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  • Are OTAs the Thing of the Future?

    2 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

    Are OTAs the Thing of the Future?

    As it looks to get new technologies developed and into the field as quickly as possible, the Department of Defense has been making greater use of Other Transaction Authority (OTA), a quick-strike contracting mechanism that has gone in and out of fashion since the 1950s, but is now seeing a resurgence. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), for example, recently awarded a $49 million OTA to Enterprise Services, teaming with four other companies, for DISA's National Background Investigation Services (NBIS), a shared service intended to combine a number of separate systems to speed up process investigations. The Navy also took the OTA route in awarding Advanced Technology International a $100 million deal to manage work on the Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Command's Information Warfare Research Project. The Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx), created in 2015 to foster innovation in partnership with industry, has made extensive use of OTAs, telling Congress earlier this year it had awarded 61 other transaction agreements worth $145 million, with the agreements reached within an average of 78 days. What both projects have in common are that they involve prototyping new technologies and involve companies that don't usually work as DoD contractors. They also aim for rapid development and deployment. The Navy contract “will accelerate acquisition and bring non-traditional sources, research and development labs, and industry together to provide new, innovative information warfare solutions,” said Rear Adm. C.D. Becker, commander of SPAWAR Systems Command. Full article: https://www.meritalk.com/articles/are-otas-the-thing-of-the-future/

  • Air Force’s future ISR architecture could feature drone swarms and hypersonics — with AI underpinning it all

    2 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR

    Air Force’s future ISR architecture could feature drone swarms and hypersonics — with AI underpinning it all

    By: Valerie Insinna POZNAN, Poland — The Air Force's ambitious new ISR strategy calls for a sensing grid that fuses together data from legacy platforms like the RQ-4 Global Hawk, emerging technologies like swarming drones, other services' platforms and publicly available information. And deciphering all of that data will be artificial intelligence. Such a system may sound like something out of a sci-fi book, but the service believes it could be in service by 2028. In a July 31 interview, Lt. Gen. VeraLinn “Dash” Jamieson, the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for ISR, explained the Air Force's new “Next Generation ISR Dominance Flight Plan,” which lays out the service's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance goals for the next 10 years. In the past, “when we fielded a sensor, we fielded a sensor to answer a question,” Jamieson said. What the ISR flight plan tries to accomplish is far more extensive: “How do I get the data so I can fuse it, look at it and then ask the right questions from the data to reveal what trends are out there?" “We have to do all of that at the speed of relevance — meaning at warfighting speed — so that our decision cycle has shrunk,” she added. “We get our effects in and out, and we create chaos and confusion in the adversary. Once he gets behind, it is extremely difficult to actually catch up.” Full article: https://www.c4isrnet.com/air/2018/08/01/air-forces-future-isr-architecture-could-feature-drone-swarms-and-hypersonics-all-with-ai-underpinning-it-all/

  • US Army increases investment on counter-drone program

    2 août 2018 | International, C4ISR

    US Army increases investment on counter-drone program

    By: Daniel Cebul WASHINGTON — Leonardo DRS has received an additional $13 million to continue engineering and testing a vehicle-mounted system that the U.S. Army hopes will protect soldiers from small drones, according to a July 31 Defense Department statement. Leonardo was awarded an initial $16 million contract by the Army in July 2017 to develop a counter-UAV capability dubbed the Mobile Low, Slow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Integrated Defense System, or MLIDS, with hopes of deploying “numerous production systems in early summer 2018." At the annual Association of the U.S. Army conference in October, the company announced it had received a $42 million production contract for an undisclosed number of MLIDS to fit the Army's requirement to defeat small, inexpensive unmanned systems such as quadcopters and fixed-wing aircraft that operate as airborne improvised explosive devices. “Drones are becoming an increasingly dangerous threat against our forward-deployed soldiers, and we are proud to support this urgent requirement to protect them from potentially lethal small unmanned aerial vehicles,” Aaron Hankins, vice president and general manager for DRS Land Systems, said in October 2017. “We are working hard to deliver the best capability to our soldiers as quickly as possible." Full article: https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2018/08/01/us-army-increases-investment-on-counter-drone-matv-program/

  • Congress finalizes $717 billion defense budget authorization months ahead of schedule

    2 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

    Congress finalizes $717 billion defense budget authorization months ahead of schedule

