Aéronautique-défense-sécurité : brutal retour en force du secteur

On the same subject

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  December 18, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  Against Army’s wishes, Congress primes pump to buy newest CH-47 variant for active force

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — Congressional appropriators and authorizers have increased advance procurement funds for the newest variant of the CH-47 Chinook cargo helicopter as preparation to supply the aircraft to the Army's active force, even though the service asked to only buy a small number of the helos in fiscal 2020 for special operations. The service's decision to cut the aircraft from the active force was based on the need to free up future cash to cover the cost of an ambitious plan to buy two new future vertical lift aircraft for long-range assault and attack reconnaissance missions. But Congress has gone against the Army's wishes to divert funding away from procurement for the active force, instead adding $28 million in FY20 funding — in both the recently released spending and policy bill conference reports — for advance procurement to begin to prime the pump to restore CH-47F Block II deliveries to the conventional Army. The cut the service made would only buy 69 special operations variants — or "G" models. The original plan was to procure 473 "F"-model Block II helicopters for the active force. The Army approved the Block II effort to move into the engineering and manufacturing development phase in April 2017, and the program officially began in July 2017. In October 2018, the first two EMD Block II Chinooks were already on the assembly line with plans to fly in mid-2019. Boeing, which manufactures the aircraft, expects a production decision in July 2021. While $28 million won't get the service much, based on the original plan the Army would start building five CH-47F Block IIs in 2021 meant for the active force. The advance procurement in FY20 would support buying longer-lead items from suppliers, but is still a stretch to claim that the additional funding restores the program. Those five aircraft would be delivered in 2023 based on Boeing's typical three-year lead time to build an airframe. It remains to be seen whether the congressional plus-up will prompt the Army to restore funding for the five CH-47F Block IIs in its FY21 budget request due out early next year. It's also unclear how many of those long-lead parts procured in FY20 could be used in G-model aircraft or are exclusive to F-models. Therefore, it's also murky how much of the $28 million in parts might be wasted if the Army sticks to its plan to only procure G-model aircraft. The Army has indicated it might reconsider the CH-47F Block II cut; the FY21 budget request, when it is released, will likely reveal the Army's decision. Shortly after the service's plan to cut the CH-47F Block II was revealed in its FY20 budget request, then-Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville, who is now chief, told reporters the Army was comfortable with its decision, but tempered that, adding: “I think in two to three years, we will have a better idea about where we are, as far as developing the helicopters we talked about, and that will drive the decision.” McConville was referring to the Army's plan to buy two future vertical lift aircraft. The same day, then-Army Secretary Mark Esper, who is now defense secretary, told another group of reporters that the service would not be rethinking its plans to build CH-47 Block IIs for the conventional force. The Army has also claimed it is pursuing foreign military sales of its CH-47F Chinooks to soften the blow from cuts made to its intended buy of the Block II variant, but none of the possible sales — to the United Kingdom or to the United Arab Emirates — were newly in the works at the time. And neither country has plans to buy Block II variants. Moreover, the number of helicopters the two countries plan to procure amount to less than 30 aircraft. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/12/17/against-armys-wishes-congress-primes-pump-to-buy-newest-ch-47-variant-for-active-force

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  March 5, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  DoD Stands Up New Biotech Manufacturing Center: Griffin

