Nouvelles

Published: 23 May 2020 by Mike Ball Leidos has been awarded a contract by the U.S. government's General Services Administration (GSA) to provide software upgrades for the U.S. Army's Unmanned Aircraft System Ground Control Station – Version 4 (UASGCS-V4). The upgraded software solution will be compatible with the existing common baseline and will maximize reusable efficiencies for the existing UAS, as well as U.S. Army, Department of Defense and commercially-available software. This will result in a simplified, efficient and integrated system that will make both training and operation simpler as well as providing commanders with maximum concept of operations (CONOP) flexibility. The new solution will improve the ability of unmanned aircraft ground control station operators to see where they need to go, locate enemies and execute their mission. As part of the contract, Leidos will provide engineering services for technical and logistics support, including software development. Leidos will also support integration of the new design solution into the Army's Universal Ground Control Station (UGCS) as well as system qualification, certification and operational testing for multiple UAS platforms. Michael Hile, Leidos division manager, Airborne Solutions, commented: “We look forward to supporting the U.S Army's UASGCS-V4 through this next-generation software solution. Our team's expertise in software programming and development, along with their deep mission knowledge, will help ensure the success of this critical mission.” https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/2020/05/u-s-army-upgrades-uas-ground-control-station/

#COGES #missile #drone #H160M #ALAT #aéroterrestre #Guépard Air&Cosmos finalise son dossier du 5 juin "Matériels de défense aéroterrestre". Cette édition d'Air&Cosmos bénéficiera d'une sur-diffusion exceptionnelle et ciblée : Diffusion à tous les abonnés papier et numérique d'Air&Cosmos magazine Diffusion à tous les contacts exposants, visiteurs et délégations partenaires du COGES/Eurosatory. En partenariat avec le COGES, la version numérique de cette édition du 5 juin sera en effet incluse dans la newsletter du COGES du 11 juin 2020 expédiée à 170 000 contacts. Diffusion dans l'espace Partenaires presse du site web d'Eurosatory. Voici le détail du dossier : Emploi des drones au sein de l'Armée de Terre. Interview du Comalat, le Général Bertrand VALLETTE d'OSIA Infographie détaillée de l'Airbus Helicopters HIL (H160M) "Guépard" Le Guépard et son MCO Mistral 3 : l'arme anti-drones de MBDA https://air-cosmos.com/article/dfense-aroterrestre-dossier-envoy-aux-170-000-contacts-coges-le-11-juin-prochain-22966

Face aux retards pris dans le programme de drone MALE européen, General Atomics pousse un concept de location, avec ou sans équipages. Du drone MALE en location Dans la famille General Atomics, on trouvait le Predator, le Reaper, le Sky Gardian et voici maintenant... le MALE (medium altitude, long endurance) disponible à la location ! La firme californienne a déjà démontré la viabilité d'un Reaper prêt à surveiller pour l'US Marine Corps : plus de 7 000 heures de vol ont ainsi été réalisés par des équipages de la société pour le compte des « Leathernecks », et en zone opérationnelle (Afghanistan) de surcroît. Cette démonstration sans la moindre anicroche pourrait bien faire école. Car dans l'éternelle et nécessaire progression capacitaire, les Etats butent souvent sur deux écueils : d'une part, trouver les ressources budgétaires pour acheter l'engin et le mettre en vol dans la durée. D'autre part, identifier puis former la ressource humaine, hautement qualifiée, qui doit assurer le vol lui-même, dont le coeur figure dans l'équipage à quatre personnels. Toujours pas de drone européen General Atomics croit donc à son concept de location, avec ou sans équipage, y compris en Europe, pour venir compléter les flottes exploitées par les Etats eux-mêmes. Des formules de ce type sont déjà employées pour d'autres vecteurs à peine moins sensibles, les avions ISR, notamment par la... France, grande consommatrice depuis une dizaine d'années. Le Reaper est servi par un coût d'exploitation relativement bas, à 2700 dollars l'heure de vol, un coût imbattable lié à son unique turbine PT-6, l'aérodynamique du Reaper fait le reste. Alors que les Européens de l'Ouest sont toujours à t'tonner pour savoir comment résoudre leurs problèmes de MALE, avec un drone européen toujours sans accord Français, au moins. La ministre des Armées estime que le concept d'Airbus, essentiellement tourné vers les besoins Allemands, coûte bien trop cher (deux fois plus cher qu'un Sky Guardian adapté aux besoins européens, l'Euro-Guardian) et ne répond pas aux besoins Français. La Marine veut aussi du MALE Dopée par les résultats de son Reaper Block 1 (déjà ancien mais toujours vaillant), l'Armée de l'Air ne peut que constater que l'appareil désormais armé a déjà raflé 40 % des frappes depuis le début de l'année au Sahel. Elle a aussi constaté que le programme européen a déjà au moins trois ans de retard et n'arrivera donc pas, au mieux, avant 2028. Sans préjuger du destin du programme de MALE Européen... ou de la rejointe sur un programme d'Euro-Guardian, qui pourrait faire la place aux sociétés européennes, les besoins en locations seront, de toute façon, patents. D'autant plus que la Marine nationale a aussi clairement exprimé son besoin pour un MALE, et n'a pas exclu d'en loger dans son programme AVSIMAR (avion de surveillance et d'intervention maritime). https://air-cosmos.com/article/dfense-general-atomics-pousse-son-drone-male-23102

