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DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY Spacelabs Healthcare Inc., Snoqualmie, Washington, has been awarded a maximum $450,000,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for patient monitoring systems, accessories and training. This is a five-year base contract with one five-year option period. This was a competitive acquisition with 36 responses received. Location of performance is Washington, with a Dec. 13, 2023, performance completion date. Using customers are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2018 through 2023 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE2D1-19-D-0008). OrthoScan, Scottsdale, Arizona, has been awarded a maximum $125,000,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for radiology systems, accessories and training. This is a five-year base contract with one five-year option period. This was a competitive acquisition with 50 responses received. Location of performance is Arizona, with a Dec. 13, 2023, performance completion date. Using customers are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2018 through 2023 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE2D1-19-D-0007). UPDATE: Moridge Manufacturing Inc., Moundridge, Kansas (SPE8EC-19-D-0031) has been added as an awardee to the multiple-award contract for commercial agricultural equipment, issued against solicitation SPE8EC-17-R-0007, announced May 18, 2017. NAVY Textron Inc., New Orleans, Louisiana, is awarded a $314,288,369 modification to previously awarded letter contract N00024-17-C-2480 for the procurement of additional long lead time material (LLTM) for the Ship to Shore Connector program, Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) 100 Class Craft 109 through 118, for the continuation of pre-fabrication activities for LCAC 109 through 112, and for the initial procurement of LLTM for LCAC 119 through 123. The SSC Program is the functional replacement for the existing fleet of vehicles, which are nearing the end of their service life. It is an Air Cushion Vehicle designed for a 30-year service life. The SSC mission is to land surface assault elements in support of Operational Maneuver from the Sea, at over-the-horizon distances, while operating from amphibious ships and mobile landing platforms. SSC provides increased performance to handle current and future missions, as well as improvements which will increase craft availability and reduce total ownership cost. Work will be performed in New Orleans, Louisiana (46 percent); Leesburg, Virginia (18 percent); Mandal, Norway (8 percent); Gloucester, United Kingdom (7 percent); Livonia, Michigan (7 percent); Cincinnati, Ohio (4 percent); Eatontown, New Jersey (2 percent); Gold Beach, Oregon (2 percent); Riverdale, Iowa (2 percent); Huntington Beach, California (2 percent); Metairie, Louisiana (2 percent), and is expected to be complete by July 2023. Fiscal 2017, 2018 and 2019 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funding in the combined amount of $235,716,277 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity. Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is awarded a $149,435,507 cost-plus-incentive contract for the engineering, manufacturing, and development of Standard Missile-2 Block IIIC. Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona (85 percent); Wolverhampton, England (6 percent); East Aurora, New York (6 percent); Middletown, Ohio (2 percent); and Englewood, Colorado (1 percent), and is expected to be completed by October 2022. Fiscal 2019 and 2018 research, development, testing and evaluation (Navy) funding in the amounts of $50,090,148 and $234,663 respectively will be obligated at time of award. Funding in the amount of $234,663 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1) - only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity (N00024-19-C-5412). Raytheon Co., Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is awarded a $32,636,301 firm-fixed-price modification to previously awarded contract N00024-18-C-5432 for over-the-horizon weapon systems. Work will be performed in Kongsberg, Norway (75 percent); Tucson, Arizona (15 percent); Schrobenhausen, Germany (4 percent); Raufoss, Norway (3 percent); McKinney, Texas (2 percent); and Louisville, Kentucky (1 percent), and is expected to be complete by December 2020. Fiscal 2019 weapon procurement (Navy); fiscal 2019 research, development, testing, and evaluation (Navy); and fiscal 2019 other procurement (Navy) in the amount of $32,636,301 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity. Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is awarded a $32,162,533 cost-only contract for long lead material in support of fiscal 2019 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 2 low-rate initial production requirements. The ESSM program is an international cooperative effort to design, develop, test, and procure ESSM missiles. The ESSM provides enhanced ship defense. This contract combines purchases for the Navy (43 percent); and the governments of Canada, Australia, Germany, Norway, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Denmark under the NATO Sea Sparrow Consortium. Work will be performed in Raufoss, Norway (47 percent); Mississauga, Canada (32 percent); and Richmond, Australia (21 percent), and is expected to be complete by December 2022. Fiscal 2017 and 2018 other procurement (Navy); fiscal 2018 and 2019 weapons procurement (Navy); and non-expiring Other Funds funding in the amount of $21,991,327 will be obligated at time of award and funds in the amount of $216,649 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with the authority 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c)(4). The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity (N00024-19-C-5418). Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is awarded a $24,717,120 cost-only contract for long lead material in support of fiscal 2019 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 1 production and spares requirements. The ESSM program is an international cooperative effort to design, develop, test, and procure ESSM missiles. The ESSM provides enhanced ship defense. This contract includes foreign military sales to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Work will be performed in Raufoss, Norway (44 percent); Mississauga, Canada (34 percent); and Richmond, Australia (22 percent), and is expected to be complete by December 2021. Foreign military sales funding in the amount of $23,846,439 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with the authority 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c)(4). The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity (N00024-19-C-5410). Austal USA, Mobile, Alabama, has been issued a fixed-price-incentive firm target modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-17-C-2301) to exercise options for the construction of two fiscal 2019 littoral combat ships (LCS). The Navy has not completed the competition for fiscal 2019 LCS class ships, therefore, the specific contract award amount for these ships is considered source selection sensitive information (see 41 U.S. Code 2101, et seq., Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 2.101 and FAR 3.104) and will not be made public at this time. Austal USA will perform and oversee all necessary design, planning, construction, and test and trials activities in support of delivery of these ships to the Navy. Work will be performed in Mobile, Alabama (50 percent); Pittsfield, Massachusetts (24 percent); Cincinnati, Ohio (5 percent); Henderson, Washington (2 percent), Kingsford, Michigan (1 percent); Bristol, Connecticut (1 percent), Slidell, Louisiana (1 percent); and various other locations of less than 1 percent each (totaling 16 percent), and is expected to be complete by September 2025. Fiscal 2019 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funding will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity. ARMY AC FIRST LLC., Germantown, Maryland, was awarded a $129,918,292 modification (0002 37) to contract W52P1J-12-G-0048 for logistics support services, maintenance, supply, and transportation services. Work will be performed in Bagram, Afghanistan, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 21, 2019. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $12,500,000 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity. Harper Construction Co. Inc., San Diego, California, was awarded a $59,467,470 firm-fixed-price contract for construction of a reception barracks complex. Bids were solicited via the internet with two received. Work will be performed in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 14, 2020. Fiscal 2015 and 2016 military construction funds in the amount of $59,467,470 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Tulsa, Oklahoma, is the contracting activity (W912BV-19-C-0003). Oshkosh Defense LLC, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, was awarded a $30,358,753 modification (P00001) to contract W56HZV-18-F-0153 for procurement of Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. Work will be performed in Oshkosh, Wisconsin; and Liverpool, New York, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 31, 2020. Fiscal 2018 and 2019 other procurement, Army funds in the amount of $30,358,753 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Warren, Michigan, is the contracting activity. Gary Kubiak & Son Electric Inc.,* Robbinsville, New Jersey, was awarded a $12,898,760 firm-fixed-price contract for repair of the electrical distribution system (Buildings 194-194 and main base area) for Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. Bids were solicited via the internet with five received. Work will be performed in Trenton, New Jersey, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 13, 2020. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $12,898,760 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity (W912BU-19-C-0004). Lockheed Martin Corp., Orlando, Florida, was awarded a $10,219,884 hybrid (cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price) Foreign Military Sales (Qatar) contract for support services for the Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor for the Apache Attack helicopter. One bid was solicited with one bid received. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, with an estimated completion date of March 31, 2024. Fiscal 2019 foreign military sales funds in the amount of $10,219,884 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity (W52P1J-19-D-0006). CORRECTION: The Nov. 8 announcement that Deloitte & Touche LLP, Arlington, Virginia, was awarded an $18,056,941 firm-fixed-price contract to provide a cyberspace analytics capability was announced early, and incorrectly stated the estimated date of completion and amount of obligated funds. The contract was actually awarded Dec. 12, 2018; the estimated date of completion is Nov. 11, 2023; and fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $8,736,000 were obligated at the time of the award. All other information in the announcement was correct. AIR FORCE Peraton Inc., Herndon, Virginia, has been awarded a $65,615,581 cost-type term order for Xdomain technology through research, evolution, enhancement, maintenance, and support software and report. The scope of this effort is to provide engineering, programmatic and technical expertise, to include: requirements definition/analysis, research, systems engineering, software engineering, development testing, software integration, quality control, configuration management, system integration, interoperability testing, security analysis/implementation, lab-based security assessment testing support, system installation planning, system component procurement, on-site installation/configuration, site security assessment testing support, system familiarization, and system operational support. Work will be performed in Herndon, Virginia; and Rome, New York, and is expected to be completed by Dec. 15, 2023. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition and one offer was received. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $250,000; and fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $72,615 are being obligated at the time of award. Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome, New York, is the contracting activity (FA8750-19-F-0003). Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, Orlando, Florida, has been awarded a $10,302,132 modification (P00001) to contract FA8682-19-C-0010 for Lot Two production of three Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, and is expected to be completed by Feb. 28, 2020. The award is the result of sole-source acquisition. Fiscal 2018 research, development, test and evaluation funds will fund the contract. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is the contracting activity. *Small business https://dod.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1714535/source/GovDelivery/

By: Geoff Ziezulewicz The Army, Navy and Missile Defense Agency are failing to take basic cybersecurity steps to ensure that information on America's ballistic missile defense system won't fall into nefarious hands, according to a Defense Department Inspector General audit released Friday. Investigators visited five sites that manage ballistic missile defense elements and technical information, but the names of the commands were redacted in the publicly released report. “The Army, Navy and MDA did not protect networks and systems that process, store, and transmit (missile defense) technical information from unauthorized access and use,” the declassified report states. Such inadequacies “may allow U.S. adversaries to circumvent (missile defense) capabilities, leaving the United States vulnerable to missile attacks,” the report states. They found officials failed to employ safeguards familiar to most people online in 2018, the latest development to raise questions about the U.S. military's cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Among the shortcomings: Administrators for classified networks had no intrusion detection and prevention systems in place to watch for cyberattacks, much less stop them, according to the report. At one site, officials said they had requested to purchase those cyber safeguards in December 2017 but nine months later it still hadn't been approved. “Without intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, (the site) cannot detect malicious attempts to access its networks and prevent cyberattacks designed to obtain unauthorized access and exfiltrate sensitive (missile defense) technical information,” the report states. Officials also failed to patch system flaws after receiving vulnerability alerts, one of which had first been identified in 1990 and had still not been fixed by April. Another vulnerability that could be exploited by an attacker was first identified in 2013 but also was never pathced, according to the report. “Countless cyber incident reports show that the overwhelming majority of incidents are preventable by implementing basic cyber hygiene and data safeguards, which include regularly patching known vulnerabilities,” the IG report states. “(Missile defense) technical information that is critical to national security could be compromised through cyberattacks that are designed to exploit these weaknesses.” Some facilities failed to force employees to use common access cards, or CAC, when accessing the classified system, a basic cybersecurity practice known as multi-factor identification. Instead, officials were able to access the sensitive information using just a username and password, the report states. Hackers use phishing and other tactics to exploit passwords and gain access to such systems. New hires are supposed to be allowed network access without a card for only their first two weeks on the job. But IG investigators found users on the systems without CAC cards for up to seven years. At one site, a domain administrator never configured the network to allow only CAC holder access. “Allowing users to access networks using single factor authentication increases the potential that cyber attackers could exploit passwords and gain access to sensitive (missile defense) technical information,” the report states. Investigators also found unlocked server racks at some locations, another key vulnerability to insider snoopers. “The insider threat risk necessitates that organizations implement controls...to reduce the risk of malicious personnel manipulating a server's ability to function as intended and compromising sensitive and classified data,” the report states. External storage devices held unencrypted data and some sites failed to track who was accessing data, and why. Other administrators told investigators that they lacked the ability to record or monitor data downloaded from the network onto these devices. Unless these officials enforce the encryption of such removed data and monitor its downloading and transferring, “they will be at increased risk of not protecting sensitive and classified (missile defense) technical information from malicious users,” the report states. Investigators also found that some supposedly secure sites were failing to even lock their doors. One location had a security door that hadn't worked for years. “Although security officials were aware of the problem, they did not take appropriate actions to prevent unauthorized personnel from gaining unauthorized access to the facility,” the report states. Other sites featured no security cameras to monitor personnel movement and security officers failed to conduct badge checks. While the report makes recommendations to fix the documented problems, officials for the inspected agencies offered no comments on the non-classified draft report of the audit. Friday's scathing IG audit marked