afford-to-develop-its-tempest-optionally-manned-stealth-fighter/#4452a87249b9

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