  WASHINGTON: DoD is opening a new manufacturing innovation center dedicated to biotechnology to figure out how to replicate “nature's manufacturing plant” on an industrial scale, Pentagon research and engineering head Mike Griffin says. This is “a key new initiative,” Griffin stressed. The idea, he said at the annual McAleese conference, is “to learn how to do in an industrial way what nature has done for us in so many areas of things that we harvest and mine and use ... now that we are beginning to learn how to manipulate genomes.” Such technology could lead to DoD creating its own fuel using synthetic biology methods, for example. This would be a leap beyond ongoing efforts by DARPA that Sydney has widely reported, designed to protect soldiers against an enemy's biotech weapons. “This is a nascent technical area in the world, and especially in the United States,” Griffin told the audience here. “We want the national security community to be out in front on this.” The new center will be the ninth so-called ManTech center, designed to help overcome the so-called ‘valley of death' between research and commercialization by reducing risks. It will be the second ManTech center with a biotech focus: The first, BioFabUSA in New Hampshire, opened in 2016 to develop next-generation manufacturing techniques for repairing and replacing cells and tissues, which for example could lead to the ability to make new skin for wounded soldiers. Griffin elaborated on several other key areas for his two-year old office. DARPA is investing $459 million in the 2021 budget for AI Next, a “campaign” aimed at automating critical DoD business processes; improving the reliability of Artificial Intelligence systems; and enhancing the security of AI and machine learning tech. Griffin said his office is also “working with the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) under the CIO to bring about what we're calling AI Now: what can we do with AI that can get into the field and bring value to the national security community today, and the next day.” On 5G newtorks, he said that his deputy Lisa Porter is in charge of efforts to “figure out how we can use 5G to press our military advantage” and to protect US military networks. DoD launched that effort in 2019, with a $53 million reprogramming, he said. Congress added $200 million in the 2020 appropriations act, he added, and DoD is asking for $484 million in the 2021 budget. A key to future 5G networks and communications will be spectrum sharing, Griffin stressed. “There is no green field spectrum left,” he said, so DoD will have to figure out how to share spectrum to keep up with both its own demand and deal with pressure from commercial industry for it to give up spectrum. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/03/dod-stands-up-new-biotech-manufacturing-center-griffin

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  June 2, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  China’s missile and space tech is creating a defensive bubble difficult to penetrate