the latest in a string of reports detailing shoddy cybersecurity throughout the armed forces and defense contractors. During the same week, the Wall St. Journal reported that Chinese hackers are targeting military systems and those of defense contractors working on Navy projects. Beijing-linked cyber raids have attempted to steal everything from missile plans to ship-maintenance data in a series of hacks over the past 18 months, the Journal reports. As a result, Navy Secretary Richard Spencer has ordered a “comprehensive cybersecurity review” to assess if the Navy's cyber efforts “are optimally focused, organized, and resourced to prevent serious breaches,” spokesman Capt. Greg Hicks said. The review will also look at authorities, accountability and if the efforts reflect and incorporate government and industry best practices, he said. “Secretary Spencer's decision to direct a review reflects the serious to which the DoN prioritizes cybersecurity in this era of renewed great power competition,” Hicks said. https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2018/12/14/audit-finds-cyber-vulnerabilities-in-us-missile-defense-system

By: Tom Kington ROME — Italy's Leonardo has announced a major shakeup of its management structure, which will see three of its seven divisions merged and entrusted to one of the firm's top British managers, Norman Bone. Reporting to CEO Alessandro Profumo, Bone will oversee a new Electronics Division, into which its Land & Naval Defence Electronics, Airborne & Space Systems, and Defence Systems divisions will be merged. Bone was previously the head of the Airborne & Space Systems division as well as chairman and managing director of Leonardo's U.K. operation. The Defense Systems division includes Leonardo's torpedo business, formerly known as WASS, and its cannon business, formerly known as Oto Melara. In a statement, Leonardo said the merging of the divisions was designed to “achieve suitable critical mass” in its electronics-related businesses. “This evolution will result in the organizational model being aligned with that of the main players in the market, ensuring an even more integrated development,” the firm said. Additionally, the firm's Air Traffic Control and Automation Systems businesses will be moved from the firm's Security & Information Systems Division to the new Electronics Division. The remainder of the Security & Information Systems division has been renamed the Cyber Security Division, and will be taken over on Jan. 21 by Barbara Poggiali, the firm said. Leonardo's three other divisions are Helicopters, Aircraft and Aerostructures. The shakeup is the latest stage in the consolidation of Leonardo's activities, which formerly existed as separate companies including AgustaWestland and Alenia. They were first transformed into divisions of the firm in 2016 as the company changed its name to Leonardo from Finmeccanica. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/12/14/italian-firm-leonardo-merges-3-divisions-names-brit-to-head-them

By: Dan Elliott, The Associated Press DENVER — After months of delays, the U.S. Air Force is about to launch the first of a new generation of GPS satellites, designed to be more accurate, secure and versatile. But some of their most highly touted features will not be fully available until 2022 or later because of problems in a companion program to develop a new ground control system for the satellites, government auditors said. The satellite is scheduled to lift off Tuesday from Cape Canaveral, Florida, aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. It's the first of 32 planned GPS III satellites that will replace older ones now in orbit. Lockheed Martin is building the new satellites outside Denver. GPS is best-known for its widespread civilian applications, from navigation to time-stamping bank transactions. The Air Force estimates that 4 billion people worldwide use the system. But it was developed by the U.S. military, which still designs, launches and operates the system. The Air Force controls a constellation of 31 GPS satellites from a high-security complex at Schriever Air Force Base outside Colorado Springs. Compared with their predecessors, GPS III satellites will have a stronger military signal that's harder to jam — an improvement that became more urgent after Norway accused Russia of disrupting GPS signals during a NATO military exercise this fall. GPS III also will provide a new civilian signal compatible with other countries' navigation satellites, such as the European Union's Galileo system. That means civilian receivers capable of receiving the new signal will have more satellites to lock in on, improving accuracy. "If your phone is looking for satellites, the more it can see, the more it can know where it is," said Chip Eschenfelder, a Lockheed Martin spokesman. The new satellites are expected to provide location information that's three times more accurate than the current satellites. Current civilian GPS receivers are accurate to within 10 to 33 feet (3 to 10 meters), depending on conditions, said Glen Gibbons, the founder and former editor of Inside GNSS, a website and magazine that tracks global navigation satellite systems. With the new satellites, civilian receivers could be accurate to within 3 to 10 feet (1 to 3 meters) under good conditions, and military receivers could be a little closer, he said. Only some aspects of the stronger, jamming-resistant military signal will be available until a new and complex ground control system is available, and that is not expected until 2022 or 2023, said Cristina Chaplain, who tracks GPS and other programs for the Government Accountability Office. Chaplain said the new civilian frequency won't be available at all until the new control system is ready. The price of the first 10 satellites is estimated at $577 million each, up about 6 percent from the original 2008 estimate when adjusted for inflation, Chaplain said. The Air Force said in September it expects the