Back to news

March 17, 2020 | International, Aerospace

Air Force Acquisition Chief: Reaper Replacement Plan Should Come in FY ’22 Budget Request

The Air Force is conducting a study that will inform how the service will continue its critical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions as it begins to phase out production of its MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial systems, acquisition chief Will Roper said March 10.

The service plans to reduce the General Atomics Aerospace Systems Inc.-developed MQ-9 Reaper combat lines from 70 to 60 by eliminating 10 contractor-operated lines while maintaining all MQ-9 aircraft in the fiscal year 2021 budget plan. House Armed Services Committee (HASC) member Rep. Filemon Vela (D-Texas) sought clarity on why the production line would be reduced in a Tuesday hearing on Capitol Hill.

“Why the major change in plans, and how will the Air Force address its ISR gap?” he asked.

Roper told the committee that the Air Force is planning to build the “next generation” of ISR drones with a mixture of options, including “more high-end, unique” systems that will require lots of money to ensure their survivability, as well as commercial platforms that can “push the price point down” and provide attritable systems for added capacity.

“We're doing studies now to see what our mix could be, and I anticipate that will be one of our major decisions in our FY '22 budget for the Air Force,” Roper said during the hearing.

The study is being led by the Air Force's Program Executive Office for ISR and Special Operations Forces at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, he told a small group of reporters after the hearing. He expects it to be complete before the end of the fiscal year to inform the service's FY '22 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which is currently in development, he added.

“It's a really great time to give [PEO ISR & SOF] an innovative program because as their portfolio appears to be trending down ... it's important that they have something that's the new version of them that's innovative, that's indicative of their future,” he said.

The Air Force has to work on dropping the cost of the counter-violent extremism mission, both in manpower and unit price, Roper said.

He added that employing commercial drone services in the defense industry could help smaller, newer companies begin to scale their production while offering the service a “much lower, much cheaper” way to sustain cost.

“Working with the Defense Department, you don't need the kind of production capacity that the globe does, so we're a pretty good first stop,” he said. He also told the committee that while the Reaper had “undeniable overmatch in a low-end fight and has certainly saved many lives, ... as we look to the high-end fight, we just can't take them into the battlefield.”

Roper warned that if the Defense Department does not move quickly to engage builders of large UAS, the market could go the same way of small, hobbyist UAS and be saturated by Chinese products, as was seen with DJI's Phantom drone.

The service's ISR portfolio could look very different in FY '21 if Congress approves its proposed FY '21 presidential budget request, released Feb. 10 (Defense Daily.) It includes the retirement of 24 Block 20/30 RQ-4 Global Hawks, including three EQ-4B drones equipped with Northrop Grumman's Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) system, as well as reducing the MQ-9 lines.

In order to provide sufficient levels of ISR with the divestment of the Global Hawk 20/30 assets and reducing MQ-9 combat lines, the Air Force will maintain and modernize the U-2 [Dragon Lady ISR aircraft] and the Global Hawk Block 40 fleets and maintain 60 government-owned/government operated MQ-9 combat lines, the Air Force previously told Defense Daily.

The service also plans to procure one Bombardier E-11A BACN-enabled aircraft through the five-year future years defense plan (FYDP), with plans to bring the total fleet up to eight by FY '26. One E-11A aircraft suffered a fatal crash in Afghanistan last month, leaving the Air Force with three in its current inventory.

Vela also asked whether the Air Force's proposed MQ-9 retirements could affect other services operating the Reaper. Marine Lt. Gen. Steven Rudder, the service's deputy commandant for aviation, said during the hearing that while the Marines recently welcomed their first MQ-9 operators at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, he is also looking at the “wide-open” unmanned systems industry for the service's next generations of drones.

“We hope to be able to continue to operate with the Air Force,” he told Vela. However, “We're ready to step out on our own system,” he added.

https://www.defensedaily.com/air-force-acquisition-chief-reaper-replacement-plan-come-fy-22-budget-request/budget/

On the same subject

  • Norway’s allies share their views on the country’s new defense plan

    April 17, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    Norway’s allies share their views on the country’s new defense plan