As governments around the world reassess national security, Ottawa could find it harder to delay plans for new ships, helicopters and fighter jets. Jeffrey F. Collins May 22, 2020 A few months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the first signs of impact on Canada's defence procurement plans are showing. The government has been following an ambitious multi-decade blueprint, starting in 2010, to kick-start the domestic shipbuilding sector, but some yards have had to scale back their workforces under public health orders. What this means for the National Shipbuilding Strategy and its more than $85 billion (by my calculations) in ongoing and planned construction of large ships is as yet unclear. The $19-billion Future Fighter Capability project, designed to replace the four-decade-old CF-18 fighter with 88 new jets, could also be affected. Government officials were adamant until early May that the June submission deadline for bids remained unchanged — before granting a 30-day extension. But with industry and public sector workers largely stuck at home, it is difficult to see how even the new July deadline can be met. In earlier times of economic strain, Ottawa found defence spending an easy target for cuts. This time could be different, as governments around the world reassess what national security means and how best to achieve it. Heading into 2020, things were still looking up for the capital spending plans of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The Trudeau government's 2017 Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) defence policy had allocated $108 billion in capital expenditures over a 20-year timeframe, 2017-37. Then came the pandemic. There were more than a million job losses in March alone, and as of early May, the Parliamentary Budget Office was predicting a $1-trillion debt by 2021. Given the rapid drop in both domestic and global consumer demand, the price collapse in the country's key commodity, oil, and the accompanying decline in the Canadian dollar, the country is now in a recession for an unknown period. If past is prologue and the virus persists without a vaccine for the foreseeable future, the likelihood of the government delaying or cancelling projects or trimming its orders for ships and planes is growing. When faced with economic pains in the past, federal governments scaled back procurement plans. The staggering debt and deficit in the late 1980s and 1990s led the Brian Mulroney government to drop its ambitious bid to acquire up to a dozen nuclear submarines in 1989, a mere two years after announcing the project in the 1987 defence White Paper. In 1993 the Jean Chrétien government infamously scrapped the contract to replace the 1960s-vintage Sea King helicopter (at a cost of $478 million in penalties). The following year's defence White Paper outlined $15 billion in delays, reductions and cancellations to the DND's procurement budget; this was in addition to large-scale base closures and 20 percent reductions in both CAF regular force personnel and the overall defence budget. The ostensibly pro-military Stephen Harper Conservatives announced 20-year funding plans, as ambitious as the SSE, in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy but deviated from them in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global recession. With a goal of returning to balanced budgets after $47 billion in stimulus spending, the Harper government delayed or cut over $32 billion in planned procurement spending and laid off 400 personnel from DND's procurement branch. Among the casualties was the army's $2.1-billion close-combat vehicle. There are several reasons why this pattern has repeated itself, but two stand out. First, defence is a tempting target for any government belt-tightening drive, typically accounting for a large share of discretionary federal spending. With most federal money going to individual citizens (employment insurance, pensions, tax benefits) and provinces (health and social transfers), there simply is little fiscal room left outside of defence. To remove money from these politically popular programs is to risk voter resentment and the ire of provincial governments. In short, when past federal governments confronted a choice between cutting tanks and cutting transfers, they cut the tanks. Second, Canada's geostrategic position has helped. Sitting securely atop North America in alliance with the world's pre-eminent superpower has meant, in the words of a defence