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March 21, 2024 | International, Land

Australia earmarks billions for naval infrastructure as BAE wins AUKUS submarine work

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  • Cyber’s uncertain future: These radical technologies and negative trends must be overcome

    November 10, 2020 | International, C4ISR, Security

    Cyber’s uncertain future: These radical technologies and negative trends must be overcome

    James Van de Velde The fate of the world may literally hinge on which states develop and appropriately introduce the radical technologies that are likely to disrupt cyberspace and the world. What are they, and what disruption do they pose? Here are a few, split into two categories: Radical-leveling technologies have leapt from linear to exponential capabilities and will shape the future competition: Additive manufacturing (i.e., 3D printing): “Who can manufacture what” may no longer be decided by governments. Human-machine interfacing: Where will this lead intelligence collection, privacy and security? The Internet of Things' expanded attack surface: The IoT may invite a near-constant struggle between good and malicious cyberspace actors throughout our government, intelligence, defense and commercial lives. Chain algorithm (i.e., blockchain) and cryptocurrencies: We have yet to discern how blockchain technology will be integrated into both public and private networks, such as for protecting the national currency of states, and what such integration will mean for intelligence collection and effects operations. Algorithmic-driven operations: Relying on algorithms in operations may aid both our and our adversaries' operations. Data analytics: Successful application of data analytics will help reduce false positives and aid in forensics (by discerning trends better). But new ways to collect, manage and analyze data will have to be discerned. Data localization: States are likely to Balkanize cyberspace into defensive pockets to capture and protect data (rather than surrender control entirely to the cloud or to servers outside their states). Russia and China are already Balkanizing their networks; many states will follow Russia and China's lead. New forms of encryption, including decentralized, local and private encryption: Enabled by quantum computing, new forms of encryption will make cyber operations more difficult. Emerging technologies represent new tech — currently developed or developed within five to 10 years — that will shape the future competition: Artificial intelligence (i.e., machine learning): China has declared that it plans to be the world's leader in AI and integrate it as much as possible into its technology and military forces and strategy. How will AI assist or thwart cyber intelligence collection, or affect the development of offensive or defensive cyberspace operations? Setting norms for AI will present new intellectual, technical and legal challenges. Quantum computing: The integration of quantum computing will assist and thwart cyber intelligence collection, as well as affect the development of offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. China's announced 2030 goal to develop a high-performing quantum computer with decryption capability is an existential threat to Western society, as it would afford adversaries unprecedented leverage and advantage over U.S. society. Shifting to quantum-resistant algorithms and encryption present certain costs and technical challenges, and a likely long-term transition. Nanotechnology: How will life as well as state vs. state competition change if devices that can impact the environment, health care or energy efficiency are built on the scale of atoms and molecules? Neuroscience technologies — biology and cyber: We have yet to discern how biology and cyberspace will converge to afford biological levels of cybersecurity and cyber biosecurity. The United States will also face challenging technological, political, historical, numerical and policy trends that will complicate efforts to absorb these technologies; the United States may soon have to adopt asymmetric strategies to contend with its competitors: The United States is telling itself that it is a status quo power (and that attempting domain dominance in cyberspace is somehow dangerous, wrong or imperial). The country currently suffers from “cyberspace fatigue” — a sense that our daily loss via cyberspace to ransomware, financial and proprietary theft, privacy invasion, and political influence is inevitable and inescapable. China and Russia both enjoy “asymmetry in interest.” That is, both Russia and China believe they care more about their foreign policy, national security, and cyberspace interests and activities than the United States and Americans generally do. It will soon be impossible for the United States to compete with China via numbers — even in cyberspace. Chinese forces will soon outnumber U.S. forces in every sector, including cyberspace forces. As the private sector compiles and controls unprecedented amounts of data on U.S. and non-U.S. citizens around the world, new public-private sector relationships must be devised. The private sector will have many more times the quantity of data on individuals and commercial activity than the U.S. government could ever obtain. China is now “out-cycling” the United States. The Chinese can do acquisition faster now than the United States, which means they will be able to collect on technological countermeasures and adopt counter-countermeasures to our attempts to defeat Chinese technology. The United States has yet to acknowledge explicitly that we are not so much in a “great power” competition, but instead we are in an era of the rise of authoritarian, anti-liberal democratic states. This is a much more serious problem, as, if left unacknowledged, the United States will appear as morally equivalent. The U.S. government may no longer be the lead for all complex technologies, including those involved in national security, computing, sensing or data analytics. Sad fact. We have — to date — accepted policy inferiority in cyberspace. We defend against malicious cyberspace operations, but we have been reluctant to conduct the escalation necessary to restore the norms we seek to protect. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/11/09/cybers-uncertain-future-these-radical-technologies-and-negative-trends-must-be-overcome/