    By: Leo Shane III WASHINGTON — Senators gave final approval to the annual defense authorization bill on Wednesday, sending the $717 billion budget package to the White House to become law in the next few weeks. The move marks the 58th consecutive year Congress has approved the military spending policy measure and the earliest that lawmakers have finished the work in 41 years. Typically, lawmakers labor until late fall before reaching agreement on the legislation. It sets the military pay raise at 2.6 percent starting next January, adds 15,600 more troops to services' overall end strength, and boosts aircraft and ship purchases above what the White House had requested. It also gives lawmakers a solid legislative victory to tout before voters in the lead-up to the November mid-term elections, and some parliamentary breathing room they hope can lead to progress on appropriations bills in the next few weeks. WASHINGTON — Senators gave final approval to the annual defense authorization bill on Wednesday, sending the $717 billion budget package to the White House to become law in the next few weeks. The move marks the 58th consecutive year Congress has approved the military spending policy measure and the earliest that lawmakers have finished the work in 41 years. Typically, lawmakers labor until late fall before reaching agreement on the legislation. It sets the military pay raise at 2.6 percent starting next January, adds 15,600 more troops to services' overall end strength, and boosts aircraft and ship purchases above what the White House had requested. It also gives lawmakers a solid legislative victory to tout before voters in the lead-up to the November mid-term elections, and some parliamentary breathing room they hope can lead to progress on appropriations bills in the next few weeks. Congress is giving the officer promotion system a massive overhaul The changes will have a far-reaching impact on military culture and change the incentives for how individual officers manage their careers. By: Leo Shane III A day earlier, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., announced that he had reached an agreement with Senate Democrats on bringing defense appropriations legislation to the Senate floor later this month, as part of a broader effort to wrap up fiscal 2019 military spending issues before the election. Full article: https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/08/01/congress-finalizes-defense-budget-authorization-months-ahead-of-schedule/

  • America could protect cyberspace like WMDs

    2 août 2018 | International, C4ISR

    America could protect cyberspace like WMDs

    By: Justin Lynch The State Department is building a coalition of allies in cyberspace that it hopes can deter state-backed malicious activity, according to a top diplomat. Rob Strayer, the deputy assistant secretary for cyber and international communications at the State Department, told Fifth Domain that the agency is trying to build a voluntary framework of countries that the United States can work with on cyber issues. The plan is for the alliance to impose consequences after malicious events in cyberspace. Strayer said that although there are norms in cyberspace, they do not enforce themselves. With the coalition of like-minded states in cyberspace, the State Department can coordinate legal, diplomatic, and attribution with a range of countries. One model is the attribution of the WannaCry and NotPetya cyberattacks, which the U.S. blamed on foreign countries in concert with other nations. Strayer said the program's initial seeds were planted after a 2017 executive order from President Donald Trump on cybersecurity. He did not disclose which countries would be involved or when the digital alliance would be complete. Full article: https://www.fifthdomain.com/civilian/2018/08/01/america-could-protect-cyberspace-like-wmds

