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  • Canada’s Secret Cold War Submarine Drone Is Still Relevant Today

    14 juillet 2020 | Local, Aérospatial

    Canada’s Secret Cold War Submarine Drone Is Still Relevant Today

    Extra-large autonomous submarines may revolutionize intelligence gathering and espionage under the sea. One of these ground breaking projects is the U.S. Navy's Boeing Orca extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle (XLUUV). It is much larger than any other underwater drone currently in the water. But there is a historical precursor that, despite its epic Cold War story, is not widely known. And its mission, to lay covert sensor networks in the arctic, may be as relevant today as it was then. During the Cold War, NATO believed that Russian submarines were using the ice cap in the Canadian Arctic as cover to covertly move between the Atlantic and Pacific. So the U.S. and Canada placed a special sonar network there, deep under the ice. Canadian engineers had to build the world's largest autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), Theseus, to lay a cable where ships could not reach. The project started in the 1980s, at a time when Russian submarines were getting much quieter. To listen for them, a joint U.S. and Canadian sonar array was to be placed several hundred miles north of the remote Canadian base at CFS Alert. The array was codenamed Spinnaker, in honor of the bar where scientists made many of the unclassified decisions in the project. This was similar to the now-famous SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System), but used classified technology to match its operational circumstances. In fact it must have been much more advanced than the original SOSUS. Connecting the sonar array to the base would require laying a fiber-optic cable for hundreds of miles under permanent ice cap. The solution was to build the world's largest autonomous underwater vehicle. The uncrewed submarine would swim from an ice hole nearer to the base all the way to the Spinnaker array. As it went the cable would unreel out of the back. Thus ‘Theseus' got its name from the mythical hero of Ancient Greece who trailed thread behind him when he ventured into the labyrinth to fight the Minotaur. When we think of advanced Canadian military projects which were ahead of their time, the Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow springs to mind. That delta-winged Mach-2 fighter flew in the 1950s and was cutting edge technology at the time, one of the all-time great aircraft. But it was cancelled abruptly in 1959 before it could enter service. The Theseus AUV is up there with the Avro Arrow, but less well recognized. And unlike the Arrow, it was used operationally, in one of the boldest projects started during the Cold War. The project had many secret aspects. Years later much of what we know about the project comes from Bruce Butler, one of the core team involved. Bulter has written a book, Into the Labyrinth (on Amazon), and recently talked to the Underwater Technology Podcast about the project. Theseus was 35 feet long and about 4 feet across. In AUV terms this is large, even today. In modern naval terminology it would be categorized as a large-displacement uncrewed underwater vehicle (LDUUV). The Spinnaker sonar system was placed on the sea floor right on the edge of the arctic shelf. It was about 84 degrees north, up in the top right-hand corner of Canada, near to Greenland. Such an advanced project took years to realize, so it was not until spring 1996 when Theseus could go to work laying the cable. The whole operation was pushing the boundaries of uncrewed underwater vehicles at the time. Despite some close calls along the way, Theseus was able to navigate to the Spinnaker, letting out the vital thread as it went. Many details of the project and technology involved are still classified. And we may never know whether Spinnaker ever picked up any Russian submarines. By the time it had been laid the Russian Navy was in steep decline following the end of the Cold War. But with a resurgent Russian Navy today, the relevance of systems like Spinnaker may be greater than ever. And one of the roles which large submarine drones like the Orca might do is lay cables on the sea floor, unseen from above. Historical precedents like Theseaus can help us understand the way that these might be employed, and the challenges that they will face. https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/07/12/canada-secret-cold-war-drone-submarine-is-still-relevant-today/#121a2da51e96

  • Les véritables menaces politiques qui pèsent sur l'industrie d'armement française (3/3)  Par Vauban*  |  13/07/2020, 8:00  |  3730  mots

    13 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Les véritables menaces politiques qui pèsent sur l'industrie d'armement française (3/3) Par Vauban* | 13/07/2020, 8:00 | 3730 mots

