Nouvelles

By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — The first of five new NATO surveillance drones began test flights over the Mediterranean Sea this month, nudging the alliance toward a new capability meant to relieve the demand for U.S. equipment. The flights took off from Sigonella air base in Sicily, Italy, the future headquarters of the Northrop Grumman-made Global Hawks of the Alliance Ground Surveillance program. The planes are owned by a collective of 15 NATO members. The alliance's supreme allied commander for Europe, a job currently filled by U.S. Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, has tasking authority over the new capability. The North Atlantic Council also gets a say in cases of missions outside of NATO territory. The first two drones arrived late last year. Officials expect the rest of the fleet to make the trip from the manufacturer's facilities in Palmdale, California, throughout the summer. Earlier this spring, travel restrictions spurred by the spread of the novel coronavirus had raised the possibility of a delay in getting the initial plane approved for its flight schedule. But the Italian government allowed a team of Northrop specialists into Italy in late May for acceptance testing, a key step in obtaining an airworthiness certificate for the drone. “COVID-related delays ended up only being a few weeks, but nothing that significant,” Camille Grand, NATO's assistant secretary general for defense investment, told Defense News in an interview, referring to the coronavirus disease. “We are now moving to a pattern of regular flight to enable the force to use the drone.” Officials have been tight-lipped about exactly where they intend to use the aircraft once they are fully operational. “You can imagine missions of looking into the situation on NATO's borders,” Grand said. “Both in the south, in the Middle East or the east. The drones enable you to collect intelligence beyond your airspace.” While the initial aircraft has already completed at least one nine-hour flight over the Mediterranean Sea, it remains to be seen if the the aircraft can get clearance from Italian regulators to fly over land, where air traffic is more crowded and a mishap could be catastrophic. The general idea is to use the Italian airworthiness approval to fly anywhere. “The beauty of the European airspace is that once your are certified in Italy, you can fly across the European airspace,” Grand said. He noted that the certification currently in effect is provisional, and that the scope of the process is “likely to expand over time.” For now, high-flying military surveillance drones traversing the continent must obtain permission from national airspace authorities for a restricted flight corridor to protect nearby civilian traffic. Such is the case, for example, when U.S. unmanned aircraft fly reconnaissance missions close to the Baltics. The Alliance Ground Surveillance program's ambition is to “lift any limitations,” Grand said. “It is a very interesting and fascinating challenge because it is the first time ever that we are incorporating those Global Hawks in what is usually a crowded airspace on a permanent basis.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/transatlantic-partnerships/2020/06/22/natos-new-surveillance-drone-begins-test-flights-over-the-mediterranean/

By: Andrew Chuter LONDON — Producing a promised new defense and security review was never going to be straightforward for the British government, but the impact of the COVID-19 crisis and the fast-evolving geostrategic position has muddied the waters even further, leaving open the question of future investment priorities. The integrated defense, security and foreign policy review ordered by Prime Minister Boris Johnson soon after he entered office last December was meant to provide answers to how Britain would make its way in the world post-Brexit. That exercise is partly, but not entirely, on ice as the government focuses its attention on trying to control COVID-19 without putting the economy back in the Stone Age. Completion of the review has been pushed back from this summer to sometime next year. Stephan Lovegrove, the Ministry of Defence's permanent secretary, told the parliamentary public accounts committee recently that some work on the review was ongoing, with early results expected to emerge this year. “There will potentially be something direction-setting later this year. Exactly how full that is, I do not know. Our view is that the fuller it can be, the better,” Lovegrove said. One MoD official, who asked not to be named, said one of the key items now being worked on was a look at the balance of economic priorities versus national security priorities. It's a key question, the answer to which will likely set the scene for decisions on defense investment priorities for years to come. Johnson's original claim that the review would be policy driven, not financially compelled, is no longer the case — if it ever was. Independent analyst John Louth says that post COVID-19, it's going to be all about the money. “Without doubt the pandemic has changed everything. It [the review] is going to be driven by affordability,” Louth said. Defense commentator Howard Wheeldon of Wheeldon Strategic Advisory said funding was going to be a big problem across the West. “Pressures on Western governments in relation to defense spending have probably never been greater. But while we are seeing a significant awareness of the need to invest in activities like cyber, space and ISTAR we cannot afford to ignore the ongoing need to invest in conventional weapons,” he said. “China is investing heavily in air and maritime, and Russia, despite economic pressures, is increasing spend on conventional weapons. Given that COVID-19 has impacted on virtually every nation we must expect that defense spending will be impacted in the medium term,” Wheeldon said. “For the UK we must anticipate cuts in legacy systems across all three services but I am of the view that the army will bear the brunt when it comes to capacity reduction,” he added. It's not just affordability that is the issue. The pandemic is focusing the minds of parliamentarians and others on issues like homeland resilience. The military here have been lauded for their efforts supporting the fight against COVID-19 but it could eventually come at a cost, according to Doug Barrie, a senior analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank in London. “The recognition for greater societal resilience, and the associated cost of this, as a result of the pandemic threatens to be a draw on the U.K.'s armed forces in terms of personnel and future investment — this will put pressure on defense expenditure across the board,” Barrie said. “A neutral budget would be a success for MoD, but I can see some projects being postponed and platform capabilities trimmed as a near term measure,” he added. It wouldn't be so bad if the defense equipment budget was currently under control, but it's not. The National Audit Office, the government's financial watchdog, reckons the current equipment plan has been unaffordable for several years. The worst-case scenario puts the 10-year equipment budget shortfall at £13 billion (U.S. $16 billion) says the NAO. While a decision by Johnson and his advisors on Britain's strategic road map is thrashed out the MoD is living pretty much hand-to-mouth, balancing the books annually by in-year reductions in equipment spending and other measures. Lovegrove told the parliamentary committee the MoD is focusing on smaller programs to cut to leave the government with space to make decisions on more strategic issues during the