Nouvelles

Every election, would-be prime ministers promise to cancel bad military purchases or processes, hurry along good ones, fix the mess once and for all OTTAWA — The seemingly endless effort to replace Canada's CF-18s fighter jets passed a tiny milestone Friday: fighter-jet makers participating in the $19-billion competition were required to explain how they planned to make their aircraft compliant with U.S. intelligence systems. For nearly a decade, Canadians have been inundated with talk of fighter jets without Canada ever buying them, an ever-worsening symbol of the failures of Canada's military procurement system. Every election, would-be prime ministers promise to cancel bad purchases or processes, hurry along good ones, fix the mess once and for all. Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer this week promised to “de-politicize” military procurement with new oversight bodies in cabinet and the Privy Council Office while working toward multi-partisan consensus on procurement projects in Parliament. The Liberals promise to establish a new agency called Defence Procurement Canada, which suggests taking the entire function away from the four departments that now share responsibility for buying military kit. The New Democrats and Greens promise, without detail, that they will ensure Canada's military gets the equipment it needs. The origins of what we face today can be traced back to the end of the Cold War when Canada and its allies began to cut defence spending after a decades-long arms race with the Soviet Union. There were concerns about whether or not you're getting the right kind of economic benefits “We deferred purchasing new fighter planes and did the same thing with our frigate fleet,” says David Perry, vice-president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and one of Canada's foremost experts on defence spending and procurement. “We just kicked the can down the road on fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft. There was a bunch of other projects that fit the same vein.” The military had to use equipment for years longer than it was supposed to and the Department of National Defence lost most of its procurement experts. But in the mid-2000s, the Forces' equipment problems were revealed in Kandahar: the military lacked transport aircraft to resupply its Afghanistan mission, artillery and tanks to support troops on the ground and helicopters to move them around. Ottawa rushed into gear, purchasing transport planes, howitzers, helicopters and tanks in short order — in most cases without competitions. New equipment flooded in but there were some big failures, starting with accusations defence officials rigged the requirements for a new search-and-rescue plane to select a specific U.S. plane. There was also a failed effort to buy new supply ships for the navy and, most explosively, a plan to buy new fighter jets, Lockheed Martin's F-35s, without a competition. In 2012, auditor general Michael Ferguson blasted the Defence Department for failing to communicate the stealth fighter's risks, including escalating costs and schedule delays, to Parliament and decision-makers. Dan Ross, who was the department's head of military procurement at the time, would later say defence officials had all the information and were willing to share it — the Harper government just wouldn't let them. Either way, the public's confidence in the system and the government's ability to manage it were shaken. The F-35 purchase was scrapped. The Tories imposed new constraints to keep costs under control and ensure Canadian industry and communities benefit from defence contracts. “There were concerns about whether or not you're getting the right kind of economic benefits, some significant concerns about whether or not process was being adhered to until you had this system recalibration where you had an injection of additional rules and governance,” Perry says. That recalibration imposed a fundamental tension on the system: the need to get the best equipment possible, with the most benefit to the economy or local industry, at the lowest cost. Every big procurement is partly about the military's needs and partly about national industrial policy — and, that means, partly about politics. Most procurements are still completed with minimal fuss. The problems largely lie with big, once-in-a-lifetime contracts like fighters and warships that are worth billions of dollars and are not only essential for the military to operate, but have the potential to benefit Canadian businesses and communities for years. The ones that involve billions of public dollars. “You're trying to get the best bang for the buck for as little buck as possible,” says Queen's University professor Kim Nossal, who wrote a book entitled “Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada” in 2016. “The one comforting thing is that very few countries have got the balance right. All industrial countries, all of our allies, faces these kinds of pressures. They worry about jobs and costs and capability.” Efforts to combine the three competing priorities can lead to bickering among federal departments, lawsuits from companies and politicians sticking their fingers in things. Seconds after saying he would de-politicize the military procurement system this week, Scheer promised to negotiate the purchase of an interim naval supply ship from Quebec's Chantier Davie shipyard, which lobbied the Liberal government for years to ink such a contract without success. Davie