30 août 2018 | International, C4ISR

What will top the Space Force to-do list?

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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Air Force's Global Positioning System was a continuous target.

“Every year [as] we went through the budget cycle the United States Air Force ... tried to kill the GPS program,” Gen. John Hyten, now head of U.S. Strategic Command, said during a 2015 speech.

“Why would they kill the GPS program? It's really very simple: ‘Why would we need a satellite navigation system when we have perfectly good [inertial navigation system, or] INS for airplanes? Why would we do it?' Nobody could see the future of what GPS was going to bring to the world.”

First developed and launched late in the Cold War, GPS made its combat debut in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and ever since has informed the movements and targeting capabilities of the Department of Defense. More than that, since GPS signals were opened to the commercial world, everything from road trips to finding new restaurants to the entire development of self-driving cars has hinged around accessing the reliable signals, that let machines and people know exactly where they are in time and space.

The whole architecture is simultaneously vital and vulnerable and, in the era of a pending Space Force, an unspoken mandate is that it has never been more important that the United States ensure the signal endures.

It is the potential risk of losing GPS, and everything else supported by the satellite network, that serves as the foundation for much of the discussion around a new Space Force. For as long as humans have put objects into orbit, space has been a military domain, but one with a curious distinction from other fighting theaters: while land, sea and air have all seen direct armed confrontation, space is instead a storehouse for sensors, where weapons are vanishingly rare and have yet to be used in anger.

“Capabilities that we have built that we now take for granted in the Air Force, the whole [remotely piloted aircraft, or RPA] fleet that we fly, is impossible without space,” Hyten said at another speech in 2015.

“You cannot have Creech Air Force Base without space because the operators at Creech reach out and talk to their RPAs via satellite links. Those aircraft are guided by GPS. You take away GPS, you take away SATCOM, you take away RPAs. They don't exist anymore. All those things are fundamentally changed in the Air Force.”

Looking over the horizon

Missiles remain the most effective way for nations to reach out and mess with something in orbit, and so long as GPS satellites cost around $500 million to build and launch, the cost of destroying a satellite will remain cheaper than fielding satellites. There is a double asymmetry here: not only are the satellites that power the GPS network expensive to build and launch, but the United States relies on this network to a far greater extent than any adversary that might decide to shoot those satellites down.

This vulnerability is one reason that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is funding development of networks of smaller satellites, which are individually less capable than existing models but are cheaper to field and replace and will deploy in greater numbers, making destruction by missile a much more expensive proposition. Blackjack, the DARPA program that aims to do this, is focused on military communications satellites first, though the approach may have lessons for other satellite functions.

“Better distribution, disaggregation and diversity of space capabilities can make them more resilient against attacks,” said Brian Weeden, director of program planning for the Secure World Foundation.

“But the specific answer of how best to do that might be different for each capability. The specific techniques to make [position, navigation and timing, or] PNT more resilient may be different than the techniques needed to make satellite communications more resilient.”

Missiles are not the only threat faced by satellites in orbit. An April 2018 report by the Secure World Foundation on Global Counterspace Capabilities details the full spectrum of weapons and tools for disrupting objects in orbit, and also the nations and, in some instances, nonstate actors that can field those tools.

The nations with counterspace programs highlighted in the report include China, Russia, the United States, Iran, North Korea and India, all of which (barring Iran) are also nuclear-armed nations. Beyond anti-satellite missiles, which only China, Russia and the United States have demonstrated, the other means of messing up a satellite are the familiar bugaboos of modern machines: electronic warfare, jamming and cyberattacks.

“The most important thing is that it's not always about the satellites in space. Space capabilities include the satellites, the user terminal/receivers, and the signals being broadcast between them. Disrupting any one of those segments could lead to loss of the capability,” Weeden said.

“In many cases, it's far easier to jam a satellite capability rather than destroy the satellite. And, from a military perspective, the end effect is what's important.”

A satellite that cannot broadcast or whose signal cannot overcome the strength of a jammer is a satellite that is functionally offline, and the means to disable satellites extend beyond the traditional strengths of near-peer competitors to the United States and down even to nonstate actors.

In 2007, the Tamil Tigers reportedly hacked the ground nodes for a commercial satellite and were able to gain control of its broadcasting capabilities, and in 2008 a set of hackers demonstrated they could eavesdrop on supposedly secure Iridium signals. A decade has passed since those demonstrations, but satellite architectures change slowly, in waves of half-a-billion dollar machines launched over time. Should a vulnerability be found on the ground, there's lag time between how long it can be exploited and how long it can be rendered inert.

