17 août 2021 | International, Aérospatial

Red 6 lands contract to put augmented reality on a T-38 training jet

After integration on a T-38 is complete, a fourth-gen fighter will be next in line.

https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2021/08/16/red-6-lands-contract-to-put-augmented-reality-on-a-t-38-training-jet

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  • Hypersonic threats need an offense-defense mix

    5 août 2019 | International, Aérospatial

    Hypersonic threats need an offense-defense mix

    By: Melanie Marlowe Next week, people from across the missile defense community will gather at an annual symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, to consider how to adapt U.S. missile defense efforts to the challenge of renewed competition with Russia and China. A centerpiece of their discussions will be the emergence of advanced hypersonic missile threats and what to do about them. Over the past few years, the Pentagon has prioritized the development of offensive hypersonic strike weapons, with billions of dollars in contracts already awarded for each of the major military services to acquire hypersonic strike missiles of their own. The counter-hypersonic mission, however, received surprisingly short shrift in recent defense budgets, with progress on hypersonic defense thus far piecemeal and halting. Some leading military officials charged with procuring hypersonic strike missiles have said that defending against hypersonic missiles is too hard, so we shouldn't even try. That short-sighted approach is at odds with the vision of newly confirmed Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, who stated to Congress that he will advocate hypersonic missile defense, to include the development of new sensors, interceptors, and advanced command-and-control systems. Public commentary on hypersonic threats has been somewhat hyperbolic. Yes, hypersonics are fast — five or more times the speed of sound — but that's slower than many ballistic missiles. Aerodynamic maneuver makes for a less predictable flight path, but this also means that atmospheric friction would remove the kind of decoys that might accompany a ballistic reentry vehicle. Whether a boosted glide vehicle, a scramjet cruise missile or a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile, hypersonics pose a complex air defense challenge, but they are not invulnerable. The strategic significance of hypersonics is nevertheless quite real. Today's Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Aegis defenses protect American carrier groups and ground forces against aerial and ballistic missile attack. Designed to go around or under those defenses, hypersonics are a more sophisticated means to hold forces at risk, and thereby undermine our broader defense goals and alliance system. Even if the United States catches up with the Chinese and Russians on hypersonic strike, our adversaries' ability to hold U.S. carriers and forward bases at risk will push back U.S. forces. They could certainly also be used to target the American homeland, but the more urgent threat is regional. Passive defense only goes so far — ships can only go so fast, and air bases cannot be moved. Active defenses must be part of a balanced strategy. The first priority here is a space sensor layer. Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles fly at lower and changing altitudes, are harder to see, and travel an uncertain flight path. Current early warning satellites can detect the launch of boost-glide vehicles but are unsuited to tracking them during the glide phase. Today's surface-based ballistic missile radars would only be able to spot a weapon once it crosses the horizon. Only space sensors can provide birth-to-death, fire-control quality tracks for hypersonic missiles. Unfortunately, recent budget requests have been rather tepid in their commitment to space sensors. The administration's 2020 request virtually divested the program, and for the second year in a row the Missile Defense Agency listed the space sensor layer as its No. 1 unfunded priority. Thankfully, Congress seems to be in the process of restoring $108 million to return the program to the MDA to move out on development this year. The second element of hypersonic defense is interceptors. Although existing interceptors may well be improved, Secretary Esper has affirmed that new interceptors will have to be developed that are better suited to the mission's stressing thermal and high-maneuver environment. The MDA's third-highest unfunded priority for 2020 — $720 million for hypersonic defense — seems unlikely to be restored this year, but should be restored in the 2021 budget. Directed-energy weapons could potentially target hypersonic threats in their cruise phase or jam them in their terminal phase, but the mission's complexity will almost certainly require both kinetic and nonkinetic effectors. The most challenging element will be developing a command-and-control architecture that ties everything together. A long-range hypersonic glide vehicle of significant range could cross continents and multiple combatant commands. Even with better interceptors and an adequate sensor layer, information and fire-control solutions must be developed and rapidly passed to commanders. The Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications network that supports the Ballistic Missile Defense System may be the foundation of such an architecture, but more dramatic upgrades will be required. The advent of the hypersonic era is central to the efforts by Russia and China to counter U.S. power projection in the world. The Pentagon's recent focus on hypersonic strike is necessary but insufficient. It falls now to congressional leadership and those assembling the 2021 budget to rebalance it with a more appropriate mix of hypersonic strike and defense. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/08/02/hypersonic-threats-need-an-offense-defense-mix/

  • Space Force eyes ‘outernet’ for better data flow in orbit

    26 avril 2023 | International, C4ISR

    Space Force eyes ‘outernet’ for better data flow in orbit

    A review of the satellite communications enterprise recommended a mix of commercial and government SATCOM networks.