is one of Canada's big players in shipbuilding — and it's in much-contested political territory just outside Quebec City. Alan Williams, who was the Defence Department's head of procurement from 1999 to 2005 and now advises companies on procurement matters, compares Scheer's promise on Davie to Justin Trudeau's promise in 2015 not to buy the F-35. That's because while a government can decide to purchase a piece of military equipment, procurement laws — and Canada's international trade obligations — forbid it from choosing or excluding a specific product or supplier except under extreme circumstances. Upon taking office, the Liberals twisted themselves in pretzels to get around the legal implications of their promise. That twisting led to a plan to buy Super Hornets from a competing vendor. When that fell through, four years passed before an actual competition was launched — with the F-35 now one of three planes still in contention. In the meantime, the CF-18s will fly until 2032, reinforced with second-hand Australian F-18s to buy time. https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/election-2019/with-billions-of-dollars-at-stake-all-parties-promise-to-fix-defence-purchases

NAVY United Technologies Corp., East Hartford, Connecticut, is awarded a $325,185,212 cost-plus-incentive-fee, fixed-price-incentive-firm contract to provide material and support equipment for depot maintenance facilities, non-recurring sustainment activities, supplies, services and planning for depot activations as well as two F135 full-scale high fidelity mockup engines and four modules for test cells in support of the F-35 Lightning II Program. Work will be performed in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (43.75%); East Hartford, Connecticut (20%); Windsor, Connecticut (3.5%); Cherry Point, North Carolina (3.25%); Fairbanks, Arkansas (3%); Miramar, Florida (2.25%); Indianapolis, Indiana (1.5%); various locations within the continental United States (2.75%) and various locations outside the continental United States (20%), and is expected to be completed in January 2023. Fiscal 2019 aircraft procurement (Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy), non-Department of Defense (DoD) participant and foreign military sales (FMS) funds in the amount of $309,357,445 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the Air Force ($142,457,377; 44%), Marine Corps ($50,633,162; 16%), Navy ($36,962,858; 11%); non-DoD participants ($86,780,595; 27 %) and FMS ($8,321,220; 2 %). This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity (N00019-20-C-0005). Lockheed Martin, Rotary and Mission Systems, Baltimore, Maryland, is awarded a $75,742,842 cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to previously-awarded contract (N00024-18-C-2300) to exercise options for the accomplishment of class services for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. This option exercise is for class services for the LCS program. Lockheed Martin, Rotary and Mission Systems will provide expert design, planning and material support services for LCS-class ship construction. Work will be performed in Hampton, Virginia (31%); Moorestown, New Jersey (27%); Washington, District of Columbia (22%); and Marinette, Wisconsin (20%), and is expected to be completed by October 2020. Fiscal 2015 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funding in the amount of $7,138,265 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity. ARMY BAE Systems Land & Armaments L.P., York, Pennsylvania, was awarded a $48,000,000 modification (P00033) to contract W56HZV-17-C-0001 for long lead material associated with the build of the Self Propelled Howitzer, Carrier-Ammunition Tracked vehicle. Work will be performed in York, Maine, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 31, 2023. Fiscal 2019 other procurement, Army funds in the amount of $48,000,000 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Warren, Michigan, is the contracting activity. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/1981471/source/GovDelivery/

By: Nathan Strout   The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is on track to announce a new commercial partner for its robotic servicing payload by the end of the year, with plans to have a spacecraft in orbit in 2022. “I'm standing here with a smile on my face. The program is moving forward and things are looking good and we're very hopeful,” Joe Parrish, program manager for the Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Spacecraft program at DARPA, said at the 2019 Global Satellite Servicing Forum Oct. 1. “We're looking to launch RSGS in late 2022.” RSGS is intended to deliver a GEO spacecraft with a payload consisting of two large 2 meter arms and a number of tools that will allow it to perform maintenance and other work on satellites in GEO. The spacecraft will perform four main functions in space: inspection, orbital adjustments, anomaly resolution and installation of self-contained payloads. With a host of cameras onboard, RSGS will be able to inspect other satellites. This can help operators on the ground diagnose problems and inform in-orbit repairs. It can also use its arms to capture a satellite and move it, either to a new orbit or to dispose of it. DARPA envisions RSGS being able, again using its arms, to install new payloads on existing satellites, replacing legacy hardware and augmenting its mission for years to come. And, of course, RSGS will be available to traverse the GEO