15 juin 2018 | Local, Aérospatial

Un nouveau commandant pour le Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

Le Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada (COIC) a officiellement changé de mains au cours d'une cérémonie tenue aujourd'hui à Ottawa. Le lieutenant-général Michael Rouleau a pris le commandement du lieutenant-général Stephen Bowes au Manège militaire de la place Cartier, en présence des membres des Forces armées canadiennes de l'organisation et d'invités d'honneur.

Présidée par le général Jonathan Vance, chef d'état-major de la défense, la cérémonie d'aujourd'hui marquait la fin du mandat de trois ans du lieutenant-général Bowes à titre de commandant de l'organisation des opérations interarmées du Canada.

Plus tôt aujourd'hui, une cérémonie de passation des fonctions a eu lieu, au cours de laquelle le COIC a salué le départ de l'adjudant-chef du Commandement Denis Gaudreault et accueilli le premier maître de 1re classe Gilles Grégoire.

Citations

« Une cérémonie de passation de commandement est plus qu'un simple changement de leadership. C'est une déclaration publique par laquelle je confie la t'che et la responsabilité d'un haut commandement à certains officiers généraux. En choisissant et en promouvant le Lgén Rouleau au commandement du COIC, j'affirme à la population canadienne qu'un officier général hautement compétent est à la tête des opérations des FAC. Il remplace un leader tout aussi accompli, le Lgén Bowes, dont la nouvelle mission sera de venir en aide à nos anciens combattants. Aux lieutenants généraux Rouleau et Bowes, je vous souhaite la meilleure des chances dans toutes vos entreprises futures. »

Général Jonathan Vance, chef d'état-major de la défense

« Je suis reconnaissant de la confiance que le général Vance me porte, et d'avoir le privilège de commander et de diriger les prochaines opérations interarmées du Canada. Je remercie le général Bowes de son travail acharné et je compte bien faire tout mon possible, avec l'aide de mon partenaire le premier maître de 1re classe Gilles Grégoire, pour m'assurer que les hommes et femmes des FAC continuent de fournir un rendement exceptionnel au nom des Canadiens dans le cadre des opérations au pays et à l'étranger. »

Lieutenant-général Michael Rouleau, commandant, Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada

« Commander les membres des Forces armées canadiennes dans le cadre d'opérations partout dans le monde a été extrêmement valorisant. Surtout, le professionnalisme et le dévouement dont font preuve tous les jours nos militaires, hommes et femmes, ne cessent de m'étonner et de me rendre fier. Ils sont la raison pour laquelle les Forces armées canadiennes sont très respectées par nos alliés. Je suis impatient de commencer mon prochain travail, qui consistera à mieux servir nos vétérans. »

Lieutenant-général Stephen Bowes

Faits en bref

· Le lieutenant-général Rouleau commence sa carrière militaire en 1985 à titre d'officier d'artillerie. Son parcours est divisé à peu près également entre l'Armée canadienne, les Forces spéciales et le Quartier général de la Défense, où il gère les portfolios de l'État‑major stratégique. Son service au sein des Forces d'opérations spéciales commence en 1994, au sein de la Force opérationnelle interarmées 2. En 1999, il prend sa retraite des Forces armées canadiennes pour faire partie du Service de police régional d'Ottawa‑Carleton, comme agent d'intervention d'urgence. À la suite des évènements du 11 Septembre, il s'enrôle à nouveau en 2002. Depuis, il met continuellement à profit ses diverses compétences et expériences, en commandant des troupes à différents niveaux au Canada et à l'étranger. Il a dirigé le Commandement des Forces d'opérations spéciales du Canada depuis 2014.

· Le lieutenant-général Bowes se prépare à être détaché auprès d'Anciens combattants Canada à Charlottetown, à compter de juillet 2018. Durant son mandat au COIC, il commande des forces déployées au pays et ailleurs dans le monde. Voici quelques exemples des opérations auxquelles l'organisation participe : recherche et sauvetage, et soutien en cas de catastrophe naturelle dans l'ensemble du Canada; lutte contre le commerce illicite dans les Caraïbes; programmes de renforcement des capacités dans différentes parties du monde; soutien des mesures de dissuasion et d'assurance de l'OTAN en Europe; et lutte contre Daech au Moyen‑Orient.

· Le commandant du COIC dirige la plupart des opérations des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) au Canada, en Amérique du Nord et ailleurs dans le monde. Il dirige également les missions des FAC, de leur planification à leur clôture, afin d'atteindre les objectifs stratégiques nationaux et internationaux.

