May 10, 2021 | International, Land
Anglo-German armored vehicle-maker Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land has signed a deal with the British Defence Ministry to upgrade Challenger 2 main battle tanks.
June 11, 2024 | International, Land
The Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, and the Honourable Ginette Petitpas Taylor, Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence, issued the following statement
October 7, 2019 | International, Land
By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The Army has disqualified Raytheon and Rheinmetall's bid for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle prototype competition, Defense News has learned. The OMFV is meant to replace the service's Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army's plan was to take the bid samples submitted this week, evaluate them over a period of time and then choose two companies to deliver 14 prototypes each and then would pick a single winner after further evaluation. The Army's goal was to begin replacing Bradleys in 2026. The Army would not comment on the disqualification and said in a statement sent to Defense News that the solicitation for the OMFV prototyping effort closed on Oct. 1 and “we are now in the competition sensitive Source Selection Evaluation process.” The service noted in the statement that it “remains committed to rapidly execute the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program,” its number two modernization priority. But multiple sources have confirmed that the bid — Rheinmetall's Lynx 41 Infantry Fighting Vehicle — was disqualified and the bid sample, the only one in existence, remains in Germany at the company's facility in Unterluss. The Army required the competitors to deliver a single bid sample — a full-up working vehicle — to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, by Oct. 1. The Lynx has left the Rheinmetall compound several times before, notably to travel to be unveiled in Paris at Eurosatory in June 2018 and again at the Association of the U.S. Army's annual conference last fall. Raytheon and the Rheinmetall announced at AUSA that they would partner on the OMFV program and submit Lynx as its offering. The disqualification of the team means that General Dynamics Land Systems' offering is the only vehicle remaining in the competition. According to sources, no other company submitted. Hanwha, a South Korean defense company, was interested in competing but chose not to participate, multiple sources claim. Industry sources have said that several companies who wanted to compete or submitted bids had asked for extensions, roughly 90 days in the case of Rheinmetall, to meet requirements. According to multiple sources, potential bidders expressed concern to the service that meeting the requirements, the timeline and a combination of the two wasn't possible. What snarled Rheinmetall, for instance, according to sources, was the timeline it needed to get approvals from the local municipal government to transport the vehicle by tractor trailer or rail and then via air. Sources said that the company had requested a four-week extension to deliver the vehicle to Aberdeen and also offered to hand over the vehicle to the Army under lock and bond in Germany by the Oct. 1 deadline and both were denied. But a larger issue, multiple sources conveyed, was the clear differences between what the Army acquisition community and what Army Futures Command wanted to do. Sources confirmed that the acquisition side of the house was willing to agree to extensions, for instance, but AFC, who is in charge of rapid requirements development and prototyping efforts ahead of programs of record, insisted the Army must adhere to the schedule. Industry also expressed concern to the Army over the roughly 100 mandatory requirements, with just six tradeable ones, expected to be met over 15 months using non-developmental vehicles. Brig. Gen. Ross Coffman, who is in charge of Next-Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) modernization efforts, said at the Defense News Conference in September that he was confident the requirements set for OMFV are appropriate and had no plans to change them. Presently, the OMFV competition is on hold due to a congressionally mandated continuing resolution that prevents the effort from kicking off. The Army had planned to begin the $378 million program in the first quarter after taking receipt of the bid samples at the start of the new fiscal year. As the Army enters its competition to build prototypes to replace the Bradley, Australia is running a similar effort and recently downselected to two competitors: Rheinmetall's Lynx and an offering from Hanwha. GDLS was competing but did not make the final cut. Australia laid out just five mandatory requirements for its competition. GDLS has not yet detailed its offering for OMFV but said it was “purpose built” for the U.S. Army. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/10/04/lynx-41-disqualified-from-bradley-replacement-competition/
November 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR, Security
