Nouvelles

By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force is racing to kick-start its new accelerated program to buy next-generation missile warning satellites, awarding a contract on Aug. 14 to Lockheed Martin for the first three satellites in the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared program. The award, which has a value of up to $2.9 billion, will allow Lockheed to do the design work, flight hardware procurement, early manufacturing and risk-reduction work necessary for a critical design review, the service said in a statement. Lockheed is set to provide the three geosynchronous Earth orbit satellites in the Next-Gen OPIR constellation. "As we develop these new systems, speed matters," Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson said in a statement. "We are focused on providing a missile warning capability survivable in a contested environment by the mid-2020s." More specifically, the Air Force has said it plans to launch its first Next Gen OPIR satellite in 2023, two years earlier than its original plan to begin fielding the replacement for the Space Based Infrared System, or SBIRS, which called for first launches in 2025. Gen. John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, was one of the biggest critics of the Air Force's original procurement strategy for a next generation SBIRS. In December, he called the service's plan to field the new constellation by fiscal 2029 “ridiculous” and said it could be done faster. Full article: https://www.defensenews.com/space/2018/08/15/sprint-towards-new-missile-warning-satellites-begins-with-first-contract-award-to-lockheed

By: Mark Pomerleau The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency had a pointed message for members of industry; whatever solution is pitched, it has to be understood in the context of how it will be used. Like many top defense leaders giving presentations nowadays, Lt. Gen. Robert Ashely, speaking Aug. 13 at the DoDIIS conference in Omaha, Nebraska, stressed the need for industry's help going forward to solve DIA's tough problems. However, solutions must not work just in the lab, but also in the operating environment military and intelligence leaders believe forces will be conducting operations in the future. “Through my career I've seen too many times the technology looks great in the lab ... but it doesn't scale to the battlefield,” he said. Full Article: https://www.c4isrnet.com/show-reporter/dodiis/2018/08/15/heres-what-the-dia-director-wants-industry-to-know/

The agency is challenging teams to build systems that chart caves, tunnels and underground urban infrastructure. Finding your way through caves and tunnels is both difficult and extremely dangerous, but the Pentagon's research office wants to build technology that can navigate underground environments while humans stay on the surface. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is finalizing teams for its Subterranean Challenge, or SubT, a three-year competition to build systems that can rapidly map and search often treacherous underground areas. The agency on Thursday awarded a $4.5 million contract to Virginia-based iRobot Defense Holdings and a $750,000 contract to Michigan Technological University to participate in the challenge. A third team, Scientific Systems Company Inc., joined the program on July 31 with a $492,000 contract. “Even under ideal conditions, these complex environments present significant challenges for subterranean situational awareness,” DARPA wrote in the program announcement. “However, in time-sensitive scenarios, whether in active combat operations or disaster response settings, warfighters and first responders alike are faced with a range of increased technical challenges, including difficult and dynamic terrains ... severe communication constraints, and expansive areas of operation.” Full Article: https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/08/darpa-wants-make-underground-maps-fly/150554/

Security would be ‘fourth pillar' in weapons purchase decisions The Pentagon should take into account the cybersecurity capabilities of defense contractors in addition to cost and performance measures when awarding contracts, a U.S. government-funded think tank recommended in a report published Monday. Through its buying process, the Pentagon “can influence and shape the conduct of its suppliers,” the Mitre Corp. said in a report titled “Deliver Uncompromised: A Strategy for Supply Chain Security and Resilience in Response to the Changing Character of War.” The Defense Department “can define requirements to incorporate new security measures, reward superior security measures in the source selection process, include contract terms that impose security obligations, and use contractual oversight to monitor contractor accomplishments,” the report said. The Pentagon must consider new measures because the very nature of war is changing, the Mitre report said. Adversaries no longer have to engage the United States in direct conflict using weapons but can respond to American military strikes “through blended operations that take place through supply chain, cyber domain, and human elements,” the report noted. The report recommends that security be made a “primary metric” in Pentagon weapons purchase and sustainment decisions and that the Defense Department increase