· Le COIC, dont le quartier général se trouve à Ottawa, comprend des forces opérationnelles et des éléments employés dans le cadre d'opérations; les quartiers généraux des forces opérationnelles interarmées régionales permanentes à Yellowknife, Victoria, Edmonton, Toronto, Montréal et Halifax; le Groupe de soutien opérationnel interarmées, qui dispose d'un quartier général à Kingston et d'unités dispersées dans l'ensemble du Canada; et un réseau mondial d'officiers de liaison et de points de commandement et contrôle. Le COIC exerce le contrôle opérationnel sur le commandement de composante aérienne ou maritime de forces interarmées, le Quartier général de la 1re Division du Canada et l'Élément de coordination des opérations spéciales.

http://www.45enord.ca/2018/06/un-nouveau-commandant-pour-le-commandement-des-operations-interarmees-du-canada/

Sur le même sujet

  • New defence procurement agency would be disruptive, costly

    20 février 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    New defence procurement agency would be disruptive, costly

    It almost seemed like a throwaway line at the end of the Liberal Party's 2019 election platform, in a section on proposed approaches to security: “To ensure that Canada's biggest and most complex defence procurement projects are delivered on time and with greater transparency to Parliament, we will move forward with the creation of Defence Procurement Canada.” Little was said about the proposal during the election campaign, but in the mandate letters to ministers that followed, National Defence (DND), Public Services and Procurement (PSPC), and Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard were tasked with bringing forward options to establish Defence Procurement Canada (DPC), a priority, the Prime Minister wrote, “to be developed concurrently with ongoing procurement projects and existing timelines.” Whether DPC would be a department, standalone agency or new entity within an existing department isn't clear. Nor is it apparent how the government would consolidate and streamline the myriad procurement functions of multiple departments. Jody Thomas, deputy minister of National Defence, acknowledged as much during an address to the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) Jan. 29 when asked about DPC progress. “I don't know what it is going to look like ... We're building a governance to look at what the options could be and we are studying what other countries have done,” she said, noting that a standalone agency outside the department of defence has not necessarily worked particularly well in other countries. “Everything is on the table. We're looking at it, but we haven't actually begun the work in earnest.” The idea of moving defence procurement under a single point of accountability is hardly new. Alan Williams, a former assistant deputy minister of Material (Adm Mat), made the case for a single agency in a 2006 book, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement. And the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI) issued a report in 2009 calling for a “separate defence procurement agency reporting through a single Minister ... [to] consolidate procurement, industrial, contracting and trade mandates into one new department, like a Defence Production Department, reporting to a minister.” More recently, an interim report on defence procurement by the Senate Committee on National Defence in June 2019 argued that “a single agency could simplify the complex procurement governance framework. Serious consideration could also be given to empowering project officials and making the Department of National Defence the lead department.” Williams remains a strong proponent. In a presentation to a CGAI conference on defence procurement in the new Parliament in late November, he greeted the DPC decision with a “hallelujah,” pointing to the high cost created by overlap and duplication when multiple ministers are involved in a military acquisition decision, and the tendency to play the “blame game” when delays or problems arise and there is no single point of accountability. But he cautioned that the initiative would falter without better system-wide performance measures on cost, schedules and other metrics. “If you don't monitor and put public pressure on the system, things will [slide],” he said. Williams also called for a defence industrial plan, backed by Cabinet approval, to help identify where to invest defence capital, and “a culture that recognizes and demands innovative creativity, taking chances.” Other former senior civil servants, many with decades of experience in public sector organizational reform, were less optimistic about the prospects of a new agency or departmental corporation. “There is always a good reason why things are the way they are,” said Jim Mitchell, a research associate with the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and part of massive reorganization of government departments undertaken by Prime Minister Kim Campbell during her brief tenure in 1993. “If you want to change things, you first have to understand, why do we have the current situation that we have in defence procurement and who are the people who have a major stake in the status quo and why? If you don't understand that, you are going to get into big trouble,” he warned the CGAI audience of government and industry leaders. At a time when the departments are moving a record number of equipment projects, including CF-188 Hornet replacement, through the acquisition process under the government's 2017 defence policy, any restructuring could significantly delay progress. “Organizational change is always disruptive, it's costly, it's difficult, it's hard on people, it hurts efficiency and effectiveness of organizations for a couple of years at minimum,” said Mitchell. “It is something you do very, very carefully.” It's a point not lost on CADSI. “The sheer scale of the change required to make DPC real should give companies pause. It could involve some 4,000-6,000 government employees from at least three departments and multiple pieces of legislation, all while the government is in the middle of the most aggressive defence spending spree in a generation,” the association wrote in an email to members in December. A vocal proponent of improving procurement, it called DPC “a leap of faith,” suggesting it might be “a gamble that years of disruption will be worth it and that the outcomes of a new system will produce measurably better results, including for industry.” Gavin Liddy, a former assistant deputy minister with PSPC, questioned the reasoning for change when measures from earlier procurement reform efforts such as increased DND contracting authority up to $5 million are still taking effect. “You really need an extraordinarily compelling reason to make any kind of organizational change. And every time we have attempted it ... it takes five to seven years before the organization is up and standing on its feet,” he told CGAI. “If you want to do one single thing to delay the defence procurement agenda...create a defence procurement agency. Nothing would divert attention more than doing that.” While few questioned the need for enhancements to the defence procurement process, many of the CGAI participants raised doubts about the logic of introducing a new entity less than three years into the government's 20-year strategy. Thomas described a number of improvements to project management and governance that are already making a difference. “The budgeting and project management in defence is really extraordinarily well done. If I am told by ADM Mat they are going to spend $5.2 billion, then that is what they spend. And we have the ability to bring more down, or less, depending on how projects are rolling,” she explained. “We are completely transparent about how we are getting money spent, what the milestones are on projects ... The program management board is functioning differently and pulling things forward instead of waiting until somebody is ready to push it forward.” “And we are working with PSPC. I think it is time to look at the government contracting [regulations], how much we compete, what we sole source, the reasons we sole source. I think there is a lot of work there that can be done that will improve the system even more.” https://www.skiesmag.com/news/new-defence-procurement-agency-would-be-disruptive-costly