remaining 22 satellites to cost $7.2 billion, but the GAO estimated the cost at $12 billion. The first GPS III satellite was declared ready nearly 2½ years behind schedule. The problems included delays in the delivery of key components, retesting of other components and a decision by the Air Force to use a Falcon 9 rocket for the first time for a GPS launch, Chaplain said. That required extra time to certify the Falcon 9 for a GPS mission. The new ground control system, called OCX, is in worse shape. OCX, which is being developed by Raytheon, is at least four years behind schedule and is expected to cost $2.5 billion more than the original $3.7 billion, Chaplain said. The Defense Department has struggled with making sure OCX meets cybersecurity standards, she said. A Pentagon review said both the government and Raytheon performed poorly on the program. Raytheon has overcome the cybersecurity problems, and the program has been on budget and on schedule for more than a year, said Bill Sullivan, a Raytheon vice president in the OCX system. Sullivan said the company is on track to deliver the system to the Air Force in June 2021, ahead of GAO's estimates. The Air Force has developed work-arounds so it can launch and use GPS III satellites until OCX is ready to go. While the first GPS III waits for liftoff in Florida, the second is complete and ready to be transported to Cape Canaveral. It sits in a cavernous "clean room" at a Lockheed Martin complex in the Rocky Mountain foothills south of Denver. It's expected to launch next summer, although the exact date hasn't been announced, said Jonathon Caldwell, vice president of Lockheed Martin's GPS program. Six other GPS satellites are under construction in the clean room, which is carefully protected against dust and other foreign particles. "It's the highest-volume production line in space," Caldwell said. For the first time, the Air Force is assigning nicknames to the GPS III satellites. The first one is Vespucci, after Amerigo Vespucci, the Italian navigator whose name was adopted by early mapmakers for the continents of the Western Hemisphere. https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/12/16/us-air-force-set-to-launch-1st-next-generation-gps-satellite

Today's critical Department of Defense (DOD) systems and platforms rely on advanced electronics to address national security objectives. To help tackle obstacles facing a half-century of electronics advancement, DARPA launched the Electronics Resurgence Initiative (ERI) – a five-year, upwards of $1.5 billion investment in the future of domestic electronic systems. In November, DARPA expanded ERI with the announcement of ERI Phase II, which seeks to further enmesh the technology needs and capabilities of the defense enterprise with the commercial and manufacturing realities of the electronics industry. One key focus of ERI Phase II is on developing connections between the various ERI programs and their potential defense applications. On Wednesday, December 19, DARPA therefore plans to host a Proposers Day to convene leaders within the defense industry base (DIB) to discuss opportunities to further develop and demonstrate ERI's technological advances for DOD needs. During the event, DARPA program managers will share their ideas for potential ERI defense applications, which include but are not limited to autonomy and artificial intelligence, large-scale emulation, cybersecurity, space applications, cognitive electronic warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). To foster further dialogue and collaboration, attendees will have a chance to provide input on how best to support the transition of electronics innovations into national defense hardware. The Proposers Day will also support the development of a potential broad agency announcement (BAA) focused on defense transitions. Tentatively titled “Electronics Resurgence Initiative: Defense Applications (ERI:DA)”, the BAA would solicit innovative proposals to develop, demonstrate, and apply emerging ERI electronic technologies to deliver significant impact on DOD capabilities. “The success of ERI relies on cooperation with the commercial sector to address shared problems. However, as a DARPA effort, ERI must also demonstrate that its research findings bolster our nation's defenses and help create strategic surprise,” said Dr. William Chappell, director of DARPA's Microsystems Technology Office (MTO). “Through the ERI:DA Proposers Day and potential BAA, DARPA seeks to procure the expertise and transition support of industry and the defense community to help accelerate the delivery of ERI-derived innovations for national security needs.” The Electronic Resurgence Initiative: Defense Applications Proposers Day will take place on Wednesday, December 19, 2018 from 9:00am to 4:00pm EST, at the Hilton Arlington, 950 N Stafford St, Arlington, Virginia. Advanced registration is required. For those unable to attend in person, registered attendees may access the event via a livestream link available on the registration page. For more information, please visit: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=aa83296cfdd337b4ca5dc8bd4929ddef&tab=core&_cview=0. https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-12-10