    By: Stephen J. Flanagan and James Black As countries around the world grapple with the unfolding coronavirus pandemic, the wider business of government continues. Norway's Ministry of Defence will shortly publish its next Long Term Plan, which will then be debated by parliament. The plan outlines how the Armed Forces, in tandem with other elements of government and society, can best address the threats to Norway from hostile states, terrorists, and fragile and failing states. The plan also examines how to bolster national resilience to deal with other risks including hybrid warfare, climate change and pandemics. A new Rand report, commissioned by the MoD to inform its strategy and policy development, offers perspectives from its closest allies on the emerging security challenges and strategic options facing Norway. We found broad alignment of Norwegian and allied assessments across Denmark, France, Germany, the U.K., the U.S. and NATO institutions, but some enduring differences in emphasis and priorities. Other allies recognize Norway as punching above its weight and playing a critical role in the defense of the North Atlantic and High North. At the same time, our research concludes there is no time for complacency. Norway's key allies agree that the most significant threat in the High North is not a crisis directed against Norway itself. The more plausible danger is “horizontal escalation” — a crisis elsewhere in Europe rapidly growing into a wider conflict that threatens Norwegian waters, airspace and territory. Russia continues to demonstrate hostile intent, and its military capabilities threaten the ability of Norway and its allies to operate military forces, secure critical infrastructure and protect civilian populations. The collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 brings an increased threat from medium-range ballistic missiles, requiring Norwegian and allied defense planners to adjust to new threats to the homeland and region. Improvements in the Russian Northern Fleet, including surface vessels and submarines armed with modern cruise missiles, also pose an increased threat to NATO operations in the Norwegian Sea, to undersea internet cables and to sea lines of communication essential to reinforcing Norway from North America or Europe in the event of any conflict. There is also strong consensus on the enduring threats posed by terrorism, nonstate actors and challenges such as climate change in the Arctic. While all allies recognize the need to consider the strategic implications of a rising China, the United States sees China as a more direct and imminent security threat. Allies also welcome Norway's contributions to missions on NATO's eastern and southern flanks. Allies perceive Norway as having an impressive mix of high-end capabilities for a country of its size and a mature total defense concept — its strategy for engaging all elements of society in national defense. These capabilities and commitments, coupled with a well-respected approach to strategy development, have allowed Norway to have significant influence on strategic thinking within NATO. Nevertheless, significant security challenges remain, and to address them our report suggests a number of options for Norwegian leaders to consider: Strengthen deterrence in Norway: Expand surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; increase the military posture in northern Norway; enhance the protection of bases and forces against air and missile threats; maximize the F-35 fighter jet's potential to aid joint operations; and prepare for operations in contested cyber, space and electromagnetic environments. Expand capacity to receive allied reinforcements: Build on lessons from the joint Trident Juncture 2018 exercise, which allies viewed as an important milestone but not a full stress test; pursue increasingly challenging training scenarios; ensure sufficient pre-positioned stocks of consumables and equipment; upgrade and expand infrastructure along with concepts for dispersing forces to prevent attack; and deepen cooperation to enhance military mobility and interoperability. Explore concepts to hold potential adversaries at risk: Invite allies with more advanced reconnaissance and deep-attack systems to deploy them to Norway periodically; develop longer-range weapons for Norwegian forces; explore the utility of low-cost, unmanned assets; collaborate with key allies on concepts to deny adversaries access to the sea and to better project forces onto the littoral; and refine parallel strategic communications to control escalation. Enhance national and societal resilience: Test and refine Norway's whole-of-government approach and the mechanisms for civil support to the military; contribute to NATO's strategy for addressing hybrid threats, such as disinformation, economic pressure and cyberattacks; and explore further measures to enhance collective preparedness and will to fight. Solidify Norwegian contributions to NATO and partners: Continue contributions to NATO operations beyond the north; help to address variations in defense expenditure across all NATO nations and rebalance trans-Atlantic burden-sharing; promote deeper NATO cooperation with Sweden and Finland; and use innovation and industry to enable influence within NATO. Other countries can learn from how Norway chooses to tackle these emerging challenges, and they can benefit from its lessons learned, particularly with respect to the total defense concept. Pursuit of some of these options, along with the Norwegian government's ongoing efforts to seek allied views, could help enhance deterrence in the north and overall NATO defense. Stephen J. Flanagan is a senior political scientist at the think tank Rand. James Black is a senior analyst in the defense, security and infrastructure program at Rand Europe. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/16/allies-share-views-on-enhancing-defense-of-norway-and-the-high-north/

  • Cohort financials show record growth before Nato contract - Army Technology

    July 17, 2024 | International, Land, Security

    Cohort financials show record growth before Nato contract - Army Technology

    Cohort have won a contract to provide communications to the Portuguese army and have announced record growth.