    Par Vauban* | 13/07/2020, 8:00 | 3730 mots L'industrie d'armement française, telle qu'elle est actuellement, est en péril : aussi bien dans son organisation nationale, que dans la volonté politique de lancer des coopérations européennes tous azimuts (programmes, alliances industrielles) en passant par les nombreuses entraves dans le domaine des exportations. (*) Par Vauban, un groupe d'une vingtaine de spécialistes des questions de défense. L'industrie d'armement n'échappe pas aux confusions conceptuelles dont les deux premières tribunes se sont déjà faites l'écho : cette dernière tribune souhaite rétablir des faits minorés ou ignorés, souvent de mauvaise foi, sur la place fondamentale de l'industrie d'armement pour la France. Il s'agit moins de rappeler son poids industriel et technologique comme le retour sur investissement qu'il crée dans l'économie, que de lui redonner sa vraie place politique en France, en Europe et dans le monde. En France, l'édification d'arsenaux et de manufactures sous l'Ancien Régime visait déjà à doter l'armée française de ses propres armes afin, d'une part d'éviter la dépendance étrangère et, de l'autre, de disposer des équipements spécifiques dont elle avait besoin : fusil du modèle 1777, pistolet de celui de 1763/66, frégate de 74, systèmes d'artillerie Gribeauval et Vallée. Le besoin actuel demeure identique et est même exacerbé par une armée expéditionnaire, conséquence des choix diplomatiques. Cet axiome de bon sens est cependant souvent perdu de vue : on ne fait bien la guerre qu'avec des équipements qu'on a soit même spécifiés. Le Rafale avec ses équipements et armements est là pour le démontrer. Cette vérité, souvent oubliée dans la folie des coopérations européennes (on y reviendra) ou la frénésie des achats américains, est cruciale, surtout en des temps où les chevaux de Troie modernes peuvent paralyser un système de défense. Indépendance militaire ? Cette vérité est aussi fondatrice : elle a engendré un modèle d'armée indépendant, polyvalent et performant qui est le choix encore assumé de la France ; pour le b'tir, un triptyque bien connu, aux équilibres délicats, a été mis en place depuis 1961 : des armées, qui connaissent leurs besoins, une DGA (direction générale de l'armement), qui traduit ce besoin et l'exprime à une industrie nationale, qui y répond, organisée en champions nationaux : systémiers de la dissuasion (Naval Group et Dassault Aviation) du terrestre (Nexter), des systèmes de missiles (MBDA). Schéma de bon sens, mais qui n'est actuellement suivi, hors club des grandes puissances, que par les nations qui veulent leur indépendance militaire : Israël, la Corée du Sud et la Turquie principalement, les autres nations se contentant d'acheter sur étagères - même avec une part de production locale sous licence - ce que d'autres pays ont conçu. Ce système est actuellement triplement en péril. Structurellement d'abord, parce que la DGA, loin d'être renforcée dans son rôle de conduite des programmes et d'expert technologique - voire de programmes civils tant les ministères civils sont dans l'impéritie totale -, est actuellement croquée pas à pas : on lui a retiré le secrétariat des CIEEMG, puis l'innovation et désormais la stratégie : or, sans ce corps technique compétent d'État, l'armement national a vécu. L'avenir le démontrera. Capitalistiquement ensuite, car l'on voit bien les incohérences d'un État qui multiplie les interférences et les conflits d'intérêt dans la vie de l'industrie d''armement alors qu'aux Etats-Unis, il gouverne par la loi et les commandes publiques et non le capital, ce qui est beaucoup plus efficace. Instituer une concurrence entre Thales, missilier résiduel et MBDA, missilier érigé en champion national sur le domaine sol-air est aussi néfaste que de ne pas trancher enfin le nœud gordien de la participation de Thales dans Naval group, où l'actionnaire est en même temps (toujours ce "en même temps" !) équipementier de son systémier et son concurrent par le truchement de sa filiale néerlandaise...L'État entretient ainsi les rivalités du village gaulois. Conjoncturellement enfin, car la crise actuelle nécessite un plan de relance spécifique à la défense. Puisque la crise est jugée plus sévère que celle de 2008 (qui n'était que financière et non globale), comment expliquer que le plan de relance actuel (833 millions d'euros) est très inférieur à celui de 2009 (2,4 milliards d'euros) ? Plan essentiellement "Airbus", l'ébauche annoncée n'est pas dimensionné aux enjeux : l'amortisseur d'activités que constituent les commandes de défense doit pourtant jouer à plein afin que les sociétés duales touchés par la crise du civil compensent un tant soit peu par la défense les parts de marché perdues, et que les sociétés purement défense trouvent aussi dans la commande d'Etat une activité que l'export atone leur a fait perdre. C'est l'idée du plan de 2009 ; c'est aussi celui du ministère allemand de la défense, qu'on ne peut décemment pas prendre pourtant comme un exemple dans la planification de défense... Il faut donc un plan de relance ambitieux dont les idées-forces politiques sont : l'avancée des hausses budgétaires prévues entre 2023 et 2025 dès la rentrée de septembre et jusqu'en 2022 au moins ; la traduction rapide dans les sociétés : la recapitalisation peu coûteuse des moyens de l'Outre-mer, qui s'offre comme un domaine privilégié et nécessaire compte tenu des menaces qui pèse sur notre souveraineté ultra-marine : allongement de la série de patrouilleurs Outre-mer (6 patrouilleurs ne coûtent que 223,9 millions d'euros) avec production sous licence dans les chantiers nationaux (CMN, Piriou, etc), Falcon Albatros, etc... ; le réarmement en munitions complexes dont les stocks sont notoirement insuffisants. Une coopération européenne élargie ou un cadre bilatéral clair ? L'Europe, ensuite. Pas à pas, l'industrie nationale est entrée dans le "système Goulard", c'est-à-dire une dépendance mutuelle qui aboutit "à privilégier des consortiums dans lesquels les Français ne sont pas toujours leaders" (déclaration de l'éphémère ministre de la défense le 8 juin 2017). Cette doctrine fédéraliste acte la fin du leadership français en Europe sur la seule industrie, qui ne soit pas encore démantelée par l'impéritie de l'État. La feuille de route du 13 juillet 2017 comme l'alliance navale italienne en sont les fruits : à des acteurs mineurs européens dans la Défense sur les plans technologiques et industriels, on donne les clés de secteurs entiers sans qu'une quelconque convergence de doctrine diplomatique et opérationnelle n'ait été réalisée avec les pays en question et sans que la méthode de conduite des programmes n'ait été enfin gommée des défauts structurels de tout programme européen et, sans enfin et surtout, que la parité exigée par nos partenaires soit méritée autrement que par l'habilité des négociateurs politiques. La taille des ensembles industriels sert de mantra aux promoteurs de ce grand bradage ; le problème est que nulle part ailleurs en Europe, on trouve trace de ce raisonnement : Damen, Saab, BAE Systems, Lürssen, GNY-K, Rheinmetall, etc... jouent leurs propres cartes ou la carte de la consolidation nationale ou des partenariats par programme, jamais celle de la fusion européenne. La taille, en outre, ne résout pas les problèmes essentiels de toute industrie : l'innovation technologique, l'agilité du mode de