  • Homeland Security announces new first response cyber center

    1 août 2018 | International, C4ISR

    Homeland Security announces new first response cyber center

    By: Justin Lynch In the face of increasing cyberattacks, the Department of Homeland Security is creating a new center to share threat information with private companies and kicking off a 90 day sprint to identify the country's digital “crown jewels" that may be especially vulnerable, the agency's secretary said July 31. The National Risk Management Center is expected to provide a centralized home where firms and local agencies can turn for cybersecurity solutions. “The next major attack is more likely to reach us online than on an airplane,” said Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen. She added that “intruders are in our systems” and “everyone and everything is now a target.” The announcement came during a cybersecurity summit that the Department of Homeland Security hosted in New York City. The event aimed to bridge the gap between the government and some of the top companies in the United States that make up the critical parts of American digital life. It was envisioned as the start of a new relationship between the private and public sector. Nielsen said that the threat center is “driven by industry needs” and is spurred by a ”re-emergence of the nation state threat” and the “hyperconnected environment” of the United States. She said that previously some local governments have called 911 during a cyberattack. In the future, they would call the new cyber center. “Nation-state actors attempt to infiltrate critical infrastructure operations across multiple sectors,” a Homeland Security fact sheet on the new center read. It added there is a “need for an agreed-upon playbook to integrate government and industry response efforts.” The center also provides a playbook for risk management and identifying critical cyber supply chain elements. Although there are already government-backed risk-sharing initiatives, DHS leaders hope that the private sector will be more willing to share their challenges and expertise. Jeanette Manfra, the assistant secretary for the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications at Homeland Security, told reporters that the new center is "going to start small, we don't want to sign up for all sorts of things and then fail.” The hope is for the national counterterrorism center to be able to focus on incident response, and the center announced on Tuesday will focus on identifying national risk. The risk center will pull staff from other parts of government, Manfra said. A leader has not been named, and it has not received an increased budget. Throughout the conference, government officials were eager to entice the private sector to work with the new risk center. It appears that business participation is a necessary condition for the centers' success. The announcement comes just one week after Homeland Security warned that the Russian government is conducting cyberattacks against critical infrastructure sectors that include energy, nuclear, water, aviation and critical manufacturing. “The warning lights are blinking red," Coats said during a July 13 event at the Hudson Institute. Current threat sharing portals have been described as ineffective. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 already attempted to spur collaboration between the public and private sector. Some experts told Fifth Domain that they did not expect the new portal to be groundbreaking. Only six companies are currently sharing cyberthreats with government, according to Chris Krebs, head of the national protection and programs directorate at Homeland Security. “We have to age to establish a value proposition for an organization to share into the system,” said Krebs. He highlighted better supply chain risk management as an incentive that would set the new center apart from previous intelligence-sharing schemes. Companies can write into their contracts that their vendors must use the threat-sharing portal so they know that contractors are managing third-party risks, Krebs said. At the event in New York City, some of the largest corporations praised the new program while speaking onstage with top government officials. “This was an obvious thing to do for a decade but it didn't happen,” said John Donovan, the chief executive of AT&T. https://www.fifthdomain.com/critical-infrastructure/2018/07/31/homeland-security-announces-new-risk-management-center/

  • Cyber Command wants to partner with private sector to stop hacks

    1 août 2018 | International, C4ISR

    Cyber Command wants to partner with private sector to stop hacks

    By: Justin Lynch The head of the National Security Agency and Cyber Command is advocating for a more expansive partnership between the government and the private sector amid an array of cyberthreats. Gen. Paul Nakasone, speaking July 31 during the Department of Homeland Security National Cybersecurity Summit in New York City, said that partnerships are America's “advantage in cyberspace,” "We have tremendous, exquisite, foreign intelligence reporting,” Nakasone said, but added he wanted to understand what the private sector and firms who make up America's digital infrastructure were looking for “so we can really tailor the information.” Information from Cyber Command and the NSA will be used in a new National Risk Management Center that hopes to share cyberthreats between the government and the private sector, according to a department spokeswoman. ”Resiliency begins with a dialogue,” Nakasone said. The new center's announcement comes after DHS said that Russia was continuing to attackAmerica's electric grid. Last week, Sen. Claire McCaskill D-Mo., said that Russian hackers tried unsuccessfully to infiltrate her office. On the same day that Nakasone spoke, Facebook said that it removed 32 accounts in an apparent influence campaign. Ninety percent of America's critical infrastructure is in private hands, Nakasone said. Therefore, the Department of Defense is kicking off the new risk center with a “90 day sprint” to identify companies that are most essential to the U.S. way of life in an effort to protect them from foreign cyberattacks. “Not all risks are created equal,” Nakasone said of the initial effort. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/cybercom/2018/07/31/cyber-command-wants-to-partner-with-private-sector-to-stop-hacks/