awareness of risks associated with its supply chains. It also calls for a National Supply Chain Intelligence Center that would include officials from the FBI, Homeland Security, the Pentagon and intelligence agencies to track risks and advise agencies. When choosing current or new contractors, in addition to considering cost, performance and schedule, the Pentagon must also make security a so-called “fourth pillar,” the report said. Contractors should be continuously monitored and assessed for the degree of risk they pose, the report said. In addition to measuring a contractor's ongoing performance on a contract, an independent, federally-funded research agency could develop a risk rating similar to credit ratings done by agencies like Moody's, the report said. Mitre is a federally-funded research and development center. The Pentagon did not respond to an email seeking comment on the report. The report and its recommendations come as U.S. intelligence officials have become increasingly alarmed at potential cybersecurity risks that may be embedded in vast computer networks and systems that power government agencies as well as weapon systems. Last year the Trump administration banned federal agencies from using a popular anti-virus software made by Kaspersky Labs, which was alleged to have close ties with Russian intelligence services. Full Article: https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/pentagon-judge-contractors-cybersecurity

By: Justin Lynch A vast majority of security professionals and experts who attended the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas predict that nation-states will target smart devices in the next year, according to a survey. Ninety-three percent of respondents told Armis, a security platform, that they expected governments to exploit connected devices during a hack or cyberattack. Twenty-three percent of respondents said that the energy and utility sector were most at risk of being attacked through smart devices, the survey found. Hackers are using connected devices as intermediaries to attack computer networks, the FBI warned Aug. 2. Examples of previous hacks using smart devices include an attack on a Las Vegas casino through the thermometer of an aquarium. Full Article: https://www.fifthdomain.com/critical-infrastructure/2018/08/14/experts-predict-countries-will-use-smart-devices-to-launch-cyberattacks/

WHEN THE CYBERSECURITY industry warns about the nightmare of hackers causing blackouts, the scenario they describe typically entails an elite team of hackers breaking into the inner sanctum of a power utility to start flipping switches. But one group of researchers has imagined how an entire power grid could be taken down by hacking a less centralized and protected class of targets: home air conditioners and water heaters. Lots of them. At the Usenix Security conference this week, a group of Princeton University security researchers will present a study that considers a little-examined question in power grid cybersecurity: What if hackers attacked not the supply side of the power grid, but the demand side? In a series of simulations, the researchers imagined what might happen if hackers controlled a botnet composed of thousands of silently hacked consumer internet of things devices, particularly power-hungry ones like air conditioners, water heaters, and space heaters. Then they ran a series of software simulations to see how many of those devices an attacker would need to simultaneously hijack to disrupt the stability of the power grid. Their answers point to a disturbing, if not quite yet practical scenario: In a power network large enough to serve an area of 38 million people—a population roughly equal to Canada or California—the researchers estimate that just a one percent bump in demand might be enough to take down the majority of the grid. That demand increase could be created by a botnet as small as a few tens of thousands of hacked electric water heaters or a couple hundred thousand air conditioners. "Power grids are stable as long as supply is equal to demand," says Saleh Soltan, a researcher in Princeton's Department of Electrical Engineering, who led the study. "If you have a very large botnet of IoT devices, you can really manipulate the demand, changing it abruptly, any time you want." The result of that botnet-induced imbalance, Soltan says, could be cascading blackouts. When demand in one part of the grid rapidly increases, it can overload the current on certain power lines, damaging them or more likely triggering devices called protective relays, which turn off the power when they sense dangerous conditions. Switching off those lines puts more load on the remaining ones, potentially leading to a chain reaction. "Fewer lines need to carry the same flows and they get overloaded, so then the next one will be disconnected and the next one," says Soltan. "In the worst case, most or all of them are disconnected, and you have a blackout in most of your grid." Power utility engineers, of course, expertly forecast fluctuations in electric demand on a daily basis. They plan for everything from heat waves that predictably cause spikes in air conditioner usage to the moment at the end of British soap opera episodes when hundreds of thousands of viewers all switch on their tea kettles. But the Princeton researchers' study