production, la gamme de produits, la compétitivité et l'exportation soutenue par l'Etat. Le nombre d'acteurs, aussi agité comme obligation majeure des consolidations européennes, est un faux argument : les industriels européens croient en la commande publique et en l'exportation et non à un raisonnement malthusien qui voudrait que moins d'acteurs amènent moins de concurrence et donc la survie de la production ; ce raisonnement qui est congénitalement contraire aux lois du marché, même ceux spéciales de la Défense. Tout l'avenir des sociétés réside uniquement dans le soutien de l'Etat par la R&D, la commande publique et le soutien à l'exportation : la Turquie et la Corée du sud en donnent une éclatante démonstration. La faille de ce raisonnement est enfin d'éluder que la coopération européenne n'a jamais fait la démonstration de son utilité et de sa performance. Ce n'est pas l'idée de coopération qui est remise en cause ici, mais la méthode de coopération : pas de contrat de réduction des risques, pas de maître d'œuvre expérimenté, pas de sélection des équipementiers par le systémier, mais un juste retour destructeur qui conduit à des sous-performances, des retards et des surcoûts. Ce qui valait hier pour l'A400M, vaut aujourd'hui pour le futur avion de patrouille maritime... Même Airbus, pourtant promoteur et exemple hier de cette consolidation, vitupère aujourd'hui contre la décision du gouvernement espagnol de sélectionner Indra sistemas, simple équipementier de second rang, comme maître de file des industriels espagnols du SCAF aux dépens d'Airbus, qui, même espagnol, est trop franco-allemand au goût de Madrid... La même politique appliquée au spatial conduit à des dispersions de compétences et des gaspillages industriels et financiers : OHB qui ne savait rien faire, est d'ores et déjà devenu un concurrent d'Airbus et de Thales, parce que Berlin a choisi de le protéger bec et ongles. Il n'y a au fond qu'en France que l'altruisme sert de boussole à la politique industrielle : partout ailleurs, c'est bel et bien le nationalisme industriel qui est lui à l'œuvre : la Suède veut développer seule son avion de combat futur (2020) après avoir fait de même sur les sous-marins (2014) ; l'Italie réfléchit à une alternative nationale ou bilatérale au MGCS, etc ; s'agissant de défense nationale, il n'y a là rien de surprenant ; s'agissant d'industrie, rien de choquant à voir un gouvernement préférer son industrie à celle des autres, mais il est surprenant que les beaux esprits parisiens ne le sachent pas ou feignent, pour le besoin de leurs discours, de l'ignorer. La consolidation européenne est jugée nécessaire enfin face à la concurrence extra-européenne ; là aussi, le raisonnement ignore ou feint d'ignorer que cette concurrence russe, chinoise, turque, sud-coréenne, sud-africaine ou israélienne use d'autres armes que celle de la taille industrielle ou du prix. Cette concurrence organisée bénéficie d'abord du plein soutien de son État en ordre de bataille : déplacements, renseignements et financements sont coordonnés par une volonté ferme de l'Etat. Elle utilise ensuite des armes que la France refuse d'utiliser : désinformation (voir la campagne en Australie contre le contrat français de sous-marin, qui vaut celles, très violentes, contre le Rafale en Inde où le parti du Congrès a été instrumentalisé par un avionneur concurrent) et corruption (qui ose croire que certains contrats récents de concurrents européens aient pu se faire sans cette douceur-là ?). Elle casse enfin les prix car les contrats domestiques sont rentables et réguliers. Face à cette concurrence-là, quelles armes la naïve consolidation européenne lui opposera-t-elle ? Celle du prix ? Aucun programme européen n'est déjà compétitif pour les armées nationales clientes... Aucun des trois arguments des promoteurs du démantèlement de l'industrie nationale au profit d'ensembles européens fédérés et intégrés ne saurait amener les gouvernements à privilégier une quelconque "préférence européenne" à leur souveraineté de choix. La préférence européenne ne se décrète pas : elle se mérite. Or, on l'a vu, les ratés de la coopération européenne n'ont jamais servi de leçon à leurs initiateurs. Pourtant, des expériences négatives du passé, au moins trois s'en dégagent : une convergence des besoins et des spécifications (ce qui sous-entend que les Etats partagent la même vision de la politique de défense), un cadre bilatéral - opérationnel et industriel - favorisant la coopération du maître d'œuvre et de son éco-système, (évitant ainsi la dispersion et les digressions de tiers imposant leurs vues ou leurs industriels) et un financement pluriannuel, lui aussi bilatéral. Aux grands programmes, toujours décevants, les nations sages préfèrent un cadre bilatéral clair, de la conception à la commercialisation. C'est le cas des programmes de missiles franco-britanniques, des programmes navals germano-norvégiens, belgo-néerlandais ; c'est le tort des programmes bilatéraux que de vouloir s'élargir à tout prix au plus vite : SCAF avec l'Espagne, MGCS avec les nations Leopard. C'est enfin le défaut majeur de tous ces projets européens que de ne jamais prévoir un financement garanti donc pluriannuel. Est-il admissible pour la France que le futur de son aviation d'armes soit dans les mains d'une poignée de députés de la commission du budget du Bundestag ? La défense de la France ne se fait pas plus au Bundestag que la politique de la France à la corbeille de la bourse. Exportation, l'un des grands défis pour la souveraineté française close volume_off L'exportation, enfin. Troisième pilier de l'industrie, après la R&D et la commande publique, elle doit être replacée dans son contexte politique puisque l'acte d'exporter depuis 1939 est un acte souverain. Sur le plan doctrinal, l'exportation est l'incarnation de la liberté souveraine que la France entend exercer en commerçant ou non avec tel ou tel pays. Elle envoie ainsi un message politique clair tant au pays à qui elle vend qu'à celui auquel elle ne vend pas ; ce faisant, elle contribue à organiser le marché par divers instruments - traités d'interdiction de tel ou tel système, traité de non-prolifération, embargo - ou bloquer toute régulation contraire à ses intérêts (ou de s'en affranchir). A cet égard, la liberté de commerce de la France dans le domaine des ventes d'armes ne saurait être entravée par l'imposition de règles étrangères : l'imposition des règles américaines - que l'Administration sait contourner et faire contourner à ses industriels, comme la règlementation anti-corruption, les normes technologiques, les embargos - est ainsi un des grands défis posés à la souveraineté de la France, l'une des rares nations occidentales à être le vrai concurrent des Etats-Unis : la rivalité sans merci dans le domaine des avions d'armes et des missiles en est l'illustration complète. Œuvre de pharisiens préoccupés d'affirmer leur vertu tout en cherchant surtout à écraser leurs concurrents, cette normalisation du marché des armes appelle au contraire à un regain de souveraineté. Cette liberté est également à défendre bec et ongles dans le domaine des coopérations que la France entend mener. Il lui faut donc négocier ces coopérations avec des partenaires qui respectent sa souveraineté, en lui laissant une totale liberté d'emploi pour ses propres opérations, et en se laissant la liberté d'exporter les