  • Army Wrestles With SIGINT vs. EW

    1 août 2018 | International, Terrestre, C4ISR

    Army Wrestles With SIGINT vs. EW

    This internal budget battle in the Army could cede the actual battlefield to high-powered Russian and Chinese jammers, electronic warfare advocates fear, with the same lethal consequences for US troops that Ukrainian forces have suffered since 2014. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. CAPITOL HILL: Can the Army unite its rival tribes to retake the high-tech high groundof modern warfare, the electromagnetic spectrum? Those are the stakes in the service's ongoing internal struggles over doctrine, organization, and an obscure but critical program known as TLIS, the Terrestrial Layer Intelligence System. Army leaders see TLIS as a powerful synergy between Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which eavesdrops on and locates enemy transmissions, and Electronic Warfare (EW), which jams those same transmissions and can be used for cyber warfare. But TLIS, as the “intelligence” in its name implies, began as a pure SIGINT system, before it absorbed the former Multi-Function Electronic Warfare (MFEW) program, and there's always the possible it might regress. At least some electronic warriors hear worrying rumors that the more powerful SIGINT branch wants to save money on TLIS by cutting back on its jamming capabilities, leaving it as a passive sensor rather than an active weapon. This internal budget battle in the Army could cede the actual battlefield to high-powered Russian and Chinese jammers, electronic warfare advocates fear, with the same lethal consequences for US troops that Ukrainian forces have suffered since 2014. “The intel people will finally be able to get rid of EW, again, by taking it over, again, and crushing it,” said Col. Jeffrey Church, who until his retirement last year was the most senior Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) in the Army: There are no EW generals, in stark contrast to SIGINT and cyber. Church was also the last EWO to run the electronic warfare directorate on the Army's Pentagon staff: His immediate successor was an engineer — an expert on bridges and minefields, not electrons. Both the staff directorate and the EWO specialty have since been folded into Army cyber. “Next,” Church predicted in a bitter post on LinkedIn, “they will cancel the intel portions of MFEW they insisted be written into the EW requirements (i.e. when MFEW was folded into TLIS) and thereby kill the MFEW program.” “I don't think your article will affect anything for Army EW,” a weary Church told me. “The only thing that will is when a bunch of our soldiers get killed. Then the Army will act shocked by it and be compelled to bring EW into the force with real gear, real operators, real training and real EW leadership.” Synergy or Tension? From drones to foot troops, radio to radar, networks to GPS, everything in a 21st century military has to send and receive signals through the electromagnetic spectrum — which means everything can be detected, targeted, and disrupted. Russia and China have invested massively in electronic warfare since the end of the Cold War while the US disbanded most EW. Today, while the Navy and Air Forcehave high-cost jamming aircraft — the EA-18G Growler and EC-130H Compass Call respectively — they're too rare, expensive, and over-powered to support small units on the ground. But the US Army's own arsenal consists almost entirely of short-range jammers that fit in backpacks or on Humvees, most of them designed to disable radio detonators for roadside bombs. Meanwhile Russia and China have fleets of heavy trucks packed with high-power EW gear that can scramble US signals hundreds of miles away. The Army's original solution to this problem was called Multi-Function Electronic Warfare (MFEW), a common family of sensors and jammers meant to go on trucks, drones and manned aircraft — eventually. But the service decided to fold MFEW into the land-based TLIS and an as-yet-unnamed airborne counterpart instead. “We are specifically looking at putting SIGINT, EW and cyber on the same platform, both on the ground and in the air,” Maj. Gen. Robert Walters told a July 18 forumorganized by the Association of Old Crows, an EW professional group. As commander of the Army's intelligence center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., Walters is the Army's lead “proponent” for TLIS requirements, with the cyber center at Fort Gordon, Ga. in a significant supporting role. There's a natural synergy here, Walters said. SIGINT finds the enemy signals and analyzes them, then cyber and electronic warfare can target the weak links in the enemy network. While he didn't say so out loud, that's how it's done by the current masters of the art, the Russians, whose SIGINT and EW officers often sit side by side in the same vehicle so they can quickly coordinate devastating electromagnetic maneuvers, as in Ukraine. But there's also a tension between the two sides. Intelligence naturally wants to keep listening to the enemy signals to find out more, whereas cyber/EW warriors want to shut them down or use them to feed cyber weapons into. Now, you can try to shut down only the enemy's most secure networks so they have to use the ones SIGINT can easily crack. That's what the Russians did against the Ukrainians, forcing them off their military radios onto personal cellphones — but it's not easy to pull off. Second, when EW turns on its jammers, their powerful signal doesn't just disrupt enemy transmissions: It also provides a big target for enemy missiles and artillery radars to home in on. At best, that means the combined SIGINT/EW unit has to relocate frequently, disrupting listening operations. At worst, it means the combined unit blows up in one shot. (You can reduce the risk to your troops by putting the jammers on drones or ground robots operated from a distance by remote control, but that creates a new problem: The enemy can detect, decode and jam your communications with the robots). So how well will the Army balance these tensions? Right now, said one well-connected electronic warfare expert, the intelligence branch is in the driver's seat, and “once again intel has defaulted back to SIGINT, which disappoints me.....It's not looking too good.” This attitude may be overly pessimistic. But there's little cause for optimism in Army's unhappy history of internecine intramural rivalries and cancelled procurement programs. Is Big Six Missing One? The current Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, is trying to make a break with the service's dysfunctional past. He has named six modernization priorities, each with its own Cross Functional Team (CFT), led by a general who