minister under Pierre Trudeau, Donald Macdonald, that “there is no obvious level for defence expenditures” in Canada. Meeting the terms of our alliances with the United States and NATO means that Canada has to do its part in securing the northern half of the continent and contributing to military operations overseas, but generally in peacetime Ottawa has a lot of leeway in deciding what to spend on defence, even if allies growl and complain. Yet it is this same geostrategic position that may lessen the impact of any cuts related to COVID-19. Unlike the Mulroney and Chrétien governments, who made their decisions amid the end of Cold War tensions, or the Harper government, which was withdrawing from the combat mission in Afghanistan, this government must make its choices in an international security environment that is becoming more volatile. The spread of the virus has amplified trade and military tensions between the world's two superpowers and weakened bonds among European Union member states as they fight to secure personal protective equipment and stop the contagion at their borders. Governments worldwide are now unabashedly protectionist in their efforts to prevent the export of medical equipment and vital materials. As supply chains fray, pressures mount for each country to have a “sovereign” industrial capability, including in defence. In fact, the Trump administration has turned to the 1950 Defense Production Act to direct meatpacking plants to remain open or to restrict the export of health products (three million face masks bound for Canada were held up, then released). The pandemic is intensifying the Trump administration's skepticism of alliances and international institutions; in late March, there was even discussion of stationing US troops near the Canadian border (the plan was eventually abandoned). Smaller powers like Canada that have traditionally relied on American security guarantees will have to maintain their defence spending, or even increase it, as they try to strengthen old alliances and create new ones. As Timothy Choi, a naval expert at the University of Calgary, has told me, an irony of the pandemic is that it may see the National Shipbuilding Strategy become a “major destination for stimulus spending in times of recession.” Either way, by the time the pandemic subsides, Canadians may yet find out that there is indeed an “obvious level” to defence spending. This article is part of the The Coronavirus Pandemic: Canada's Response special feature. Photo: The Halifax-class navy frigate HMCS Fredericton in the waters of Istanbul Strait, Turkey. Shutterstock.com, by Arkeonaval. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2020/defence-procurement-wont-be-so-easy-to-cut-in-a-time-of-covid-19/

« La défense occupe un rôle particulier pour la relance de l'économie et la soutenir permet de relancer efficacement l'économie française » ont plaidé d'une même voix lors d'une audition devant la commission des affaires étrangères et de la défense du Sénat, le président du GIFAS et PDG de Dassault Aviation Eric Trappier ainsi que les président du CIDEF et du GICAT et du GICAN. « Pourquoi ne pas anticiper certains programmes pour appuyer notre industrie selon les priorités, en coordination avec la DGA (Direction générale de l'armement) ? » déclare Eric Trappier qui a aussi rappelé que « le Rafale est très important pour nos armées et l'export ». Environ 500 entreprises sont effectivement associées au programme Rafale, piloté par Dassault Aviation, rappelle La Tribune. Par Michel Cabirol Aéronefs, drones, navires de guerres, véhicules blindés... Les industriels de l'armement français plaident pour un plan de relance industriel, qui doit passer entre autre par la défense. "La défense occupe un rôle particulier pour la relance de l'économie et la soutenir permet de relancer efficacement l'économie française", a résumé le 14 mai le président du CIDEF et du GICAT Stéphane Mayer, qui est aussi PDG de Nexter lors de son audition le 14 mai devant la commission des affaires étrangères et de la défense du Sénat. La relance économique par la défense permettrait ainsi aux entreprises de ce secteur, la plupart du temps duales, de s'appuyer sur la commande publique pour passer le cap en attendant un futur rebond du marché civil. D'autant que cette filière crée des emplois et des technologies "Made in France" : entre 80 % et 90% des programmes sont réalisés en France. Pour soutenir la supply chain aéronautique, maritime et de l'armement terrestre, le gouvernement n'a en fait que l'embarras du choix, notamment en anticipant des commandes d'hélicoptères, de Rafale, de véhicules blindés, de navires de guerre, de satellites... "La défense est un amortisseur, il faut améliorer la LPM (Loi de programmation militaire) qui sera révisée en 2021", a confirmé lors de cette même audition le président du GIFAS et PDG de Dassault Aviation Eric Trappier. "Pourquoi pas anticiper certains programmes pour appuyer notre industrie selon les priorités, en coordination avec la DGA (Direction générale de l'armement)", a-t-il