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  April 21, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Is the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System program gearing up to be the next major acquisition failure?

  Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — Since Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Dave Goldfein took over as the service's top general in 2016, the Air Force has made figuring out how to connect its weapons with those of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps its biggest priority. The Air Force is set to have spent $300 million on the Advanced Battle Management System through fiscal year 2021. However, the service is still struggling to define what ABMS needs to do and how much it will cost, the Government Accountability Office said in a report released April 16. "The Air Force has not established a plan or business case for ABMS that identifies its requirements, a plan to attain mature technologies when needed, a cost estimate, and an affordability analysis. ... To date, the Air Force has not identified a development schedule for ABMS, and it has not formally documented requirements,” it read. That could have significant consequences for the program down the road, GAO continued: “GAO's previous work has shown that weapon systems without a sound business case are at greater risk for schedule delays, cost growth, and integration issues.” The GAO made four recommendations: create a cost estimate and a plan laying out how to afford the program, formalize the decision-making authorities of those involved in ABMS, and develop a list of technologies that are expected to fit into the initial system. In a response to the report, Kevin Fahey, the assistant secretary of defense for acquisition, concurred with all four recommendations — a sign that, going forward, the Air Force may be required to solidify more of its ABMS plans. The Air Force has maintained that the program's unconventional structure and methodology is a feature, not a bug. It wants to use a series of experiments to help discover and mature new technologies that can be weaved in alongside legacy platforms. For instance, the first ABMS experiment connected SpaceX's Starlink constellation with an AC-130 gunship, and the next demo will employ a Kratos Valkyrie drone carrying communications gear that enables the F-22 and F-35 to securely share data while allowing them to maintain stealth. Air Force officials have said technologies that are proven to be successful and mature during the experiments could become programs of record inside the ABMS family of systems. However, the Air Force does not seem to have a firm plan for what technologies it needs and when to bring them online, the GAO said. The service has identified 28 development areas that includes a new cloud network, a new common radio, and apps that provide different ways of presenting and fusing data. However, none of those areas are linked to specific technical requirements, and the Air Force hasn't explained what organizations are responsible for the development of those products. In one damning section, GAO compared ABMS with several cancelled programs with similar aims, such as the Army's Future Combat Systems program that sought to field a family of manned and unmanned technologies and the Joint Tactical Radio System, which was intended to create a government-owned software defined radio. These programs publicly flamed out after millions of dollars were spent in development, in part because certain technologies were not mature enough and caused the schedule to unravel. The scope of ABMS will be far larger than those previous programs, the Pentagon's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation told the GAO. But because the Air Force has not provided a detailed acquisition strategy, CAPE does not have confidence that the Air Force will be able succeed where those programs have failed. “Given the criticality of the battle management command and control mission and the planned retirement of legacy programs, the lack of an ABMS business case introduces uncertainty regarding whether the needed capabilities will be developed within required time frames,” the GAO said. Figuring out who has responsibility and decision-making authority for ABMS is also a messy proposition, the GAO said. The ABMS effort is led by a chief architect, Preston Dunlap, who is responsible for managing tradeoffs among the portfolio of technologies and guide experimentation efforts. However, existing programs that will be part of the ABMS family will retain their separate program office with their own independent management, and the Air Force has yet to clarify whether Dunlap will be able to redirect those program's funding to fall in line with ABMS objectives. For example, the Air Force's program office for space is currently working on a data integration project that could correspond with ABMS efforts to field a cloud network. But “although some ABMS funds have been obligated for this project, there is no documentation to support that the Chief Architect will be able to direct the PEO to change the project objectives or timeline to align with ABMS requirements once they are defined,” the GAO said. The role of the Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability or AFWIC, which was established in 2017 to help define how the service will fight wars in the future, is also unclear. An AFWIC senior official told the GAO that the organization began leading the service's multidomain command and control initiatives in 2019, but it is uncertain whether AFWIC also has the power to change the direction of the ABMS program. https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2020/04/20/is-the-air-forces-advanced-battle-management-system-program-gearing-up-to-be-the-next-major-acquisition-failure/