can pull in people from across the bureaucracy and put them in one room until they thrash out how to get things done. Those CTFs, in turn, will play a leading role in the new Army Futures Command being stood up in Austin. But electronic warfare has no clear home in this new structure. Of the six priorities — 1) long-range artillery, 2) armored vehicles, 3) aircraft, 4) networks, 5) air & missile defense, and 6) soldier equipment, in that order — the closest fit is with Priority No. 4, the network. That covers all the computerized communication and data systems the Army uses to transmit orders and intelligence: Lose all those and you're back to carrier pigeons. So, understandably, the emphasis of the network Cross Functional Team is on defending the US network from jamming and hacking, not on attacking enemy networks with our own jammers and hackers. A spin-off CFT on Precision Navigation & Timing has a similar defensive focus: How can US forces keep track of where everything is and when it has to happen if the enemy disrupts GPS? For that matter, the entire cyber center at Fort Gordon, despite having responsibility for electronic warfare, evolved when the old Signal Corps school took on a growing role in not just setting up communications networks but defending them. It's only recently taken on an offensive role, and primarily in cyberspace rather than electronic warfare. So all these leading Army organizations have the same focus on defense. Their job is to keep the network working under attack. But defense is not enough on its own. A tank doesn't just need armor: It needs a gun. Maybe a network doesn't just need cybersecurity and resilience against jamming: It needs to be able to attack the other side's network. A rmy Secretary Mark Esper has made clear the Big Six priorities are unlikely to change, so don't expect him to add electronic warfare as Big No. 7 any time soon. But there is still some wiggle room to spin off subsidiary priorities with their own Cross Functional Teams. In fact, from the beginning, there've been eight Cross Functional Teams, not six: The network priority is also supported by that Precision Navigation & Timing CFT, while the soldier equipment CFT spun off a training simulations CFT. Now, that eight-fold structure hasn't changed since the initial announcement in 2016. But there's no fundamental reason why the Army couldn't add a ninth CFT for electronic warfare, supporting the network priority area alongside the PNT team. What this would take — besides a memo from Esper and Milley — would be a fundamental change in how the Army thinks about “the network,” as an offensive weapon instead of a mere technical function. his is a philosophical shift. There's a longstanding tendency in Western militaries to focus on reducing what Clausewitz called the friction and fog of war, the innumerable minor mishaps, miscommunications, and misunderstandings that constantly impede military operations. The ambition to “lift the fog of war” reached its peak of hubris in the “transformation” movement before the invasion of Iraq, where the fog rolled in again unstoppably. Eastern tradition, by contrast, has long seen fog and friction as not only obstacles but weapons: You want to reduce them for your own side, of course, but also to increase them for the enemy. Hence Sun Tzu's maxim that “all warfare is based on deception,” a concept the Russians have embraced with their doctrine of maskirovka and which seems well-suited to the information age. So, instead of treating the network simply as an electromagnetic means to reduce our fog and friction, why not extend the concept to include electromagnetic means to increase the enemy's fog and friction? Instead of an asset to be defended, what if it's a weapon to attack? s the Network a Weapon? There are signs the Army is starting to think this way. At the Capitol Hill forum, Lt. Gen. Stephen Fogarty — current head of Army Cyber Command and former chief of the Cyber Center at Fort Gordon — even talked about the network as a “weapon” and (intentionally or not) echoed Sun Tzu. “We've truly started to operationalize the Army networks,” Fogarty said. “That's the foundational weapons platform for a modern military.” Without the network, he said, you can't do persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); long-range precision fires (LRPF) with missiles and artillery; logistics; medical evacuation; or command and control (C2, what the Army now calls “mission command”). Now, Fogarty's list is about how the network enables other parts of the Army, rather than the network taking the offensive itself. Still, calling the network a “weapons system” is a long way from the old-school Army view of it as a mere utility, a technical convenience the geeks set up in the back room so the real mencan go up front and fight. Why is the network so fundamental, in Fogarty's view? Because, he said, “our ability to operate and defend that network is what gives our commanders the ability to do two things: to see the adversary and see ourselves.” Once again, Fogarty is not talking about using the network to attack, only to “operate and defend.” Nevertheless, he's sounding an awful lot like Sun Tzu: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Or as Fogarty put it, with less elegance but more specificity: “In the multi-domain battlespace, not of the future but of today, against peer and near-peer adversaries, whoever has the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than their opponent (will) enjoy decisive advantage.” (He's referring to an updated version of the classic OODA loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, & Act). That requires bringing formerly disparate specialties together in new ways, said Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the deputy chief of Army staff for intelligence (G-2). “Our primary challenge is one of integration,” he told the AOC forum. “Future forces must integrate SIGINT, electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities to provide situational awareness” — i.e. know yourself, know your enemy — “and enable commanders to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic fires” — i.e. both physical attacks, like missiles, bombs, and shells, and intangible ones, like hacking and jamming. This transition can be intellectually and culturally wrenching, Berrier admitted. “While the tribes have come together, there are still members of the tribes that are a little obstinate,” he said to laughter. For those who don't see the inherent benefits, however, Berrier added, “another reason we're doing it is that the Chief of Staff of the Army told us to do it.” https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/army-wrestles-with-sigint-vs-ew/