matériels co-développés. En ce sens, la coopération européenne n'est pas la prolongation d'un modèle national d'indépendance mais bel et bien - et c'est là le but recherché par ses auteurs allemands et bruxellois - une dépendance mutuelle qui est à rebours de la conception nationale défendue ici. Cette liberté se niche aussi dans la conception morale du commerce des armes : du moment que les décisions nationales sont prises selon ses règles d'éthique, qui sont celles d'ailleurs que chacun proclame de son côté, il n'y a pas lieu de laisser contester ces décisions au motif qu'elles contreviendraient à l'interprétation publique de circonstance de ces mêmes règles par ses concurrents. Sur le plan opérationnel, cette liberté d'exporter permet ensuite de graduer l'intensité des relations que la France décide d'entretenir avec tel ou tel pays. La géopolitique française - c'est-à-dire sa capacité à profiter de sa géographie, de son Histoire et de ses atouts pour assurer son influence - s'exprime par le type de matériel qu'elle est prête à vendre à un tel pays. La vente d'avions d'armes, de sous-marins conventionnels, de satellites d'observation, de systèmes de radars ou de missiles ou de services sensibles (R&D) inscrit en effet la relation bilatérale dans une longue durée : elle détermine ainsi un ancrage qui vaut au moins pour la durée de vie d'un système (en moyenne 30 ans pour un avion d'armes ; 35 ans pour un sous-marin ; 15 ans pour un système de missile). Cet ancrage durable permet le partage : de doctrine, de formation, de renseignements, d'équipements pour des exercices ou des opérations. La France a ainsi équipé presque intégralement jusqu'à une époque récente des pays-clés pour sa diplomatie comme les Emirats Arabes Unis (EAU) et le Qatar ; elle a été, ou est encore selon, la double source en Arabie Saoudite (pour la défense sol-air, la Marine, la Garde Nationale), à Oman (pour la Garde Royale), en Inde, aux EAU, au Qatar, en Egypte, au Brésil, en Malaisie, etc. La coopération navale avec la Grèce pave la voie à des contrats d'acquisition ou de modernisation face au danger turc. Elle continue à faire partie des rares pays appelés pour des appels d'offres sur des systèmes majeurs (sous-marins en Pologne, Pays-Bas, Indonésie ; avions d'armes et défense sol-air en Suisse, etc), preuve qu'elle pèse encore de manière significative tant sur les plans diplomatique qu'industriel. Sur le plan industriel, l'exportation d'armement est une valeur ajoutée, qui démultiplie la souveraineté. D'abord en France où les flux financiers tirés de l'exportation permettent non seulement à l'Etat de consolider sa planification de défense, d'en retirer des revenus (formation), mais aussi aux industriels de conforter des investissements sur fonds propres pour développer des versions utiles ultérieurement aux armées françaises. Les conséquences sur l'emploi qualifié et non délocalisable sont connues (entre 40 et 50.000 emplois vivant directement de l'exportation, soit 25% environ des emplois du secteur). Elle projette ensuite sur le pays partenaire un modèle français de souveraineté où l'indépendance nationale du pays acheteur est non seulement respectée mais consolidée par un pays vendeur - la France - qui n'émet pas de restrictions d'utilisation dans la mesure où la relation est cadrée par un accord d'Etat à Etat fondé sur le respect de la souveraineté. Le pays n'est plus un client, mais un partenaire qui entre dans la sphère d'influence française lié par un contrat intergouvernemental produisant et permettant des échanges féconds de renseignements et d'expériences. La vente d'avions d'armes en Inde comme celle de sous-marins au Brésil, à l'Inde et à la Malaisie l'illustre. De cette vente d'armes découle bien souvent une relation politique, qui débouche sur de nouvelles opportunités souvent éloignées du secteur de la défense : en ce sens, la fiabilité de la France comme fournisseur de systèmes d'armes trace la voie à d'autres ventes et dans d'autres secteurs stratégiques (énergie, nucléaire, etc). Ce modèle souverain dans la conception, la production et l'exportation d'armement a fait ses preuves. La Turquie et la Corée du Sud et dans une moindre mesure l'Indonésie et l'Inde, suivent en cela l'exemple français : fort taux de R&D, développement de champions nationaux en monopole, structuration de l'offre, promotion organisée sur les marchés de l'armement et accompagnement diplomatique complet des offres de d'armement. L'exportation n'échappe cependant pas à l'ordre naturel des choses : tout bouge et se transforme sans cesse. La position de la France est ainsi forte mais s'érode. Il y a les explications diplomatiques : un alignement des positions nationales sur les positions de ses concurrents (américains), un moralisme aussi inutile que destructeur, absence de déplacements (qui égale les voyages de Jean-Yves Le Drian ?) pour faire du client un partenaire ; il y a les raisons financières : myopie de Bercy, peur des encours trop nombreux sur des pays fragiles (Brésil, Égypte), frilosité des banques sur des pays (Arabie, Indonésie) ou des domaines (drones armés) sensibles ; il y a enfin - et actuellement surtout -, des explications juridiques sous couvert d'une morale douteuse : alors que la France, à la différence de nombreux pays occidentaux, a un système rigoureux de contrôle des exportations, elle se voit accusée de vendre n'importe quoi à n'importe qui et, surtout, de le faire au moyen de la corruption. Le grand combat perdu de l'industrie d'armement (et de l'industrie tout court) aura été celui de la lutte contre la corruption. Face à Transparency International, elle a perdu en effet le combat principal en 2000 avec l'imposition de la convention OCDE qui bannit les "frais commerciaux extérieurs", les criminalise rétroactivement et la pénalise alors que les principaux corrupteurs avaient déjà trouvé la parade (Etats-Unis avec le FCPA de 1977) ou refusaient de signer un texte aussi suicidaire (Afrique du Sud, Israël, Chine, Russie, etc). Depuis 2000, l'industrie subit de plein fouet les effets pervers de procédures stériles, qui sont la ruine de son commerce et la fortune des avocats et consultants spécialisés. Elle subit les procédures inquisitoriales sur ses contacts, consultants, contrats. Elle subit le détournement de ses échanges électroniques vers des serveurs situés à l'étranger. A force d'être pure, elle est épurée ; à force d'être morale, elle perd le moral ; à force de laver plus blanc que ses concurrents, elle sort lessivée. Et ce n'est pas tout : jugée coupable au tribunal de la morale à géométrie variable d'ONG manipulées ou naïves, elle est régulièrement traînée dans la boue dans les media et désormais devant les tribunaux avec l'État. Si l'on doit à la ministre une belle défense des exportations nationales d'armement, on sent que le ver est partout dans le système et détruit des réseaux commerciaux entiers et donc des ventes futures. Alors que l'État parle d'abord de redistribuer une richesse inexistante, l'industrie d'armement démontre qu'il faut d'abord savoir la créer. Donc exporter. Montesquieu ne disait pas autre chose dans l'Esprit des Lois que "Le commerce est la chose du monde la plus utile à l'État". L'armement ne fait pas exception : il faut oser le dire. https://www.latribune.fr/opinions/les-veritables-menaces-qui-pesent-sur-l-industrie-d-armement-francaise-3-3-852610.html