What happens if the GPS signal stutters out of sync with time? Everything about how GPS works is bound up in its ability to precisely and consistently track time. Knowing where something is depends on knowing when something was. Without the entire network of automatic navigation aids they've built their lives around, people will fumble. Consider what happened for 11 hours on Jan. 26, 2016.

“The root cause was a bug in the GPS network,” wrote Paul Tullis in Bloomberg.

“When the U.S. Air Force, which operates the 31 satellites, decommissioned an older one and zeroed out its database values, it accidentally introduced tiny errors into the database, skewing the numbers. By the time Buckner's inbox started blowing up, several satellites were transmitting bad timing data, running slow by 13.7 millionths of a second.”

Tullis goes on to detail the possibility and plans for a redundant ground-based navigation system that could let GPS-dependent functions of commercial machines keep working, even if a satellite slips out of sync. There is an international agreement to eventually make all signals across the Global Navigation Satellite System (GPS, Galileo, etc.) broadcast compatible civil signals. This would improve the redundancy among day-to-day civilian applications dependent upon GPS, but it would do very little for the military signals.

“There is no such compatibility between the military signals of the different constellations,” says Weeden.

“In fact, during negotiations with the European Union the U.S. demanded that the Galileo protected/military signal be made separate from the GPS military signal. It is possible to create receivers that can pull in the military signals from both GPS and Galileo, but it's not easy to do so securely.”

GPS III, which Lockheed Martin is building, will mitigate some of this when those satellites are on orbit: the new hardware is designed with stronger signals that will make them harder to jam, but that will also require new receivers on the ground.

While developers are working on making those new receivers, one way to build in redundancy would be to make GPS receivers that can use both Galileo and GPS military signals, suggests Weeden. That's a technical solution that requires at least some political finesse to achieve, but it's one possibility for making existing infrastructure more redundant.

“But there are also other ways to get precision timing and navigation other than from GPS, such as better gyroscopes or even using airborne or terrestrial broadcasts of PNT signals,” says Weeden.

“These alternatives are probably not going to be as easy to use or have other drawbacks compared to GPS, but they're better than nothing.”

Redundant systems or complementary systems provide a safeguard against spoofing, when a navigation system is fed false GPS coordinates in order to reroute it. Big changes in inputs are easy for humans monitoring the system, say a car's navigation or a drone flying by GPS coordinates, to spot, but subtle changes can be accepted as normal, lost as noise, and then lead people or cars or drones into places they did not plan on going.

The next generation of threats

Protecting the integrity of satellite communications from malicious interference is the centerpiece of a report from the Belfer Center, entitled “Job One for Space Force: Space Asset Cybersecurity.”

The report's author, Gregory Falco, outlines broad goals for organizations that manage objects in space, policymakers, as well as a proposed Information Sharing and Analysis Center for space. These include everything from adopting cybersecurity practices like working with security researchers and encrypting communications to setting up a mechanism for organizations to disclose if their satellites suffered interference or hacking. If the security of GPS is suffering from anything, it is less ignorance of the threat and more complacency in the continued durability of the system as currently operating.

“Cybersecurity challenges will only become more substantial as technology continues to evolve and attackers will always find the weakest link to penetrate a target system,” writes Falco.

“Today, space assets are that weakest link. Space asset organizations must not wait for policy-makers to take action on this issue, as there are several steps that could be taken to secure their systems without policy guidance.”

The fourth domain of space is more directly threatened by threats traveling through the fifth domain of cyberspace than anything else.

To the extent that space requires a specialized hand, it is managing from the start to the launch the specific vulnerabilities of orbital assets, and the points at which they are controlled from the ground. Perhaps the way to address that specific problem is a Space Force framed around the physical and cybersecurity needs of satellites.

Raytheon is the contractor tasked with building GPS OCX, the next-generation operational control system for the satellite network.

After years of delay in the program, Block 0 of the OCX deployed in September 2017, putting in place a system that could manage the launch and early orbit management of the new GPS satellites. Besides managing the satellites, the control system has to ensure that only the right people access the controls, and that means extensive cybersecurity.

Raytheon says that, together with the Air Force, the company recently completed two cybersecurity assessments, including a simulated attack by an adversary. While Air Force classification prevents Raytheon from disclosing the results of that test, the company's president of intelligence, information and services, Dave Wajsgras, offered this:

“We've built a layered defense and implemented all information assurance requirements for the program into this system. We're cognizant that the cyber threat will always change, so we've built GPS OCX to evolve and to make sure it's always operating at this level of protection.”