expliqué. Et le patron de Dassault Aviation a rappelé que "l'aéronautique, c'est avant tout le Rafale qui est très important pour nos armées et l'export". Environ 500 entreprises sont effectivement associées au programme Rafale, piloté par Dassault Aviation. Des idées dans le domaine aéroterrestre Dans le domaine terrestre, le patron du GICAT a également des idées sur des programmes à "accélérer" pour soutenir l'industrie de défense, notamment les PME, qui cherchent des financements. "Il faudrait accélérer dans l'idéal, a-t-il estimé, toutes les commandes, qui devraient l'être, dans des tranches additionnels d'ici à 2025". Pour Stéphane Mayer, ce serait "autant de signaux positifs et attendus par tous, plus encore par les PME". Il compte plus particulièrement sur l'affermissement anticipé de tranches conditionnelles des véhicules du programme Scorpion, dont Nexter est l'un des principaux architectes. Soit les Griffon, Jaguar et Serval. Le PDG de Nexter souhaite également que soient confirmées de nouvelles commandes prévues. https://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/plan-de-relance-les-industriels-de-la-defense-ont-des-idees-beaucoup-d-idees-848385.html

In a first, the USS Portland took down a target drone with a new solid state laser this week, the first step in the Navy's quest to get the powerful weapon on more ships in the future. By PAUL MCLEARY WASHINGTON: In a first, the USS Portland took down a target drone with a new solid state laser this week, the first step in the Navy's quest to get the powerful weapon on more ships in the future. The shot from the San Antonio-class landing platform ship tested out what's known as the Technology Maturation Laser Weapon System Demonstrator, or LWSD, which has been aboard the ship for several months. The May 16 test, announced by the Pacific Fleet today, is the first public acknowledgement of the system being put to use. The Northrop Grumman-made LWSD is a high-energy laser weapon initially developed by the Office of Naval Research, and its operational employment marks “the first system-level implementation of a high-energy class solid-state laser,” according to a Pacific Fleet release. The test comes as the US, in bits and pieces, ramps up operations in the Pacific as a counterweight to China — moves which include new, ambitious B-1 bomber flights close to Russian and Chinese territory. Just this week, the USS Ronald Reagan and Theodore Roosevelt carriers went back to sea from bases in Japan and Guam, respectively, while the USS Nimitz is getting its air wing up to speed off the coast of Washington state. And earlier this month, two Navy ships sailed into the middle of an ongoing dispute between China and a neighbor in the South China Sea — steaming near a shadowing Chinese warship in Washington's latest effort to show presence in an increasingly contested waterway. The Littoral Combat Ship USS Montgomery and supply ship USNS Cesar Chavez sailed close to a Malaysian drillship, the West Capella, warning off Chinese warships who spent weeks harassing the commercial vessel in international waters illegally claimed by Beijing. Since the passthrough, both the Chinese and Malasyian ships have moved away from one another. Late last month, the destroyer USS Barry cruised near the Paracel Islands, claimed by China, followed a day later by the cruiser USS Bunker Hill sailing near the Spratlys conducting freedom-of-navigation operations. On April 30, a day after Bunker Hill's transit, two B-1 bombers flew over the South China Sea. These transits came just days after the USS America amphibious ship packed with Marine Corps F-35s passed through the South China Sea while conducting flight operations. The laser test was much quieter, but no less significant in the long run. “By conducting advanced at sea tests against UAVs and small crafts, we will gain valuable information on the capabilities of the Solid State Laser Weapons System Demonstrator against potential threats,” said Capt. Karrey Sanders, commanding officer of Portland. The LWSD is thought to pack about 150kw worth of power, a step up from the smaller, 50kw laser that was tested on the USS Ponce starting in 2014. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/us-warship-fries-drone-with-powerful-new-laser/

By: Bradley Bowman   The United States is now engaged in an intense military technology competition with the Chinese Communist Party. The ability of U.S. troops to deter and defeat great power authoritarian adversaries hangs in the balance. To win this competition, Washington must beef up its military cooperative research and development efforts with tech-savvy democratic allies. At the top of that list should be Israel. Two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee understand this well. Sens. Gary Peters, D-Mich., and Tom Cotton, R-Ark., introduced S 3775, the “United States-Israel Military Capability Act of 2020,” on Wednesday. This bipartisan legislation would require the establishment of a U.S.