18 juillet 2023 | International, C4ISR

White House unveils cybersecurity labeling program for smart devices

U.S. Cyber Trust Mark initiative to be overseen by the Federal Communications Commission, with voluntary industry participation.

https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2023/07/18/white-house-unveils-cybersecurity-labeling-program-for-smart-devices/

Sur le même sujet

  • US Navy eyes new launchers on destroyers for hypersonic weapons

    2 juillet 2019 | International, Naval

    US Navy eyes new launchers on destroyers for hypersonic weapons

    By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — With bigger, faster missiles in development and bound for the fleet, the U.S. Navy's engineers are considering installing upgraded launchers on the stalwart Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The head of Naval Sea Systems Command, Vice Adm. Thomas Moore, told an audience at a conference of naval engineers that the Arleigh Burkes — due to their vertical launch system and Aegis missile capabilities — were easier to keep relevant than other destroyers such as the Adams and Spruance classes. Still, with the service attempting to keep the ships longer, new launchers may be in order to pace the threat from Russia and China, which have been developing their own hypersonic weapons. “Vertical launch system has been a real game changer for us. We can shoot any number of things out of those launchers,” Moore said. “We'll probably change those out and upgrade them for prompt strike weapons down the road.” Putting hypersonic weapons on surface ships would greatly increase the effectiveness of their strike capabilities. The current main strike weapon, the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, is a subsonic missile that is vulnerable to evermore advanced Russian and Chinese air defenses. Prompt strike, which refers to a Pentagon-wide effort to field hypersonic weapons to quickly strike anywhere in the world, are most likely coming first to submarines, said Thomas Callender, a retired submarine officer and analyst with the Heritage Foundation. Because subs are stealthy and can sneak in close to land undetected more easily than a surface ship, they make the most sense. “They're looking at putting hypersonics on submarines first because where you can get access,” Callender said. “You can potentially then put them on surface ships as an added capability for them, but the submarines would be the priority for access and the ranges you can achieve.” The Navy is designing a new large surface combatant to replace the cruisers and ultimately the destroyers with larger missiles in mind. As a result, the ship may be fairly large, former Surface Warfare Director Rear Adm. Ron Boxall told Defense News last year. The benefit of larger vertical launch cells is that you can pack more missiles into each cell, if you are not using the cell for the larger hypersonic missiles, Boxall said. “We are going to need, we expect, space for longer-range missiles,” he said. They are going to be bigger. So the idea that you could make a bigger cell, even if you don't use it for one big missile, you could use it for multiple missiles — quad-pack, eight-pack, whatever.” The missiles that would go into a larger launcher are still very much under development. The Navy is teamed with the Army to develop a booster for a hypersonic missile, and the Army is leading a team with the Navy and Air Force to internally build a common glide body that is producible on a larger scale. Radar upgrades Naval Sea Systems Command is also examining installation of a scaled-down version of the air and missile defense radar AN/SPY-6, under development for the Flight III DDG. The scope of that project, however, remains to be determined. “We are looking at a scaled-back version of the air and missile defense radar to back-fit the Flight Is and Flight IIs, similar to how we are looking for a version of the [Enterprise Air Search Radar] developed for [the Ford-class aircraft carriers] to back-fit on some of the old Nimitz class,” Moore said. “I'm not sure how many ships it is going to go on, we're still doing the design work. It's a fairly significant change to the structure of the ship, AMDR versus Spy.” The purpose of the upgrade would be used to track the faster, more dynamic missiles under development by Russia and China. The array is a smaller version of the SPY-6 intended for the Flight III DDG, the first of which is now under construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries. The SPY-6 destined for DDG-125 will have 37 radar modular assemblies, or RMA, which are 2-foot-by-2-foot-by-2-foot boxes that use gallium nitride technology to direct radar energy on air targets. The Flight IIA version will have 24 RMAs in the array. A version of the radar planned for the FFG(X) future frigate is a nine-RMA configuration. The Navy wants to upgrade all of its DDGs to Aegis Baseline 9 or higher with a ballistic missile defense capability and extend the service lives to 45 years as part of an effort to grow the fleet. But the Navy is going to try to get 50 years out of its Flight IIA ships. The IIAs make up the bulk of the DDG fleet, with 46 total planned for the service — DDG-79 through DDG-124. DDG-127 will also be a Flight IIA. That upgraded SPY-6 will be far easier to maintain than the current SPY-1D. Raytheon claims the radar can be maintained by simply removing an RMA and switching it out with a new one, with the rest of the work performed offsite. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/06/30/navy-eyes-new-launchers-on-stalwart-destroyers-for-putting-hypersonics-afloat/

  • China’s missile and space tech is creating a defensive bubble difficult to penetrate

    2 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    China’s missile and space tech is creating a defensive bubble difficult to penetrate