Ideally, this massive job of protecting GPS will fall to the Space Force.

“One of the big drivers for the Space Force is improving the space acquisitions process, and another is developing better ways to defend U.S. military satellites against attack,” says Weeden.

“So, in that context, the Space Force debate could impact the future of GPS.”

Yet many of the answers to vulnerabilities in space are not found in orbit, and it's possible that shifting the full responsibility for signal security to a body built around managing satellites would miss the ways greater signal redundancy can be built in atmospheric or terrestrial systems. The Army and Navy are funding GPS alternatives, but that funding is minuscule by Pentagon standards.

“The United States should take smart steps to make its space force more resilient,” writes Paul Scharre of the Center for New American Security, “but the U.S. also needs to be investing in ways to fight without space, given the inherent vulnerabilities in the domain.”

https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/satellites/2018/08/29/what-will-top-the-space-force-to-do-list

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  • Pilatus PC-21: This simulator burns jet fuel

    6 janvier 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Pilatus PC-21: This simulator burns jet fuel

    Posted on January 6, 2020 by Robert Erdos The dogfight was over in seconds. Our radar painted a bogey closing on us from about 20 miles. Selecting the radar to “Track” mode, a tone in our helmets confirmed that a radar-guided missile had locked on the target, and with a squeeze of the trigger we dispatched a lethal message about virtue and democracy. Splash one bad guy. There was something unusual about our air combat victory: there was no bogey, no radar, and no missile. The entire engagement was an elaborate airborne simulation. It was all in a day's work for the PC-21; Pilatus' latest concept in pilot training. Pilatus Aircraft Limited invited Skies to its factory in Stans, Switzerland, to experience something new and innovative in military pilot training. At first, the experience was, frankly, a bit boggling. Would we be flying or were we simulating? Well, both. Modern technology allows training to be conducted on the ground in simulators, often to a high degree of fidelity but, as any pilot knows, simulators have their limitations, particularly in the realm of dynamic manoeuvring. With the PC-21, Pilatus has blended the in-air and in-the-box experiences, creating a form of high fidelity, in-flight simulation. It's a capability that is a game changer in the complex and expensive business of military pilot training. What's new in flight training? Pilatus lists the PC-21's design objectives as increased performance, enhanced maintainability, lower operating costs and added capability. While it scores points on all counts, the “added capabilities” are at the heart of what makes the PC-21 unique, in that those capabilities include full-spectrum mission-systems simulation embedded within the aircraft. As combat aircraft become more sophisticated, they become easier to fly; however, increased complexity of the sensors, weapons, countermeasures and tactics make them similarly harder to fight. Introducing tactical systems and procedures early in the training makes sense. The collateral benefit of doing so in a turboprop PC-21 versus an operational combat aircraft also makes economic sense. Pilatus touts the PC-21 as a trainer that can take an ab initio pilot from their first flying lesson through fighter lead-in training. To say I was skeptical is an understatement. In my experience, a trainer that is easy enough for a new student to fly would be ill-suited for advanced air combat training. Similarly, an aircraft with sufficient performance and systems to credibly perform air combat would be too “hot” for a student. Military budget managers might eschew operating multiple types, but no single type would suffice. Pilatus was eager to prove otherwise. Two sorties were scheduled for my visit. For the first, I would ostensibly be an ab initio student. My plan was simply to strap-in and fly the PC-21, reasoning that a good trainer should be sufficiently conventional and forgiving that it shouldn't present any obstacles to a trained pilot. Admittedly, I learned to fly in an analog environment several decades ago, but that shouldn't be an impediment, right? My PC-21 training began in the simulator, a fixed-base device which replicates the aircraft with sufficient fidelity to habituate me to normal procedures, systems and basic handling. An hour in the “box” left me feeling ready to strap in and find the important levers and switches – provided that I had adult supervision. I would fly my first sortie with Pilatus' experimental test pilot Matthew “Fish” Hartkop, an ex-U.S. Navy F/A-18 pilot. Teaching the fundamentals Strapping into the Martin-Baker ejection seat – survival kit, leg restraints, oxygen hose, G-suit, communications, harnesses – puts one in a tactical frame of mind. The cockpit layout roughly emulates an F-18, with a heads-up display, three reconfigurable 6×8-inch portrait-style displays and a fighter-style up-front control panel as the interface for avionics and simulated weapons systems. The stick and throttle emulate a fighter's hands-on-throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) design. The cockpit layout was snug and utilitarian. Hartkop talked me through the start-up of the