10 février 2024 | International, Terrestre
In support of this contract, Peraton will be hiring roles in the following key areas: cybersecurity, system administration, information technology optimization and automation, and managed network services.
https://www.epicos.com/article/789043/peraton-awarded-28b-support-us-special-operation-command
15 juin 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval
Vanilla Unmanned, a small business that was featured in an April naval drill, promises “world-record endurance, unmatched payload, and then a disruptive cost profile
15 octobre 2020 | International, Naval
Usman Ansari ISLAMABAD — Pakistan's Navy is racing to plug operational and technological gaps as part of an unprecedented modernization effort, according to the outgoing naval chief, but analysts are divided on whether the move will deter adversaries. Adm. Zafar Mahmood Abbasi was speaking during the an Oct. 6 change-of-command ceremony when he detailed measures he enacted, prioritizing “combat readiness and offensive capability” for the historically undersized force amid tension with India. In addition to reorganizing the Navy's force structure, he outlined acquisition and development programs, some of which were mentioned for the first time or had new details confirmed. These included: Expanding the Navy to more than 50 warships (more than doubling major surface combatants to 20, with plans for six additional large offshore patrol vessels). The apparent free transfer of a Chinese Yuan-class submarine to train Pakistani crews for its eight Hangor subs. Developing the hypersonic P282 ship-launched anti-ship/land-attack ballistic missile. Establishing the Naval Research and Development Institute to nurture indigenous design talent (it is presently engaged in programs such as the Jinnah-class frigate, Hangor-class subs, UAV jammers, directed-energy weapons, underwater sonar surveillance coastal defense systems, unmanned underwater vehicles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles). Replacing of the P-3C Orion patrol aircraft with 10 converted commercial jets, the first of which has been ordered. Acquiring medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned combat aerial vehicles as well as 20 indigenous gunboats, which are to be commissioned by 2025. The Navy would not provide more details when asked, though the gunboats were previously confirmed as undergoing design. Rivals However, analysts are divided on whether these programs will prove a sufficient deterrent against Pakistan's archrival India. Author, analyst and former Australian defense attache to Islamabad, Brian Cloughley, claimed it is “quite impossible for Pakistan to achieve a naval structure that even approaches that of the Indian Navy.” “It cannot afford it. At best, its deterrence value would be entirely local," he said. Though he described India's aircraft carriers as “decidedly inferior in effectiveness in international terms, and present no threat to China,” they are a “major threat” to Pakistan's Navy when they are out of range of shore-based air power. In the event of a conflict involving India's Navy, Pakistan “would deploy all its assets to destroy it, and although the [Indian Navy] would suffer major losses, the attrition factor would be the decider,” he added. In contrast, expansion of the Pakistan Navy would “effectively neutralize India's growing naval capability,” according to Mansoor Ahmed, a senior research fellow at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. He noted that India has “long enjoyed the most decisive numerical advantage; that is potentially destabilizing, as it could encourage belligerency and aggression, and fuel crisis instability.” However, Pakistan's modernization efforts would “help keep the nuclear threshold high,” “enhance Pakistan's second-strike capability by increasing survivability of its surface and submarine fleet,” and provide considerably increased capacity for attrition, Ahmed added. Similarly, Tom Waldwyn, a naval expert at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, said there is merit in the expansion program. “Certainly the ship- and submarine-building plans, once realized, will be a significant boost to Pakistan's conventional maritime capability. By the end of this decade, the frigate fleet will grow by half and the submarine fleet will probably double in size. The planned gunboats could free up the new frigates to perform tasks the Pakistan Navy is currently not able to do as often,” he said. The Hangor program is probably the most noteworthy because of China's involvement, Waldwyn added. “Although local build of Hangor submarines is planned to be complete before the end of the decade, regenerating that industrial capability will be a big effort, and I expect that Chinese assistance in doing so will be crucial.” But one factor depends on whether Germany provides export clearance of diesel engines for the submarine. Pakistan's Ministry of Defence Production, the Navy's public relations department, the German embassy in Islamabad, and Germany's Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control all declined to respond to Defense News' inquiries about the engines. It is unknown whether the program is now proceeding with Chinese substitutes. Weapons and platforms Announcement of a contract for unmanned combat aerial vehicles, however, appears to be official confirmation the Chinese Wing Loong II deal first reported in October 2018. Though photographed undergoing testing in Pakistan, there was never official confirmation of a contract. Air power expert at the Royal United Services Institute think tank, Justin Bronk, said it “is probably one of the most effective options for armed UAV acquisition available to Pakistan.” “It has proven fairly satisfactory in service with the [United Arab Emirates] and others, and can carry a wide variety of cheap and effective Chinese munitions. Its sensor capabilities are not up to U.S. standards, especially in terms of stabilization. But given that sales of MQ-9 and other comparable U.S. systems are restricted, and Israeli UAVs are seldom exported with acknowledged weapons capabilities, Wing Loong II is probably the best option available,” Bronk explained. In regard to what aircraft Pakistan will choose to replace its P-3C Orion fleet, Defense News asked the Navy and the Ministry of Defence Production, but neither provided details by press time. A small number of business or regional jets from Brazil, Russia or Ukraine with non-Western systems (to avoid sanctions) could readily be converted to suit Pakistan's requirements. However, there is no official, publicly available notice or hint of sale to Pakistan from these countries' manufacturers, and there was no response to related queries. Such a conversion could be locally done, as wider naval modernization is underpinned by Pakistan's in-house research and development