13 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

Top 100 for 2018

Rank Last Year's Rank Company Leadership Country 2017 Defense Revenue* (in millions) 2016 Defense Revenue* (in millions) % Defense Revenue Change 2017 Total Revenue* (in millions) Revenue From Defense
1 1 Lockheed Martin 1 Marillyn Hewson, Chairman, President and CEO U.S. $47,985.00 $43,468.00 10% $51,048.00 94%
2 4 Raytheon Company 1 Thomas Kennedy, Chairman and CEO U.S. $23,573.64 $22,384.17 5% $25,348.00 93%
3 3 BAE Systems Jerry DeMuro, President and CEO U.K. $22,380.04 $23,621.84 -5% $25,288.20 88%
4 5 Northrop Grumman 2 Wes Bush, Chairman and CEO U.S. $21,700.00 $20,200.00 7% $25,803.00 84%
5 2 Boeing 3 Dennis Muilenburg, President and CEO U.S. $20,561.00 $20,180.00 2% $94,005.00 22%
6 6 General Dynamics 4 Phebe Novakovic, Chairman and CEO U.S. $19,587.00 $19,696.00 -1% $30,973.00 63%
7 7 Airbus Thomas Enders, CEO Netherlands/France $11,185.91 $12,321.00 -9% $75,702.63 15%
8 11 Almaz-Antey 5 Yan Novikov, CEO Russia $9,125.02 $6,581.69 39% $9,125.02 100%
9 10 Thales Patrice Caine, Chairman and CEO France $8,926.13 $8,362.00 7% $17,852.26 50%
10 9 Leonardo Alessandro Profumo, CEO Italy $8,856.48 $8,526.22 4% $13,024.24 68%

Full top 100: http://people.defensenews.com/top-100/

Sur le même sujet

  • Shipbuilding suppliers need more than market forces to stay afloat

    21 mai 2020 | International, Naval

    Shipbuilding suppliers need more than market forces to stay afloat

    By: Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton The U.S. Navy's award this month of the contract for its new class of frigates starts the very necessary process of rebalancing the U.S. surface fleet, but the competition also highlighted the U.S. shipbuilding-industrial base's increasing fragility. If they lost, two of the four shipyards bidding on the frigate were at risk of either going out of business or joining the underemployed ranks of U.S. commercial shipbuilders. Due to specialization, only one or two yards construct each class of Navy combat ship with workforces, equipment, and infrastructure that would be expensive and difficult to adapt. A decision on any single ship class, as with the frigate, can shut down a shipyard and send its workers to the unemployment line. Specialization is also a problem when orders increase. The Navy's two submarine shipyards, General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News division, shrank the time needed to build subs by 20 percent during the past decade while increasing production to two per year. The rising sophistication of Virginia-class submarines has now reversed this trend, however, and submarine builders' challenges are only increasing. They recently started a new contract to build up to 10 of the larger Block V Virginia submarines and are in negotiation with the Navy on a block-buy contract for the first two Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines. Supplier challenges abound U.S. shipbuilders may be fragile, but their suppliers are on life support. After decades of being whipsawed by changes to shipbuilding plans and budget uncertainty, a shrinking number of suppliers are able and willing to stay in business. The Navy's recent initiatives to improve supplier production capacity and resilience don't go far enough to address its rising dependence on sole-source suppliers, which now provide more than 75 percent of submarine parts. For example, when problems with Columbia missile tubes led the Navy to seek new suppliers, it replaced the existing, sole source — BWXT — with another — General Dynamics — that will assemble tubes at the same facilities that are constructing parts for the Virginia and Columbia submarines. Last year, the Trump administration used the Defense Production Act to establish new suppliers for military missile fuel. The Navy should build on this effort to identify sole-source items for which an additional supplier is appropriate. In selecting additional suppliers, the Navy should prioritize attributes other than cost. Sole-source items by definition are important enough to justify seeking out or creating a single supplier rather than adapting the ship's design to use an existing item. Therefore, the Navy should emphasize the provider's track record in conducting similar or other challenging engineering; its ability to adjust to what will likely be variable demand and changing specifications; and the likelihood of quality production that avoids rework. Planning for resiliency The Department of Defense could help address the shipbuilding-industrial base's fragility with its current study of the number and mix of ships needed in the future fleet. Although the primary goal of this analysis should be determining the most effective fleet possible within likely budget constraints, it must also ensure the industrial base can build and sustain the future Navy. Industrial base considerations are not new to Navy force structure planning. During the last decade, the Navy or Congress added amphibious ships, submarines, destroyers and auxiliary vessels to maintain hot production lines or keep a shipyard afloat until the next order. Each of the Navy's new combatant ships are expected to cost more than $1 billion to build, constraining the Navy's ability to spread ship construction to other qualified shipyards to fill production gaps or extend classes to keep a shipyard in operation. The Navy could better support shipbuilders by rebalancing its fleet architecture to increase the number of smaller vessels such as corvettes or tank landing ships, and reduce the number of larger destroyers and amphibious warships. Smaller, less-expensive ships could be built in larger numbers per year, providing more flexibility in shipbuilding plans to stabilize the workload for shipbuilders and providing more scalability to align shipbuilding expenditures with changing budgets. Smaller ships could also be built at a wider range of shipyards, including those that only build commercial vessels and noncombatant government ships like Coast Guard cutters and oceanographic research vessels. These “dual-use” shipbuilders suffer today from a lack of coordination between commercial and government shipbuilding, which creates a feast-or-famine cycle of orders. The Navy and nation depend on a healthy shipbuilding-industrial base. To foster the industrial base in the face of natural and man-made challenges, the Navy should change its fleet design and shipbuilding plans, while investing to establish and qualify new suppliers. Without deliberate action, the U.S. shipbuilding industry will become increasingly fragile, limiting the Navy's ability to build the ships it needs and respond when today's competitions turn to conflict. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where Timothy A. Walton is a fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/20/shipbuilding-suppliers-need-more-than-market-forces-to-stay-afloat/