landscape to help satellites that fail to deploy correctly. “If somebody launches up into GEO while we're up there and a solar array fails to deploy or a reflector or antenna fails to deploy, we can come galloping to the rescue,” said Perrish. “The benefit is not to demonstrate robot arms waving around in space. The benefit is to increase the resilience of our infrastructure in space.” While DARPA is developing the payload with robotic arms, according to Parrish, DARPA needs a commercial partner to build the spacecraft that will house the payload and carry it around in orbit. “We're looking for the partner to provide the spacecraft bus — so using a heritage GEO bus that may have had some tailoring for RSGS requirements, integrating the payload and the spacecraft bus together, procuring and launching that integrated spacecraft to GEO, and then providing mission control center for operations for a long period of time,” explained Parrish. Parrish said that the full project would be turned over in due time to the commercial partner to operate RSGS for fun and profit. But DARPA has hit some stumbling blocks in securing that commercial partner. In 2017, Orbital ATK sued DARPA to stop it from developing what it saw as competition to its own satellite servicing space vehicle. While that effort failed, the company's efforts to develop its own satellite servicing program have continued. Orbital ATK was acquired by Northrop Grumman in 2018, and now the Northrop Grumman subsidiary SpaceLogistics is preparing to launch the first satellite life extension vehicle into space in the coming weeks. Then, in January, Maxar Technologies' Space Systems Loral pulled out of an agreement with DARPA to build the spacecraft to host the RSGS payload as the company moved out of the GEO construction market. DARPA has spent much of the last year working to find a new commercial partner. In May they hosted a Proposer's Day to discuss the program with potentially interested companies, and now Parrish says they expect to announce a partner toward the end of the year. “2019 has been quite a year,” said Parrish. “We are still in source selection for a new commercial partner.” Meanwhile, work on the payload itself is ongoing. The first of two flight robotic manipulator arms is in final assembly and will be shipped to the Naval Research Lab in the next two weeks, where it will be integrated into the payload. The second arm lags the first by about two months, said Parrish, and is currently in assembly. In 2020, all of the components of the payload will be sent to NRL for assembly into the actual payload. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2019/10/03/darpa-wants-a-robotic-satellite-mechanic-launched-by-2022/

By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — The race between Boeing's F-18 jet and the Airbus Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft to replace Germany's Tornado fighter-bombers has tilted toward the American plane, according to a German media report. That is after German defense officials received information from the Pentagon about the time needed to certify the Eurofighter to carry nuclear weapons, according to an article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung. Getting the Eurofighter approved for that mission would take between three and five years longer than the F-18, which is considered a nuclear weapons-capable aircraft in the U.S. military, the newspaper reported. Germany has kept a subset of its approximately 80-strong Tornado fleet equipped to carry out the NATO nuclear-sharing doctrine. That means in the case of a hypothetical atomic war, German pilots would load their aircraft with U.S. nuclear bombs and drop them on their intended targets at the behest of the alliance. While Germany's nuclear mission periodically comes up as a source of controversy here, previous governments have left it untouched, portraying the largely symbolic assignment as a vital element of trans-Atlantic relations. A spokeswoman for the Defence Ministry in Berlin declined to comment on the SZ report, saying only that American and German defense officials have been in “continuous conversations” on the issue. The government is expected to announce a winner between the F-18 and the Eurofighter Typhoon early next year. In January 2019, defense officials eliminated the F-35 as a candidate, largely because picking an American plane would weaken the case for having such weapons be made by European companies in the future. Such is the case with the Future Combat Air Systems program, led by Airbus and Dassault. Airbus says if Germany chooses the Eurofighter as a Tornado replacement, it would be easier for companies on the continent to transition to an eventual development of the German-Franco-Spanish platform. The German defense minister's visit to Washington last month put the spotlight back on the prospect of an American buy, however. “We want to treat this question jointly,” Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer told reporters in the U.S. capital on Sept. 23. She added that Germany wants a “gap-less” continuation of the Tornado's capabilities, adding that she envisions a “tight schedule” for the replacement. Airbus, meanwhile, doesn't see the need to rush. With 10 years or so left before ditching the Tornado, the reported nuclear-certification time seems to still fit into the overall replacement schedule, spokesman Florian Taitsch told Defense News. Plus, he argued, it should be expected that, when given a choice, the Trump administration with its “America First” doctrine would be keen to push American-made weapons over European ones. “For us, the situation hasn't changed,” Taitsch said. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/10/04/boeings-f-18-may-have-a-leg-up-in-germany-over-eurofighter/

