US State Dept OKs possible sale to Canada of drone munitions | Reuters

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  10 octobre 2019 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Opinion: How To Assess Defense Prospects For The Future

  Byron Callan During upcoming earnings conference calls, expect some defense contractors to again state that they are well-positioned in high-priority programs and markets that fully align with customer priorities. In addition, planners and analysts are going to be asking a lot more questions about contractor positioning and the outcome of the 2020 U.S. election. Who will be best positioned if President Donald Trump is reelected or if there is a Democrat in the White House in 2021? On the first assertion of “well-positioned,” to a degree it is axiomatic. Defense requirements are validated, so by that very process, they take priority over emerging and yet-to-be-funded requirements. However, if one accepts the premises that Defense Department budgets may be flat for a multi-year period and that demand signals for security are going to rise, the sector will be entering a far more dynamic period in the 2020s than the past 4-5 years. Instead of being “well-positioned,” a broader set of filters may need to be applied. Posture may be a better way to assess contractor outlooks. There are five attributes on which this may be assessed. 1. The priority and relative safety of programs matters both in U.S. and international markets. But that needs to be assessed and reassessed against changed defense needs. Today's major programs of record are likely to change. If there is doubt on that issue, a reading of the U.S. Marine Corps Commandant's Planning Guidance released last July may dispel notions that the next 10 years are going to be stable and predictable. 2. One contractor can disrupt others through new product and service offerings or even a new business model. Examples of the former include Boeing's T-X/T-7 aircraft, which, if evolved into a fighter/attack aircraft, may be good enough for some missions. Kratos' Valkyrie is another example, which could affect demand for manned combat aircraft. On the latter, the Pentagon now intends to purchase launch services instead of expendable launch vehicles. Where else might these sorts of “as a service” models be applied? 3. The pipeline of bid opportunities: There are some large programs that are in competition and for which decisions are pending. The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, Long-Range Standoff, Army aviation and ground-vehicle modernization and Navy FFG(X) programs are some of the larger ones that could be decided, but there also are classified ones and swaths of opportunity in unmanned systems, hypersonics, software for data and artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity. International opportunity also clearly matters in assessing how a contractor is postured. 4. The ability to execute within cost and schedule is essential. Human capital, technology application and risk, contracting and supply chain management are critical attributes. This also will tie into the bid pipeline and the degree to which a contractor is postured to pursue new opportunities or if the contractor will have challenges managing its current portfolio of products and services. From the outside looking in at contractors, this attribute may be difficult to measure. Open job position data can be sketchy, but it is one metric to consider. Performance on current programs is another. 5. Contractor culture will be critical in the 2020s. One aspect of culture is how well a contractor anticipates potential changes in defense and security needs. Another is how receptive company leaders are to positioning or repositioning to capitalize on those changes. There will not be solid metrics here, although there are plenty of good questions to ask. In order to anticipate change, contractors are going to have to be wired to understand when and where change is occurring. This has to allow perspectives that may differ from the consensus view to reach leaders so they can assess whether ideas are worth pursuing or if there is a threat to be addressed. Part of this posture entails a willingness to create top cover and breathing space for conflicting views. There will be a natural tendency of company leaders to continue to exploit current business models and protect major products and services. There will likely be very strong pressure from shareholders to sustain or increase operational margins and cash flow and stay within current business lanes. Posture, however, may also include a willingness to take some short-term or even intermediate-term pain and risk in order to better position for the future. Innovation is an overused term these days, and it may be like former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's assertion on obscenity: “I know it when I see it.” Be that as it may, contractors must dedicate time to innovation every week in order to achieve it. https://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-how-assess-defense-prospects-future

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  3 octobre 2018 | Local, Aérospatial