    By: Mike Yeo MELBOURNE, Australia — The U.S. Navy is facing growing asymmetric threats, not least of which is from China, and more specifically its anti-access/area denial strategy. The Pentagon's annual report on China' military strength from 2019 describes the A2/AD strategy as a means to “dissuade, deter, or, if required, defeat third-party intervention against a large-scale, theater-wide campaign” mounted by China's People's Liberation Army, or PLA. In short, it appears Beijing's aim is to prevent American and allied military forces from operating freely in the A2/AD airspace and maritime “bubble” around China's coastline. China has in recent years worked to extend the range of this bubble beyond the so-called first island chain and into the Western Pacific. The key to this effort is not just longer-range missiles, but also a growing number of space-based sensors. The U.S.-based Union of Concerned Scientists reported that as of 2016, China had 192 satellites in orbit, a number that has since increased, with nearly all of these belonging to organizations or companies with close ties to the government and having dual roles to for civilian and military use. Some of China's satellites include several payloads that are almost certainly for military purposes, such as electro-optical sensors, synthetic aperture radar and electronic intelligence technology. The country also uses a constellation of Naval Ocean Surveillance System satellites providing persistent coverage of water surrounding China. These capabilities can also support targeting for China's anti-ship ballistic missiles, and with sufficient numbers and integration, they could provide real-time target triangulation data to build up a robust picture of a target's location to ultimately generate a targeting approach. Meet the DF-21D The long-range, conventionally armed ballistic missile DF-21D is meant for attacking moving ships at sea, most notably the U.S. Navy's showpiece nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The theory behind its creation is that a missile speeding down to sea level on a ballistic trajectory at speeds of Mach 5 or higher would prove extremely difficult to counter. The road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile system is mounted on a wheeled transporter erector launcher to improve survivability against enemy counter-strikes. Said to have a range of about 780 nautical miles, the DF-21D is a version of the DF-21 family of two-stage, solid-fueled, single-warhead conventional or nuclear medium-range ballistic missiles in use by the PLA Rocket Force. The U.S. Defense Department suggests that the DF-21D reached initial operating capability with the PLA in 2010, with the system thought to employ maneuverable reentry vehicles with a terminal guidance system assisted by China's network of satellites, such as the Jianbing-5/YaoGan-1 and Jianbing-6/YaoGan-2 that provide targeting data in the form of radar and visual imaging, respectively. There are, however, questions about the missile's effectiveness. China has reportedly tested the DF-21D against fixed land targets, but it's unknown whether it was tested against a moving target. This makes it difficult to accurately assess the capability of the weapon, particularly from a maturity and efficacy standpoint. It also brings into question whether China's sensor technology can generate the kind of real-time, highly precise data required to enable the DF-21D to accurately target an aircraft carrier maneuvering at 30 knots. But the missile and its sensor net could be used to keep watch on and provide deterrence at maritime chokepoints among the first island chain, specifically the Miyako Strait between Okinawa, Japan, and Taiwan as well as the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. This would theoretically reduce the demand on a less-than-mature sensor net and kill chain to limited geographic areas through which potential targets would have to sail. Considering the limited combat radius of carrier-borne aircraft without large-scale support from aerial refueling tankers, the ability to keep an American carrier battle group at arm's length may be all that China's A2/AD capability requires. An attack with anti-ship ballistic missiles can be used in conjunction with other anti-ship missiles and timed to simultaneously arrive at a target. Such an attack could be mounted from longer-range anti-ship missiles like the YJ-12 and YJ-18. Both are Chinese improvements of Russian designs, derived from the Kh-31 air-to-surface missile and the 3M-54 Klub cruise missiles, respectively. Both are capable of supersonic speeds, with the anti-ship YJ-18A variant attaining its maximum speed of about Mach 2 in its terminal attack phase following subsonic cruise. The YJ-12 can fly at speeds of between Mach 2 and Mach 4, depending on launch and cruise altitudes. Both can also reach long ranges. The YJ-12 is widely believed to have a range of between 108 and 216 nautical miles, while the YJ-18 is believed to possess a range of 290 nautical miles. The YJ-12 can be launched from wheeled transporter erector launchers as well as from vertical launch cells on ships like the Type 052D or Type 055 destroyers. The YJ-12 can also be launched from aircraft, like the Xian H-6 bomber, the JH-7 fighter bomber and possibly the Shenyang J-11/15/16, Chinese derivatives of the Russian Sukhoi Flanker family. Is a new long-range air-to-air missile on its way? China's indigenous Flanker derivatives are also expected to the primary carrier platform for a new long-range air-to-air missile reportedly in development. Expected to be used to target an adversary's high-value airborne assets such airborne early warning and control systems and tanker aircraft, the missile has been given the temporary designation “PL-XX.” Observers believe the eventual in-service designation will be PL-20. The new missile was first observed in 2016 carried by a Shenyang J-16 multi-role fighter, however it almost certainly was an inert mock-up. It was seen earlier this year on a Xian JH-7 fighter-bomber. By comparing the known sizes of the parent aircraft and its hardpoints, it's been estimated the missile is about 5.8 metres (20 feet) long and about 300 milometers (1 foot) in diameter, which is significantly larger than typical medium-range air-to-air missiles, like the American AIM-120. Four rear-mounted fins bestow maneuverability and control for the missile. There is little verifiable information about the new missile's performance; however, a public schematic of how China would use the weapon shows the ramjet or solid fuel-powered missile can attain a straight-line range of 300 kilometers (188 miles). After launch, most likely with preliminary targeting data provided by a friendly airborne early warning and control aircraft, the missile would fly a parabolic trajectory on its way to its target, attaining an altitude of approximately 100,000 feet from a launch altitude of 50,000 feet, before plunging toward the target. A mixture of GPS, inertial navigation systems and space-based radars are expected to provide launch and mid-course guidance, before an active electronically scanned array radar takes over at the terminal phase. If China succeeds in putting such a weapon into service, the PLA Air Force will then be able to compel an adversary's vital force-multiplier aircraft to operate farther away, or risk being shot down. This would reduce their effectiveness and that of the tactical aircraft they are supporting in the event of a conflict. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/06/01/chinas-missile-and-space-tech-is-creating-a-defensive-bubble-difficult-to-penetrate/