By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The Army has disqualified Raytheon and Rheinmetall's bid for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle prototype competition, Defense News has learned. The OMFV is meant to replace the service's Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army's plan was to take the bid samples submitted this week, evaluate them over a period of time and then choose two companies to deliver 14 prototypes each and then would pick a single winner after further evaluation. The Army's goal was to begin replacing Bradleys in 2026. The Army would not comment on the disqualification and said in a statement sent to Defense News that the solicitation for the OMFV prototyping effort closed on Oct. 1 and “we are now in the competition sensitive Source Selection Evaluation process.” The service noted in the statement that it “remains committed to rapidly execute the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program,” its number two modernization priority. But multiple sources have confirmed that the bid — Rheinmetall's Lynx 41 Infantry Fighting Vehicle — was disqualified and the bid sample, the only one in existence, remains in Germany at the company's facility in Unterluss. The Army required the competitors to deliver a single bid sample — a full-up working vehicle — to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, by Oct. 1. The Lynx has left the Rheinmetall compound several times before, notably to travel to be unveiled in Paris at Eurosatory in June 2018 and again at the Association of the U.S. Army's annual conference last fall. Raytheon and the Rheinmetall announced at AUSA that they would partner on the OMFV program and submit Lynx as its offering. The disqualification of the team means that General Dynamics Land Systems' offering is the only vehicle remaining in the competition. According to sources, no other company submitted. Hanwha, a South Korean defense company, was interested in competing but chose not to participate, multiple sources claim. Industry sources have said that several companies who wanted to compete or submitted bids had asked for extensions, roughly 90 days in the case of Rheinmetall, to meet requirements. According to multiple sources, potential bidders expressed concern to the service that meeting the requirements, the timeline and a combination of the two wasn't possible. What snarled Rheinmetall, for instance, according to sources, was the timeline it needed to get approvals from the local municipal government to transport the vehicle by tractor trailer or rail and then via air. Sources said that the company had requested a four-week extension to deliver the vehicle to Aberdeen and also offered to hand over the vehicle to the Army under lock and bond in Germany by the Oct. 1 deadline and both were denied. But a larger issue, multiple sources conveyed, was the clear differences between what the Army acquisition community and what Army Futures Command wanted to do. Sources confirmed that the acquisition side of the house was willing to agree to extensions, for instance, but AFC, who is in charge of rapid requirements development and prototyping efforts ahead of programs of record, insisted the Army must adhere to the schedule. Industry also expressed concern to the Army over the roughly 100 mandatory requirements, with just six tradeable ones, expected to be met over 15 months using non-developmental vehicles. Brig. Gen. Ross Coffman, who is in charge of Next-Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) modernization efforts, said at the Defense News Conference in September that he was confident the requirements set for OMFV are appropriate and had no plans to change them. Presently, the OMFV competition is on hold due to a congressionally mandated continuing resolution that prevents the effort from kicking off. The Army had planned to begin the $378 million program in the first quarter after taking receipt of the bid samples at the start of the new fiscal year. As the Army enters its competition to build prototypes to replace the Bradley, Australia is running a similar effort and recently downselected to two competitors: Rheinmetall's Lynx and an offering from Hanwha. GDLS was competing but did not make the final cut. Australia laid out just five mandatory requirements for its competition. GDLS has not yet detailed its offering for OMFV but said it was “purpose built” for the U.S. Army. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/10/04/lynx-41-disqualified-from-bradley-replacement-competition/

