24 avril 2020 | International, Terrestre

US Army confident any tech schedule slips are recoverable

By: Joe Gould

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army is girding for modernization program delays and a rise in acquisition costs as the coronavirus pandemic ripples across its installations and through its network of suppliers.

Army leaders told reporters Thursday they are confident the service can juggle schedules to make up for any emerging delays and would ask Congress to help address future cost growth. While some larger prime contractors have adapted quickly, officials said, they warned that lower-tier companies with less slack in their workforces remain vulnerable.

The Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System had several major tests and evaluations scheduled, including a long-awaited limited-user test, or LUT. However, Army Futures Command chief Gen. Mike Murray said in a call with reporters that the testing schedule “will slide a little bit, but we will be on time” for the program's other milestone decisions.

“I am very confident we will get the LUT done this summer or early fall,” he said.

The Army is in the third year of an ambitious modernization overhaul, which depends in part on “soldier touchpoints,” or user evaluations of new equipment. The modernization efforts are now in question as commanders apply physical distancing measures to protect their soldiers.

For example, a touchpoint at Fort Riley, Kansas, for a future replacement of the RQ-7 Shadow unmanned aircraft system is going ahead, but the commander at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, decided to postpone one there.

Whether wider program delays are coming, “we're still watching very closely, and what I am very much focused on is there may be some slips in key decisions and soldier touchpoints,” Murray said. “The current estimate is we will deliver that [UAS] capability to our soldiers by the time we said we would.”

The Army will also push a critical touchpoint for the Integrated Visual Augmentation System from the summer to the fall after Microsoft — a subcontractor for the prime — temporarily closed. The device is a set of goggles meant to provide soldiers next-level night and thermal vision as well as enhance navigation and targeting.

“Not only for that program but for all our programs, input from the soldiers that were actually asked to use this equipment has been critical,” Murray said. “That has been impacted.”

The comments came as the Pentagon expects a broader three-month delay for major acquisition programs and speeds progress payments to primes that should trickle to small businesses. Army acquisitions officials have worked to help get second- and third-tier suppliers access to small business loans as well as facilitate cash flow to them.

“The supply chain does have some challenges, and that's probably where the vast majority of any slips would occur that are tied to individual companies,” said Bruce Jette, the Army's acquisition chief. “These companies are small, and if one person gets COVID in the company, the next thing you know you've lost 14 days with the company because everybody that didn't get it is in quarantine.”

BAE Systems coordinated a temporary closure with the Army and plans to scrap a planned summer break to make up the time. Boeing's closure in Philadelphia also came and went.

“It's like that down [the] chain for the primes: They tend to be coming back online,” Jette said. “The ones where we end up with two or three weeks are the ones where we've got small individual companies of maybe 20 to 30 people who were suppliers of cables, or connectors and things like that.

“There's something there that tends to have a bigger impact or take a little bit longer time. And with them, we try to execute those portions of the program which aren't dependent upon those components, and then we'll come back and clean up the battlespace.”

Some big agenda items for the Army don't appear to have been knocked off balance. For example, the Army is still planning on another flight test of Lockheed Martin's Precision Strike Munition, or PrSM, by April 30, which will deliver a new long-range precision fires capability to the battlefield. The capability is the Army's No. 1 modernization priority.

“I'm confident enough that we're going to do the next test flight [of] PrSM that I scheduled a military aircraft to go out and see it, so I'm very confident,” Murray said.

The Army's latest “night court” review — used to divest the service of unneeded programs — proceeded virtually, as much of the Pentagon shifted to remote work. As part of the review, Army leaders recently received the final brief concerning equipment.

“A lot of the recommendations are pretty much close to being finalized,” Murray said.

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/04/23/us-army-confident-any-tech-schedule-slips-are-recoverable/