-Israel operations-technology working group. As the senators wrote in a February letter to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, the working group would help ensure U.S. “warfighters never encounter a more technologically advanced foe.” Many Americans may be surprised to learn that they can no longer take U.S. military technological superiority for granted. In his new book, “The Kill Chain,” former Senate Armed Services Committee staff director Chris Brose notes that, over the last decade, the United States loses war games against China “almost every single time.” To halt this trend, the Pentagon must shift its ongoing modernization efforts into high gear. Early cooperative R&D with the “Startup Nation” can help in this regard. Israel is one of America's closest and most technologically advanced allies. The country boasts an “innovative and agile defense technology sector” that is a “global leader in many of the technologies important to Department of Defense modernization efforts,” as the legislation notes. Some may deem the working group unnecessary, citing the deep and broad cooperation that already exists between the United States and Israel. But, as the legislation explains, “dangerous United States military capability gaps continue to emerge that a more systematic and institutionalized United States-Israel early cooperative research and development program could have prevented.” Consider the fact, for example, that the Pentagon only last year acquired for U.S. tanks active protection systems from Israel that had been operational there since 2011. Consequently, U.S. soldiers operated for years in tanks and armored vehicles around the world lacking the cutting-edge protection Washington could have provided against missiles and rockets. That put U.S. soldiers in unnecessary risk. Such examples put the burden of proof on those who may be tempted to reflexively defend the status quo as good enough. Given the breakneck speed of our military technology race with the Chinese Communist Party, it's clear the continued emergence of decade-long delays in adopting crucial technology is no longer something we can afford. One of the reasons for these delays and failures to team up with Israeli partners at the beginning of the process is that U.S. and Israeli defense suppliers sometimes find it difficult to secure Washington's approval for combined efforts to research and produce world-class weapons. Some requests to initiate combined U.S.-Israel R&D programs linger interminably in bureaucratic no-man's land, failing to elicit a timely decision. Confronted by deadly and immediate threats, Israel often has little choice but to push ahead alone with unilateral R&D programs. When that happens, the Pentagon misses out on Israel's sense of urgency that could have led to the more expeditious fielding of weapons to U.S. troops. And Israel misses out on American innovation prowess as well as on the Pentagon's economy of scale, which would lower unit costs and help both countries stretch their finite defense budgets further. Secretary Esper appears to grasp the opportunity. “If there are ways to improve that, we should pursue it,” he testified on March 4, 2020, in response to a question on the U.S.-Israel working group proposal. “The more we can cooperate together as allies and partners to come up with common solutions, the better,” Esper said. According to the legislation, the working group would serve as a standing forum for the United States and Israel to “systematically share intelligence-informed military capability requirements,” with a goal of identifying capabilities that both militaries need. It would also provide a dedicated mechanism for U.S. and Israeli defense suppliers to “expeditiously gain government approval to conduct joint science, technology, research, development, test, evaluation, and production efforts.” The legislation's congressional reporting requirement would hold the working group accountable for providing quick answers to U.S. and Israeli defense supplier requests. That's a benefit of the working group that will only become more important when the economic consequences of the coronavirus put additional, downward pressure on both defense budgets. Once opportunities for early cooperative U.S.-Israel R&D are identified and approved, the working group would then facilitate the development of “combined United States-Israel plans to research, develop, procure, and field weapons systems and military capabilities as quickly and economically as possible.” In the military technology race with the Chinese Communist Party, the stakes are high and the outcome is far from certain. A U.S.-Israel operations technology working group represents an essential step to ensure the United States and its democratic allies are better equipped than their adversaries. Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/22/securing-technological-superiority-requires-a-joint-us-israel-effort/