By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — The U.S. State Department cleared $67.9 billion in weapons in fiscal 2019, in an indication that America's position in the global arms trade remains strong. The number, spread across 64 individual procurement requests from 28 different countries and a NATO consortium, represents the second year in a row that the overall value of foreign military sales requests have slightly declined. But the total still represents almost double the total cleared by the State Department in fiscal year 2016. These numbers represent potential arms sales that the State Department cleared internally, then passed on to Congress through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The notifications do not represent final sales; if Congress does not reject the potential sale, it then goes into negotiations, during which dollar figures and quantities of equipment can change. In some cases, as highlighted by the large FMS request notification for Turkey to buy Patriot batteries, those sales will never happen. However, while not solid dollars, notifications are a notable way of tracking interest in procuring American arms from foreign partners, and can be a leading indicator of final sales to come. Geographically, the Pacific region led the way with 21 requests, totaling $24.8 billion in potential sales – notable given the emphasis put forth by the Trump administration that the Pacific represents a priority theater for the future. Following that was the Middle East, with 18 requests totaling $15.2 billion. Europe had 18 requests for $19.8 billion; the only nation from Africa, Morocco, put in six requests totaling $7.26 billion; and Canada put in three requests, for $731 million. The biggest potential customer, at a time of a whole-of-government effort against China is underway, is Taiwan. Over four different requests, Taiwan requested $10.7 billion in sales, driven primarily by $8 billion for long-sought F-16 aircraft, as well as $2 billion for Abrams tanks. In second place was Japan, with $7.54 billion in requested sales, spread over six requests. That was driven by three different tranches of SM-3 missiles and an Aegis Ashore missile defense system. Morocco, which was cleared for six separate requests totaling $7.26 billion on U.S. arms, came in third. Their procurement was driven mainly by its purchase of new F-16 fighter jets and the associated equipment, as well as a request for Abrams tanks. As always with FMS notifications, a few large sales can drive the overall total. Sixteen of the 63 sales requests topped $1 billion, led by Taiwan's F-16 request ($8 billion), Poland's F-35 request ($6.5 billion), Morocco's F-16s ($3.79 billion), the U.K's procurement of Chinook helicopters ($3.5 billion), Turkey's Patriot request ($3.5 billion) and Japan's largest SM-3 request ($3.3 billion). The F-16 was a significant driver of FMS requests this year, showing the Lockheed Martin legacy plane remains popular around the world. Eight requests, with a potential total of $15.8 billion in sales, involved the F-16, raging from the request for tranches of fighters from Taiwan, Morocco and Bulgaria to $125 million for Pakistan security support related to their F-16 fighters. While the numbers are strong, Roman Schweizer, an analyst with Cowen, notes that political realities could upend an unusual number of these potential deals in the coming year. “Notably, for FY19, there are a number of large sales that may be unlikely for political or other reasons: these include a $3.5B sale to Turkey of Raytheon's Patriot missile system, a $2B sale to Taiwan of General Dynamics' M1 Abrams tanks, and an $8B sale to Taiwan of Lockheed Martin F-16s,” he wrote in a note to investors. “We don't think a Turkish Patriot purchase is possible as they continue to own/operate Russian-made S-400s. And while Taiwan needs U.S. weapons (fighters, tanks and more), there is a legitimate concern that those sales could be halted if there is a broader strategic agreement with China on trade and economic issues. “If that's the case, about 20% of this year's potential deals aren't viable, meaning this would be a step-down year but not quite as low as FY16's $37B in announcements.” From a corporate level, Schweizer estimates Lockheed Martin is the big winner for the year with $32 billion, followed by Raytheon at $15 billion, Boeing at $9 billion, General Dynamics at $3 billion, Northrop Grumman at $1.2 billion and Textron $600 million. A specific wrinkle for FY19's accounting was the inclusion of $3.9 billion as part of a controversial emergency package pushed through by the Trump administration for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For the better part of a year, those weapons were tied up in Congress over concerns of how they will be used as part of the Saudi-led actions against Iranian-backed fighters in Yemen, an operation that has contributed to a humanitarian crisis in that country. The issue escalated following the death of columnist Jamal Khashoggi, which has been tied to the Saudi royal family. In May, the State Department announced that an emergency exemption would be used to push those arm sales through; while the administration cited a broad threat from Iran in the region as the reason, the move received bipartisan rebuke from both the Senate and the House, with some members expressing concern this was a precedent-setting move to take away arms sale veto powers from Congress. That $3.9 billion was divided among seven FMS notifications, four for the UAE and three for Saudi Arabia. https://www.defensenews.com/global/2019/10/04/heres-how-many-foreign-military-sales-the-state-department-okd-in-fy19/