  • Securing the final frontier: Digital twins, satellites and cybersecurity

    3 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Securing the final frontier: Digital twins, satellites and cybersecurity

    Kevin Coggins The United States and our allies are increasingly dependent on unfettered access to space. However, it has become abundantly clear that our space systems have significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to exploit. Earlier this year, William Akoto wrote about the growing constellations of satellites operated by private industry, led by SpaceX, Blue Origin and others: “If hackers were to take control of these satellites, the consequences could be dire. On the mundane end of scale, hackers could simply shut satellites down, denying access to their services. Hackers could also jam or spoof the signals from satellites, creating havoc for critical infrastructure. This includes electric grids, water networks and transportation systems.” Space Policy Directive 5, recently issued by the White House, notes that “cybersecurity principles and practices that apply to terrestrial systems also apply to space systems” and that we must integrate these principles and practices into every phase of the space system life cycle. SPD-5 is charting the right course toward assuring our cybersecurity in the space domain. This article highlights the unique vulnerabilities of space systems and how innovative solutions like “digital twins” can help us protect systems in orbit today and design more secure ones for the future. Cyberattacks on space systems — comprised of satellites, ground control stations, and user terminals (e.g., GPS receivers) — are appealing to nation-states, criminal groups, hackers and other bad actors. It's a tremendous opportunity to breach data and disrupt operations in a low-risk way with a low cost of execution. The different components that make up space systems each come with their own set of cyber vulnerabilities, the ground segment in particular. Some space systems were built with speed to market rather than cybersecurity in mind. In contrast, for traditional defense-focused space systems, a slower design and development process has introduced vulnerabilities as well. Space systems operating today may have taken a full 20 years to go from paper to launch and lack the capabilities to recognize or respond to today's cyberthreats. Space systems are increasingly interconnected — a malicious attack can easily spread from a single point of vulnerability in a ground station to the satellites. Cybersecurity in space systems has struggled to keep pace with the rapid evolution of threat actors and exploits. Given these challenges, how can organizations with space systems stay ahead of cyberthreats and protect their missions and users? The older approach of paper-based assessments has significant limitations, like the inability to duplicate reactions to all possible scenarios. At the other end of the spectrum, full-scale replicas are expensive and time-consuming to build. In the middle is the “digital twin” concept — a virtual mirror model that synchronizes a physical object with a cyber representation. With this approach, organizations can test a satellite in different scenarios to identify vulnerabilities and develop protection strategies, even before the satellite is built. One specific project that demonstrated digital twins' strengths and capabilities: testing Air Force GPS space systems for vulnerabilities after the passage of Section 1647 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. Starting with a model-based system engineering review of thousands of pages of design documents, we built a digital replica of critical GPS Block IIR satellite components launched between 1987 and 2004 that ran on a single laptop with lightweight applications. Our digital twin created the foundation for a flexible cyber test bed — a suite of scalable software applications to demonstrate and validate cyber vulnerabilities and protection strategies as the system is designed or modified. The test bed can connect with assets beyond the network to generate data, provide war-gaming support and explore attack scenarios. We need this flexibility and functionality for future space system protection. The next generation of satellites will encounter more extreme service conditions and increased, simultaneous cyberattack vectors over longer periods of time. To respond to these challenges, these space systems will need increasingly complex designs, and with such complexity comes potentially greater vulnerability to cyberattacks and threats. Digital twins and model-based system engineering approaches can strengthen security throughout the acquisition and sustainment phases. Use them to: Develop system requirements and analyze design trades. Create test scenarios for requirements clarification and reference systems. Simulate threats, anomalies and impacts without risk to critical infrastructure. Assess the impact of new threats or operational scenarios on an on-orbit system design. What can space system acquisition professionals, developers and operators learn here? Digital twins offer an innovative approach that can streamline and strengthen the testing and design process of our space assets. They can also provide insights on as-built systems and enable the buydown of risks across the space system life cycle, enabling affordability across the entire system life cycle. Now is the time to leverage their capabilities, to ensure that the space infrastructure so vital to our security and American way of life has the protection it requires. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/11/02/securing-the-final-frontier-digital-twins-satellites-and-cybersecurity/

  • Turkish firm says it has made a supersonic target drone

    30 mars 2022 | International, Aérospatial

    Turkish firm says it has made a supersonic target drone

    The 3-meter-long drone, now undergoing flight testing, features a mini-turbojet engine that helps it fly at least as fast as Mach 1.

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