suggests that hackers could make those demand spikes not only unpredictable, but maliciously timed. The researchers don't actually point to any vulnerabilities in specific household devices, or suggest how exactly they might be hacked. Instead, they start from the premise that a large number of those devices could somehow be compromised and silently controlled by a hacker. That's arguably a realistic assumption, given the myriad vulnerabilities other security researchers and hackers have found in the internet of things. One talk at the Kaspersky Analyst Summit in 2016 described security flaws in air conditioners that could be used to pull off the sort of grid disturbance that the Princeton researchers describe. And real-world malicious hackers have compromised everything from refrigerators to fish tanks. Given that assumption, the researchers ran simulations in power grid software MATPOWER and Power World to determine what sort of botnet would could disrupt what size grid. They ran most of their simulations on models of the Polish power grid from 2004 and 2008, a rare country-sized electrical system whose architecture is described in publicly available records. They found they could cause a cascading blackout of 86 percent of the power lines in the 2008 Poland grid model with just a one percent increase in demand. That would require the equivalent of 210,000 hacked air conditioners, or 42,000 electric water heaters. The notion of an internet of things botnet large enough to pull off one of those attacks isn't entirely farfetched. The Princeton researchers point to the Mirai botnet of 600,000 hacked IoT devices, including security cameras and home routers. That zombie horde hit DNS provider Dyn with an unprecedented denial of service attack in late 2016, taking down a broad collection of websites. Building a botnet of the same size out of more power-hungry IoT devices is probably impossible today, says Ben Miller, a former cybersecurity engineer at electric utility Constellation Energy and now the director of the threat operations center at industrial security firm Dragos. There simply aren't enough high-power smart devices in homes, he says, especially since the entire botnet would have to be within the geographic area of the target electrical grid, not distributed across the world like the Mirai botnet. But as internet-connected air conditioners, heaters, and the smart thermostats that control them increasingly show up in homes for convenience and efficiency, a demand-based attack like the one the Princeton researchers describes could become more practical than one that targets grid operators. "It's as simple as running a botnet. When a botnet is successful, it can scale by itself. That makes the attack easier," Miller says. "It's really hard to attack all the generation sites on a grid all at once. But with a botnet you could attack all these end user devices at once and have some sort of impact." The Princeton researchers modeled more devious techniques their imaginary IoT botnet might use to mess with power grids, too. They found it was possible to increase demand in one area while decreasing it in another, so that the total load on a system's generators remains constant while the attack overloads certain lines. That could make it even harder for utility operators to figure out the source of the disruption. If a botnet did succeed in taking down a grid, the researchers' models showed it would be even easier to keepit down as operators attempted to bring it back online, triggering smaller scale versions of their attack in the sections or "islands" of the grid that recover first. And smaller scale attacks could force utility operators to pay for expensive backup power supplies, even if they fall short of causing actual blackouts. And the researchers point out that since the source of the demand spikes would be largely hidden from utilities, attackers could simply try them again and again, experimenting until they had the desired effect. The owners of the actual air conditioners and water heaters might notice that their equipment was suddenly behaving strangely. But that still wouldn't immediately be apparent to the target energy utility. "Where do the consumers report it?" asks Princeton's Soltan. "They don't report it to Con Edison, they report it to the manufacturer of the smart device. But the real impact is on the power system that doesn't have any of this data." That disconnect represents the root of the security vulnerability that utility operators need to fix, Soltan argues. Just as utilities carefully model heat waves and British tea times and keep a stock of energy in reserve to cover those demands, they now need to account for the number of potentially hackable high-powered devices on their grids, too. As high-power smart-home gadgets multiply, the consequences of IoT insecurity could someday be more than just a haywire thermostat, but entire portions of a country going dark. https://www.wired.com/story/water-heaters-power-grid-hack-blackout/