Nathan Strout In a new proposal, the U.S. Space Force is asking Congress to overhaul the tools it uses to acquire new space systems, allowing the new service to move with more agility and keep pace with near-peer adversaries. “Our nation requires a bold Alternative Space Acquisition System that not only matches the pace of change but also manages unpredictability and regularly disrupts our adversaries' threat cadence," the Department of the U.S. Air Force report concludes. “The features outlined in this report will create a new space acquisition approach for the USSF that is the envy of all other services and ultimately enables the USSF to rapidly leverage industry innovation to outpace space threats.” When Congress passed legislation establishing the Space Force as the nation's sixth branch of the armed services in December, it included a provision requiring the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report by the end of March on whether the military should adopt an alternative space acquisition system. While the Pentagon did deliver a report to Congress in March, it largely kicked the can down the road on any specific acquisitions reforms. Space Force leadership have touted this more detailed acquisitions report as “groundbreaking” in recent appearances. The new report, which was first reported by Bloomberg Government, includes nine specific proposals to improve Space Force contracting, although it doesn't make any suggestions towards unifying the various organizations involved in purchasing space platforms and systems, such as the Space Development Agency, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the Space and Missile Systems Center, or the National Reconnaissance Office, which purchases satellites for the intelligence community. Instead, the report's recommendations include changes to the contracting tools and reporting requirements the Space Force will use to acquire new systems, with a focus on increasing flexibility and delegating authority. Three of the suggestions require legislative action, while the remaining proposals will simply require internal Department of Defense adjustments. Perhaps the most important recommendation in the report, according to the Air Force, is the consolidation of budget line items along mission portfolios, such as missile warning or communications, instead of by platform. While this has been done on a limited basis in the past for the Space Rapid Capabilities Office and some classified efforts, it marks a change from standard DoD budgeting practices. Theoretically, this would allow the Space Force to move funding between missile warning systems without having to submit reprogramming requests to Congress, something it did several times last year in order to move up the delivery date for the first Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared satellite. The Air Force's repeated reprogramming requests rankled some members of Congress, leading to a fight between lawmakers and the White House over the program's funding for fiscal 2020. The Air Force claims this fix is needed to give program managers the flexibility to adapt to growing threats. According to the report, transparency at the program level would be preserved in future budget documents. This change would not require legislation. Beyond that, the Air Force is asking Congress for permission to push milestone decision authority down the chain of command, similar to what's been demonstrated by the Missile Defense Agency and National Reconnaissance Office. This change would speed up decision making for space programs. The third major change the Air Force is pursuing is authority for the Space Force to use incremental funding for space systems and programs. This “Efficient Space Procurement” coding was used to acquire the fifth and sixth satellites in the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites at the same time as well as the fifth and sixth Space-Based Infrared System satellites, resulting in significant savings. The department claims full funding each space vehicle has lead to affordability issues in the past, and can “lead to production breaks, obsolescence, and industrial base impacts.” Instead, the department wants to spread out funding for satellites over multiple years to help keep costs in check and avoid funding spikes. Other changes include streamlining requirements validation and reporting requirements. “Under these reforms, our Nation's newest military service will have unprecedented agility to build resilient, defendable, and affordable space capabilities through streamlined processes and closer partnerships with one of America's decisive advantages—its innovative and rapidly changing commercial space industry,” Secretary of the Air Force Barbara Barrett wrote in the introduction to the report. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/05/21/space-force-lays-out-acquisitions-reforms-in-new-report/