  • The calculus of cheaper military comms satellites

    31 juillet 2018 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR

    The calculus of cheaper military comms satellites

    By: Kelsey Atherton Space is not so much hard as it is expensive. Satellites today are expensive machines, expensively built and expensive to launch, with the understanding that, once on orbit, they can work for years. That calculus assumes several eggs in every pricey basket, and as space moves from a home for military satellites to a domain where nations prepare for actual combat, building resilience in orbit means rethinking how satellites are done. It means rethinking costs in the billions and imagining them instead in the millions. And to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Paul “Rusty” Thomas it means creating a whole new ecosystem for payloads and launches. Thomas is the program manager for Blackjack, a DARPA initiative that wants to pilot a constellation of cheaper satellites for military communication, with the costs low, uplinks up and the resilience of the whole constellation baked-in. C4ISRNET's Kelsey Atherton spoke with Thomas about the program. C4ISRNET: There's a lot of interest in both low Earth orbit [LEO] and constellations of satellites. What is DARPA's specific goal with Blackjack? PAUL “RUSTY” THOMAS: Blackjack, as an architecture demonstration, will build a portion of a constellation, looking at about 20 percent of a fully proliferated LEO constellation. That's a range of 20 satellites, 20 percent of the 90 to 100 satellite constellation, which would give a ground user three to four hours per day or more of theater-level operations so that we could actually demonstrate what we're going to do with a full, fully proliferated 24/7 constellation that covers the entire Earth and gives global constant coverage and global constant custody. C4ISRNET: What was the logic behind accepting separate proposals for busses and payloads? THOMAS: Most exquisite spacecraft we built have been married to the bus and payload from Day 1. That's a wonderful model for exquisite spacecraft. But we're trying to build a proliferated LEO payload ecosystem — like the commercial commoditized bus ecosystem — that can match the numerous types of payloads. To do that you don't want to just show that one payload matches great and then move forward. That just gives you a great payload. To try and build that ecosystem out, you want to go to at least Program Design Review with the payload developers working to a generalized initial design covering numerous types of commoditized busses. Once you get deeper into the design phase, match that payload to a bus, which allows a large range of payloads to be developed. C4ISRNET: There's a lot of commercial interest in this space; does that pose any risk to deploying a new constellation? THOMAS: The goal of Blackjack is to prove you can leverage commercial approaches with potentially lower costs, lower cycle times, lower times for design and build. It also comes with the issue that we're not directing the approach to building the bus, we're not directing how the constellation is put together for these folks; therefore, the rest is getting the government itself to do that match and to put our systems into play in a way that marches in lockstep with them without directing their commercial elements will play. That brings risk. We have to learn how to do business a little different than it's been done in the past, and to move a little quicker than the government has in the past. C4ISRNET: So, there's no risk of LEO being too crowded to accommodate more constellations? THOMAS: No. Well, I wouldn't say no risk, there's always risk, the mega constellations that you're starting to see FCC filings for look like they're going to put hundreds, and some of them into the 10,000-plus range, and that's certainly going to be a challenge and it's going to be a risk. Fortunately, we have air traffic control systems on the ground that cover large numbers of aircraft in the air at any given time. We haven't actually taken that step into how to manage large numbers of spacecraft in space yet, but we believe that all the technology is there and it's just a matter of implementing an area where the government is going to be tracking what the commercial folks are doing. There's a risk — it's not major, space is big — but you absolutely need to track the spacecraft and make sure they can deorbit. But in terms of putting thousands or even tens of thousands of satellites into low Earth orbit, all of that seems very feasible and is not in the high-risk bucket. C4ISRNET: What's the rough timeline you're expecting for demonstrations? THOMAS: For the 20-satellite constellation, we plan to have the first two spacecraft that we have integrated to the commercial busses and the payload together ready by the end of 2020, with launch by early 2021. We will follow that in 2021 with the rest of the 18, once we've confirmed the first two are