  • US considers new ways to detect and track enemy missiles

    17 janvier 2019 | International, C4ISR

    US considers new ways to detect and track enemy missiles

    By: Robert Burns, The Associated Press WASHINGTON — The Trump administration is considering ways to expand U.S. homeland and overseas defenses against a potential missile attack, possibly adding a layer of satellites in space to detect and track hostile targets. Details on how far the administration intends to press this in a largely supportive Congress are expected to be revealed when the Pentagon releases results of a missile defense review as early as Thursday. The release was postponed last year for unexplained reasons, though it came as President Donald Trump was trying to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. A review might have complicated the talks. The Trump approach is expected to include emphasis on stopping missiles either before they are launched or in the first few minutes of flight when their booster engines are still burning. Congress already has directed the Pentagon to push harder on this "boost-phase" approach, which might include the use of drones armed with lasers. Any expansion of the scope and cost of missile defenses would compete with other defense priorities, including the billions of extra dollars the Trump administration has committed to spending on a new generation of nuclear weapons. An expansion also would have important implications for American diplomacy, given longstanding Russian hostility to even the most rudimentary U.S. missile defenses and China's worry that longer-range U.S. missile defenses in Asia could undermine Chinese national security. Senior administration officials have signaled their interest in developing and deploying more effective means of detecting and tracking missiles with a constellation of satellites in space that can, for example, use advanced sensors to follow the full path of a hostile missile so that an anti-missile weapon can be directed into its flight path. Space-based sensor networks would allow the U.S. to deal with more sophisticated threats such as hypersonic missiles. "I think that makes a lot of sense," said Frank Rose, a former Pentagon and State Department official and now a senior fellow for security and strategy at the Brookings Institution. "This could make a real improvement in our missile defense capabilities." Current U.S. missile defense weapons are based on land and aboard ships. Republican presidents starting with Ronald Reagan, who proposed a "Star Wars" system of anti-missile weapons in space, have been more enthusiastic about missile defense than Democrats. In recent years, however, both parties have argued that better defenses are needed, if only against emerging nuclear powers such as North Korea. Trump's detailed views on this are not well-known. The national security strategy he unveiled in December 2017 called "enhanced" missile defense a priority, but it also said it was not intended to disrupt strategic relationships with Russia or China, whose missile arsenals the U.S. sees as the greatest potential threat. John Rood, the undersecretary of defense for policy, said last year that a space-based layer of missile-tracking sensors would not mark a big shift in American policy or as a security threat to others like Russia or China. "It watches, it detects what others are doing. I don't regard it as a provocative act to observe the missile flights of missiles that are potentially threatening to the United States," Rood said in September. "I don't think having a sensor capability is a sea change for the United States," he added, without stating directly that the Trump administration will pursue this. Such a system is different than the more provocative idea of putting missile interceptors aboard satellites in space, which is not expected to be part of the Trump strategy. Congress has ordered the Pentagon to study it and some senior Pentagon officials have said recently that space-based interceptors are feasible and affordable. However, Rood in September strongly suggested that that Pentagon is not ready to move ahead with that. "Those are bridges yet to be crossed, some time away," he said. Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said he expects the missile defense review to endorse an expanded role for missile defenses to counter certain Russian and Chinese missiles, especially those that could threaten U.S. allies in Asia and Europe. “This is likely to stimulate them to accelerate offensive missile programs, like hypersonic vehicles, that can evade our missile defense,” Kimball said. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/01/16/us-considers-new-ways-to-detect-and-track-enemy-missiles

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