digitally controlled engine, and we were ready to taxi in about three minutes. The mechanical nosewheel steering was tight and responsive, with only a touch of brake required to regulate speed. The field of view from the front seat through the single-piece canopy was expansive, and I was beginning to think that the PC-21 was no big deal. Then I opened the throttle. To tame propeller torque, full throttle is scheduled to deliver “just” 1080 HP below 80 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), increasing to its rated 1600 HP above 200 KIAS. Initial acceleration was brisk behind 1080 HP, and remained strong as we cleaned up landing gear and flaps and accelerated to the scheduled 190 KIAS climb speed, where we were rewarded by a spectacular 3,900 foot-per-minute initial climb rate. In addition to taming the natural directional instability of a propeller, the speed-scheduled power limits gave the PC-21 the characteristic long slow push of a pure jet, allowing me, as Hartkop put it, to “quickly forget about the propeller.” Aerobatics are a productive way to get acquainted with a new airplane. Flying in the highly segmented Swiss airspace was a bit like learning to swim in a bathtub! Most of our aerobatics seemed to occur out of necessity as we bounced off the corners of the tiny country, but I was in pilot heaven. Friendly handling I found the simple, reversible, mechanical flight controls – with hydraulically-boosted ailerons augmented by roll spoilers – to be light, crisp and predictable. The published maximum roll rate of 200 degrees per second is sufficient to replicate tactical manoeuvring. Wind-up turns to for ‘g' displayed a well-balanced stick-force gradient estimated at 10 pounds per ‘g.' Overall, the control harmony and response of the PC-21 were delightful throughout the flight envelope. Cruising in slow flight at 95 KIAS in the landing configuration, I did some crisp roll attitude capture tasks, expecting to need copious rudder co-ordination, but the PC-21 rewarded me with cleanly decoupled roll response. The published stalling speed of 81 KIAS makes the PC-21 a fairly hot single-engine airplane, but the stall characteristics in both the clean and landing configuration were entirely benign, with a distinct pitch break at the stall, retaining full lateral control throughout. Having marvelled at how “unpropeller-like” the airplane was at low speed, Hartkop suggested a similar demonstration at high speed. We shoved the throttle forward, unleashing all 1600 HP as I accelerated at low level up a Swiss alpine valley. I saw 294 KIAS, which equates to an impressive 323 knots true airspeed. With 1,200 pounds usable fuel onboard, low level fuel flow averages 700 pounds per hour. At higher altitudes, Hartkop uses 300 to 400 pounds per hour as a fuel flow rule of thumb. Retaining a turboprop powerplant is a decision driven by economy, yet the expectation is that students will graduate to fly high-performance tactical jets. That is, the propeller is a training distraction that is ideally transparent to the budding jet pilot. In an effort to mask its effects, the PC-21 features a sophisticated computerized rudder trim aid device (TAD) that moves the rudder trim tab based on inputs of airspeed, engine torque, angle of attack, and load factor. The trim aid device kept the aircraft co-ordinated as we accelerated, as evidenced by a slow migration of the rudder pedals underfoot, but pilot workload to co-ordinate that big propeller was effectively nil. Something else I wouldn't have noticed unless Hartkop mentioned it: the ride. It was like rumpled velvet. The sky around us was a roiling mess of torn cumulus, so I could see that the conditions were turbulent, but the PC-21's high wing loading gave us a ride that could only be described as “jet-like.” We returned via a vectored-ILS at the nearby Swiss Air Force base at Emmen, before returning to work the airfield at Stans. Equipped with a glass cockpit, autopilot, dual civil-certified flight management systems, dual inertial reference units, dual GPS and instrument landing system (ILS) receivers, the PC-21 is very well equipped for instrument flight training. Hartkop let me loose in the circuit, and with his prompting I did a suitable job with several touch-and-go landings, a closed pattern, a flapless approach, and a practice forced landing. My experiment was to simply strap into the PC-21 and safely take it flying, figuring those first impressions would reveal any quirks awaiting the new trainee. After about 90 minutes in the front seat of the PC-21, my growing confidence with the aircraft was ample proof of its merits as a trainer. Meet the PC-21 Pilatus has been building airplanes since 1939, and is perhaps best known today for the success of its PC-12 single-engine turboprop design. However, it has long been a key player in the military training market with its PC-7 and PC-9 designs, of which over 800 have been delivered, as well as licensed variants of the PC-9, called the T-6 Texan/Harvard II. The PC-21 is an entirely new design, although by this point a mature one, having first flown in July 2002. As a trainer, the PC-21 seems exceptionally well equipped, including a heads-up display (HUD), airbrakes, health and usage monitoring system (HUMS), single-point refuelling, cockpit pressurization, onboard oxygen generating system (OBOGS) and anti-skid brakes. Pilatus claims that the turn-around between flights can be performed in 12 minutes by a single technician. The aircraft features