  Canada's fighter jet debacle: This is no way to run a military

  Opinion: In many NATO countries, national defence is a bipartisan or nonpartisan issue. Those governments don't use defence as a political tool By David Krayden Last week the United States Marine Corps flew the F-35 joint strike fighter into combat for the first time. That same day, one of the fighters also set a first: crashing in South Carolina — fortunately without the loss of life. As military aviators would remark, crap happens (or words to that effect). The state-of-the-art fighter jet first flew as a prototype in 2006 and has been flying with the United States Air Force since 2011. The Royal Air Force in the U.K. also uses the F-35. And just this year, in a moment of sheer historical irony, the Royal Australian Air Force took delivery of its first F-35s. Why irony? Because just as Australia was welcoming its new jets to its defence inventory, Canada was at the doorstep begging for Australia's used F-18s. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan had come calling because politics had again intervened in Canada's storied but sorry defence procurement planning. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, not knowing what to do with the obsolescent CF-18s — ordered by his father in the late 1970s for a 1982 delivery — had been musing about buying some Super Hornets from Boeing but had decided not to in a peevish fit of trade retaliation. Of course the Super Hornets were only a “stop-gap” measure anyway, as both Trudeau and Sajjan emphasized. The contract to replace the entire fleet of aging CF-18s would be delayed again because Trudeau did not want to buy the previous Conservative government's fighter replacement choice: the F-35. But there's an additional irony here. The F-35 was not just the choice of the Harper government. It was initially selected by the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien. The primary reason: interoperability with our primary allies. The U.S., U.K. and Australia would all be buying the F-35 so it just made sense. I was working at the House of Commons at the time for the Official Opposition defence critic, who thought the decision to participate in the development, and eventually, the procurement of the F-35, was a refreshing but rare moment of common-sense, non-political defence planning on the part of the government. Full article: https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canadas-fighter-jet-debacle-this-is-no-way-to-run-a-military

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  15 février 2023 | Local, Autre défense

  Déclaration conjointe des ministres de la Défense de l’Allemagne, du Canada, de l’Estonie, de la Lettonie, de la Lituanie et du Royaume-Uni

  Le 15 février 2022 – Bruxelles (Belgique) – Défense nationale/Forces armées canadiennes Nous, les ministres de la Défense des pays hôtes d’une présence avancée rehaussée (eFP), soit l’Estonie, la Lettonie et la Lituanie, ainsi que des pays-cadres respectifs, soit le Royaume‑Uni, le Canada et l’Allemagne, réaffirmons notre engagement à protéger nos populations et celles de nos Alliés. Nous continuerons de renforcer considérablement la posture de dissuasion et de défense dans la région de la Baltique dans le cadre des obligations de l’OTAN en matière de défense collective. La guerre d’agression non provoquée et injustifiable de la Russie contre l’Ukraine définira le contexte de sécurité de l’avenir en Europe et au-delà. La Russie est – et restera – la menace la plus importante et la plus directe pour la sécurité des Alliés. Nous, l’Estonie, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, le Royaume-Uni, le Canada et l’Allemagne, en respectant pleinement les différentes approches adoptées pour la présence adaptée dans les pays baltes, coordonnerons nos efforts entre nous et avec l’OTAN afin de parvenir à une posture de dissuasion et de défense optimale sur le plan de l’efficacité et de la crédibilité dans la région. Afin d’atteindre cet objectif, nous voulons resserrer et renforcer notre collaboration comme suit : Intégration de l’eFP dans la poursuite de la mise en œuvre du concept de dissuasion et de défense de la zone euro-atlantique, y compris dans de nouveaux plans de défense, une structure de forces modernisée et des modalités de commandement et de contrôle, en coordination étroite avec l’OTAN. Collaboration étroite pour le prépositionnement d’équipement et de munitions dans les pays baltes. Nous mettrons nos approches en commun pour trouver la façon la plus convenable de préparer nos forces, y compris par le stockage et le prépositionnement d’armes, de munitions, de matériel et d’équipement. Amélioration de notre défense collective, y compris par une présence accrue des Alliés dans les États baltes, ainsi que par des exercices qui nous permettront d’être prêts pour mener des opérations de haute intensité et multidomaines ou pour assurer le renforcement d’un Allié à court préavis. Recherche active de moyens d’échanger l’information au sujet de l’instruction, des exercices, du déploiement des forces et d’autres initiatives majeures similaires. Coordination de nos communications stratégiques pour maximiser les effets de dissuasion et de défense de nos engagements ainsi que diffusion et promotion cohérentes des messages et des priorités de l’OTAN. Les pays baltes continueront d’investir dans l’infrastructure et les occasions d’entraînement pour assurer tout le soutien nécessaire de la part du pays hôte. Notre engagement à l’égard de l’article 5 est résolu et ferme. Nous, les ministres de la Défense de l’Allemagne, du Canada, de l’Estonie, de la Lettonie, de la Lituanie et du Royaume-Uni, nous engageons à mettre en œuvre les décisions du sommet de Madrid de 2022 et nous continuerons de travailler ensemble pour renforcer la posture de l’OTAN dans la région. https://www.canada.ca/fr/ministere-defense-nationale/nouvelles/2023/02/declaration-conjointe-des-ministres-de-la-defense-de-lallemagne-du-canada-de-lestonie-de-la-lettonie-de-la-lituanie-et-du-royaume-uni.html