Ashley Roque, Washington, DC - Jane's Defence Weekly Once again the US army is looking for new active protection systems (APSs) to equip on its family of M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Whether this is a positive or negative for IMI Systems' Iron Fist remains unclear. On 11 December, the service issued a draft request for proposal in the form of a "market survey" for APSs with a technology readiness level (TRL) 6. "This APS shall have been proven and characterised on the Bradley Family of Vehicles [FOV]," the service wrote in a short notice. "This will be accomplished through the procurement of a B-Kit, consisting of the system and countermeasures." Industry has until 18 December to respond. Recently, the service has been evaluating three APSs: Rafael's Trophy on the Abrams main battle tank (MBT), IMI Systems' Iron Fist on the M2 Bradley, and Artis' Iron Curtain on the Stryker infantry combat vehicle. In June Leonardo DRS (Rafael's US-based partner) was awarded USD193 million to integrate the capability on Abrams MBTs. Artis' Iron Curtain system, however, was cut due to a lack of maturity. IMI Systems' Iron Fist is now uncertain, and the company and an army spokeswoman did not immediately respond to Jane's request for information. Colonel Glenn Dean, project manager for Stryker Brigade Combat Team and APS acquisition, told reporters in August that IMI's Iron Fist technology was still participating in Phase I live-fire and automotive characterisation testing due to an eight-month delay caused by funding gaps, inclement weather, and integration challenges. At the time, he noted that the findings would be turned over to the Army Requirements Oversight Council in the first quarter of fiscal year 2019 for a decision on how to proceed. He also explained that the M2 Bradley is a "very difficult platform to install on". https://www.janes.com/article/85180/us-army-seeking-aps-technology-for-bradley-vehicles

By: Mark Pomerleau The Marine Corps has famously claimed that every Marine is a rifleman, but the Corps has moved 1,000 personnel in the last two years to focus on cyber, electronic warfare, signals intelligence and information operations. These moves have come at the cost of infantry, “a pretty big cost to go pay for the Marine Corps,” Kenneth Bible, deputy director of the C4 directorate and deputy chief information officer, said Dec. 6 at the Charleston Defense Contractors Association Defense Summit. "The commandant really had to go think about taking that out of the structure to create these [units] across the Marine Corps.” Now the Marines are looking to integrate these new units — called Marine Expeditionary Force Information Groups, or MIGs — with traditional formations. The deputy commandant for information, a new three-star position created in 2017 to oversee all aspects of information-related warfare, is overseeing efforts to further develop the groups and integrate them into battle plans. "How does he employ those capabilities as part of an integrated warfare plan? How does he implement a strike package in the information domain?” Bible said. “We really have to figure out how to go make that a relevant force and make it something that the MEF commanders can use.” Bible explained these forces will be able to provide traditional military information support operations, psychological operations, military deception, or cyber to fight in the information environment. An operational advisory group met earlier in December with all of the group commanders that focused a lot on how they were maturing capabilities, Bible said. Some of the key questions that still remain surround how to provide intelligence support to cyber, as well as how to incorporate information support capabilities for a more integrated force package, from shaping operations to when operations actually take place. Bible said that Lt. Gen. Lori Reynolds, the deputy commandant for information, has told the organization to start building out exercise plans to work more closely together, adding there will be more specifics to come in the near future. Trident Juncture, NATO-led Trident Juncture exercise in Norway that took place from Oct. 25 to Nov. 7, he said, was a good example of getting limited capability out to commanders to test. New tactical defensive cyber teams participated in the exercise and commanders saw their impact, Bible said. https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2018/12/11/marines-looking-to-integrate-new-information-capabilities

By: Mark Pomerleau The Marines are looking to develop and equip specialized tactical cyber teams with a specific defensive tool set. These teams, known as defensive cyber operations-internal defensive measures (DCO-IDM) companies, are designed to help defend critical digital assets at the tip of the spear. These companies will fall under the newly established Marine Expeditionary Force Information Groups, or MIGs, and one will reside within each MEF providing MEF commanders information-related capabilities to include cyber, intelligence, electronic warfare and information operations. All three DCO-IDM companies have reached the minimum threshold for deployment,though their specific kits are not in place yet, Gregg Kendrick, executive director of Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, said Dec. 6 at the Charleston Defense Contractors Association Defense Summit. In the interim, service-retained cyber protection teams — strategic-level defensive cyber teams that feed up to U.S. Cyber Command — are partnering with the companies to conduct operations and participate in exercises. These companies will serve as a “paired down version” of cyber protection teams in the cyber mission force and be employed at the Marine Air Ground Task Force level, said MGySgt Carlos Torres, senior enlisted Marine in the cyberspace division for the Deputy Commandant for Information, during the annual C4ISRNET Conference in May. The companies have used the expertise from cyber protection teams and Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command throughout their establishment. Kendrick said the companies and elements of a cyber protection team participated in the NATO-led Trident Juncture exercise in Norway that took place from Oct. 25 to Nov. 7. Kenneth Bible, deputy director of the C4 directorate and deputy CIO, said Trident Juncture served as a good example of giving these teams exposure to operations and commanders, who want this capability. Kendrick added that the deputy commandant for information, which oversees all aspects of information for the Corps, to include the MIGs, requested Marines with intelligence backgrounds to go to each of the DCO-IDM companies. This will allow them to begin the process of establishing an organic intelligence support ability in the defensive cyber sphere as opposed to having to rely on outside resources, such as Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command. This is critical given the expeditionary and tactical nature of these teams. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/marine-corps/2018/12/11/marines-need-to-equip-defensive-cyber-teams/