a single digitally-controlled 1,600 horsepower (HP) Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-68B engine that drives a five-blade graphite propeller. For reference, that's a better pounds-per-horsepower ratio (power loading) than a Second World War P-51 Mustang, so rather satisfying performance might be anticipated. It's maximum operating speed (Vmo) is 370 KIAS (0.72 Mach). Planning for combat Our second mission was to demonstrate the PC-21's simulated tactical capabilities in a composite air-to-air and air-to-ground mission. I flew with Pilatus test pilot Reto “Obi” Obrist. Mission planning requires downloading topographic and tactical data to a removable hard drive, called a “brick.” Alternatively, an instructor in either seat in the PC-21 can enhance the scenario by assuming a degree of real-time control of the threat aircraft. It also records DATA for post-flight playback, along with HUD video, cockpit audio, and a reconstruction of all the players in the three-dimensional battle space. “Fox three” I rode the back seat as Obrist demonstrated how quickly he could make the PC-21 emulate a multi-mission fighter. Using the instructor's pages on the MFD, he “loaded” imaginary missiles onto imaginary rails on our very real aluminum wings, adding a few notional free-fall bombs and some virtual chaff and flares until we were virtually bristling with simulated firepower. We launched in a two-ship formation of PC-21s, with Hartkop departing first in the “threat” aircraft. Our aircraft split to a distance of about 30 miles and then turned toward each other. Hartkop's aircraft was continually visible on the multi-function display, based on real-time high-bandwidth datalink. Obrist obligingly explained that he had selected a “six bar scan” on the F/A-18 radar emulation. I was quickly recalling that I don't understand fighter pilot talk, but the HUD symbology indicated that a weapon had locked onto Hartkop's aircraft at a range of 16 miles, allowing Obrist to squeeze the trigger. “Fox 3,” he called on the radio, indicating a radar-guided missile shot. Hartkop was dead, sort of, until Obrist “reset” him for the next engagement. We did four air-to-air engagements. Our first engagement was simply a missile shot, but it let me experience the basic functionality of the F/A-18's AN/APG-73 radar and its associated weapons systems in a very realistic setting. The training scenarios proceeded incrementally. We set up for another engagement, but this time Hartkop seemed inclined to shoot back. The warning tone of his missile trying to lock onto our aircraft sent us into a defensive manoeuvre with some additional radar work to widen the sector scan to obtain a weapons lock. Things were getting interesting. On the next, a simulated missile was launched against us, requiring Obrist to employ the radar countermeasures. We survived. Obrist made no claims about the fidelity of the radar or weapons simulations. The performance and behaviour of the tactical systems relies upon unclassified commercial models of weapons and sensors that Pilatus has integrated into the aircraft. Exact realism isn't the objective, however. Rather, the goal is effective training. The purpose of the tactical scenarios is to teach the pilot to behave appropriately and to do so in a setting where their judgment, timing and skills are critical to the outcome. The only thing missing from complete realism were live warheads. Interestingly, some simulation models have been modified to enhance training effectiveness. For example, Hartkop explained that in the interest of improved training, the onboard dynamic model of the air-to-air missiles needed to be slowed down to give realistic time-of-flight between turboprop trainers engaging at slower speeds and shorter distances than actual fighter aircraft. Bombs without the boom There is a lovely lakeside town south of Stans that needed a bit of friendly bombing, so we split our formation, set the radar to Ground Mode, and set course for the target. I was impressed by the air-to-air radar simulation capability, but utterly gobsmacked when Obrist selected the air-to-ground mode. The synthetic radar display depicted a pseudo-photographic image of the terrain ahead. Let's take a moment to appreciate what we were seeing: In the absence of an actual radar, the radar return was simulated; meaning that the software “knew” the shape and texture of the local terrain, “knew” the characteristics of an AN/APG-73 radar beam, including all the fancy features and modes such as Doppler beam sharpening, “knew” where the radar beam was in space, and calculated what the reflected radar image should look like under those conditions. Impressive! Our navigation system put a waypoint near the target, allowing Obrist to visually identify and update the target designator during our low-level ingress to the target. The HUD guided us through a pop-up manoeuvre to the continually computed release point (CCRP), where it simulated release of the weapon. The PC-21 can simulate – and even score – gun, rocket or bomb delivery. Taking simulation airbourne The PC-21 wasn't a fighter, but you couldn't tell from where I was sitting. Taking stock of the experience, the PC-21 isn't an airplane and it isn't a simulator, but rather combines the best aspects of both to provide a unique training capability. It can't deliver a weapon, but if the need ever arises the PC-21 can teach you how. https://www.skiesmag.com/features/pilatus-pc-21-this-simulator-burns-jet-fuel