By Ellen Nakashima The Pentagon has a new goal aimed at protecting its $100 billion supply chain from foreign theft and sabotage: to base its weapons contract awards on security assessments — not just cost and performance — a move that would mark a fundamental shift in department culture. The goal, based on a strategy called Deliver Uncompromised, comes as U.S. defense firms are increasingly vulnerable to data breaches, a risk highlighted earlier this year by China's alleged theft of sensitive information related to undersea warfare, and the Pentagon's decision last year to ban software made by the Russian firm Kaspersky Lab. On Monday, President Trump signed into a law a provision that would bar the federal government from buying equipment from Chinese telecommunications firms Huawei and ZTE Corp., a measure spurred by lawmakers' concerns about Chinese espionage. “The department is examining ways to designate security as a metric within the acquisition process,” Maj. Audricia Harris, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said in a statement. “Determinations [currently] are based on cost, schedule and performance. The department's goal is to elevate security to be on par with cost, schedule and performance.” The strategy was written by Mitre Corp., a nonprofit company that runs federally funded research centers, and the firm released a copy of its reportMonday. “The major goal is to move our suppliers, the defense industrial base and the rest of the private sector who contribute to the supply chain, beyond a posture of compliance — to owning the problem with us,” said Chris Nissen, director of asymmetric-threat response at Mitre. Harris said the Pentagon will review Mitre's recommendations before proceeding. She added that the Department of Defense, working with Congress and industry, “is already advancing to elevate security within the supply chain.” Testifying to Congress in June, Kari Bingen, the Pentagon's deputy undersecretary for intelligence, said: “We must have confidence that industry is delivering capabilities, technologies and weapon systems that are uncompromised by our adversaries, secure from cradle to grave.” Security should be seen not as a “cost burden,” she told the House Armed Services Committee, “but as a major factor in their competitiveness for U.S. government business.” The new strategy is necessary, officials say, because U.S. adversaries can degrade the military's battlefield and technological advantage by using “blended operations” — hacking and stealing valuable data, manipulating software to sabotage command and control systems or cause weapons to fail, and potentially inducing a defense firm employee to insert a faulty component or chip into a system. “A modern aircraft may have more than 10 million lines of code,” Mitre's report said. “Combat systems of all types increasingly employ sensors, actuators and software-activated control devices.” The term “Deliver Uncompromised” grew out of a 2010 meeting of senior counterintelligence policy officials, some of whom lamented that the Defense Department was tolerating contractors repeatedly delivering compromised capabilities to the Pentagon and the intelligence community. Addressing the security issue requires greater participation by counterintelligence agencies, which can detect threats against defense firms, the report said, and ideally, the government should establish a National Supply Chain Intelligence Center to monitor threats and issue warnings to all government agencies. Ultimately, the military's senior leaders bear responsibility for securing the supply chain and must be held accountable for it, the report said. The Defense Department, although one of the world's largest equipment purchasers, cannot control all parts of the supplier base. Nonetheless, it has influence over the companies it contracts with as it is the principal source of business for thousands of companies. It can shape behavior through its contracts to enhance supply-chain security, the report said. Legislation will be needed to provide incentives to defense and other private-sector companies to boost security, Mitre said. Congress should pass laws that shield firms from being sued if they share information about their vulnerabilities that could help protect other firms against cyberattacks; or if they are hacked by a foreign adversary despite using advanced cybersecurity technologies, the report said. Contractors should be given incentives such as tax breaks to embrace supply chain security, the report suggested. The Department of Homeland Security is addressing the security of the information technology supply chain through its newly established National Risk Management Center. “What we're saying is you should be looking at what vendors are doing to shore up their cybersecurity practices to protect the supply chain,” said Christopher Krebs, DHS undersecretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate. The National Counterintelligence and Security Center, an agency of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that coordinates the government's counterintelligence strategy, said in a report last month that software-supply-chain infiltration has already threatened critical infrastructure and is poised to endanger other sectors. According to the NCSC, last year “represented a watershed in the reporting of software supply chain” attacks. There were “numerous events involving hackers targeting software supply chains with back doors for cyber espionage, organizational disruption or demonstrable financial impact,” the agency found. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-pentagon-is-rethinking-its-multibillion-dollar-relationship-with-us-defense-contractors-to-stress-supply-chain-security/2018/08/12/31d63a06-9a79-11e8-b60b-1c897f17e185_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.265ce85b6eb1

