May 25, 2023 | International, Other Defence
The Biden administration is asking Congress to make Australia and the U.K. eligible for U.S. Defense Production Act grants and loans as part of AUKUS.
March 31, 2021 | International, Naval
ROCHESTER, U.K. — BAE Systems is taking decades of flight controls expertise underwater on-board the United Kingdom’s next-generation submarine, Dreadnought. This innovative approach involves adapting controls that are usually used in fly-by-wire aircraft and applying them in a marine environment,...
June 9, 2020 | International, Aerospace
By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/
June 26, 2019 | International, Other Defence
GERMANTOWN, Md.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--AECOM (NYSE:ACM), a premier, fully integrated global infrastructure firm, has been awarded a Multiple Award, Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity contract by the U.S. Department of State for Diplomatic Platform Support Services. The contract ceiling is $6 billion over a five-year period and provides an opportunity for AECOM to expand its proven global logistical and operations and maintenance capabilities. “This is a significant program of work with the Department of State and expands our market share in providing logistical and mission support for many branches of the U.S. Government,” said John Vollmer, AECOM's president of its Management Services group. “We have made significant investments in asset management solutions which are paying dividends in our growth in this market.” The contract requires Program Management, Procurement of Critical Items, Life Support Services, Logistics Services, Operation and Maintenance Services, and Construction and Renovation Projects for U.S. Department of State facilities, and other U.S. Government facilities overseas, with a focus on high-threat contingency environments. “We look forward to the opportunity to deliver these key services to the Department of State, partnering with them to provide world-class support for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy,” said Dr. Karl Spinnenweber, AECOM's executive vice president and general manager of its Mission Readiness business. For over 100 years, AECOM and its legacy companies have worked with governments around the world, providing cost-effective and innovative solutions to help them achieve mission success. AECOM leverages its global defense, civilian and commercial expertise to deliver services across the entire life cycle for clients' most challenging projects – from concept design, development, construction, acquisition, management and operation to testing, training, sustainment and supply chain management. About AECOM AECOM is built to deliver a better world. We design, build, finance and operate critical infrastructure assets for governments, businesses and organizations. As a fully integrated firm, we connect knowledge and experience across our global network of experts to help clients solve their most complex challenges. From high-performance buildings and infrastructure, to resilient communities and environments, to stable and secure nations, our work is transformative, differentiated and vital. A Fortune 500 firm, AECOM had revenue of approximately $20.2 billion during fiscal year 2018. See how we deliver what others can only imagine at aecom.com and @AECOM. Forward-Looking Statements: All statements in this press release other than statements of historical fact are “forward-looking statements” for purposes of federal and state securities laws, including the future term, price, performance and financial impact of the Department of State support service agreement as well as other future business and economic conditions. Actual results could differ materially from those projected or assumed in any of our forward-looking statements. Important risk factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from our forward-looking statements are set forth in AECOM's periodic report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2019, and other reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. AECOM does not intend, and undertakes no obligation, to update any forward-looking statements. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190626005114/en