  • GKN Aerospace continues to support the Gripen’s RM12 engine

    13 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    GKN Aerospace continues to support the Gripen’s RM12 engine

    GKN Aerospace has signed a follow-on performance based logistics (PBL) contract with the Swedish Armed Forces for the provision of comprehensive support for the GKN Aerospace RM12 engine. The RM12 engine powers the JAS 39 Gripen C/D fighter. This contract follows a series of multi-year RM12 PBL agreements and is expected to be worth approximately USD440M. Under the agreement, GKN Aerospace will continue its support for the day-to-day operations of JAS 39 Gripen C/D users. The company will ensure engine availability for every Swedish Air Force mission as well as for Gripen C/D export customers: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Thailand. This will include the provisioning of technical product support as well as comprehensive maintenance, repair and overhaul including repair development and spare parts supply. Joakim Andersson, president GKN Aerospace Engines said: “We are totally committed to ensuring RM12 engine availability and its secure and safe performance in all operations. At the same time GKN Aerospace closely monitors every aspect of product life cycle cost effectiveness. “With the recognition and award from the customer GKN Aerospace will continue to do its best in keeping this engine's excellent track record, ensuring it is one of the best single engine installations in the world. The company understands the importance of keeping the engine system in active service for many years to come.” The GKN Aerospace RM12 engine has powered the JAS 39 Gripen throughout the approximately 310,000 flight hours this aircraft has already achieved. It is based on the General Electric F404 engine from which it has been developed to include single engine safety criteria, higher performance and greater durability. The primary focus of the development programme for the RM12 engine was to deliver the highest possible operational effectiveness with the most favourable life-cycle cost. GKN Aerospace holds the military type certificate (MTC) for the RM12 engine. www.gknaerospace.com https://www.aero-mag.com/gkn-aerospace-gripen-rm12-08072020/

  • Calspan Awarded DARPA Air Combat Evolution (ACE) Contract

    13 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Calspan Awarded DARPA Air Combat Evolution (ACE) Contract

    July 08, 2020 10:04 ET | Source: Calspan photo-release DARPA ACE Buffalo, New York, July 08, 2020 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Calspan Corporation has been awarded a $14.1M, four-year contract by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop full-scale air combat experimentation infrastructure for its Air Combat Evolution (ACE) program. The overall focus of ACE is to develop and measure human trust in artificial intelligence (AI). The technologies developed within the ACE program will ultimately enable future pilots to confidently offload some high workload tactical tasks like visual air-to-air engagements so they can better focus on managing the larger battlespace. Under this contract Calspan Flight Research will modify up to four Aero Vodochody L-39 Albatros jet trainers with Calspan's proprietary autonomous fly-by-wire flight control system technology to allow implementation and demonstration of advanced Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) and AI algorithms. Flight tests and demonstrations will be conducted from the Calspan Flight Research Facility at the Niagara Falls, NY, International Airport and flown in the Misty Military Operating Area (MOA) over nearby Lake Ontario. “Calspan is proud of our selection by DARPA to build an airborne air combat experimentation lab for the ACE program,” said Peter Sauer, Calspan President. Louis Knotts, Calspan Owner and CEO added “Since 1947, Calspan has been the world's premier innovator, developer, and operator of in-flight simulators and UAV surrogates. This program presents an outstanding opportunity for Calspan to partner with DARPA for the use of our programmable flight control technology and provide them with a safe and flexible means to flight test these advanced algorithms.” The program will be conducted over three phases of development with Phase 1 beginning immediately. About Calspan For more than 75 years, Calspan has been providing research and testing services in the aviation and transportation industries. Internationally recognized for safety research and innovation, the company's headquarters is located in Buffalo, NY, housing a variety of research and testing facilities, including a transonic wind tunnel, ground vehicle crash testing, dynamic sled testing and research, and tire research and performance testing. Calspan conducts flight testing, flight training, and aircraft modifications in Niagara Falls, NY where they own a fleet of seven airborne testbeds. Calspan also has prototype test device manufacturing capabilities in Newport News, Virginia, as well as force measurement equipment manufacturing capabilities in San Diego, California. For more information about Calspan, please visit http://www.Calspan.com. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/07/08/2059382/0/en/Calspan-Awarded-DARPA-Air-Combat-Evolution-ACE-Contract.html

  • Aero Montreal supports appeal to the federal government

    13 juillet 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Aero Montreal supports appeal to the federal government

    Aero Montreal said it fully supports the arguments presented by the Canadian aerospace industry to the federal government and shares its concerns about the lack of support for the sector in Finance Minister Bill Morneau's recent economic update. This new snapshot makes no reference whatsoever to measures that would allow the industry to emerge from the crisis. That is why Aero Montreal is reiterating the importance of implementing a Canada-wide aerospace strategy, with specific measures dedicated to our sector, as soon as possible. By putting the aerospace industry at the heart of economic policies for more than 80 years, both in Quebec and in Canada, governments have succeeded in making aerospace an industry that contributes more than $25 billion to the country's GDP. Amidst the COVID-19 crisis, when other jurisdictions around the world are redoubling their efforts to support their aerospace industry, Quebec is supporting its “champion.” But the Canadian government is still waiting and Canada continues to fall behind on international markets. Aero Montreal is sounding the alarm on behalf of the Québec aerospace industry, which represents 49 per cent of the Canadian aerospace sector's workforce and 57 per cent of its sales. In Canada, research and development is at the heart of the aerospace industry, with an investment of $1.4 billion per year, more than 70 per cent of which is carried out in Quebec. In times of economic recovery, innovation is critical. For example, France is banking on an innovative recovery with a carbon-neutral aircraft. The United States has repeatedly demonstrated its support for the defence sector, allowing for the development of leading edge technologies that can be transferred to commercial aircraft. Canada must, without further delay, continue to invest in this strategic sector to position itself in this race for innovation. In order to succeed, our industry must be able to retain its highly-skilled workforce and prevent the ecosystem from being eroded. “The unprecedented mobilization of all players in the aerospace industry illustrates the intensity of the crisis we are experiencing. Through a collective approach, we are advocating the urgent need for a specific strategy dedicated to our sector that will accelerate the recovery, while emphasizing that this cannot be achieved without the help of the federal government,” said Suzanne M. Benoît, president of Aero Montreal. https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/aero-montreal-supports-appeal-to-the-federal-government/

  • GA-ASI Conducts Japan Coast Guard Validation Flights

    13 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    GA-ASI Conducts Japan Coast Guard Validation Flights

    General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) announced that it will partner with Asia Air Survey (AAS) to hold a series of validation flights for the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) featuring GA-ASI's SeaGuardian beginning in mid-September. The purpose of the flights is to validate the wide-area maritime surveillance capabilities of RPAS for carrying out JCG's missions, including search and rescue, disaster response, and maritime law enforcement. The flights are expected to run for approximately two months and will include support from the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) at its Hachinohe base in Aomori Prefecture. According to the JCG, the flight validation will be conducted in accordance with “The Policy on Strengthening the Maritime Security Systems,” using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to perform maritime wide-area surveillance using new technology. “We're pleased to support the JCG's goals of validating SeaGuardian's maritime surveillance performance,” said Linden Blue, CEO, GA-ASI. “We know there is a need in Japan and worldwide for affordable, long-endurance airborne surveillance in the maritime domain.” The SeaGuardian system will feature a multi-mode maritime surface-search radar with Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) imaging mode, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver, and High-Definition – Full-Motion Video sensor equipped with optical and infrared cameras. This sensor suite enables real-time detection and identification of surface vessels over thousands of square nautical miles. The featured Raytheon SeaVue surface-search radar system provides automatic tracking of maritime targets and correlation of AIS transmitters with radar tracks. https://www.uasvision.com/2020/07/09/ga-asi-conducts-japan-coast-guard-validation-flights/