  • Here’s how a CR could hurt America’s nuclear weapons modernization

    November 13, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land

    Here’s how a CR could hurt America’s nuclear weapons modernization

    By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — A long-term continuing resolution will result in delays for modernizing America's nuclear warheads, while putting at risk an already challenging plan to build plutonium pits needed for the next generation of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear officials are warning. The National Nuclear Security Administration is a semiautonomous agency under the Department of Energy that handles the manufacturing and maintenance of America's nuclear warheads. Like other government agencies, NNSA would be limited to fiscal 2019 funding limits under a continuing resolution, and it would be unable to start new contracts. The current continuing resolution, or CR, is set to end Nov. 21, but there is little expectation that regular budgeting will then resume. Congress is debating the merits of pushing the CR through December, but analysts are concerned the CR could extend into next year. “We are in a situation right now where we have single-point failures throughout our enterprise,” Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA administrator, said during a Defense Writers Group breakfast earlier this month. “It's necessary for us, for the NNSA and for the nuclear security enterprise to receive consistent and robust funding to modernize our infrastructure as well as continue ongoing operations.” “We're looking at where we can move funding insofar as CRs will allow us to do so,” she added. “We're working very closely with OMB and the administration to see what we can do to continue our important programs to modernize the infrastructure as well as the stockpile and our workforce initiatives and our endeavors.” Gordon-Hagerty did not go into detail about specific CR-related worries, but according to an NNSA source, the agency has identified three main areas of concern under a longer CR. The first is, broadly, keeping the warhead modernization efforts on schedule. Two of those modernization programs — the B61-12 gravity bomb and W88 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead — already face program delays thanks to an issue with a commercial part that has to be redesigned. Gordon-Hagerty said a CR should not impact that particular issue, as the funding for a solution is coming from a realignment of other warhead modernization programs. But a delay to one program caused by a CR “does affect all of the other modernization programs and all of the other work that we have ongoing throughout our nuclear security enterprise,” she said. The second major area of concern is the surplus plutonium disposition program, which is supposed to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium at a South Carolina facility. That program emerged as the successor to the controversial MOX program, and has faced opposition from South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham. Construction on that facility could be delayed under a CR. The NNSA source said that the agency requested extra funding for the surplus plutonium disposition program through the budget anomaly process, but was not given the resources it requested. The third area of concern is a 10-year plan to develop a native plutonium pit in the United States. The NNSA has been charged with producing 80 plutonium pits a year by 2030, a target that Gordon-Hagerty acknowledged is a tight window for the agency to hit, even with stable funding. “We are again rebalancing, looking at our budget across the entire enterprise to see what it is we need to do to meet the scope and schedule of that 2030,” she said. “Am I confident we can get there? Yes. Is it fraught with — probably a bad way of saying it — land mines? It is.” Construction costs Construction featuring prominently on this list should not be a huge surprise; NNSA officials are quick to point out in public events that they are still using some buildings that date back to the Manhattan Project. According to Gordon-Hagerty, more than 50 percent of NNSA facilities are more than 40 years old, and over a third of those are about 70 years of age. The looming CR extension comes as the agency launches a number of construction projects, and a CR could lead to major delays in standing up those facilities. While that's an issue for every agency under a CR, the NNSA is concerned that the specialty construction talent needed to build those facilities may not available if a contract is frozen and then picked up again later. There could also be high-dollar costs. Responding to a lawsuit by environmental groups trying to halt the construction of the Y-12 facility in Tennessee, NNSA said a six- to 12-month delay in construction at that location could result in almost $1 billion in extra costs for taxpayers and the agency may have to lay off 1,000 construction personnel. Those numbers, first reported by the Exchange Monitor, likely have resonance with other potential delays at construction sites caused by a CR — meaning construction delays at one or more sites could quickly become costly for an agency whose facilities and construction needs have traditionally been underfunded. “It's been on schedule and on budget for the last six years. It will be finished in 2025 for approximately $6.5 billion,” Gordon-Hagerty said of the Y-12 facility. “If that funding somehow fails to materialize, then we've got over 1,000 crafts [personnel] working at the site right now. Crafts personnel are hard to come by, especially those that are qualified. So if they see a question about funding or funding gets pulled back, they're going to find positions elsewhere.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2019/11/12/heres-how-a-cr-could-hurt-americas-nuclear-weapons-modernization/

All news