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  December 17, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Lithuania’s defense minister: It will be a good year for NATO

  By: Raimundas Karoblis The end of the year is a traditional time to pause for reflection and take a moment to look ahead. Especially so, if the upcoming year brings an important milestone, like the 70th anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance. From the outside, it may seem that NATO is approaching the year 2019 quite perplexed, if not embattled. The important decisions of the NATO Brussels Summit were overshadowed by acrimonious public exchanges among the allies on the highly sensitive issue of burden-sharing. Moreover, the recent initiatives on European defense — in particular, all the talk about a “European army” — are perceived by many as highly divisive and damaging to the very foundations of NATO. However, to paraphrase a famous saying, the rumors of the imminent death of the alliance seem to be greatly exaggerated. The burden-sharing drama at the NATO Brussels Summit has obscured the vitally important decisions that were taken there to prepare the alliance for the post-2014 security environment. Whereas the earlier NATO summits in Wales and Warsaw focused on quick-impact deterrence measures to support the most vulnerable allies, the Brussels Summit marks the start of a systemic NATO adaptation to the conventional threat posed by Russia (as well as to the threats emanating from the south). This adaptation will take many years to complete, but its impact will be durable and profound. In the course of 2019 we will see the key elements of NATO's long-term adaptation process taking shape. In February, NATO will start systemic implementation of a reinforcement strategy, which will be a major step in carrying out the Readiness Initiative, better known as the Four Thirties. The initiative aims at providing the alliance with more high-readiness forces — a crucial aspect in today's security context. Furthermore, we will be making significant advances with the NATO Command Structure update and upgrade. Work will continue in setting up the new Cyberspace Operations Centre in Belgium to provide situational awareness and coordination of operational activity within cyberspace — a capacity that is long overdue in the alliance. Next year, the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Germany will achieve its initial operational capability to ensure rapid movement of troops and equipment into and across Europe, which has become one of the most pressing operational needs. All of these steps will make us more fit to plan and execute operations in today's demanding security environment. A significantly improved financial background is another major reason to approach the new year optimistically. In fact, if there is any drama in the NATO context, it is the dramatically increased defense budgets across the alliance. Last year we witnessed the most substantial growth in defense spending since the end of the Cold War, and 2019 will continue to mark further progress in this area, with the majority of the allies nearing the fulfillment of their commitment to reach 2 percent of their gross domestic product by 2024. Two eastern flank allies — Lithuania and Poland — have committed to moving well-beyond this number, striving to raise their defense spending to 2.5 percent of the GDP by 2030. We should be soon starting to see how the additional investments translate into more and better capabilities for the alliance. We are also approaching 2019 after a year of passionate discussions on European defense and the ways to organize it. There are voices putting forward ideas on how the European Union should strengthen its “strategic autonomy” and make sure it is able to ensure security independently. The launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation and other European initiatives are sometimes interpreted across the Atlantic as an attempt to build an alternative to the alliance. We find such fears ungrounded. Europe's own defense efforts notwithstanding, NATO is bound to remain an irreplaceable pillar of collective defense on the European continent. It is the sole organization that can provide truly credible deterrence and defense for its members. As keen supporters of NATO-EU cooperation, we are very pleased to have witnessed the recent expansion of this cooperation into new areas. This cooperation has acquired additional importance with the finish line of Brexit just around the corner. While leaving the EU, the United Kingdom will remain in Europe, with every significant defense problem in and around the continent still affecting it. The U.K. has already assumed an immense role within NATO in addressing them, and the country has continuously indicated that its commitment to the alliance will be even stronger following Brexit. In welcoming a new year and a new chapter of its history, NATO is not doing it perplexed. The alliance is turning a new leaf, is proud of its achievements and with confidence is looking toward the future. For this reason, I am sure that 2019 is going to be a great year for the alliance. Raimundas Karoblis is the defense minister of Lithuania. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/lithuanias-defense-minister-it-will-be-a-good-year-for-nato/

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  July 10, 2024 | International, Aerospace

  Saudi Arabia signs deal for four Airbus A330 MRTT aircraft