Kevin Coggins The United States and our allies are increasingly dependent on unfettered access to space. However, it has become abundantly clear that our space systems have significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to exploit. Earlier this year, William Akoto wrote about the growing constellations of satellites operated by private industry, led by SpaceX, Blue Origin and others: “If hackers were to take control of these satellites, the consequences could be dire. On the mundane end of scale, hackers could simply shut satellites down, denying access to their services. Hackers could also jam or spoof the signals from satellites, creating havoc for critical infrastructure. This includes electric grids, water networks and transportation systems.” Space Policy Directive 5, recently issued by the White House, notes that “cybersecurity principles and practices that apply to terrestrial systems also apply to space systems” and that we must integrate these principles and practices into every phase of the space system life cycle. SPD-5 is charting the right course toward assuring our cybersecurity in the space domain. This article highlights the unique vulnerabilities of space systems and how innovative solutions like “digital twins” can help us protect systems in orbit today and design more secure ones for the future. Cyberattacks on space systems — comprised of satellites, ground control stations, and user terminals (e.g., GPS receivers) — are appealing to nation-states, criminal groups, hackers and other bad actors. It's a tremendous opportunity to breach data and disrupt operations in a low-risk way with a low cost of execution. The different components that make up space systems each come with their own set of cyber vulnerabilities, the ground segment in particular. Some space systems were built with speed to market rather than cybersecurity in mind. In contrast, for traditional defense-focused space systems, a slower design and development process has introduced vulnerabilities as well. Space systems operating today may have taken a full 20 years to go from paper to launch and lack the capabilities to recognize or respond to today's cyberthreats. Space systems are increasingly interconnected — a malicious attack can easily spread from a single point of vulnerability in a ground station to the satellites. Cybersecurity in space systems has struggled to keep pace with the rapid evolution of threat actors and exploits. Given these challenges, how can organizations with space systems stay ahead of cyberthreats and protect their missions and users? The older approach of paper-based assessments has significant limitations, like the inability to duplicate reactions to all possible scenarios. At the other end of the spectrum, full-scale replicas are expensive and time-consuming to build. In the middle is the “digital twin” concept — a virtual mirror model that synchronizes a physical object with a cyber representation. With this approach, organizations can test a satellite in different scenarios to identify vulnerabilities and develop protection strategies, even before the satellite is built. One specific project that demonstrated digital twins' strengths and capabilities: testing Air Force GPS space systems for vulnerabilities after the passage of Section 1647 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. Starting with a model-based system engineering review of thousands of pages of design documents, we built a digital replica of critical GPS Block IIR satellite components launched between 1987 and 2004 that ran on a single laptop with lightweight applications. Our digital twin created the foundation for a flexible cyber test bed — a suite of scalable software applications to demonstrate and validate cyber vulnerabilities and protection strategies as the system is designed or modified. The test bed can connect with assets beyond the network to generate data, provide war-gaming support and explore attack scenarios. We need this flexibility and functionality for future space system protection. The next generation of satellites will encounter more extreme service conditions and increased, simultaneous cyberattack vectors over longer periods of time. To respond to these challenges, these space systems will need increasingly complex designs, and with such complexity comes potentially greater vulnerability to cyberattacks and threats. Digital twins and model-based system engineering approaches can strengthen security throughout the acquisition and sustainment phases. Use them to: Develop system requirements and analyze design trades. Create test scenarios for requirements clarification and reference systems. Simulate threats, anomalies and impacts without risk to critical infrastructure. Assess the impact of new threats or operational scenarios on an on-orbit system design. What can space system acquisition professionals, developers and operators learn here? Digital twins offer an innovative approach that can streamline and strengthen the testing and design process of our space assets. They can also provide insights on as-built systems and enable the buydown of risks across the space system life cycle, enabling affordability across the entire system life cycle. Now is the time to leverage their capabilities, to ensure that the space infrastructure so vital to our security and American way of life has the protection it requires. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/11/02/securing-the-final-frontier-digital-twins-satellites-and-cybersecurity/