By: Sebastian Sprenger BERLIN — As the European Union positions itself to become a defense force in its own right, some in Washington have wondered if such moves would weaken NATO as the dominant trans-Atlantic security pact. Alliance leaders, including Camille Grand, who serves as NATO's assistant secretary general for defense investment, have defended EU efforts, arguing something good will come out of it if both organizations manage to cooperate. Grand sat down with Defense News Europe Editor Sebastian Sprenger during the NATO-Industry Forum in Berlin in November to discuss the state of play between the EU and NATO, defense spending by allies, and new technologies on the horizon. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said the alliance can benefit from the European Union's newfound interest in all things defense. How so? It can be fruitful for both organizations as long as we work well together. Of course it is good news to see the European Union as a more active player in the field of defense, provided that we operate in an environment where we avoid competing guidance to the member states and the allies, especially those who are members of both organizations, and provided that the EU effort strengthens trans-Atlantic security by enabling the European allies to acquire capabilities earlier or faster or in a more efficient way. Outlook 2019: World leaders and analysts speak on the state of global security and the defense industry We have a number of areas of cooperation between the EU and NATO, including in the field of capability development. Could things be better? Yes, probably, for example in terms of interaction between both organizations and fostering transparency, access to relevant documents, and so forth. Ultimately, I think the issue is whether the European effort can be a good contribution to a broader burden-sharing effort. But I think we also have to keep in mind that the effort in the field of defense remains primarily with nations. There is still a sizable trans-Atlantic imbalance as it pertains to the size of the defense-industrial base. Is that detrimental in the long run? The situation is relatively well-known. The defense market in North America, and especially in the United States, is larger than in Europe. There is an imbalance in defense spending; that's the whole point about the defense investment pledge, to partially correct that and having European members invest more in defense. Beyond that, the consolidation of defense industries took place in the United States earlier. In Europe it is still a process that is underway. There are still many companies competing for all sorts of markets. We have a fragmented demand and a fragmented supply, if you will. The issue is not to end up with a single company in Europe or in the U.S.; I think competition is healthy. The issue is: Can we tackle the issue of fragmentation in a European market? As seen from NATO, we don't really do industrial policy, per se. That's really a European Commission perspective. If it enables Europeans to be more efficient in delivering the capabilities we all need in the alliance, that can be good news. What do you expect to come out of industry consolidation in Europe? First of all, I think it has to be a business-driven process, primarily. It's not for organizations such as the EU or NATO to decide. I think what is true is that we see repeatedly cases of where there are a very large number of types of equipment in the same category available. There are a number of medium and small players in Europe that are part of the defense equation, and the defense industry is something where states look carefully at preserving some national capacity. The issue is: Should that organization evolve over time into a slightly more consolidated market? For me, the key criteria is to promote opportunities for multinational cooperations, which is something that we do both at NATO and the EU. It's very important that allies who are EU member states, when they are in a position to do so, decide to go for multinational solutions — with or without a single industrial champion. The European NATO members have pledge to spend more on defense. How does that manifest itself from where you sit? First of all, they are indeed spending more on defense. The increase in defense spending for this year is expected to be more than 5 percent for Europe and Canada. It's a complete overturn from the previous 25 years. We are now in the fourth year in a row of increasing defense spending. This is starting to make a real difference. In the last couple of years, Europe and Canada have spent €36 billion (U.S. $27 billion) more on defense than they had done previously. This starts being real money. It enables us to do three things: First of all, to fill some of the very serious gaps that we have — whether in ammunition or spare parts, for example. Secondly, to reinvest in building up capabilities for identified shortfalls, for example air-to-air refueling, anti-submarine warfare, all sorts of domains. Thirdly, to invest in defense for innovation. For example, take a deeper look at disruptive technologies, 21st century technologies. From where I sit, I can see two things. First of all, the NATO defense-planning targets have been apportioned by all allies. It's the first time in history that all allies have agreed to deliver what they are being asked. Secondly, all allies have agreed to keep increasing their defense spending. We might see nuances in terms of when they intend to reach 2 percent of GDP, which has partly to do with the politics in each