  • Too many cooks in the DoD: New policy may suppress rapid acquisition

    2 janvier 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Too many cooks in the DoD: New policy may suppress rapid acquisition

    By: Eric Lofgren In 2015, Congress passed middle tier acquisition, or MTA, authorities for rapid prototyping and rapid fielding. Lawmakers expected detailed guidance to follow shortly after. By June 2019, the Government Accountability Office found little clarity on documentation and authority. Congress reacted by threatening to withhold 75 percent of MTA funding in 2020 until the Pentagon released guidance. Dangle the purse strings and compliance follows. The undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, or USD(A&S), released Department of Defense Instruction 5000.80 on Dec. 30, 2019. The MTA guidance, however, is more likely to pump the brakes on rapid acquisition than propel it forward. Programs designated “middle tier” do not have to follow regulatory processes for requirements and milestone reviews. That can shave years off a program schedule. In return, the prototype must be completed — or system fully fielded — within five years. As of March 2019, there were 35 middle tier programs. The term “middle tier” is perhaps misleading considering nearly half of them exceed the cost thresholds for major weapon systems — roughly $200 million for prototyping or $1 billion for fielding. Many questions remained unanswered until the new policy. How big was a middle tier? What documentation does it require? What is the role of oversight and USD(A&S)? Authority For several years, acquisition authority had been delegated down to the services. While the services only managed 48 percent of major programs in 2014, the figure grew to 90 percent in 2019. DoDI 5000.80 reverses the trend. While the services can approve MTA for non-major programs, only USD(A&S) may approve major programs. Moreover, major programs have far more entrance documentation than non-majors, including approved requirements, an acquisition strategy and a cost estimate. The services may avoid some documentation by disaggregating major systems into multiple MTA programs. For example, two of the Navy's non-major programs are components to Standard Missile-6 Block 1B. The same is true of the Air Force's Airborne Warning and Control System. USD(A&S), however, can still disapprove any MTA program, whether major or non-major. With advisers from all around the Office of the Secretary of Defense, there will be will numerous potential veto points. Each official may extract concessions from MTA programs managed by the services. Even though 31 out of 35 MTA programs are rapid prototyping efforts, the undersecretary for research and engineering, or USD(R&E), has been relegated to a secondary position. All MTA authority rests with USD(A&S). Almost as an affront to USD(R&E), he was given control over a rapid prototyping fund that Congress stopped funding. The outcome reflects a broader weakening of USD(R&E). Congress has reacted negatively to the undersecretary's effort to move fast and reallocate funds to higher value uses. USD(R&E) may lose control of the Missile Defense Agency to USD(A&S). Documentation While MTA exempts programs from traditional requirements and milestone processes, documentation abounds. Each service must create its own requirements process with approval in six months. Joint service requirements are discouraged from using MTA pathways. MTA requirements, however, must still meet the needs determined by four-star generals in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commands. This may in effect bring the same approvals from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process back into MTA. Many of the DoDI 5000.02 processes also apply. Still required are system analyses, sustainment plans, test strategies, cybersecurity, risk assessments, cost estimates and more. Contractors performing on MTA programs must still report cost data. No exemption was made for earned value management systems. Sidestepping many contract regulations — for example, with other transactions authorities — remains a separate process. Most importantly, Congress requires detailed justification in the budget for every MTA program. That means the services must start justifying MTAs at least two years in advance of funding receipt. Many of today's MTA programs spun off existing, budgeted line items. New programs may find a hard time finding funds. The present situation is reminiscent of the time David Packard attempted rapid acquisition between 1969 and 1971. A couple years later, new layers of bureaucracy descended. Similarly, MTA has built within it the seeds of another slow-paced bureaucratic order. Adm. Hyman Rickover's skepticism to the reforms nearly 50 years ago rings true today. As Rickover wrote to Packard in a memo: “My experience has been that when a directive such as the one you propose is issued, most of the effort goes into the creation of additional management systems and reports and the preparation of large numbers of documents within the Service to ‘prove' that the requirements of the directive are being met in order to justify funds for the Service. “So long as the bureaucracy consists of a large number of people who consider that they are properly performing their function of approval and evaluation by requiring detailed information to be submitted through the bureaucracy, program managers will never be found who can in fact effectively manage their jobs.” https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/02/too-many-cooks-in-the-dod-new-policy-may-suppress-rapid-acquisition/

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