defense review. Such an approach does have financial consequences, though. “What we typically seek to do is to look at some of the less strategic capabilities, which we are capable of making decisions on outside of a full-blown, multi-year strategic review, and ask difficult questions of those for the [Service] Commands. Ultimately, we would like the Commands to make their own decisions. Sometimes those are cut; more often, they are deferred and descoped,” he said. “Deferring programs in order to give ministers proper choices within a strategic context has the result of pushing the bow wave of the unbalanced budget out a year or two, making it a bit bigger,” the permanent secretary said. “There is a cumulative effect of doing what we have to do to maintain the integrity of the program of record when the balance is out of whack, in that we defer for a year, then defer for a year, then put projects on shorter rations. The bow wave becomes bigger. You see that in the nature of the more difficult financing position that we have for the next three or four years. ... So, yes, I think that the program is very tight and getting tighter,” Lovegrove warned. Without the results of the review the defense sector is operating in a bit of a vacuum on the equipment front. Louth said that ultimately what the MoD spends its money on will be dictated by an as yet unknown view of Britain's foreign policy goals in a post-coronavirus, post-Brexit era. “Where the money is invested depends what they [the government] want to do. The problem is can anybody put their hand up and say ‘we understand what theUK strategic ambition is at the moment,” he said. Despite the strategy vacuum the review likely heralds significant change to investment priorities, according to Wheeldon. “I see a huge change of approach emerging in the UK — one that will concentrate more resources on internal defense, cyber and space and less on conventional armies and battlefield activities. The UK will remain committed to air and maritime and in particular ISTAR and carrier strike. Whilst retaining the overall air and maritime commitment to the NATO alliance I envisage a shift away from front-line land systems support to that of increased ISTAR, space and cyber,” Wheeldon said. Which sectors will see the money invested ? “My money would remain very much on ensuring we have sufficient air and maritime capabilities, particularly ISTAR, and fast jet and surface and sub-surface maritime capability. Investing in space is crucial, investing in cyber is hugely important. I also remain committed to replacement of our nuclear deterrent capability,” Wheeldon said. Barrie agreed about the key requirement to invest in sectors like cyber, space and ISTAR, but cautioned that even here “ambitions will have to be shaped by budgetary reality.” In a paper published in March as the COVID-19 crisis took hold, the Royal United Services Institute's deputy director-general, Malcolm Chalmers, and Will Jessett, a former strategy director at the MoD, offered a view of Britain's defense priorities should be in the future. Britain's new policy should be encapsulated in a new doctrine of enlightened national interest, they said. “Under such an approach, the first priority for the armed forces should be the defense of the UK homeland and its immediate neighborhood. ... The shape of expeditionary forces should now be determined primarily through the need to work closely with NATO allies in defense of Europe and its immediate neighborhood,” the two analysts said. The analysts' view of local and regional defense is partly reflected in their equipment list for Britain's future forces. “Defence priorities over the coming decade need to include robust air defense of the UK (and the Republic of Ireland), strengthened coastal defenses against limited incursions, protection of infrastructure (defense and civil) against virtual and physical attack, and maintaining the ability to provide adequate support to the civil power in national emergencies,” they said in their RUSI paper. A move towards defense of the U.K. and, through NATO, its immediate neighborhood, would represent a significant shift. Just a little over 15 months ago then-Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson was making the case for Britain competing for its interests on a global playing field. “In an era of great power competition we cannot be satisfied simply by protecting our own backyard” Williamson said in a speech at RUSI. Britain has spent billions of pounds building two new F-35 equipped aircraft carriers as part of that policy and needs to invest heavily to buy additional jets and carrier strike support vessels. But a swing towards beefing up defenses in Europe may gain more traction following U.S. President Donald Trump's recent announcement he was withdrawing thousands of troops from Europe. Whether or not Trump means it, or is playing to the gallery ahead of the U.S. elections in November, is unclear, but a significant reduction in U.S. manpower would go right to the heart of NATO planning assumptions. Causing European powers like Britain to rethink how they address the need for their forces to maneuver against a potential adversary like Russia without significant US military support. Louth said the Russian's pushing west to regain territory lost since the end of the Cold War is not as unthinkable as it once was. “We have to be able to address that level of uncertainty and in defense that must be about protecting Europe's borders. What it means is you have to have an investment strategy and a capability generation process that allows you to protect those borders by being able to maneuver across a highly amorphous battlefield across a number of domains.The physicality of force goes to the heart of deterrent,” the analyst said. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/transatlantic-partnerships/2020/06/22/defense-planning-takes-a-back-seat-in-britains-struggle-to-shake-the-coronavirus/

By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The former head of the U.S. Navy said in June testimony that as the service grapples with establishing the right type of force, it must account for the degraded capabilities of its allies, hinting at the once substantial Cold War-era European navies. “In my mind [there's] been an over-fixation on the total number of ships as opposed to the nuance numbers of specific types of ships that support viable operational plans,” retired Adm. Gary Roughead, former chief of naval operations, said before the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. “There's also the need to understand just how small our allied navies have become, and in the past we have always looked to our allies to support us, but those navies are extraordinarily small.” NATO has for years counted on the U.S. Navy as the centerpiece of its maritime forces, with the individual European navies serving as augmenting and supporting forces. And in the post-Cold War era, Europe's navies have focused on low-end missions like counterterrorism and counter-piracy. And that has led to a precipitous decline in naval power available to surge in the event of a high-end conflict. In a 2017 study, the Center for a New American Security found that Europe's combat power at sea was about half of what it was during the height of the Cold War. “Atlantic-facing members of NATO now possess far fewer frigates — the premier class of surface vessels designated to conduct [anti-submarine warfare] ASW operations — than they did 20 years ago,” the study found. Where they collectively had about 100 frigates in 1995, that number hovers at 51 today. “Similarly, these nations had, in 1995, 