  • US Air Force considers adopting the Army’s Future Vertical Lift program

    13 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    US Air Force considers adopting the Army’s Future Vertical Lift program

    By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force is keeping an eye on the Army's next-generation rotorcraft program, which could fill a gap for agile airlift that might be needed in a fight against Russia and China, an Air Force general said Thursday. With its large air bases vulnerable to attacks from a near-peer adversary, there's no guarantee that the Air Force will be able to rely on its current processes or equipment to transfer supplies in and out of air bases. In a war with China or Russia, the U.S. Air Force would distribute its assets to bases owned by allies and partners, cutting down the threat to aircraft usually located at the service's large installations. But that poses a problem for rapidly transporting materiel like spare parts and maintenance equipment to more austere locations in a time of war, said Lt. Gen. Warren Berry, the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for logistics, engineering and force protection. “We know we're going to have to get after some other things that might be a different way of doing distribution and lift,” he said during a July 9 event hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “It might be a different way of doing airfield recovery. It might be different equipment that's lighter and leaner that allows us to set up in a more expeditious manner with less fuel.” “Agility Prime is certainly one [option],” he said, referring to an ongoing Air Force effort to tap into the emerging commercial market for “flying cars” — basically, experimental transport aircraft that the service could use for logistics, search and rescue, or shuttling troops to remote locations. Another option is the Army's future vertical lift effort, or FVL, Berry said. “That's something that we'll certainly look at, but we know that we need to do lift in a different way.” The Army intends to break FVL into multiple programs, which could give the Air Force multiple aircraft to pick from if it decides to buy in. The future long-range assault aircraft will replace the UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter and is planned to be fielded in 2030. As part of the Army's risk-reduction effort, Bell Helicopter is developing its V-280 Valor, while a Sikorsky-Boeing team is working on its own SB-1 Defiant aircraft. The future attack reconnaissance aircraft would fill an existing capability gap, accomplishing the reconnaissance missions that have been performed by AH-64E Apaches teamed with Shadow drones following the retirement of the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior in 2017. It's currently on track to be fielded in 2028, with Sikorsky and Bell chosen to build prototypes. Aside from closely watching the Army's FVL effort, the Air Force is also engaging with the Army-led Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office on ways to defend U.S. bases against small drones, Berry said. “That's going to be a demand signal on this force moving forward that we're going to have to really think through and make sure that we have them [airmen] resourced appropriately to execute that part of the air base air defense mission as well,” he said. In June, the office rolled out a plan for the Defense Department to consolidate its counter-UAS technologies from about 40 systems to a total of eight. The approved systems were chosen after an Army-led assessment and included fixed, mounted and dismounted solutions. An Air Force system known as Negation of Improvised Non-State Joint Aerial-Threats, or NINJA — which jams radio signals between the UAS and its operator — was among those selected. “Our goal is to align existing and future counter-UAS technology solutions to best address operational needs while applying resources more efficiently,” said Maj. Gen. Sean Gainey, the office's director. Berry said that the Air Force has embedded some of its personnel within the counter-UAS office to stay synchronized with the Army's efforts. “So far we're happy with where it is and where it's going,” he said. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/07/09/the-air-force-is-watching-the-armys-future-vertical-lift-program/

  • Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - July 10, 2020

    13 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - July 10, 2020

    MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY The Boeing Co., Huntsville, Alabama, was awarded a $150,000,000 undefinitized contract modification (P00057) to previously awarded HQ0147-12-C-0004/-19-C0004 on the Ground-based Midcourse Defense development and sustainment contract (DSC). The scope of work under the current DSC includes development, fielding, test, systems engineering, integration and configuration management, equipment manufacturing and refurbishment, training and operations and sustainment for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense weapon system and associated support facilities. Under this undefinitized modification, the Missile Defense Agency executes the procurement of four additional Configuration 2 Ground Based Interceptor boost vehicles to maintain the fleet and flight test programs. The value of this contract, including options, is increased from $11,337,396,890 to $11,487,396,890. The work will be performed in Chandler, Arizona, and the period of performance is from July 10, 2020, to July 30, 2023. This acquisition was executed on a sole-source basis. Fiscal 2020 procurement funds in the amount of in the amount of $72,000,000 have been obligated at the time of award. The Missile Defense Agency, Huntsville, Alabama, is the contracting activity. NAVY ASMD LLC, Honolulu, Hawaii, is awarded a $100,000,000 maximum amount, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, architect-engineer contract for design and engineering services for various projects funded by the government of Japan (GOJ) direct cash contributions (or otherwise referred to as the Mamizu funds) and U.S. funds for the development of infrastructure and facilities covered by the Defense Policy Review Initiative under the cognizance of Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Pacific. Work will be performed at various Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and other government facilities within the NAVFAC Pacific area of responsibility, including but not limited to, Hawaii and Guam, and may include work in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands. The work to be performed provides for design and engineering services for the execution and delivery of plans and specifications, including design-build request for proposal contract documents and design-bid-build contract documents; technical surveys and reports including engineering investigation, site investigation, topographical survey, geotechnical investigation and munitions of explosive concern investigation; functional analysis concept development/design charrettes; construction cost estimates; and post construction award services. Work is expected to be completed by July 2025. Contract funds in the amount of $20,000 are obligated on this award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Contract funds are GOJ direct cash contributions. Future task orders will be primarily funded by GOJ direct cash contributions. This contract was competitively procured via the Navy Electronic Commerce Online website with two proposals received. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, is the contracting activity (N62742-20-D-0001). Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is awarded an $87,498,287 cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. This contract provides non-recurring engineering for the development and maturation of the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) in support of data migration and transition to the newly developed F-35 Operational Integrated Data Network (ODIN). ALIS and ODIN provide maintenance capabilities to support worldwide F-35 operations. Additionally, this contract provides software and hardware engineering in support of F-35 ODIN development, delivery and associated data management activities for the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and non-Department of Defense participants. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida (75%); and Fort Worth, Texas (25%), and is expected to be completed by June 2022. No funds will be obligated at the time of award. Funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity (N00019-20-D-0007). Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., McLean, Virginia, is awarded a $70,337,682 firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. This contract provides for the development and delivery of the PC-based Open-architecture for Reconfigurable Training Systems (PORTS). Work will be performed in Middletown, Rhode Island (60%); Orlando, Florida (13%); San Diego, California (7%); Newport, Rhode Island (5%); Point Loma, California (5%); Norfolk, Virginia (1%); Dam Neck, Virginia (1%); Virginia Beach, Virginia (1%); Mayport, Florida (1%); Everett, Washington (1%); Point Mugu, California (1%); Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (1%); Fort Worth, Texas (1%); Fallon, Nevada (1%); and Yokosuka, Japan (1%). Additionally, this contract provides PORTS life cycle support to include training system modifications, trainer hardware purchases, configuration, installation and disposal, distance simulation software deficiency analysis, engineering distance simulation software, on-site simulation software troubleshooting, Training Equipment Change Request (TECR) corrections, TECR installation and test, spare parts and simulation software product delivery for PORTS-related trainers around the world. Work is expected to be completed by July 2025. No funds will be obligated at the time of award. Funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division, Orlando, Florida, is the contracting activity (N61340-20-D-0016). Raytheon Co., Tucson, Arizona, is awarded a $17,229,374 cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price order (N00019-20-F-0493) against previously issued basic ordering agreement N00019-15-G-0003. This order provides non-recurring engineering in support of upgrading the existing Tactical Tomahawk Guidance Test Set (TTGTS) product baseline to eliminate obsolescence and production issues. Additionally, this order provides for the development, test and delivery of six new TTGTSs. Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona (77%); Clearwater, Florida (4%); Glenrothes Fife, United Kingdom (3%); Midland, Ontario (3%); Huntsville, Alabama (2%); Scottsdale, Arizona (2%); North Salt Lake, Utah (1%); various locations within the continental U.S. (7.5%); and various location outside the continental U.S. (0.5%). Work is expected to be completed by December 2022. Fiscal 2020 weapons procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $17,229,374 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, Tewksbury, Massachusetts, was awarded a $9,686,463 cost-plus-fixed fee and firm-fixed-price order under basic ordering agreement N00024-18-G-5501 for engineering design and component replacement parts to support the Dual Band Radar systems. Work will be performed in Andover, Massachusetts (25%); Marlborough, Massachusetts (25%); Tewksbury, Massachusetts (25%); and Portsmouth, Rhode Island (25%), and is expected to be completed by November 2022. Fiscal 2018 other procurement (Navy); fiscal 2019 other procurement (Navy); fiscal 2020 other procurement (Navy); and fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance (Navy) funding in the amount of $9,686,463 will be obligated at time of award and funding in the amount of $2,975,360 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This order was procured under the statutory authority of 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1); one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-20-F-5505). (Awarded July 8, 2020) Lockheed Martin, Rotary and Mission Systems, Moorestown, New Jersey, is awarded a $7,344,470 cost-plus-incentive-fee modification to previously awarded contract N00024-16-C-5102 to exercise an option for AEGIS Platform Systems Engineering Agent efforts for the integration and delivery of AEGIS Baseline 9 capabilities. Work will be performed in Moorestown, New Jersey. The contract provides for the completion of the development and fielding of the AEGIS Baseline 9 AEGIS Weapon System and integrated AEGIS Combat System on the remaining AEGIS Technical Insertion (TI) 12 configured destroyers as well as TI 12 and TI 08 configured cruisers. Work is expected to be completed by July 2021. Fiscal 2013 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy); fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance (Navy); fiscal 2020 other procurement (Navy); and fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funding in the amount of $7,344,470 will be obligated at time of award and funding in the amount of $1,380,964 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. AIR FORCE TAC Industries, Springfield, Ohio, has been awarded a $69,422,312 requirements contract for the production of cargo nets for the support equipment and vehicles division at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. The base contract year has a value of $13,469,074; Option One has a value of $13,565,182; Option Two has a value of $13,842,626; Option Three has a value of $14,127,218; and Option Four has a value of $14,418,212. The contract provides for the production of 40,600 low profile side nets and 17,000 top nets under the basic period, and best estimated quantities of 40,600 low profile side nets and 17,000 top nets during each option period thereafter. Work will be performed in Springfield, Ohio, and is expected to be completed by July 10, 2025. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. Fiscal 2020 other procurement funds in the amount of $13,469,074 are be obligated at the time of first delivery order award. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity (FA8534-20-D-0005). Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory LLC, Laurel, Maryland, has been awarded a $29,702,388 cost-plus-fixed-fee modification (P00013) to contract FA9453-18-D-0018, task order FA9453-18-F-0007, to provide technical and programmatic support of Tactical Space and Small Satellite Portfolio's core competencies and mission lifecycle. This includes support of the mission phases from concept through design, implementation, operations and transition of space assets. Work will be performed in Laurel, Maryland, and is expected to be completed Sept. 29, 2023. This modification brings the total cumulative face value of the contract to $53,550,559. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $1,329,250 are being obligated at time of award. Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, is the contracting activity. Howell Instruments Inc., Fort Worth, Texas, has been awarded an $8,034,280 firm-fixed-price, requirements-type contract, for the production of environmental control test sets. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas, and is expected to be completed July 9, 2025. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. No funds are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Support Equipment Directorate, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity (FA8533-20-D-0006). ARMY Phylway Construction LLC,* Thibodaux, Louisiana, was awarded a $51,702,210 firm-fixed-price contract for construction of hurricane protection features in Plaquemines Parrish, Louisiana. Bids were solicited via the internet with six received. Work will be performed in New Orleans, Louisiana, with an estimated completion date of Aug. 31, 2026. Fiscal 2020 civil construction funds in the amount of $51,702,210 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, Mississippi, is the contracting activity (W912P8-20-C-0032). Pine Bluff Sand and Gravel Co., Pine Bluff, Arizona, was awarded a $48,002,240 firm-fixed-price contract for flood control on the Mississippi River and tributaries. Bids were solicited via the internet with two received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of July 10, 2022. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans, Louisiana, is the contracting activity (W912P8-20-D-0011). Speegle Construction Inc.,* Niceville, Florida, was awarded a $10,373,085 firm-fixed-price contract to construct two new facilities at Eglin Air Force Base. Bids were solicited via the internet with 10 received. Work will be performed at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, with an estimated completion date of Aug. 30, 2022. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation (Air Force) funds in the amount of $10,373,085 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W91278-20-C-0020). Mike Hooks LLC, Westlake, Louisiana, was awarded a $10,207,400 firm-fixed-price contract for pipeline dredging of the Matagorda Ship Channel. Bids were solicited via the internet with three received. Work will be performed in Bay City, Texas, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 31, 2021. Fiscal 2019 and 2020 civil construction funds in the amount of $10,207,400 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Galveston, Texas, is the contracting activity (W912HY-20-C-0023). USA Environmental Management,* Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was awarded a $9,473,200 firm-fixed-price contract for hot cargo hydrant system replacement at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. Bids were solicited via the internet with five received. Work will be performed at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 30, 2022. Fiscal 2020 military construction, defense-wide funds in the amount of $9,473,200 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New York, New York, is the contracting activity (W912DS-20-C-0017). Ashford Leebcor Enterprises III,* Williamsburg, Virginia, was awarded an $8,134,009 firm-fixed-price contract to renovate Building 11 at the Defense Logistics Agency. Bids were solicited via the internet with 11 received. Work will be performed in Richmond, Virginia, with an estimated completion date of Sept. 22, 2021. Fiscal 2016 facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization funds in the amount of $8,134,009 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Norfolk, Virginia, is the contracting activity (W91236-20-C-2021). CORRECTION: The contract announced on July 8, 2020, to BFBC LLC, Bozeman, Montana (W912PL-20-C-0002), for a $138,335,455 modification (P00005) to modify existing electrical attributes (closed-circuit TV, linear ground detection system and shelters) on the Barry M. Goldwater Range, Yuma 10/27 design-build border infrastructure project, was actually awarded on July 9, 2020. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY American Water Operations and Maintenance LLC, Camden, New Jersey, has been awarded a $26,919,360 modification (P00163) to a 50-year contract (SP0600-08-C-8257), with no option periods for the ownership, operation and maintenance of water and wastewater utility systems at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This is a fixed‐price with prospective-price redetermination contract. Locations of performance are Louisiana and New Jersey, with a Jan. 31, 2059, performance completion date. Using military service is Army. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2059 (Army) operations and maintenance funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Energy, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Baltimore, Maryland, has been awarded a $19,660,934 cost-plus-fixed fee contract for the base period of a research project for hypersonic boost glide systems. Work will be performed in Baltimore, Maryland, with an estimated completion date of March 2023. Fiscal 2019 research and development funds in the amount of $549,419; and fiscal 2020 research and development funds in the amount of $17,449,429 are being obligated at time of award. This contract is a sole-source award. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia, is the contracting activity (HR0011-20-C0-0054). *Small Business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2270757/source/GovDelivery/