By: Thomas Ayres As Americans respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, we have become acutely aware of the outsized impact of our dependence on China in the supply chain. Pharmaceutical companies learned key chemicals and minerals are exclusively made or mined in China. For instance, reports show China produces 97 percent of the antibiotics, 95 percent of ibuprofen and 91 percent of hydrocortisone consumed in the U.S. market. Hospitals also learned that while China produces 50 percent of the world's face masks, they are of dubious reliability. There is cause for concern with the quantity or quality of ventilators. In sum, we learned as citizens what we in the Department of Defense have known for some time: Our national security supply chain must be free from dependence on China. The DoD's concern for its supply chain is not new. Congress spurred activity over a decade ago by questioning the DoD's supply chain risk management, or SCRM, policies. The National Defense Strategy‘s recognition of a new era of strategic, great power competition further sharpened the DoD's focus, propelling recent efforts to enhance regulations and procedures in addressing supply chain threats. We are transitioning from analog to digital, with the goal of planes, ships, tanks and satellites all seamlessly sharing data — a lethal version of the ride-sharing app on your smartphone. Yet, even as the DoD builds this future, the threat of supply chain disruption and concerns about component quality within the electronic backbone are real. Counterfeit or planted microelectronic parts can be vectors for cybersecurity intrusions. Recently, for instance, the DoD voiced concerns that Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei's 5G solution provided back doors, purposefully or negligently, for data corruption, data extraction, system failure or worse. Similarly, SCRM policies have increasingly addressed the concern of intellectual property theft enabled by subcomponents designed to allow information to flow back to larger architectures. The COVID-19 pandemic is giving new meaning to that threat, and the risk of disruption to both raw and manufactured materials from abroad has become apparent. Our SCRM focus must broaden in response to COVID-19 to better address national production capacity and sustainability. Being able to assure access to the minerals, chemicals, subcomponents and components required to build weapon systems is essential. China supplies 80 percent of the rare earth minerals imported to the U.S., many of which are essential to electronic parts. Since 1933, the Buy American Act has required federal agencies, including the DoD, to purchase items manufactured in the U.S. Additionally, these items must be made from supplies mined or made in the U.S. The act is implemented by regulations requiring analysis of the components — where they are mined or made, and where they are assembled. Companies that falsify “Made in America” designations can be debarred from the federal marketplace. In July 2019, months before the pandemic emerged, President Donald Trump issued an executive order seeking to increase the minimum domestic manufacture thresholds above the current 50 percent floors. The pandemic now shows even more needs to be done. We must increase to President Trump's mandated percentages, and we must also analyze where each of the subcomponents are manufactured. This doesn't mean we need to back away from allied contributions or alliance-based weapon systems like the F-35 fighter jet, which benefits from the industrial cooperation of nine partner nations. But in light of COVID-19, it does mean that when we make risk-based and measured decisions to produce an alliance system, we program in several months' worth of component backlogs to allow continued production during future quarantines. The majority of our weapon systems are made in the U.S. by American companies with greater than 50 percent of component production and assembly done domestically. Yet, what is less clear are the composition of the subcomponents in the components themselves. Not recognizing the risks of the subcomponents equally jeopardizes the new reality of disruptions to our supply chain and risks of data extraction, degradation and spying, about which we have increasingly been concerned. Recently, I sought to buy a grapefruit spoon on the internet and found it exceedingly difficult to learn where the offered spoons were made. The harder it was to find, the more I suspected it was made in China. Perhaps Congress should pass a law making it easier to learn the source of manufacturing. Ensuring my access to an American-made grapefruit spoon is not nearly as vital as assuring our access to critical weapon systems, rare earth materials, and pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. A vital step is knowing the source countries of components and subcomponents. We must have deeper knowledge of the full supply chains of subcomponents, and how and where they are produced. Trust can only come once we know all that is required to understand our supply chains and we seek even greater focus in our new normal. Our security depends on it. Thomas Ayres is general counsel for the U.S. Air Force. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/22/the-us-needs-to-rethink-its-overseas-supply-chain/