145 attack submarines — those dedicated to anti-shipping and anti-submarine warfare missions — but that number has plummeted to a present low of 84,” the study found. But with the U.S. increasingly focused on Asia and amid tension within the alliance, Europe is coming to grips with the need to grow its forces and regain high-end capabilities it once had — a realization that also grew out of Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. “Throughout the 1990s, the focus was low-end missions: counter-piracy, counterterrorism, migration, search and rescue,” said Sebastian Bruns, head of the Center for Maritime Strategy and Security in Kiel, Germany. “And they did so with the legacy platforms of the 1980s and 1990s. You know, sending an ASW frigate to fight piracy, well that's not a lot of bang for your buck. “But 2014, that's really the turnaround. I can't think of any European nation that's not on board with modernizing and growing their navies. But the long-lead times and having to replace the legacy units, it just takes a damned long time to turn the ship around.” But an unfortunate side effect of the long-lead times involved in force design — sometimes a decade or more — is that pre-2014 ship designs that are coming into service now are ill-suited for the high-end fight, Bruns said. The prime example of this mission mismatch is Germany's 7,200-ton Baden-Württemberg-class frigate. It began entering service in 2019, but is designed for low-end operations. “They were designed in the 2000s — they even call it a ‘stabilization frigate' — and they're coming online at a time where the German Navy needs them for presence, but they don't have the kind of teeth you'd expect for a 7,000-ton frigate,” Bruns said. “They're really capable for presence and maritime security operations, but of course that's not so much the world we live in anymore.” But new, more advanced frigates are starting to filter into the market. For example, in 2017, France's Naval Group launched a five-hull intermediate air defense frigate program designed to intercept air threats with the Aster 15 and Aster 30 missiles. And in January, the German Navy announced it had hired Dutch shipbuilder Damen to build at least four new MKS 180 frigates — a 9,000-ton ship designed to operate in waters with ice formations in a nod to the renewed competition in the Arctic. Payloads over platforms It's not just new frigate designs that show Europe gradually upping its game. Similar to the track the U.S. Navy has taken in fielding the Naval Strike Missile on its littoral combat ships and the Marine Corps' approach to fielding it as a shore battery, European navies have begun to upgrade their ships' systems in preparation for a high-end fight, said Jeremy Stöhs, a naval analyst who authored the book “Decline of European Naval Forces.” “What we see now is since 2014 the focus is much more on sea control, lines of communication, territorial defense,” Stöhs said. “But because of the long-lead times, it is not just the ships they're building; it's the sensor suites, midlife upgrades, focusing again on sea-denial capabilities.” Countries like the Black Sea and Scandinavian states are investing in anti-ship missiles and shore-based missile systems, he added, whereas a lot of those weapons were disbanded in the 1990s. In 2016, for example, Sweden announced it was fielding coastal batteries with Saab's RBS-15 anti-ship missile to defend its Baltic coast for the first time since 2000. The Franco-British Sea Venom anti-ship missile is being designed to launch from a helicopter such as the U.K.'s Wildcat. It recently passed its first firing trial. The missile is currently designed for small, fast-moving vessels up to Corvette-sized warships. In the Netherlands, the government announced in 2018 that their De Zeven Provinciën-class frigates would be ditching the venerable Harpoon missile for a new, more advanced surface-to-surface missile by 2024. Evolving threat, evolving politics Europe's evolution toward more high-end naval battles in many ways mirrors the United States' own pivot away from wars in the Middle East and Asia. But it's also informed by changing politics. “I'm seeing European navies pivot back to the basics: How do we handle the GIUK [Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom] gap? How do we patrol the North Atlantic? Anti-submarine warfare, convoy escort, anti-surface warfare: They are starting to come back to that,” said Jerry Hendrix, an analyst with Telemus Group and a retired Navy captain. “And as you are starting to see the new heavy German designs, they're coming back to focusing on a maritime challenger.” But with this evolution has come a realization of Europe's shortcomings and just how dependent those navies have been on the U.S. for some core capabilities. “They're starting to think about a naval force without the US present,” Hendrix said. “[German Chancellor] Angela Merkel has talked about the need for Europe to start thinking about going its own way. And by the way, I don't think that's a bad thing. I do see the interests on the continent and the U.S. going in different directions.” But a European naval construct without the U.S. would prove challenging, as many countries based their investments on the idea of a shared responsibility, with the U.S. as the main high-end capability provider, said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at The Hudson Institute. “NATO, in theory, still has the NATO strategic concept where different countries were going to specialize in different capabilities, which led to the Finns and Swedes really embracing amphibious capabilities for small-scale, special operations forces insertion. The Brits and Italians focused on ASW. But without the U.S. acting as the strategic centerpiece, the strategic concept starts to fall apart. “The concept assumes you have someone that has a multimission capability that you can augment, as opposed to: ‘We're going to pull all this together without the U.S. from a bunch of disparate countries with disparate capabilities.' ” That situation means any NATO action with just European nations would need a lot of participation, he said. “Before, if you had just the U.S. and three or four nations participating, you'd have a pretty robust, multimission capability” Clark said. “But without the U.S., you'd need half the alliance to contribute so as to not miss out on key mission areas.” And without the robust U.S. logistics system, countries would have to replace not just the high-end weapons and sensors, but much of the support infrastructure as well. That could mean even more downward pressure on how much capability Europe can bring to bear. “If you have to expend weapons or do extensive resupply or refueling, the whole model starts to break down,” Clark added. “The way the European navies are structured, they don't have this end-to-end capability to deliver on all the support missions as well. “So if they have to invest in a significant combat logistics force, with budgets for defense being limited, that's going to mean their navies will potentially become even smaller.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/transatlantic-partnerships/2020/06/22/with-challenges-aplenty-europes-navies-are-coming-to-grips-with-high-end-warfare/