TREVOR WILHELM It's a bird. It's a plane. It's the Windsor Police Service. Windsor police officially launched their new drone program Wednesday with a show-and-tell at their Sandwich Street training facility. Before sending one into the sky outside the Major F.A. Tilston Armoury and Police Training Centre, officers stressed they will not be using drones to randomly watch people. “We will not be going out there to do traffic stops,” said Staff Sgt. Sue Garrett, who runs the operational support unit. “We will not be putting it out there for routine policing on a daily routine. It will always have the proper judicial authority in order to use that. We will not be doing random surveillance or anything like that.” Citing operational reasons, police would not reveal how many drones they have. Without giving a reason, they also refused to reveal how much the program costs. They bought the equipment from Aeryon Labs, a company based in Waterloo that makes “unmanned aircraft systems” for military and police use. Six Windsor officers are trained to operate the drone. They will be pulled from their regular units to run it part time as needed. The drone — police call it a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) — has a two-kilometre range and lasts 50 minutes on a single battery charge. It can fly in light rain and snow, sustained winds of 50 km/h, and wind gusts up to 90 km/h. The aircraft has an optical zoom camera and an infrared night vision camera that pick up movement police can't see on the screen. It is also loaded with software that can reconstruct a crash scene with photos and measurements in 15 to 20 minutes. Other potential uses include search and rescue, taking aerial photos of crime scenes, and helping with marine emergencies. It will also be the eyes for police in dangerous situations such as bomb calls, hostage situations, and hazardous material spills. “The RPAS will assist multiple units within the Windsor Police Service, and it will increase the quality of our investigations as well as help to ensure the safety of our community,” said acting Chief Pam Mizuno. “The RPAS will enhance the Windsor Police Service's response to emergencies and it's going to provide our officers with the ability to lawfully gather intelligence prior to developing safe action plans.” https://windsorstar.com/news/local-news/windsor-police-unveil-new-crime-fighting-drone

by Alan Stephenson The path towards procuring a replacement fighter for the CF-188 Hornet has been one with many twists and turns due to political gamesmanship and strategic business marketing, causing much public misunderstanding. This short article aims to put a few things into perspective as the competitors complete their analysis and response to the government's request for proposal (RFP) issued July 23, 2019, for the Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP). Eligible suppliers Of the original five qualifying suppliers, only the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet Block III, Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II, and Saab Gripen E fighters remain in the competition. The Dassault Rafale and Airbus Eurofighter Typhoon were both pulled from consideration, with company officials citing “that NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] security requirements continue to place too significant of a cost on platforms whose manufacture and repair chains sit outside the United States-Canada 2-EYES community.” Given that the Canadian government identified the first two principal roles of the Canadian Armed Forces as ensuring Canadian sovereignty and the defence of North America, the requirement to be fully functional and integral within NORAD is mandatory. The reality today is that fighters are not simply weapons platforms, but flying computers that also function as airborne sensors that are designed to be integrated into command and control computer networks. Thus, the challenge for non-American manufacturers is to overcome both sensitive commercial and U.S. national security concerns when they are required to integrate and support U.S. information-sharing equipment in their platforms. A second reason given for Airbus's departure was the eleventh-hour modification to the RFP that relaxed the expected industrial technological benefits (ITB) obligations. To attract more than three suppliers and ensure a competition, the government originally stuck to its standing ITB policy of “requiring the winning supplier to make investments in Canada equal to the value of the contract.” However, this effectively eliminated the F-35 due to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program agreement – signed by Canada – that forbade such a demand. To provide latitude to all bidders, the final RFP was modified into a two-phased proposal to allow non-American companies to address 2/5-EYES challenges up front, while also applying rated criteria for economic offset potential of stated ITB requirements, to keep the F-35 within the bidding process. Additionally, five per cent was shifted from cost to economic criteria to compensate for changes in the original draft ITB policy. The proposals will now be assessed on 60 per cent technical merit, 20 per cent cost and 20 per cent economic benefits. Current bidders In recent years, the Saab Group expanded globally by offering industrial partnerships that combined local production and capital-heavy ventures with national customer partners. Saab's approach with the Gripen E bid in Canada follows this successful formula of maximizing national economic benefits with an economical product; however, Saab also faces the challenges that Airbus determined to be too difficult to overcome. Additionally, the Gripen E is still in development; its first production flight occurred on Aug. 26, 2019, meaning issues of proven performance and systems maturation need to be factored in during bid evaluation. According to the firm, this first fighter will be used as a test