By: Jessie Bur The Department of Defense kicked off its sixth bug bounty program Aug.12 with Hack the Marine Corps, a challenge focusing on the Corps' public-facing websites and services. “Hack the Marine Corps allows us to leverage the talents of the global ethical hacker community to take an honest, hard look at our current cybersecurity posture," said Maj.Gen. Matthew Glavy, the head of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, in a news release. “Our Marines need to operate against the best. What we learn from this program will assist the Marine Corps in improving our war-fighting platform, the Marine Corps Enterprise Network. Working with the ethical hacker community provides us with a large return on investment to identify and mitigate current critical vulnerabilities, reduce attack surfaces and minimize future vulnerabilities. It will make us more combat ready.” The DoD launched its first bug bounty, Hack the Pentagon, in May 2016, which was considered one of the first major successes for the then-newly minted Defense Digital Service. Since then the DoD has held bug bounties for the Army, the Air Force, the Air Force again and the Defense Travel System. The combined programs resulted in over 600 resolved vulnerabilities with approximately $500,000 awarded to the ethical hackers participating in the program. “Information security is a challenge unlike any other for our military. Our adversaries are working to exploit networks and cripple our operations without ever firing a weapon," said Chris Lynch, the director of the Defense Digital Service. "Sometimes, the best line of defense is a skilled hacker working together with our men and women in uniform to better secure our systems. We're excited to see Hack the Pentagon continue to build momentum and bring together nerds who want to make a difference and help protect our nation.” Hack the Marine Corps was launched with HackerOne, which partners with the hacker community to help businesses and government conduct bug bounties, and kicked off with a live hacking event coinciding with the Black Hat USA, DefCon and BSides conferences in Las Vegas. The live hack resulted in 75 unique vulnerability reports and more than $80,000 in awards. “Success in cybersecurity is about harnessing human ingenuity,” said Marten Mickos, CEO at HackerOne. “There is no tool, scanner or software that detects critical security vulnerabilities faster or more completely than hackers. The Marine Corps, one of the most secure organizations in the world, is the latest government agency to benefit from diverse hacker perspectives to protect Americans on and off the battlefield.” The bug bounty program ends Aug. 26. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/marine-corps/2018/08/13/pentagon-invites-researchers-to-hack-the-marine-corps/

Just after 2 a.m. Eastern time on Saturday, Sept. 29, 1962, a two-stage Thor-Agena rocket launched Alouette-I, Canada's first satellite and the first built by a country other than the United States or the U.S.S.R., into a near perfect 1,000-kilometre orbit around Earth. It was the start of a 10-year mission that was unprecedented at the time, producing more than one million images for studies of the ionosphere–the part of Earth's upper atmosphere that reflects and modifies radio waves used for communication and navigation–and it signalled to the world that Canada was a space-faring nation. Alouette-I originated in a proposal from the Defence Research Board of Canada, an arm of the Department of National Defence (DND), and was an early step in a long history of military collaboration that is reaching new heights as the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) assumes responsibility for the nation's ambitious defence space program. “It's about protecting our assets,” said BGen Kevin Whale, director general, Space. “We have to wake up to the fact that space has become critical infrastructure. Imagine a day without space?” The RCAF took over responsibility for the defence space program from Chief of Force Development in 2016 and its mandate is laid out in Strong, Secure and Engaged (SSE), Canada's new defence policy, which sets an ambitious agenda for future investments in space-based capabilities. As an environment with the horsepower to generate and develop forces for employment, the Air Force is well-positioned “to take leadership of this capability,” said Whale, though he acknowledged it would take “some time” for the institution to fully deliver on its mandate. Space is an increasingly congested, contested and competitive domain, with dozens of military and civilian players–and the stakes aren't small. Space systems go a long way to enabling the world's economies, and what happens in space impacts the security of nations below. Whale himself noted that over a 30-year military career, he has benefitted countless times from space-based capabilities and never given them a second thought. Now he is adopting an “air plus space” approach to shape conversations about the RCAF roadmap. “Space, for a long time, had considered itself special, different, unique–which it is, as a domain,” he said. “But there are similarities and there are differences. We are wrapping our heads around that, and we will take care of this capability, just like we do any other one.” POLICY PUSH SSE identifies space as a critical aspect of Canada's defence, and it prescribes an extended mission to “defend and protect” military space capabilities, while also remaining committed to the peaceful use of space. The five-year roadmap lays out the framework for the defence space program, focused on three key areas: force employment, force generation, and force deployment. While the resources and personnel allocated to deliver this mission were initially modest–the core of the joint space cadre is about 60 personnel in Canada and 30 on exchange in the U.S.