Steve Trimble A U.S. hypersonic defense system has evolved from wide-open concept studies two years ago into a densely layered architecture populated by requirements for a new generation of space-based sensors and ground-based interceptors. Over the next two years, the first elements of the Defense Department's newly defined hypersonic defense architecture could advance into operational reality if all the pieces can overcome various challenges, including the Pentagon's so far ambiguous commitment to long-term funding. Space-based hypersonic tracking is possible in 2023 New sea-based interceptor will possibly be ready by mid-2020s Pentagon seeks Congressional add-ons to finance plan The Space Development Agency (SDA), with assistance from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), next year will start launching satellites into orbit with new forms of tracking technology optimized to perform the challenging task of remotely targeting hypersonic missiles as they maneuver in the atmosphere hundreds of miles below. At the same time, the MDA and DARPA will soon begin demonstrating a new class of kinetic and nonkinetic interceptor technologies. In addition to solving the guidance and thermal challenges posed by hypersonic flight, this new class of missile defense weapons must be guidable by satellites potentially perched far over the horizon, not by sensors integrally linked on the ground to their launching systems. Pentagon officials began conceiving a hypersonic defense architecture a year after launching multiple offensive weapons programs in 2017, seeking to close gaps in the ballistic defense system that missiles now fielded by adversaries are designed to exploit. With the ability to maneuver hundreds of miles off a ballistic trajectory, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and cruise missiles are designed to evade the MDA's network of stationary ground-based and slow-moving sea-based radars dotted around the globe. By gliding or powering through the atmosphere against the warm background of Earth, the same missiles appear 10-15 times less luminous during the midcourse phase than the boost-phase, exoatmospheric objects that the MDA designed the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites to detect, according to Michael Griffin, the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering. Closing those gaps will require serious investment. Despite plans to infuse more than $10 billion to field at least three different rocket-boosted HGVs by 2025 as offensive weapons, the Pentagon's financial commitment to field a defensive capability is not as clear. The MDA, for example, submitted a fiscal 2020 budget request in February 2019 that included around $157 million in hypersonic defense. A month later, the agency submitted an unfunded-priorities list to Congress, asking for another $720 million for hypersonic interceptors and tracking sensors. Congress met the MDA more than halfway, adding $400 million to the final appropriations bill. A similar shortfall then appeared in the MDA's fiscal 2021 budget request. The agency included $207 million for hypersonic defense but asked Congress to chip in another $224 million on top of the budgeted amount, according to a March report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS) Missile Defense Project. Moreover, the Defense Department's long-range forecast for hypersonic defense spending shows an ambiguous commitment at best. The MDA plans to launch a competition to select a Regional Glide-Phase Weapon System (RGPWS) in fiscal 2021 but only if Congress approves the additional $224 million identified in the unfunded priorities list. At the same time, the new SDA plans to start demonstrating MDA's Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking and Surveillance System (HBTSS) alongside the SDA's own tracking layer in orbit. But the unclassified version of the Future Years Defense Program, which details the Defense Department's five-year spending forecast, shows declining support for hypersonic defense after next year. If Congress approves the extra $224 million for MDA, hypersonic defense spending would peak at around $450 million next year, then average about $112 million annually from fiscal 2022 to 2025, according to the CSIS data. The implication seems clear: Despite the MDA's public commitment to a hypersonic defense system, the agency prefers to finance the development mainly by annual congressional add-ons. Although the MDA's long-term funding plan for hypersonic defense is limited, the potential threats are no longer speculative. In December, the Russian government announced it had achieved operational status for the Avangard, a nuclear-tipped HGV launched by a modernized SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile. Two months earlier, Gen. Paul Selva, then-vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained the implications of an adversary with a nuclear-armed HGV: Imagine if NATO attempted to blunt a move by Moscow to occupy a Baltic state, and Russian strategic forces responded by threatening to launch an Avangard missile. The now-retired general warned that a single Avangard could arc over the Arctic Ocean, and as it reached the northern tip of Hudson Bay, Canada, could change course. It could then veer to target the U.S. East Coast or strike the West Coast, Selva says. U.S. forces currently have no ability to deter or defend against such a capability. To solve that problem, a new space-based tracking system is needed. The Pentagon's existing satellites are either looking for a more luminous signal than that of an HGV or a hypersonic cruise missile or are using a very narrow field-of-view sensor to minimize background clutter, says SDA Director Derek Tournear, who spoke with Aviation Week during a June 4 webinar. The first attempt to solve that problem is scheduled for launch in fiscal 2024. Forty satellites in SDA's Tranche 1 constellation in low Earth orbit carry sensor payloads for tracking hypersonic missiles. Unlike the SBIRS or other space-based capabilities, the sensors will neither have a narrow field of view nor be optimized for tracking only during the boost or exoatmospheric phases of a missile's trajectory. Instead, the spacecraft in Tranche 1 will carry a wide-field-of-view infrared sensor. “However, the jury is still out on whether [the sensors] will be able to form a track that is high enough quality to actually give you that fire control solution so that you can fire [interceptors] on [a] remote [track],” Tournear says. The backup to the SDA sensor will be demonstrated under MDA's HBTSS program. The MDA is developing what Tournear calls a medium-field-of-view system, which falls between the narrow-field-of-view format of existing satellites and the SDA's wide-field-of-view design for Tranche 1. Ideally, the SDA's wide-field-of-view sensors will detect an HGV or a cruise missile and pass the data in orbit to the HBTSS sensors, which will then develop a target-quality track. That data will be passed down to interceptor batteries on the ground. Modified interceptors, such as Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, will augment new kinetic and non-kinetic options to shoot down hypersonic missiles. Credit: Missile Defense Agency Within a few years, the SDA will find out how the concept works. By the end of 2022, eight Tranche 0 satellites equipped with the SDA's wide-field-of-view sensors should be in low Earth orbit. A year later, the MDA plans to launch two satellites into low Earth orbit with medium-field-of-view sensors. The Tranche 0 constellation—aided by 20 communications-relay and data-processing “transport” satellites—will provide a limited operational capability and validate that the sensors work as designed. The next step comes in 2024, when the SDA plans to launch the 40 satellites in the Tranche 1 constellation. “We would have, in essence, regional persistence of [infrared satellites] over any area of the globe that we choose,” Tournear says. There is a catch, however. The launch of the Tranche 1 