  • 2018 RCAF Today Digital Edition Out Now

    3 juillet 2018 | Local, Aérospatial

    2018 RCAF Today Digital Edition Out Now

    REELING IN THE YEAR The operational, procurement, training and historical milestones of the past 12 months. By Joanna Calder NORAD AT 60 NORAD AT 60 By Ken Pole SUBMARINE HUNTER The formidable CP-140 Aurora is getting reacquainted with anti-submarine warfare. By Chris Thatcher FUTURE FIGHTERS To manage “interdependencies,” the RCAF placed all fighter projects in one office. By Chris Thatcher YEAR OF THE CYCLONE Declared operationally capable, the CH-148 is embarking on its first deployment. By Lisa Gordon SHAKEDOWN OVER IRAQ The mission in Iraq may have changed, but CH-146 Griffons are still critical support. By Chris Thatcher BIRTH OF SWIFT DEATH In one of many firsts, 401 Tactical Fighter Squadron is marking its 100th anniversary. By Richard Mayne RAM TOUGH After 100 years, 401 Squadron remains on high readiness duty. By Chris Thatcher TROUBLE WITH TRANSITIONS Managing personnel poses a challenge in the transition from old to new fleets. By Chris Thatcher DAWN OF MARITIME AVIATION Formed to counter German submarines, 12 Wing Shearwater celebrates 100 years. By Ernie Cable BOMBER COMMAND Sharing tales of the true nature of courageous fighting spirit. By Richard Mayne CRITICAL SPACE The RCAF has responsibility for the defence Space program. Now comes the hard part. By Ben Forrest AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION Before deploying to Mali, CH-147 Chinooks became forward aeromedical evacuation capable. By Chris Thatcher TECHNICIANS AT WORK Cpl Taylor Hartnell shares a day in the life of maintaining the CH-147 Chinook. By Ken Pole INSIGHT SHOWCASE 2018 supplier capability https://assets.skiesmag.com/digital/2018/RCAF-2018/html5/index.html?page=2:

  • Russia’s Arctic Agenda and the Role of Canada

    16 avril 2020 | Local, Naval

    Russia’s Arctic Agenda and the Role of Canada

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 51 By: Sergey Sukhankin April 15, 2020 05:24 PM Age: 14 mins New research (which includes two articles written by Russian experts) published by the prominent think tank the Canadian Global Affairs Institute has spurred interest and hopes in Russia's expert community about the possibility of normalizing ties between Russia and Canada through cooperation in the Arctic region (Russiancouncil.ru, April 3; Cgai.ca, accessed April 12). This cooperation could potentially be premised on two main pillars. First would be the mutual rejection of “internationalization” of the Arctic. Both Canada and Russia—for whom the Arctic region is an issue of foreign policy (Russiancouncil.ru, July 1, 2019) —feel ill at ease with the increasing involvement of non-Arctic states in the region, particularly, China. Russian information outlets noted the level of distress when the Chinese icebreaker Snow Dragon completed its first-ever voyage through the Arctic Ocean off the coast of Canada, accumulating “a wealth of experience for Chinese ships going through the Northwest Passage in the future” (Regnum, September 17, 2017; see EDM, October 3, 2017). Second, Moscow seeks to exploit regional frictions and disagreements between Canada and the United States (Pentagonus.ru, accessed April 10) to boost its own position/influence in the region. Russian sources recall the year 2010, when then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly challenged Canada's stance on the status of the Northwest Passage, which Ottawa considers part of Canadian territory (Foreignpolicy.ru, February 20, 2015). In the past, both the Russian tone and general assessment of Canada's role in the Arctic were denigrating, claiming Ottawa lacked agency. Perhaps the clearest expression of this sentiment came from the director of the Institute of Strategic Planning and Forecasting, Professor Alexander Gusev, who, in 2015, declared that “they [Canada] are only performing the role assigned by the US” (Odnako.org, March 30, 2015). After 2016, however, Russia dramatically changed its coverage of the US-Canadian dispute in the Arctic region, with Moscow increasingly employing reconciliatory rhetoric toward Ottawa and employing ever more assertive public diplomacy tools. One notable example of this new approach is Moscow's reliance on pro-Russian experts based in Canada. In 2016, speaking in Sochi, on the margins of that year's Valdai Club session, Professor Piotr Dutkiewicz (a former director of the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University, in Ottawa) stated, “[T]his area [the Arctic region] will be the first one where we will feel real changes in our relations... Arctic cooperation will become the focal point thanks to which our two sides [Canada and Russia] will be extending their areas of collaboration” (Izvestia, October 28, 2016). Moreover, as repeatedly stated by Federation Council member Igor Chernyshenko (a senator from Murmansk Oblast), the Arctic region could become a “bridge,” helping Canada and Russia overcome the existing difficulties in their bilateral ties. Last May, he announced, “[W]e invited them [the Canadian side] to return to a dialogue. We proposed holding a conference between Russian and Canadian universities in northwest Russia, maybe in Murmansk Oblast. They supported this idea” (TASS, May 25, 2019). Notably, the last such event was held in November 2014, in Canada, hosted by the aforementioned Carleton University. In addition to trying to foster bilateral academic ties, Russia's outreach to Canada on Arctic issues involves sustained information campaigns via RT and similar multi-language information outlets with international reach. In particular, Russian propaganda narratives routinely overemphasize the extent of current US-Canadian disagreements in the Arctic. At the same time, foreign-audience-facing Kremlin-linked media outlets underscore the allegedly negative role of President Donald Trump (and his policies toward Canada) in aggravating the existing disputes. RT widely claimed that “after Trump's inauguration, he began pressing Ottawa on economic issues and extended claims on Canadian possessions in the Arctic region.” It also highlighted US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo's remarks suggesting that “Russia is not the only country with illegitimate claims [in the Arctic] ...the US has a lasting dispute with Canada over its claims on sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Finally, RT's propaganda reporting also relied on a statement by Pavel Feldman, the deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Forecasts at the Moscow-based Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN). Feldman is quoted as saying, “[T]he US and Canada carry on a heated competition over the Arctic region; yet, publicly, these countries are trying to position themselves as partners” (RT, October 16, 2019). In recent months, this increasing Russian attention to Canada as an Arctic power and a key element of regional stability and order has started to be expressed at the highest levels in Moscow. Poignantly, President Vladimir Putin declared in a public address at the start of this year that Russia “is open to cooperation with Canada on the basis of mutual respect and consideration of each other's interest.” Putin added, “[O]ur countries are neighbors in the Arctic region and bear joint responsibility for the development of this vast region, for preservation of the traditional lifestyle of its native populations and the careful treatment of its brittle ecosystem” (Vzglyad, February 5, 2020). Such reconciliatory rhetoric should, however, be taken with a heavy dose of caution in Ottawa: from the earliest days of the Soviet Union, Moscow's stance on the Arctic region has been deliberately flexible and tightly premised on being able to demonstrate its military potential in the High North and to intimidate other regional players. The Russian Federation has increasingly undertaken the same policy course since 2014 (see EDM, April 9). Incidentally, on January 31, 2020, two Russian Tu-160 heavy strategic bombers approached Canadian airspace—maneuvers that the Russian Ministry of Defense explained away as “planned exercises” (Vpk.name, February 3). It is worth pointing out that the US North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is unable to identify and track Russian bombers of this type until they are close enough to launch missiles at targets on the continent. Furthermore, it is worth keeping in mind that, in fact, Russia (not the US) is Canada's direct competitor when it comes to territorial claims in the Arctic (the Lomonosov Ridge)—a point explicitly corroborated by Russia's Arktika 2007 expedition, which explored this disputed undersea area and famously planted a Russian flag at the North Pole, on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean (Izvestia, August 3, 2007). Lastly, it may be worth keeping an eye on one of the proposed amendments (soon to be officially adopted) to the Russian Constitution on the “prohibition of actions related to the alienation of Russian territory, or the propaganda thereof” (TASS, February 25). This amendment—reportedly drafted with predominantly Kaliningrad and Vladivostok in mind—is likely to also be applied to some Arctic territories that are of equally strategic interest to Canada. https://jamestown.org/program/russias-arctic-agenda-and-the-role-of-canada/

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