  • FVL: Army Picks Bell & Sikorsky For FARA Scout

    26 mars 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    FVL: Army Picks Bell & Sikorsky For FARA Scout

    The Bell 360 Invictus and the Sikorsky Raider-X will vie for the final contract to build FARA, with rival prototypes in flight by 2023. Bell and Sikorsky (with Boeing) are also facing off for the FLRAA transport. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR WASHINGTON: The Army has now narrowed its future aircraft choices to Sikorsky vs. Bell. This afternoon, the service announced that it had picked Sikorsky and Bell to build competing prototypes for Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA), a high-speed optionally manned scout to replace the retired Bell OH-58 Kiowa. Just eight days ago, it picked the same two firms – plus aerospace giant Boeing, acting as Sikorsky's de facto junior partner – to compete for the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA), which will replace the Sikorsky's UH-60 Black Hawk as the military's aerial workhorse for everything from Ranger raids to medevac. The FLRAA transport decision was no surprise. The Army picked the two teams it had been funding for years to develop prototypes, the Bell V-280 Valor tiltrotor and the Sikorsky-Boeing SB>1 Defiant. There was more uncertainty over the FARA scout, because the service had given five companies Other Transaction Authority contracts to develop designs. Of those five, only Sikorsky had built and flight-tested an actual aircraft, the S-97 Raider, of which its Raider-X design is basically a super-sized version. Sikorsky and Bell now get to build FARA prototypes, while AVX, Boeing, and Karem have been cut. While AVX and Karem are design houses that have never built an actual aircraft, Boeing is a major aerospace player for which this is just the latest in a series of blows. Sikorsky and Bell have taken starkly different approaches to Future Vertical Lift. For both the FARA scout and the FLRAA transport, Sikorsky is offering its signature compound helicopters, descended from its record-breaking X2, that use a combination of ultra-rigid coaxial rotors and a pusher propeller to overcome the aerodynamic limits that cap the speed and range of traditional helicopters. No compound helicopter has ever entered mass production, but Sikorsky has built and flown two S-97 prototypes and, with Boeing, the much larger SB>1 Defiant: Raider-X will fall between the S-97 and SB>1 in size. Bell's marquee technology is the tiltrotor, most famously the widely used V-22 Osprey, using two massive rotors that tilt forward like a propeller for level flight and upwards like a helicopter for vertical takeoff and landing. It's a next-gen tiltrotor, the V-280 Valor, that Bell is flying for FLRAA. But Bell couldn't scale down their tiltrotor design – whose side-by-side rotors inevitably make for a wide aircraft – enough for the Army's FARA scout, which is meant to fly down city streets in urban warzones. So instead, their Bell 360 Invictus is, in essence, a streamlined conventional helicopter with wings: It has a single main rotor and a tail rotor, just like the old Kiowa, but it adds winglets to help with lift for high-speed fleet. Sikorsky argues their compound helicopter configuration is inherently much more efficient, pointing out that Bell's design requires more horsepower to achieve the Army's required speeds. Bell argues their time-tested single-main-rotor configuration will be less risky to develop, cheaper to buy, and easier to maintain. They each have three years to prove their case to the Army. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/03/fvl-army-picks-bell-sikorsky-for-fara-scout

  • FY24 defense appropriations bill invests in more modern, ready force

    21 mars 2024 | International, Terrestre

    FY24 defense appropriations bill invests in more modern, ready force

    Opinion: We cannot rely on our legacy arsenal to retain military advantage and deter threats.

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