satellites in 2024 fall within the five-year spending plan but so far remain unfunded. Shortly after the scheduled Tranche 1 layer is activated, the MDA plans to field RGPWS, the new interceptor optimized for HGVs. If Congress adds the funding, RGPWS could be fielded as early as the “mid-2020s” with the Navy's Mk. 41 vertical launch systems on ships and submarines, followed later by air- and land-launched versions. The design requirements for RGPWS are classified, but it's possible the interceptor may benefit from an ongoing DARPA program. Glide Breaker, which includes Aerojet Rocketdyne as a supplier, seeks to demonstrate a “critical enabling technology” for a hypersonic defense missile. The MDA also plans to demonstrate an “extreme power” microwave weapon against “very long-range” missile threats within two years. At the same time, the MDA is adapting existing point defenses against atmospheric threats. Lockheed Martin is studying improved versions of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, called “Dart,” and of the Patriot, called “Valkyrie.” In addition to the extreme power microwave, Raytheon also is studying a new variant of the SM-3 called Hawk. Editor's note: The article has been updated to correctly identify the names of the hypersonic defense concepts under study for THAAD and Patriot. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/us-hypersonic-defense-plan-emerges-not-cash

By Ed Adamczyk June 19 (UPI) -- The Pentagon's strategy for defense in space treats the environment as a warfighting domain, a Defense Department report says. The Defense Space Strategy calls for maintenance of space superiority, support to national, joint and combined operations on earth,and assurance of space stability, the Pentagon said this week. The report identified what officials call four priority lines of effort: building a comprehensive military advantage in space; integration of power in space into the military; shaping the strategic environment; and cooperation with allies, partners, and other U.S. government departments and agencies. The 18-page unclassified section of the report was released on Wednesday. "China and Russia have weaponized space and turned it into a war-fighting domain," Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Stephen Kitay told reporters on Wednesday. "Their actions pose the greatest strategic threat with ongoing development, testing and deployment of counter-space systems and the associated military doctrine designed to hold allied and U.S.space systems at risk." "The U.S. space enterprise was not built for the current strategic environment," Kitay added, noting that space has historically been regarded as a supporting domain for satellites to support other efforts, but not as a battleground. The U.S. Space Force, established as the sixth branch of the Armed Forces in 2019, is specifically designated as the country's space warfare service branch. It has previously noted Russia's direct ascent weapons and potential weapons to destroy satellites, as well as threats including electronic warfare, cyberattacks and ground-based lasers capable of blinding satellites. https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2020/06/19/Pentagon-maps-out-defense-space-strategy/3191592594867/

Point clé: L'armée avait le choix entre quelques options lorsqu'elle recherchait le prochain chasseur furtif. Il a finalement décidé de ce qui allait devenir le F-35. Le ministère de la Défense (DoD) n'a pas eu à opter pour le F-35. Dans les années 1990, Boeing et Lockheed Martin ont soumissionné pour le prochain gros contrat de chasse, un avion qui servirait dans chacune des forces aériennes, navales et marines, ainsi que pour soutenir les forces aériennes de nombreux alliés américains. Boeing a servi le X-32; Lockheed le X-35. Le Pentagone a choisi le F-35. Compte tenu des luttes de la dernière décennie avec le Joint Strike Fighter, il est impossible de ne pas se demander ce qui aurait pu être; Et si le DoD était parti avec le X-32 de Boeing à la place, ou avec une combinaison des deux appareils? Histoire: À la fin de la guerre froide, le Pentagone a proposé un projet de chasseurs conjoints dans l'espoir de réduire la queue logistique globale des forces en campagne, ainsi que de minimiser les coûts de développement. Chacun des trois services d'avions de chasse avait besoin d'être remplacé par l'avion de 4e génération dans son inventaire; les F-15 et F-16 dans le cas de l'Air Force, et les F / A-18 et AV-8B Harrier dans le cas de la Navy et du Marine Corps. Le nouveau chasseur avait donc besoin de configurations conventionnelles, porteuses et STOVL (atterrissage vertical à décollage court). Historiquement, le DoD n'avait pas eu de chance avec les programmes conjoints, mais l'espoir était qu'une «articulation» accrue entre les services, combinée à des techniques de production plus avancées et à des procédures logistiques plus soigneusement affinées, ferait qu'un combattant partagé en valait la peine. Toutes les parties ont compris que le vainqueur de la compétition connaîtrait probablement un grand succès à l'exportation, car de nombreuses forces aériennes du monde entier avaient besoin d'un chasseur de cinquième génération. En bref, il s'agissait de la plus grosse transaction à l'horizon de l'industrie de la défense de l'après-guerre froide. Boeing et Lockheed Martin ont remporté des contrats pour développer chacun deux démonstrateurs. L'histoire continue Capacités: Construits selon les mêmes spécifications, le X-32 et le F-35 avaient des paramètres de performances relativement similaires. Décidant de rivaliser sur les coûts, Boeing a conçu le X-32 autour d'une aile delta monobloc qui s'adapterait aux trois variantes. Le X-32 n'avait pas la portance du turboréacteur entraîné par l'arbre du F-35, utilisant à la place le même système de vectorisation de poussée que l'AV-8 Harrier. Le système du X-32 était moins avancé que celui du F-35, mais aussi moins complexe. Le X-32 a été conçu pour atteindre Mach 1,6 en vol conventionnel. Il pourrait transporter six AMRAAM ou deux missiles et deux bombes dans sa baie d'armes interne. Les caractéristiques de portée et de furtivité étaient généralement similaires à celles attendues du F-35, et le corps de l'avion pouvait accueillir une grande partie de l'équipement électronique avancé que le F-35 transporte maintenant. Décision: Une chose est sûre; le X-32 était un avion ridiculement laid. Cela ne ressemblait pas tellement à la ponte d'un A-7 Corsair et à un lamantin hideusement déformé. Le F-35 n'est pas un prix d'un point de vue esthétique, sans les lignes élégantes et dangereuses du F-22, mais le X-32 a rendu le F-35 positivement sexy en comparaison. Quelle importance cela devrait-il avoir? Pas du tout. Quelle importance cela avait-il? Bonne question. Les pilotes de chasse n'aiment pas piloter des avions qui semblent pouvoir être écrasés par un hors-bord en Floride. Pour des raisons plus concrètes, la stratégie de Boeing a probablement nui à ses chances. Au lieu de construire un démonstrateur capable de répondre aux exigences des trois services, Boeing en a construit deux; l'un capable de vol supersonique conventionnel, et l'autre de décollage et d'atterrissage vertical. Le prototype de Lockheed pourrait faire les deux. Le Pentagone a également apprécié la nature innovante (bien que risquée) du turbolift du F-35. Enfin, l'expérience de Lockheed avec le F-22 a suggéré qu'il pourrait probablement gérer un autre grand projet de chasseur furtif. Conclusion: Choisi en 2001, le F-35 est devenu le plus grand projet d'approvisionnement du Pentagone de tous les temps et l'un des plus assaillis. Le X-32 a échappé à