  • SpaceX postpones planned launch of US military's secretive X-37B spaceplane
  • SCAF : la Suède et le Royaume-Uni cherchent à rompre leur isolement

    August 1, 2019 | International, Aerospace

    SCAF : la Suède et le Royaume-Uni cherchent à rompre leur isolement

    Les ministres suédois et britannique de la Défense ont signé un protocole d'accord concernant le développement conjoint des systèmes de combat aérien du futur. Face à l'axe mis en place entre l'Allemagne, l'Espagne et la France pour développer conjointement un système de combat aérien du futur (SCAF), le Royaume-Uni et la Suède cherchent à rompre leur isolement en s'alliant. La secrétaire d'État à la Défense du Royaume-Uni, Penny Mordaunt, et le ministre suédois de la Défense, Peter Hultqvist, se sont donc rencontrés à Londres pour signer un protocole d'accord portant sur le développement d'un système similaire de combat aérien du futur (SCAF). S'étalant sur dix ans, cet accord doit permettre d'établir les conditions d'une coopération plus étroite concernant le développement d'un SCAF. Cela inclut la possibilité d'intégrer des technologies installées sur les Saab JAS 39 Gripen et BAE Systems Typhoon. Selon les parties concernées, les industriels et les gouvernements des deux pays ont identifié des besoins futurs similaires en matière de combat aérien. Le ministre de la Défense suédois, Peter Hultqvist, a souligné que les relations industrielles partagées par les deux pays étaient essentielles pour garantir cette future puissance aérienne de combat. « La coopération internationale fait partie de la stratégie de croissance de Saab et la collaboration avec les industries britanniques représente cette façon de travailler, également en prévision du futur », commente Håkan Buskhe, président de Saab. Le constructeur suédois rappelle qu'il développe actuellement le chasseur de nouvelle génération, le Gripen E/F, et qu'il « s'engage à le faire en étroite collaboration avec ses partenaires stratégiques, les forces aériennes suédoises et brésiliennes, ainsi qu'avec d'autres clients existants et nouveaux du Gripen, afin que le Gripen évolue pour répondre aux nouvelles exigences opérationnelles des prochaines décennies. » De son côté, le ministre britannique chargé des achats de la Défense, Stuart Andrew, a rappelé que le partenariat entre le Royaume-Uni et la Suède comportait déjà des exercices conjoints dans l'Arctique ainsi que l'exercice Ramstein Alloy au-dessus de l'Europe de l'Est. De même, les Typhoons de la Royal Air force sont équipés de distributeurs de paillettes et de leurres de fabrication suédoise tandis que le radar Giraffe de Saab est un élément clé du système de défense aérienne au sol britannique Sky Saber. Enfin, les Gripen sont équipés de radars conçus et construits par Leonardo à Edimbourg et le Royaume-Uni, en collaboration avec des partenaires européens, dont la Suède, a mis au point des missiles air-air Meteor. https://www.air-cosmos.com/article/scaf-la-sude-et-le-royaume-uni-cherchent-rompre-leur-isolement-21536

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