22 janvier 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité
Mark Pomerleau
New documents provide insight into the growing pains U.S. Cyber Command faced in building a force while simultaneously conducting operations.
The documents, which were released as part of a Freedom of Information Act request from the National Security Archive at George Washington University and later shared with journalists, are a series of internal briefings and lessons from the Defense Department's most complex cyber operation at the time, Operation Glowing Symphony.
That operation was part of the larger counter-ISIS operations — Joint Task Force-Ares — but specifically targeted ISIS's media and online operations, taking out infrastructure and preventing ISIS members from communicating and posting propaganda.
While Cyber Command described the operation, which took place in November of 2016, as a victory in the sense that it “successfully contested [ISIS] in the information domain,” the documents demonstrate the extent to which the command was still learning how to conduct operations and the exact steps to follow.
“Process maturation is something they pull out a lot. Obviously, as CYBERCOM was standing up, it was pulling together plans for how they were going to operate. They actually hadn't operated that much,” Michael Martelle, cyber vault fellow at the National Security Archive, told reporters. “A lot of these frameworks were formed in theory. Now they go to try them out in practice.”
Cyber Command leaders have stressed in public remarks for years that the command was building its force while operating. But the extent of those operations has been limited. Officials in recent years have explained that the command didn't undertake many offensive operations. One official said last year he could count on less than two fingers the number of operations, Cyber Command conducted in the last decade or so. One member of Congress said DoD didn't conduct an offensive cyber operation in five years.
But when they were in action, in this case with Operation Glowing Symphony, Martelle said the documents show cyber leaders did not anticipate the amount of data they would access.
“They actually weren't prepared for the amount of data they were pulling off of ISIS servers ... CYBERCOM was not set up for an operation of this magnitude from day one,” he said. “They had to learn on the fly, they had to acquire on the fly, they had to grow on the fly.”
The documents note that Cyber Command's capability development group, is “developing USCYBERCOM data storage solutions.”
The capabilities develop group, now known as the J9, serves as the advanced concepts and technology directorate and worked to plan and synchronizing cyber capability development and developed capabilities to meet urgent operational needs.
Experts had noted that in the past the CDG/J9 had been stressed in recent years by a limited staff and burdened by developing tools for operational needs, namely Joint Task Force-Ares.
Another example of potential growing pains the documents point to was the fact that updates to operations checklists were not made available readily to the team.
Finally, the documents note that authorities and processes the command was operating under that the time were restrictive in some cases.
“Absent of significant policy changes from [the office of the secretary of defense], USCYBERCOM is limited in its ability to challenge ISIS [redacted]. As a result, USCYBERCOM has [redacted] to achieve our objectives,” the executive summary of a 120-day assessment of Operation Glowing Symphony says.
Those authorities and processes have been streamlined by the executive branch and Congress in recent years.
Commanders now follow a process that defaults toward action, Maj. Gen. Dennis Crall, deputy principal cyber adviser and senior military adviser for cyber policy, said during an event Jan. 9. He explained the updated process provides continuity, tempo, pace and timing.
Ultimately, Martelle noted that the real importance behind Operation Glowing Symphony is that Cyber Command used the experience from those events and Joint Task Force-Ares more broadly as a template for future operations.
Cyber Command's top official, Gen. Paul Nakasone, who was also led Joint Task Force-Ares, has noted that the task force laid the foundation for the Russia Small Group, which was created to combat election interference in the 2018 midterms.
“This concept of a task force lives on. A lot of that thinking came from what we were doing in 2016,” he told NPR.
That task force has now evolved to be more all encompassing covering election threats more broadly.
18 juillet 2023 | International, Aérospatial
The Tunisian defense ministry said on Tuesday it had received four T-6C training aircraft from the United States, as part of cooperation to renew its fleet of training aircraft for the air force.
24 janvier 2019 | International, Aérospatial
By: Jeff Jeong SEOUL — It looked like Italy's aerospace group Leonardo was going to be an easy winner for South Korea's second batch of anti-submarine helicopters. The procurement program would seek 12 more AW-159 “Wildcat” helicopters, with no other competitors for the $840 million program. But the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, or DAPA, threw a curveball, deciding to accept a U.S. proposal for alternate option and to begin the competitive bidding process from the scratch. The plan for the maritime operational helicopter, or MOH, was originally to sign a direct commercial deal with a foreign helicopter maker, with three bidders — Leonardo, Lockheed Martin and NH Industries — showing interest. The two latter contenders failed to submit their proposals by the Oct. 31 deadline, leaving Leonardo seemingly as the only remaining bidder. According to sources from DAPA, however, the U.S. government in November sent a letter of price and availability of Lockheed Martin's MH-60R Seahawk, causing South Korea's arms procurement officials o rethink the acquisition approach. “We've decided to consider the U.S. FMS option,” DAPA spokesman Park Jung-eun told Defense News. “We're going to weigh in on both options of commercial and FMS contracts.” As dictated by acquisition regulation, two successive failed biddings mean that the agency can make a private contract with a sole bidder, but that's not mandatory. The agency is expected to issue a renewed request for proposals as early as March, according to DAPA officials. Leonardo would be a direct buy, while the Sikorsky bid would be a foreign military sale. Leonardo said in a statement that it would still pursue the South Korean naval helicopter program “in a fair and transparent manner.” A Leonardo spokesman said the AW-159 is optimized for the Korean theater of operations, pointing to an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar for detecting North Korea's coastal weapon system and a missile firing range that is more than three times longer than Seahawk. “We do not really know about the details of the U.S. Navy's latest proposal,” a Lockheed Martin communications official said, declining to elaborate. “After an RFP is issued, we could be able to discuss with the service.” Pundits here expressed different reactions to the renewed MOH bidding process. Shin In-kyun, head of Korea Defense Network, a Seoul-based private defense think tank, said it's a better opportunity to acquire state-of-the-art naval helicopters with better performances. “The Seahawk is estimated to be more expensive by 20 to 30 percent than the Wildcat, but the former has performances about two times better than the latter,” said Shin. “The unit price of the MH-60R could be lowered through the FMS, as the U.S. and Indian Navies are also said to be procuring more than 40 MH-60Rs.” Shin Jong-woo, a senior analyst at the Korea Defense & Security Forum, said an FMS deal may not guarantee economic benefit for South Korea. “You give up offset programs should an FMS deal be made,” he said. “I'm not really sure how much the unit cost of the MH-60R could be lowered. If lowered, we may have to lose some optional functions of the helicopter.” Moreover, a possible MH-60R selection will bring more work to change the designs of warships, he added. “The Navy's existing warships, including the KDX-III Aegis destroyer, are not able to accommodate the MH-60R, so it's inevitable to change the design should the American helicopter be chosen.” The South Korean Navy currently operates eight AW-159s acquired under a 2012 deal. The helicopters fly missions aboard KDX-series destroyers and Incheon-class guided-missile frigates. The service plans to commission at least 12 more new frigates fitted with a flight deck and a hangar that can accommodate one Lynx helicopter. https://www.defensenews.com/2019/01/23/change-of-plans-seoul-decides-to-start-from-scratch-with-helo-competition
26 avril 2021 | International, C4ISR
The upgrades will modernise the way in which NATO's transportable shelters transmit, relay and receive critical mission data from ally nations by replacing the current communications suite with a future-proof...