–the defence policy provides an additional 120 civilian and nearly two dozen military positions to the CAF/DND enterprise. Integration with other agencies, including the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and Industry, Science and Economic Development Canada, are key requirements of the strategy. “We know how to do this,” said Whale. “We've just got to get our heads around what's different and what's the same about space.” FORCE EMPLOYMENT The RCAF now provides integrated space capabilities to the commanders of Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). Whale is dual-hatted as DG Space and as the space component commander, overseeing a director of space operations and readiness, who coordinates defence-related space activities through the Canadian Space Operations Centre (CANSpOC). CANSpOC launched in 2014 and provides a round-the-clock space watch that is integrated with the Canadian Forces Integrated Command Centre (CFICC). The space watch monitors and reports on space situational awareness (SSA), missile warning (as reported by the U.S. Department of Defence Joint Space Operations Center), space weather and the status of space mission systems. CANSpOC has the ability to generate a Joint Space Support Team (JSST) to support a deployed joint task force, as was the case for the mission to Latvia in support of Canada's contribution to Operation Reassurance and to Iraq in support of Operation Impact. The operations centre is also responsible for the CAF navigation warfare (NAVWAR) program, which is working to provide operational commanders with the tools, training and tactics and procedures to operate in a position, navigation, and timing (PNT)-degraded environment where network access is denied from jamming or spoofing. Though one of Whale's objectives is educating operational commanders of what a deployed space cell can provide in theatre–“education is a huge piece,” he said–the cadre of joint signals technicians available for deployment at the moment is very “lean” and must be expanded “so we can support the wider CAF.” “CANSpOC is only so big, until I can grow it,” he said. “This is [a] balance between fixing the car and operating it ... [In] some of these areas, we're currently one or two [persons] deep.” FORCE GENERATION To build up its space force with qualified tradespeople, the RCAF is borrowing an employment model from Canadian Special Operations Forces Command that Whale calls an “ABC approach.” Group A will be made up of individuals who enter the space program and stay there their entire careers; Group B will comprise tradespeople who enter space, leave for other postings, but will eventually return to the space program; and Group C will work in the space program temporarily, before leaving permanently for another division of the RCAF. “We haven't decided about a [specific space-related] trade yet,” said Whale. “But we are absolutely going to look at it.” An aerospace engineer, for example, is currently being trained as one of the first permanent space employees. As the RCAF grapples with recruitment and retention across its operations, Whale acknowledged that finding enough people to populate the space program is a concern. “To grow by a couple hundred folks, [it's] going to take a decade,” he said. “It's going to be measured and paced–unless, a commander decides, ‘You know what? Space is so important, Squadron X or capability Y, I'm going to cut you by 20 per cent, and I want to take those people and put them in here. I'll fill you back up, but I need this to move quicker.' ” FORCE DEVELOPMENT In its force development role, the RCAF will focus on three areas: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communications (SATCOM), and position, navigation, and timing (PNT). ISR capabilities will include systems that provide surveillance from space, and others that provide surveillance of space. SATCOM initiatives, buttressed by the Assistant Deputy Minister Information Management (ADM IM) SATCOM Operations Centre, will support operations, joint capability development, and research and development. PNT will focus on electronic support of Canada's military, electronic protection, electronic attack, and direct support to operations. The intended result is a mix of CAF, federal government, allied, and commercial assets and systems that will ultimately help defend Canada's sovereignty. “We are now wrestling with–just like everyone else–how do we balance the commercial versus uniform versus civilian piece,” said Whale. MILSATCOM In partnership with the U.S. Department of Defense, the Canadian Armed Forces have embarked on two major