fine. We will have the full demonstration capability running late in 2021 with an expectation of theater-level autonomous operations from low Earth orbit in 2022. C4ISRNET: One argument for satellite constellations and against exquisite satellites is resiliency. How does that work here? THOMAS: You get a lower cost, the individual node becomes a bit expendable, you don't build your resiliency around the individual node, you don't try to protect that spacecraft to the nth degree like in exquisite billion-dollar-plus craft. If the Blackjack model works, spacecraft will be in the $3 million to $4 million range, $2 million to $3 million to put it into orbit. We're talking about a $6 million node, including the cost of getting it into space. Therefore, it's less than the cost of a high-end munition. The constellation itself becomes your resilient element. You can put your high-level availability, reliability and mission assurance at the constellation level instead of at the node, because of the numbers you're putting up. If one satellite has fallen, its replacement is coming over the horizon 10 to 15 minutes later. You have a different approach to resiliency, large numbers of spacecraft in play, which totally turns some of the counterspace elements on its ear. C4ISRNET: What counter-space elements might this be especially resilient against? THOMAS: You now have low-cost nodes, so a lot of the direct ascent type of methods out there no longer makes a lot of sense. Of course, you still have varied threats from non-kinetic and cyber. We still need to protect the constellation against all the other types of threats out there, so it probably helps the most on the kinetic side, but it certainly gives you lot of resilience in all the areas. C4ISRNET: What kind of communications presence will this enable? THOMAS: Blackjack is aimed at leveraging the new mesh networks being set up by these commercial companies. A user currently in the DoD might need to look up at two or three different options in space to actually talk and do communications in this space segment. Once we link up and do encryption, the user on the ground will look up and see hundreds or more potential network nodes overhead at any given point on the planet, North Pole to South Pole; it's going to drastically change how the DoD does communication. That is a bit independent of what Blackjack is going to do. If the commercial companies succeed and come out, that capability, call it raw gigabit-per-second class, not all of them it. But they all have many megabit data links from one point of the planet to another, at very low latency, 100-200 milliseconds, so you do really change the game for how any user, DoD included, does global communication. C4ISRNET: Is a desired end goal of Blackjack specifically a redundant spaceborne network that can function independently if access to internet on the ground is cut off? THOMAS: If you have a problem with your terrestrial network — whether it's a ground network system or point-to-point comms, fiber optics or others being interfered with — the space mesh network provides the ability to move the data up, move it through the space mesh, and move it back to the ground, without any other system being involved in that data transition. The switch network that Iridium has up right now, it's low bandwidth but a wonderful system in terms of moving data from one point to another on the planet through the Iridium gateways that DoD and its users have worldwide. Move that up to high broadband access, and not just two or three satellites overhead but dozens or hundreds, and it really does move us into a new realm. C4ISRNET: At what point in the program do bus and payload link? Is there a point where they're demoed together? THOMAS: In the [broad agency announcement] out right now, you can see we're looking for multiple payloads to go at least through phase one, potentially multiple buses to go through phase one. As we progress the programs through the preliminary design review into phase two and get critical design review, first two spacecraft built, we'll be selecting the ones to continue deeper and deeper into the program to match up and do the demo. We'll start with a wide range and narrow down to a smaller set to actually do the demonstration with a secondary objective of showing why a huge payload will work, why different types of payloads will be successful in this type of architecture, even though we've only got one or two of them. C4ISRNET: What does the future of Blackjack look like? THOMAS: We are looking at large numbers of types of payloads. We very much want to get into a rapid tech refresh cycle ... putting up payloads every two or three years that are newer version of the ones that have gone previously, have an open architecture standard so we can update over the air with better algorithms. https://www.c4isrnet.com/thought-leadership/2018/07/30/the-calculus-of-cheaper-military-comms-satellites/

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