21 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR

Why Did Boeing Opt To Fully Redesign The KC-46 Remote Vision System?

Lee Hudson

Why did Boeing opt to fully redesign the vision system on the KC-46 instead of using the Royal Netherlands Air Force KDC-10's reliable and proven technology?

Aviation Week Pentagon Editor Lee Hudson answers:

The Netherlands' Organization for Applied Scientific Research, Physics and Electronics Laboratory designed the Tanker Remote Vision System in 2006 for the McDonnell Douglas KDC-10. It is used on two tankers that serve in both tanking and transporting missions. The technology supports inflight refueling operators by providing a picture of the air-to-air tanking process, even in bad visual conditions.

Boeing was unable to use the KDC-10 Tanker Remote Vision System (TRVS) because the technology does not meet U.S. Air Force requirements for the KC-46. The 1980s design does not support covert aerial refueling missions or operate in all lighting and background conditions. Boeing says that is why it opted to build a system featuring high-resolution cameras, display and processing capability.

Some critics believe the Air Force and Boeing would both be better off if the remote vision system outfitting the KC-46 adopted pieces of the TRVS, given the new aircraft has experienced years of delays and cost overruns. Boeing took a $551 million charge in the first quarter because of changes agreed to by both the company and the Air Force in April for the KC-46 Remote Vision System (RVS).

The redesign includes high-definition color cameras, updated displays and computing systems. The problem with the initial RVS design is what the Air Force called a “rubber sheet” effect that distorts the image on the visual display used by the boom operator during refueling.

To date, Boeing has taken more than $4 billion in charges for the problem-plagued tanker. This is roughly the same amount the company was willing to pay for Embraer's commercial aircraft division before it walked away from that deal.

https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/why-did-boeing-opt-fully-redesign-kc-46-remote-vision-system

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  • Will COVID-19 Kill The Liberal World Order?

    22 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Will COVID-19 Kill The Liberal World Order?

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    20 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Study sees British defense sector hurting after Brexit

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    15 septembre 2020 | International, Terrestre, C4ISR

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KIOUTAS: We are learning from what we're doing. It's really a change in the construct of how we do acquisitions. Instead of having the one huge program that's been perfectly thought out, perfectly tested and built, and then we get it to the field and it's 10 years too late and it's really not what we want, we're doing more iterative learning steps. So, everything that we learn even on the MAPS side — [which] is very similar technology — will apply to the DAPS side. With DAPS we're also developing some prototypes. We've got three vendors right now that we're working with to give us early prototypes, get them to the soldiers, let them touch and play with them, tell us what they like and what they didn't like, and then we'll do an initial capability set. And then we'll decide, hey, was there something that we can do different, better and then upgrade? So, [we're] constantly going to try to do that approach. 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