  By: Mike Yeo MELBOURNE, Australia — The U.S. Navy is facing growing asymmetric threats, not least of which is from China, and more specifically its anti-access/area denial strategy. The Pentagon's annual report on China' military strength from 2019 describes the A2/AD strategy as a means to “dissuade, deter, or, if required, defeat third-party intervention against a large-scale, theater-wide campaign” mounted by China's People's Liberation Army, or PLA. In short, it appears Beijing's aim is to prevent American and allied military forces from operating freely in the A2/AD airspace and maritime “bubble” around China's coastline. China has in recent years worked to extend the range of this bubble beyond the so-called first island chain and into the Western Pacific. The key to this effort is not just longer-range missiles, but also a growing number of space-based sensors. The U.S.-based Union of Concerned Scientists reported that as of 2016, China had 192 satellites in orbit, a number that has since increased, with nearly all of these belonging to organizations or companies with close ties to the government and having dual roles to for civilian and military use. Some of China's satellites include several payloads that are almost certainly for military purposes, such as electro-optical sensors, synthetic aperture radar and electronic intelligence technology. The country also uses a constellation of Naval Ocean Surveillance System satellites providing persistent coverage of water surrounding China. These capabilities can also support targeting for China's anti-ship ballistic missiles, and with sufficient numbers and integration, they could provide real-time target triangulation data to build up a robust picture of a target's location to ultimately generate a targeting approach. Meet the DF-21D The long-range, conventionally armed ballistic missile DF-21D is meant for attacking moving ships at sea, most notably the U.S. Navy's showpiece nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The theory behind its creation is that a missile speeding down to sea level on a ballistic trajectory at speeds of Mach 5 or higher would prove extremely difficult to counter. The road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile system is mounted on a wheeled transporter erector launcher to improve survivability against enemy counter-strikes. Said to have a range of about 780 nautical miles, the DF-21D is a version of the DF-21 family of two-stage, solid-fueled, single-warhead conventional or nuclear medium-range ballistic missiles in use by the PLA Rocket Force. The U.S. Defense Department suggests that the DF-21D reached initial operating capability with the PLA in 2010, with the system thought to employ maneuverable reentry vehicles with a terminal guidance system assisted by China's network of satellites, such as the Jianbing-5/YaoGan-1 and Jianbing-6/YaoGan-2 that provide targeting data in the form of radar and visual imaging, respectively. There are, however, questions about the missile's effectiveness. China has reportedly tested the DF-21D against fixed land targets, but it's unknown whether it was tested against a moving target. This makes it difficult to accurately assess the capability of the weapon, particularly from a maturity and efficacy standpoint. It also brings into question whether China's sensor technology can generate the kind of real-time, highly precise data required to enable the DF-21D to accurately target an aircraft carrier maneuvering at 30 knots. But the missile and its sensor net could be used to keep watch on and provide deterrence at maritime chokepoints among the first island chain, specifically the Miyako Strait between Okinawa, Japan, and Taiwan as well as the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. This would theoretically reduce the demand on a less-than-mature sensor net and kill chain to limited geographic areas through which potential targets would have to sail. Considering the limited combat radius of carrier-borne aircraft without large-scale support from aerial refueling tankers, the ability to keep an American carrier battle group at arm's length may be all that China's A2/AD capability requires. An attack with anti-ship ballistic missiles can be used in conjunction with other anti-ship missiles and timed to simultaneously arrive at a target. Such an attack could be mounted from longer-range anti-ship missiles like the YJ-12 and YJ-18. Both are Chinese improvements of Russian designs, derived from the Kh-31 air-to-surface missile and the 3M-54 Klub cruise missiles, respectively. Both are capable of supersonic speeds, with the anti-ship YJ-18A variant attaining its maximum speed of about Mach 2 in its terminal attack phase following subsonic cruise. The YJ-12 can fly at speeds of between Mach 2 and Mach 4, depending on launch and cruise altitudes. Both can also reach long ranges. The YJ-12 is widely believed to have a range of between 108 and 216 nautical miles, while the YJ-18 is believed to possess a range of 290 nautical miles. The YJ-12 can be launched from wheeled transporter erector launchers as well as from vertical launch cells on ships like the Type 052D or Type 055 destroyers. The YJ-12 can also be launched from aircraft, like the Xian H-6 bomber, the JH-7 fighter bomber and possibly the Shenyang J-11/15/16, Chinese derivatives of the Russian Sukhoi Flanker family. Is a new long-range air-to-air missile on its way? China's indigenous Flanker derivatives are also expected to the primary carrier platform for a new long-range air-to-air missile reportedly in development. Expected to be used to target an adversary's high-value airborne assets such airborne early warning and control systems and tanker aircraft, the missile has been given the temporary designation “PL-XX.” Observers believe the eventual in-service designation will be PL-20. The new missile was first observed in 2016 carried by a Shenyang J-16 multi-role fighter, however it almost certainly was an inert mock-up. It was seen earlier this year on a Xian JH-7 fighter-bomber. By comparing the known sizes of the parent aircraft and its hardpoints, it's been estimated the missile is about 5.8 metres (20 feet) long and about 300 milometers (1 foot) in diameter, which is significantly larger than typical medium-range air-to-air missiles, like the American AIM-120. Four rear-mounted fins bestow maneuverability and control for the missile. There is little verifiable information about the new missile's performance; however, a public schematic of how China would use the weapon shows the ramjet or solid fuel-powered missile can attain a straight-line range of 300 kilometers (188 miles). After launch, most likely with preliminary targeting data provided by a friendly airborne early warning and control aircraft, the missile would fly a parabolic trajectory on its way to its target, attaining an altitude of approximately 100,000 feet from a launch altitude of 50,000 feet, before plunging toward the target. A mixture of GPS, inertial navigation systems and space-based radars are expected to provide launch and mid-course guidance, before an active electronically scanned array radar takes over at the terminal phase. If China succeeds in putting such a weapon into service, the PLA Air Force will then be able to compel an adversary's vital force-multiplier aircraft to operate farther away, or risk being shot down. This would reduce their effectiveness and that of the tactical aircraft they are supporting in the event of a conflict. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/06/01/chinas-missile-and-space-tech-is-creating-a-defensive-bubble-difficult-to-penetrate/