aircraft in a joint Swedish/Brazilian test program, the only two customers for the Gripen E to date. Given that the Eurofighter bid was sponsored by the U.K. government, a member of the 5-EYES community that decided it could not meet the information-sharing requirements, Saab will need to be innovative and cost-conscious in its proposal if it is to surmount this mission-critical criteria. As for the Super Hornet, Boeing promised to invest $18 billion in ITBs under the failed 2017 purchase agreement for 18 fighters, and it is anticipated that the company will follow its established approach to investing in Canada as per previous ITB commitments. Concern over the so-called Boeing Clause, “to allow only companies that it deems ‘trusted partners' to bid on major capital programs,” has faded away and Boeing is confident that it can mount a competitive bid, particularly now that the U.S. Navy's (USN) commitment to future purchases will keep the production line open until 2033. By incorporating leading-edge technology into the Block III to meet adversarial advances, Boeing has ensured the Super Hornet will meet Canadian requirements. Although still in development as well, a major question for government decision-makers has to do with sustainability. At present, only the USN and Kuwait will operate the Super Hornet Block III, while Australia has plans to upgrade their Block II version. As Australia expects to retire its fleet in the early 2040s and the USN in 2045, the challenge for Boeing will be in meeting the stated lifecycle expectancy of Canada's future fighter in a cost-effective manner. Since 2015, the much-maligned F-35 has proven itself in combat and counts Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the three U.S. services as customers. As the only fifth generation fighter, it contains technological advances that are designed into the aircraft and cannot be replicated in fourth generation platforms. The overall architectural concept regards the F-35 as more than just a weapons platform, but also as a forward sensor that is fully integrated into the developing multi-domain command and control system. Initial airframe costs have been significantly reduced and early sustainment issues are being resolved; however, the F-35 remains the most costly platform to own and operate at the moment. With a projected lifetime production run of over 4,000 fighters, lifecycle support is guaranteed, and Canadian industry stands to gain substantially from Canada's early investment in the co-operative JSF Program. However, according to reports, manufacturers will lose points in the ITB element formula scoring system if they do not make a 100 per cent commitment to the contract value, which Lockheed-Martin is prohibited from doing by JSF contractual agreement. Arctic Interestingly, all remaining competitors can lay claim to being Arctic platforms. Canada has already proven the F/A-18's credentials in the high North, the U.S. will base two combat F-35 squadrons in Alaska, and Sweden has developed the Gripen with Arctic operations in mind. The issue of one versus two engines has never been a significant issue for Arctic operations except in Canada. Originally, two engines was one of the many discriminators used in choosing the F/A-18 over the F-16 in 1979. Recently, the Standing Committee on National Defence's shaping of the narrative in 2016 to promote the sole-source purchase of the Super Hornet reintroduced the idea that operations in the Arctic demanded two engines. As with commercial aviation where transatlantic flight once required four-engine passenger planes, the advancements in engine technology have led to standard two-engine models today. Engine reliability is not a concern with any of the competing fighters. However, operations in Canada's Arctic are unique and risky in an inhospitable region that is 11 times the size of Sweden. Other discriminators, such as continuous communications and tracking, become equally or more important to survival. Stealth One of the unfortunate aspects of American F-35 global marketing efforts with respect to the FFCP is the issue of stealth technology. Although the idea of penetrating, first strike operations sells well in the U.S., stealth is a much maligned and misappropriated concept in Canada. Stealth technology is all about maximizing self-protection and increasing survivability by disrupting the ‘kill-chain' through low observability. This concept is no different from the tactical advantages that I used while flying the CF-104 in Germany during the Cold War. The Starfighter had a one-square-metre cross-section nose-on, making the adversary's initial radar detection difficult and target acquisition and identification questionable, delaying force commitment to the target. This complicated the decision and order to attack the target, and finally upon weapons release, the low radar cross-section shrunk the available radar weapons envelope needed for destruction of the fighter. The CF-104's speed significantly exacerbated the adversary's kill-chain difficulties. The CF-188 Hornet I flew later required a Defensive Electronic Countermeasures suite that masked the larger aircraft radar cross-section, and electronically intervened and complicated a more advanced kill-chain. The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) will significantly decrease ambiguity and decision-making time in the near future. Whether built into the design or strapped on later, some form of self-protection is required to protect