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How would you respond to the critics who say it's time to give up, or even that it was the wrong approach all along? A: At the time I joined [the Defense Department], which was actually two years ago this week, the first thing that Deputy Shanahan turned over to me was JEDI. The first thing he asked me to do was to go back and take a hard look at was, was this the right thing we were doing for the Department of Defense, were we going about it the right way. Was it the right thing? Yes. Were we going about the right way? Well, I'd say, mixed results. [Now] there's this whole conversation: “Should the DoD give up? Should the DoD start over? Should the DoD go and do something else?” I've spent a lot of time contemplating a bunch of different scenarios, and no matter what scenario I look at, you still have to solve the problem for the warfighter. We need to take data all the way out to the tactical edge, across multiple classification levels. And even if I wanted to stop JEDI today, there is no solution that is available already inside the Department of Defense to do that. I'd have to turn right around, go back out to the market, start an RFP once again to solve for that particular problem. This is why we stay the course. We're not staying the course because we're just being defiant or stubborn. We're staying the course because it's the shortest way to get from point A to point B, because if we don't stay this course, we will still have to go back and solve this particular warfighting need. And that is why I believe staying with JEDI and moving forward is the right solution. It's very easy for critics to say, “hey, there's a bunch of clouds already inside of the Department of Defense, why don't you just go use one of those?” Or “why don't you just split this up and give this to a bunch of different suppliers?” Yes, of course, JEDI can do commodity cloud capabilities, and so do a lot of our other clouds across the Department of Defense. The whole world of commodity cloud has gotten better and better. But it doesn't solve for our classification levels. It doesn't solve for the tactical edge today. 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One of the criteria that we really wanted out of JEDI was to get to the best commercial terms and conditions. And I can tell you after we were done with that award, we clearly in that award had better terms, better pricing than we had in any cloud across the Department. Q: But you took a long time assessing which competitors could meet your technical requirements, finally choosing Microsoft. Given the delays, and given how fast IT changes, is that assessment now obsolete? A: We did not take this final decision on the selection of our vendor until towards the back half of last year. Yes, we started this in 2018, but the offerings that we were looking at were being updated and refreshed throughout the entire RFP process until the point that they submitted their final submissions. Our [implementation] schedule is actually going to be in phases. First, we're going to roll out unclassified, then we're going to roll out the secret, and then we're going to roll out the top secret. And those solutions were going to be designed and built as we went through this process. One of the reasons we did that was because we did recognize that technology would change. We set it up in a way that we absolutely can stay fresh with technology as it changes, because we have these option periods [at two years, five years, and eight years] to go back and look at whoever our provider is and to decide whether or not they're staying current. If we saw that a vendor was starting to lose its competitiveness either on pricing, on speed of delivery, or on technology, you make it clear that if they were to continue down the path they're going, there's not going to be a renewal. The best evidence you get is just how are they delivering every day? Is it working, is it up and running? Do they really give you a tactical edge? Do they really give you multiple classifications? Are the warfighters benefiting from it? Q: But why is having a single contractor you can opt out of at set times better than having multiple vendors competing all the time for work orders under an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quanity contract? A: It's a fair question. And if what we were providing the Department of Defense was pure commodity cloud, a platform for storing and compute and building applications in a standard way that we see industry doing it today, IDIQ would be a perfect way to go. But that's not what we're doing here. That's what gets lost in this whole conversation. This is not your typical, basic, commodity cloud offering where you can put it out to three or four vendors and let the service pick every day who they want. Let's go back to what the requirements are. We are trying to build a cloud that can handle CONUS, OCONUS, unclassified, secret, top secret, traverse the data between those environments, and create hardware solutions at forward bases and to the tactical edge. Imagine for a second that I now wanted to have three or four vendors to do that. Think of the complexity it would take to build cross domain solutions for unclassified, top secret and secret, OCONUS, CONUS, forward bases, tactical edge devices, all the way out to the guys on the side of the mountain. Especially when you think about trying to move forward with this Joint All-Domain Command & Control, where the fight of the future is going to be multiple services and combatant commands having to work together and share data. That becomes almost untenable if you set it up as an IDIQ with multiple vendors. I mean, how would you ever build that to work all the way to the tactical edge? To move data from unclassified to secret to top secret, it's extremely complicated. It's not like you go buy this off the shelf. This is a very bespoke, tailored solution that has to be built. 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There's going to be a lot of business across the Department of Defense where IDIQs are going to be perfect and we'll have lots of cloud providers that will flourish. But JEDI is a unique environment where having a partner to help us build this out is the smartest way to go. Throughout this entire process one thing has stayed constant: You have to find a way of putting a warfighter cloud capability into the hands of our men and women out on the tactical edge every day. And I've always looked at my responsibilities as CIO is to not to satisfy the cloud industry, but to satisfy what the warfighter needs. We have a unique war-fighting need that you just can't go get off of the shelf today. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/exclusive-dods-cio-makes-case-for-sticking-with-jedi

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