tous les défis les plus importants pour le F-35. Le X-32 n'a jamais fait face à des décennies de tests et de refonte; il n'a jamais connu de dépassements de coûts massifs; il n'a jamais été soumis à une série interminable d'articles sur la façon dont il ne pouvait pas déjouer un F-16A. La nostalgie de ce qui aurait pu être est courante dans les compétitions d'avions, et il est impossible de dire si le X-32 aurait rencontré les mêmes difficultés que le F-35. Étant donné la nature complexe des projets de chasse avancés, la réponse est presque certainement «oui». Mais avec le recul, il aurait presque certainement été plus logique de choisir un chasseur alternatif VSTOL pour le Marine Corps. Cela aurait éliminé l'aspect le plus complexe du projet «conjoint»; la nécessité de créer un avion qui partage des composants critiques à travers trois variantes très différentes. Cela aurait également aidé à répartir la richesse entre les différents grands entrepreneurs de la défense, une pratique qui est devenue de plus en plus une priorité du Pentagone. Bien sûr, étant donné que les aspects STOVL des F-35 et X-32 ont été intégrés au stade de la proposition, cela aurait nécessité de revenir en arrière jusqu'en 1993, pas seulement en 2001. Robert Farley, un contributeur fréquent de TNI, est l'auteur du Battleship Book. Il est maître de conférences à la Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce de l'Université du Kentucky. Son travail comprend la doctrine militaire, la sécurité nationale et les affaires maritimes. Il blogue sur Avocats, Armes à feu et Diffusion d'argent et d'informations et Le Diplomate. Cela est apparu pour la première fois en 2016. https://www.breakingnews.fr/international/lavion-qui-aurait-pu-remplacer-le-f-35-523306.html

Dans une interview avec Ouest-France, Gérard de Boisboissel, ingénieur de recherche au centre de recherche des écoles militaires de Saint-Cyr-Coëtquidan, revient sur la militarisation de l'armée française, entre les drones aériens Reaper déployés au Sahel, les drones marins de guerre des mines développés à Brest ou « mules » mécaniques en test pour les forces terrestres. « Il est inéluctable que la robotisation de nos équipements va s'accélérer, explique-t-il. Les avantages sont trop importants, notamment la réduction du danger pour l'Homme et sa préservation, mais aussi pour l'omniprésence que permettent ces machines sur le terrain, 24 heures sur 24, sous réserve d'une autonomie énergétique, ainsi que leur meilleure réactivité et précision. Ce seront de nouveaux pions tactiques au service du chef militaire ». Ouest-France du 21 juin 2020

AIR FORCE Federal Resources, Stevensville, Maryland; W.S. Darley & Co., Itasca, Illinois; US21 Inc., Fairfax, Virginia; Atlantic Diving Supply Inc., Virginia Beach, Virginia; and Tactical & Survival Specialties Inc., Harrisonburg, Virginia, have been awarded a $950,000,000, 10-year, multiple-award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract to provide equipment, training and product support to approximately 3,500 Air Force Special Warfare operators, as well as authorized users in support of Special Warfare mission requirements. Work will be performed at various U.S. locations, and is expected to be completed June 2030. These awards are the result of a competitive acquisition with 17 offers received. Fiscal 2019 other procurement funds in the amount of $2,000 will be obligated on the initial order placed against each of the contracts. Air Force Life cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, is the contracting activity. (FA8629-20-R-5003). Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, has been awarded an estimated $44,055,036 firm-fixed-price and cost-reimbursable contract for contractor engineering and technical services engine support for Air National Guard and Foreign Military Sales partners. Work will be performed in Thailand; Iraq; Jordan; Taiwan; Turkey; Bahrain; Morocco; Egypt; Chile; Pakistan; Indonesia; Oman; Utah; Texas; and Florida, and is expected to be completed June 30, 2023. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition and is a basic indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. No funds will be obligated at award. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity (FA8604-20-D-8002). General Dynamics Information Technology, Westwood, Massachusetts, has been awarded a $27,686,482 firm-fixed-price modification (P00012) to task order FA8051-18-F-0045 to support the Air Force Civil Engineering Center (AFCEC) in procurement of professional information technology services for AFCEC's Control Systems Cybersecurity Initiative. This modification provides for the full funding of Option Year One. Work will be performed in Panama City Beach, Florida, as well as various locations worldwide, and is expected to be completed Aug. 19, 2021. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the full amount are being obligated at the time of award. This modification brings the total cumulative face value of this contract to $78,113,693. The 772d Enterprise Sourcing Squadron, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, is the contracting activity. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Linthicum Heights, Maryland, has been awarded an $18,733,197 firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee modification (P00026) to contract FA8615-17-C-6047 for active electronically scanned array radars of Air Force F-16 aircraft. The contract modification is for definitization of the Radio Frequency Target Generator, additional support equipment and software development to support Phase Two. Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, Maryland, and is expected to be completed by April 2023. Fiscal 2018 aircraft procurement funds in the amount of $3,510,172; and fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $10,103,436 are being obligated at the time of award. Total cumulative face value of the contract is $1,027,044,025. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity. (Awarded June 18, 2020) Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp., Beavercreek, Ohio, has been awarded a $12,602,959 contract to develop, prototype and demonstrate an integrated sensor suite capability for effective cockpit sensing, including pilot physiology and cockpit environments. The final product will be a stand-alone prototype system ready for transition to platform program offices for acquisition. Work will be performed in Dayton, Ohio, and is expected to be completed Nov. 21, 2023. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition and seven offers were received. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $1,750,000 will be obligated at the time of award. Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity (FA8650-20-C-6231). ARMY Airborne Systems North America of California Inc., Santa Ana, California (W911QY-20-D-0027); and Mills Manufacturing Corp.,* Asheville, North Carolina (W911QY-20-D-0028), will compete for each order of the $150,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for the purchase of MC-6 personnel parachute systems. Bids were solicited via the internet with three received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of June 18, 2028. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Gilbane Federal, Concord, California, was awarded a $96,903,333 firm-fixed-price contract for construction of a new 135,392 gross square-foot building. Bids were solicited via the internet with five received. Work will be performed at Fort Gordon, Georgia, with an estimated completion date of June 19, 2022. Fiscal 2018, 2019 and 2020 military construction (Army) funds in the amount of $96,903,333 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Savannah, Georgia, is the contracting activity (W912HN-20-C-3006). Oshkosh Defense LLC, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, was awarded a $71,134,382 modification (PZ0009) to contract W56HZV-19-C-0087 for heavy equipment transport system trailer and contractor logistics support. Work will be performed in Kampen, Netherlands; and Oshkosh, Wisconsin, with an estimated completion date of May 23, 2023. Fiscal 2018 and 2019 other procurement (Army) funds in the amount of $71,134,382 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, is the contracting activity. Dawson HDR Services JV LLC,* Huntsville, Alabama (W9128A-20-D-0005); Engineering/Remediation Resources Group Inc.,* Martinez, California (W9128A-20-D-0006); GSI Pacific Inc.,* Honolulu, Hawaii (W9128A-20-D-0007); and Na Ali'i Consulting & Sales LLC,* Honolulu, Hawaii (W9128A-20-D-0008), will compete for each order of the $49,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for environmental service activities at various locations within the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Honolulu District's area of responsibility. Bids were solicited via the internet with eight received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of June 16, 2025. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Honolulu, Hawaii, is the contracting activity. Tepa EC,* Colorado Springs, Colorado, was awarded a $46,208,579 firm-fixed-price contract for construction of company operations facilities at Fort Carson. Bids were solicited via the internet with five received. Work will be performed at Fort Carson, Colorado, with an estimated completion date of April 5, 2022. Fiscal 2020 military construction (Army) funds in the amount of $46,208,579 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska, is the contracting activity (W9128F-20-C-0029). General Electric Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, was awarded a $37,070,579 firm-fixed-price contract for support of the T700 series engine program. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 31, 2025. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-20-D-0046). Record Steel And Construction Inc., Boise, Idaho, was awarded a $27,554,000 firm-fixed-price contract for design and construction of an approximately 51,000 square-foot, single-story joint simulation environment facility at Nellis Air Force Base. Bids were solicited via the internet with four received. Work will be performed in Las Vegas, Nevada, with an estimated completion date of June 30, 2022. Fiscal 2020 military construction, defense-wide funds in the amount of $27,554,000 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles, California, is the contracting activity (W912PL-20-C-0018). Sauer Inc., Jacksonville, Florida, was awarded a $20,768,000 firm-fixed-price contract for an operations support facility. Bids were solicited via the internet with two received. Work will be performed in Fayetteville, North Carolina, with an estimated completion date of June 30, 2022. Fiscal 2020 military construction (Army) funds in the amount of $20,768,000 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Wilmington, North Carolina, is the contracting activity (W912PM-20-C-0016). Stampede Ventures Inc., Nome, Alaska, was awarded a $10,398,844 firm-fixed-price contract to repair multiple systems and areas in Hangar 714 at Dover Air Force Base. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 19, 2022. Fiscal 2020 civil construction funds in the amount of $10,398,844 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity (W912BU-20-C-0024). Ophirex Inc.,* Corte Madera, California, was awarded a $9,873,778 hybrid (cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price) contract to support a clinical study to determine the safety and efficacy of Varespladib to control or prevent COVID-19-associated Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome as an addition to standard of care. Bids were solicited via the internet with 63 received. Work will be performed in Corte Madera, California, with an estimated completion date of June 18, 2023. Fiscal 2020 Defense Health Program funds in the amount of $9,873,778 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity, Fort Detrick, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W81XWH-20-C-0066). Mahaffey Tent & Awning Co. Inc.,* Memphis, Tennessee, was awarded a $9,201,291 modification (P00007) to contract W9124E-16-D-0006 for furnishing and maintenance of generators and providing potable water, portable light sets, sleep and dining facilities tents, hygiene units, tables, chairs and hand-wash stations. Bids were solicited via the internet with six received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of June 20, 2021. The U.S. Army 418th Contracting Support Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, is the contracting activity. NAVY Ultra Electronics Ocean Systems, Braintree, Massachusetts, is awarded a $45,324,258 modification to previously awarded contract N00024-18-C-6405 for the production of MK54 MOD 0 lightweight torpedo (LWT) array kits. This modification combines purchases for the Navy (18%); the government of Canada (68%); Republic of Korea (8%); Denmark (5%); and Spain (1%), under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Work will be performed in Braintree, Massachusetts (70%); and Lititz, Pennsylvania (30%). This action is to exercise Phase One of Option Year Two of the MK54 MOD 0 LWT array kits program to supply array nose assembly kits. This option provides MK54 LWT MOD 0 array kits for the Navy and FMS partners, in addition to spares, production support material and related engineering services, hardware support and the maintenance of government-furnished equipment. Work is expected to be complete by March 2023. FMS funding in the amount of $37,374,934; and fiscal 2020 weapons procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $7,949,324 will be obligated at time of award. Funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. Lockheed Martin, Rotary and Mission Systems, Moorestown, New Jersey, is awarded a $25,125,344 cost-plus-incentive-fee modification to previously awarded contract N00024-13-C-5116 to exercise an option for Aegis Combat System Engineering Agent (CSEA) efforts for the design, development, integration, test and delivery of Advanced Capability Build 20. Work will be performed in Moorestown, New Jersey. Under this contract, the Aegis CSEA develops, integrates, tests and delivers computer program baseline advanced capability builds (ACBs) and supports technology insertions (TIs). It also includes a replacement or upgrade of combat system computing hardware and associated middleware/firmware. The design development and develops engineering products support ship integration, developmental test and operational test events, develops training and logistics products and provides field technical support for designated Aegis baselines. The systems engineering, development and integration work under this contract begins with ACB 16 and TI 16, and continues with a future ACB/TI through the period of performance of the contract. Work is expected to be complete by December 2020. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation (Navy) funds; and 2020 other procurement (Navy) funding in the amount of $25,125,344 will be obligated at time of award. Funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. American Computer Development Inc.,* Frederick, Maryland (N00164-20-D-JN94); Advance Circuit Technology Inc.,* Rochester, New York (N00164-20-D-JN95); Bionetics Corp.,* Heath, Ohio (N00164-20-D-JN96); ZENTECH Bloomington LLC,* Bloomington, Illinois (N00164-20-D-JN97); Printed Circuits Corp.,* Lilburn, Georgia (N00164-20-D-JN98); Sechan Electronics Inc.,* Lititz, Pennsylvania (N00164-20-D-JN99); Spectrum Advanced Manufacturing Technologies Inc.,* Colorado Springs, Colorado (N00164-20-D-JN00); and Unified Business Technologies Inc.,* Troy, Michigan (N00164-20-D-JN01), are awarded a $14,705,110 five-year, firm-fixed-price, multiple award contract for build-to-print circuit card assemblies for military projects. These contracts combine purchases for the Navy (58%); and sales to the governments of other countries (42%) under the Foreign Military Sales program. Work will be performed in Frederick, Maryland; Rochester, New York; Heath, Ohio; Bloomington, Illinois; Lilburn, Georgia; Lititz, Pennsylvania; Colorado Springs, Colorado; and Troy, Michigan. These build-to-print circuit card assemblies are used for military projects including, but not limited to, helmet display tracking system, fixed forward firing weapons and interface unit automatic data processor systems that are utilized on the MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters. Work is expected to be complete by June 2025. If all options are exercised, work will continue through June 2030. These contracts include options, which if exercised, will bring the cumulative value of these contracts to $38,418,061. Working capital funding that does not expire in the amount of $24,000 will be obligated at time of award. This contract was competitively procured via the beta.SAM website, and 11 offers were received. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, Crane, Indiana, is the contracting activity. T&M Painting & Construction Inc.,* Murrieta, California, is awarded $10,000,000 for an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract with a maximum amount of $10,000,000 for exterior and interior painting at the Naval Base Point Loma, California. All work on this contract will be performed in San Diego, California. The initial task order is being awarded at $254,029 for exterior painting at Building T302 and Building 145, Naval Information Warfare Center (NIWC) Pacific. The work to be performed is for the preparation of paint surfaces and various buildings aboard Naval Base Point Loma facilities and also includes incidental lead paint removal, scrapping and removing old paint on fascia boards, doors, windows and trim, eves, downspouts and rain gutters and power washing of paint surfaces as needed. Work is expected to be complete by September 2020. The term of the contract is not to exceed 60 months with an expected completion date of June 2025. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance (Navy) (O&M,N) contract funds in the amount of $254,029 are obligated on this award. Funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Future task orders will be primarily funded by O&M,N. This contract was competitively procured via the Navy Electronic Commerce Online website, and three proposals were received. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southwest, San Diego, California, is the contracting activity (N62473-20-D-0003). Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems, Owego, New York, is awarded $7,732,575 firm-fixed-price delivery order N00019-20-F-0406 against basic ordering agreement N00019-19-G-0029. Work will be performed in Owego, New York. This delivery order procures labor and hardware to design, develop and test upgrades to currently fielded operation test program sets required for intermediate level support, to include the audio management computer-lite, smart multi-function display, common avionics multi-function display and the control display unit in support of the H-60 Multi-Mission helicopter. Work is expected to be complete by September 2023. Fiscal 2018 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $7,732,575 will be obligated at time of award, all of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY Aurora Flight Sciences Corp., Manassas, Virginia, has been awarded a $7,115,128 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Control of Revolutionary Aircraft with Novel Effectors (CRANE) program. Work will be performed in Manassas, Virginia (50%); Tucson, Arizona (26%); St. Louis, Missouri (15%); and Los Angeles, California (9%), with an estimated completion date of June 2021. Fiscal 2020 research and development funds in the amount of $7,109,177 are being obligated at the time of award. This contract is a competitive acquisition in accordance with the original broad agency announcement HR0011-19-S-0072. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia, is the contracting activity (HR0011-20-C-0119). *Small Business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2226670/source/GovDelivery/

Nathan Strout The Space and Missile Systems Center will award ride-share contracts to six small launch providers under the Defense Production Act, providing support to a market the Pentagon has repeatedly said is vulnerable to coronavirus-related financial restraints. The six companies approved by the Industrial Base Council are Aevum, Astra, X-BOW, Rocket Lab USA, Space Vector and VOX Space. Each company will be awarded sole-source contracts for two ride-share missions to be conducted over the next 24 months. The value of the contracts was not included in the announcement originally posted on SAM.gov on June 16. Funding for the 12 ride-share missions will come from the Defense Production Act Title III funding effort, which is backed by the recently passed coronavirus relief act. The Pentagon has singled out the small launch market as being particularly hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic over the last few months. On April 20, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord warned that the small launch market was one of three sectors she was most worried about. In a later statement to C4ISRNET, the Space and Missile Systems Center elaborated on her remarks. “There is concern that the current financial and market constraints resulting from the COVID-19 have reduced funding sources necessary to continue development and operations for the nascent small launch industry,” said Col. Rob Bongiovi, director of SMC's launch enterprise directorate. “Much of the industry have limited flight capability or are in the critical transition from development to flight and this funding restriction may prevent or delay these systems. The Space and Missile Systems Center is evaluating the impacts to the small launch industrial base to consider actions to enable a robust U.S. launch industrial base.” In response, the Space Force Acquisition Council held an emergency meeting with representatives from the U.S. Space Force, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Space Development Agency and others. A survey was sent out to members of the Space Enterprise Consortium to see how the Defense Department could help. SMC Commander Lt. Gen. John “JT” Thompson hinted earlier in the week that Defense Production Act awards would be forthcoming for the small launch market. “In the small launch environment, Secretary Lord and [U.S. Space Force Service Acquisition Executive Will] Roper have both commented about how important small launch is to our enterprise, and I can't give you the details right now but I would anticipate here very shortly some very critical Defense Production Act awards to our small launch providers to keep that industry going,” Thompson said. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/06/19/space-force-invokes-defense-production-act-to-prop-up-small-launch-market/