country. But I think the political commitment is very strong and was strengthened by the Brussels summit in many ways. There is more money coming, and that creates more opportunities not only for new capabilities but also more cooperation. I think altogether, we have a dynamic that is very positive. Ultimately it makes a difference. People were always pointing at the fact that the Russian Federation had tripled its defense budget over the previous decade. Without trying to match that in any shape or form into an arms race, we also have seen now that reinvesting massively in defense, as the Russian Federation has done, has given Moscow more ability to act in the Middle East, to modernize its conventional and nuclear forces, and so on and so forth. The notion that investing in defense doesn't make a difference is wrong. What are the top three of four areas that need more investment for NATO? One that we are focusing on is the joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance domain. This is something where modern warfare requires us to have an edge. Then also I would emphasize mobility, both tactical and strategic. All of our missions require the alliance to be very mobile and be able to forward-deploy quite quickly. I would also cite integrated air and missile defense as a domain of focus. And lastly, the maritime domain, especially anti-submarine warfare. But those are only examples. We are in the process of designing NATO for the 21st century, which needs to be more agile and regain a degree of robustness that we didn't necessarily anticipate 10 years ago when we were working on the assumption that the primary objective of NATO would be to have light, deployable forces to go out of area. I could have mentioned cyber, of course, as a priority. I didn't mention it because while it is obviously a major, major domain for building our capabilities on, it is probably not as cash-intensive as others. The Germans seems to be perpetually moving toward 2 percent of GDP on defense, as opposed to saying when they will reach it. Is that enough? Is the GDP-percentage metric suitable for defense contributions? First of all, Germany has turned a corner on defense spending. I would note that Germany has a commitment to move to 1.5 percent, which is significant. Is this enough? Probably not. And Germany should meet its political commitment like other allies and aim towards moving as quickly as possible to the 2 percent objective. Having said this, 2 percent is a figure that is quite reasonable. The Cold War figure for Germany was more in the 3 percent realm. The notion that 2 percent would be a massive and disruptive number doesn't seem to me quite convincing. The second argument that I sometimes hear in the wealthy European countries is that 2 percent when you're rich is much more difficult to achieve. I could exactly reverse that argument, saying 2 percent when you're poor is much more difficult to achieve because then you're competing with much more immediate, existential needs in terms of infrastructure, education and so on. From that perspective, the good news with the 2 percent concept is that the burden is the same for everyone. Of course, with Germany being the largest economy in Europe, a lot of effort tends to be indeed with Germany. Germany already has demonstrated a willingness to move significantly in this direction, and there are high expectations that it will continue down that route and meet the target. I honestly think it's both doable and manageable. But then, of course, that doesn't happen overnight. Are NATO and the EU on the same page when it comes to modernizing the members' combat aircraft fleets, especially in Europe? I wouldn't say there is a NATO-EU competition or disagreement over that because, first of all, NATO doesn't take sides in terms of choosing equipment. NATO identified the need to modernize and keep an effective air force. And then each ally can decided which way they want to go. Some of them, quite a number now, have decided to go for the F-35 solution. On the other hand, other allies have either recently acquired planes that are quite modern — whether it's the Eurofighter or the Rafale — or are projecting to build together — as the French and the Germans [are] — the next generation of aircraft. Britain is also contemplating its own. From a NATO perspective, I think it's fair to say that we recognize every ally's right to pursue what they think is the best approach to address a capability challenge. The European Union is pursuing a slightly different perspective because the EU does have a dimension in terms of industrial policy and research policy where they can see benefits in supporting technological development in Europe. The United States, Russia and China are spending significant amounts of money on artificial intelligence research and development. Where does NATO as a whole stand on investments in this area? We have to look very seriously, as NATO allies, at the latest generation of disruptive technologies. And artificial intelligence is one of them. There is a major challenge coming from other major powers, starting with China. The United States is already well into it, Europe is starting to do that. I would nevertheless put AI in the broader context of new and disruptive technologies because I think it's one of them. And AI can also probably bring a lot to our intelligence efforts. But I would put it in the broader context of all sorts of technology revolutions underway. And maybe sometimes we over-focus on AI only, as if it was the single game changer. Nobody has fully assessed how much it's going to change the way we do military operations. Is AI going to be a tool to assist in decisions, or is AI going to allow for more autonomous systems to operate? On this, we've been working very, very hard, including with Allied Command Transformation. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/nato-defense-investment-official-talks-european-security-and-artificial-intelligence