the pilot and the fighter asset that will either be defending Canadian territory or operate in foreign contested airspace when the government commits its fighter force. The question is one of application and the cost effectiveness of self-protection measures used by each platform and how they are expressed in the bid proposal. Costs Costing is a nebulous exercise outside evaluation of the final bids due to the many variables. Although airframe costs are most often thrown around, the government must consider the airframe, operating, infrastructure, sustainment and other related costs as a package, balanced against the capability being purchased. A good example of the intricacies involves the way the fighter fleet is bought. The Super Hornet must be purchased through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, where the U.S. government acts as the broker. Generally, a 30 per cent mark-up is charged for research and development (R&D) and administrative fees. In the case of the F-35, as a JSF partner, these costs are reduced for Canada through common funding. The costs for R&D have already been shared by the membership pool, and partners pay the same price for the weapons system as the U.S. services. Future upgrades become additional FMS expenses for the Super Hornet, whereas upgrade developments are shared by JSF members. Each of the competitors is being asked to provide 88 fighter aircraft within the $19 billion funding envelope and the old adage of “you get what you pay for” is very applicable. Each of these platforms brings a different level of current and future combat capability that needs to be judiciously weighed. If the fighter is to reach the government's goal of flying until 2060, each needs to be flexible and adaptative to evolving technology. More significantly, 70 per cent of lifecycle costs are in sustainment and therefore the fighter chosen must be cost-effectively supported for the next 40 years. The next leg In the lead-up to the RFP, it has been evident that national security factors have been competing with economic benefit interests. With the election this fall, the next government (whatever form this takes) will no doubt want to review the project and put its own stamp of approval on the process that it has inherited. Hopefully this will not further delay the decision on the replacement of the CF-188 fleet and the Royal Canadian Air Force will finally be able to move ahead with the best fighter aircraft Canadians can provide to the women and men who are putting their lives in harm's way. https://www.skiesmag.com/features/erratic-flight-path-canadas-fighter-procurement-plan

Tony Osborne The managing director of Leonardo's helicopter business says he would like to see a role for European industry in the programs that emerge from the U.S. Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL). Gian Piero Cutillo told Aerospace DAILY on the sidelines of the 1,000th AW139 helicopter delivery in September that the European helicopter industry had generated the competencies to make it a useful partner in such a program, and said the company was in continuous talks with different partners but “there is nothing concrete.” European industry points to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, which while securing significant sales in Europe has had an impact on the sales of European-built combat aircraft. There is a fear that with the volume of FVL platforms likely to be purchased by the U.S., their price could make FVL an attractive proposition for export customers. Sikorsky's Black Hawk has secured an increased customer base, particularly in Eastern Europe in recent years. The U.S. Army's work on a Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) and Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) is beginning to attract attention from European nations, with the U.S. Army planning to begin sharing information with allies shortly. The UK already has personnel embedded into the FVL program and is working on an operational analysis of its future helicopter fleets, with a focus on what high-speed rotorcraft can offer UK land forces. “From my heart, I would like to see European industry become one of the main actors. I strongly believe we have all the capabilities,” Cutillo said. “We are talking about what will be a global program, with more than one technology and room for the traditional technology as well.” Any FVL partnership should not be like that of previous programs, Cutillo said. European industry has already begun the development of high-speed rotorcraft, such as Leonardo's AW609 tiltrotor, Airbus' X3 compound helicopter and a future development of the latter, the Rapid And Cost-Efficient Rotorcraft (RACER). But so far they are targeted to the commercial market. An Airbus proposal for FARA, believed to use the X3 technology, was rejected earlier this year, with only U.S.-based companies awarded contracts. The Italian military is said to be interested in purchasing the Leonardo tiltrotor. But contractual limitations imposed by Bell, which was previously a partner on the AW609, stipulate that the aircraft cannot be offered with armaments. It is unclear whether these limitations extend to future tiltrotor models. Leonardo is investigating future tiltrotor technologies through the European Union Clean Sky 2 program, with a technology demonstrator, the Next Generation Civil Tilt Rotor, due to fly in 2023. https://aviationweek.com/vertical-flight/leonardo-europe-should-have-role-future-vertical-lift