  • DoD hands out $84 million in recovery funds for small drone makers and a space firm

    13 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    DoD hands out $84 million in recovery funds for small drone makers and a space firm

    By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of Defense announced Friday it is issuing $84.4 million in funding through the Defense Production Act to small unmanned technology, space and shipbuilding companies. The money, divided among seven different companies, will be used to “sustain and strengthen essential domestic industrial base capabilities,” per a Pentagon announcement. “These actions will help to retain critical workforce capabilities throughout the disruption caused by COVID-19 and to restore some jobs lost because of the pandemic.” The Defense Production Act has been in the spotlight in recent months, as it's served as a central tool in attempts by the Trump administration to increase production of personal protective equipment to combat the spread of the coronavirus, something critics say the administration was too slow to implement. Title III of the DPA gives the department the opportunity to fund what it sees as critical suppliers of the defense industry who might otherwise be at risk of closing. Although those authorities have been on the books for years, the department became more serious about using them following a 2018 landmark study of the defense industrial base that identified a number of sectors where small companies that provide key parts for America's arsenal could go out of business. The undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, Ellen Lord, previously identified shipbuilding, aviation and the small space sector as three areas that are suffering under the economic impacts from COVID-19. She has said her office will keep an eye on those sectors. That seems to have played out in the Pentagon's announcement about the $84.4 million in funding. Of the funding, $13.4 million went to five small unmanned systems companies. Funding was authorized and appropriated under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act, and awarded through the Defense Innovation Unit — the Silicon Valley technology hub for the Pentagon. The department claims the funding “saved 14 jobs, created 20 new positions, and will support continued advancement of capabilities providing the companies additional paths for recurring revenue.” Even before the economic damage from COVID-19, the department had identified small UAS manufacturers as a sector that needs to grow. Included in this latest funding are: AirMap, in Santa Monica, California, which received $3.3 million. The money will “aid product development and engineering support for integration of sUAS mission planning, post-mission analysis, and unmanned traffic management software.” ModalAI, of San Diego, California, which received $3 million to “develop their next generation U.S.-made flight controller that will enable advanced autonomy including GPS-denied navigation, and all-environment obstacle avoidance.” Skydio, in Redwood City, California, which received $4 million to “improve the flight controller hardware/software and data link for their sUAS so that highly capable components can be purchased and used across U.S. Government unmanned systems.” Graffiti Enterprises, located in Somerset, New Jersey, which was given $1.5 million to “modify their commercial data link for DoD's sUAS use including operation in restricted frequency bands, reduction in the size, weight, and power of the hardware, and software developments to improve security and resiliency of their data link.” Obsidian Sensors, from San Diego, California, which received $1.6 million to build a “low-cost, dual thermal sUAS camera that can be mounted onto a stabilization gimbal and then integrated and flown on small, packable, ISR systems.” In addition, the Pentagon awarded $15 million to LeoLabs, based in Menlo Park, California, to “ensure the continued viability of space surveillance capability through the operation and maintenance of a world-wide highly capable phased-array radar network.” The department said LeoLabs is the only domestic commercial supplier with the capability to meet requirements in this area. Last month, the Space Force invoked the DPA to get funding for six small space companies that were considered at risk, before it reversed those awards two weeks later. While those are all fairly small technology firms, the biggest dollar amount awarded was $56 million for ArcelorMittal Inc., a steel and mining company based in Chicago, Illinois. The funding, also from the coronavirus relief package, will be used to “protect” jobs impacted by the pandemic that are critical to military shipbuilding. Specifically, the investment will “expand ArcelorMittal's plate processing footprint and heat-treating capability, subsequently increasing its alloy steel plate production and ensure the U.S. Government gets dedicated long-term industrial capacity to meet the needs of the nation,” per the department. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/07/10/dod-hands-out-84-million-in-recovery-funds-for-small-unmanned-companies-space-firm

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