projects to provide military SATCOM (MILSATCOM) with the level of capability the operational community demands. The first is the Protected Military SATCOM (PMSC) project. PMSC leverages the U.S. DoD advanced extremely-high frequency constellation to provide survivable and jam-resistant SATCOM in Ka- and Q-band to users around the world. PMSC achieved initial operating capability (IOC) in 2013 and is expected to reach full operational capability (FOC) in 2024. A second major MILSATCOM initiative is the Mercury Global (MG) project, which leverages the U.S. DoD wideband global SATCOM constellation to provide high bandwidth SATCOM in X-band and MIL Ka-band to global users. This capability achieved IOC in 2013 and is expected to achieve FOC in 2018. SSE identifies several challenges that will remain even after the implementation of PMSC and MG, and as a result the military has launched two additional SATCOM projects. The Tactical Narrowband SATCOM (TNS) project is expected to provide guaranteed, reliable and secure SATCOM in narrowband UHF, transmitting both voice and data and providing coverage from 65 degrees South to 65 degrees North. The current approach to TNS is focused on an effort with the U.S. DoD to gain assured access to the mobile user objective system (MUOS) UHF SATCOM constellation, with planned IOC in 2021 and FOC in 2023. Another critical project, known as the Enhanced Satellite Communications Project–Polar (ESCP-P), will provide “guaranteed, reliable and secure access” in narrowband and wideband to support operations in the Arctic. IOC is planned for no later than 2029, with FOC by 2031. As part of its consultation with industry, the RCAF will be asking if projects can be advanced quicker if the resources become available. “ESCP-P is one of the first ones we are trying to accelerate if we can,” said Whale. SURVEILLANCE Surveillance of space is a long-standing capability of the RCAF, demonstrated most recently with the Sapphire satellite, which launched in 2013. SSE identified a need to replace Sapphire through the Surveillance of Space 2 (SofS2) project. The goal of SofS2 is to acquire the ability to identify and track objects in space that could threaten the space-based systems of Canada and its allies, and to defend and protect military space capabilities. RCAF documents identify surveillance from space as the capability with perhaps the greatest growth in the space environment. Up until now, space-based surveillance has been used mainly for ISR and maritime domain awareness, often in significant cooperation with other government departments. A key next step will be the RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM), a whole-of-government project led by the Canadian Space Agency that is expected to deliver better land surveillance and intelligence products. RCM is expected to launch this fall, with an IOC expected in 2019. Unclassified Remote-Sensing Situational Awareness (USRA) capability, an award-winning system, comprises air-transportable ground stations and small teams that can be deployed anywhere in the world in support of a joint task force. It draws down unclassified satellite imagery, making it an invaluable asset in large coalitions where information sharing is often a challenge. URSA and a six-person team are currently deployed with the Canadian Army forward enhanced presence battlegroup in Latvia. The capability is in the process of being transferred from CJOC to the RCAF. Other projects include the Defence Enhanced Surveillance from Space–Program (DESS-P), which “will implement a follow-on to RCM for surveillance-from-space capabilities” for the CAF, and the Synthetic Aperture Radar–Data Continuity (SAR-DC), being developed by the Canadian Space Agency to deliver remote-sensing capabilities for civil applications, with capability that is expected to extend beyond 2025. THE ‘NEW SPACE' As the RCAF assumes responsibility for Canada's defence space program, it must weigh the influence of dozens of military and commercial players. Everyone from NASA to celebrity billionaire Elon Musk is launching products into orbit. It's estimated more than 24,000 objects larger than a softball are already in motion around Earth. There are “countless more” objects with a smaller diameter, which could have catastrophic consequences in the event of a collision that creates debris. Canada alone has 47 satellites in space (both government and commercial), and 42 are active in orbit. Thousands more may be on the way, as private companies crowd into what Whale refers to as, “the new space.” “The cost of entry's going down, and because of industry innovation, the congestion is a concern,” he said. “But I think we can eventually manage that ... essentially, the Air Force has made a promise: we'll take care of this capability. “We've taken what's been built, and we're putting our minds to, how are we going to give the same level of attention–like we do to any other capability–to move it forward? “Of course, we need to sustain the same level of integration with Army, Navy, SOF, because it's a joint thing,” he added. “But the Air Force has taken the lead, and we're going to find a way to progress what the defence policy tells us to progress.” It's a clear indication the RCAF is all-in on its new Joint Space leadership role. https://www.skiesmag.com/features/critical-space/