program. Still, the IISS analyst added, it's not essential the work be performed domestically. On the modernization effort as a whole, Waldwyn noted that “developing the local capability to design and build this equipment is not a prerequisite to providing conventional deterrence in the short term, and importing equipment from abroad can sometimes be less expensive.” “However, there is value to developing the defense industrial base and sovereign technological capabilities, as it can protect you against geopolitical changes going forward,” the IISS analyst added. For Ahmed, domestic work would demonstrate Pakistan “is determined to maintain the required level of modernization” — particularly with directed-energy weapons. Meanwhile, he said he's uncertain what new purpose the P282 missile will serve. He is unconvinced the P282 is a hypersonic cruise missile intended to replace the current ship- and submarine-launched Harbah cruise missile. However, if the P282 is a ballistic missile as claimed, “it would make sense only if deployed on a submarine” where it could serve as part of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Nevertheless, he added, the modernization program will still “greatly enhance the overall credibility of Pakistan's deterrent posture vis-a-vis India.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/14/outgoing-pakistan-navy-chief-reveals-details-of-modernization-programs/
10 août 2020 | International, Terrestre
By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The Government Accountability Office is warning the Army its approach to cost estimates and technical development for its Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program is risky and should be amended, according to an August 6 report. The Army has already struggled to get the OMFV program, intended to replace the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, off the ground, canceling its previous solicitation to compete after receiving just one bid from General Dynamics Land Systems last fall. And GAO, in its report, is concerned that the service's newest attempt to get after delivering an OMFV comes with risk because the program documentation “does not clearly communicate the uncertainty associated with projected costs” and limits the program's “ability to gather the knowledge to effectively mitigate risk associated with system design maturity.” For one, the Army has come up with a singular cost estimate for the life-cycle of the program rather than a range of potential costs that takes uncertainty into account, according to the report. The OMFV program cost estimate, the report notes, is roughly $46 billion in fiscal 2019 dollars. “Our past work has determined that a point estimate alone is insufficient for managers to make informed decisions about the cost of a program,” the GAO writes. “For informed decisions, the cost estimate must reflect a degree of uncertainty, typically achieved through an uncertainty analysis, so that level of confidence can be given about the estimate.” For example, the OMFV program will be optionally manned, “which adds complexity and unknowns to the design as no vehicle like this currently exists in the Army's ground vehicle fleet,” the GAO said. “But the uncertainty surrounding this complex design is not reflected in the point estimate.” And because of this “decision makers are left making choices without a clear understanding of the impact on costs and may not be able to accurately budget for the program,” the report states. The constrained development schedule for OMFV is also a cause for concern as it inevitably drives risk into the program. GAO notes the Army had laid out, in its previous solicitation, a plan to design and demonstrate an OMFV prototype in three years and three months, but has since spread the schedule out a bit more with the relaunch of the program and now plans to complete system development and prototype demonstration in “close to” five years. The new solicitation also lays out a five-phase effort that will allow the Army to reassess the process at certain checkpoints throughout development, according to the report. The GAO also found promise in the Army's plan to use a modular open systems architecture to incorporate incremental upgrades. In the Army's previous plan for OMFV it also planned to use a mix of existing and new technologies but, the GAO report states, the program did not include plans to complete an independent technology readiness assessment until it was approaching a production decision. According to the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in a report to Congress, “the least mature technology for OMFV had only been demonstrated at the component level in a laboratory environment,” the report notes, adding that the level of technology maturity would require “significant” additional development before it could be added to a weapon system. “The Army is maturing, or has plans to mature, individual technologies to a level lower than the threshold recommended by leading practices before beginning system development,” the report says. “This creates a danger of limited insight into key technology risks.” Critical technologies, GAO states, should be demonstrated in “an operational or realistic environment — not simply in a relevant environment — prior to their incorporation into a system design to ensure that they work as intended for the end-user.” The GAO adds, based on past experience, that without proving out technology at that level, the Army risks the possibility that new capabilities won't work as planned and will require further maturation, which results in schedule slips and rising costs. In the previous competition, OMFV didn't hold a systems engineering design review before beginning system development and the Army canceled the solicitation “in part due to the conclusion that contractors could not complete a system design that met requirements within the given schedule,” the report notes, which “illustrates the risk of beginning system development without conducting a systems engineering design review.” Program officials told the GAO that the program office and requirements developers “may have misjudged the ability of contractors to integrate the desired technology within the given schedule.” The GAO recommends the Army secretary direct the OMFV program office to include a range of cost estimates to support a range of possible outcomes as well as conduct systems engineering reviews at key decision points. The report also lays out similar findings on the Mobile Protected Firepower program, which is heading into competitive prototype testing this summer. General Dynamics Land Systems and BAE Systems are competing to build the new light tank for Army infantry. The GAO recommended the Army should ensure the MPF program also include a range of cost estimates that account for uncertainty. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/08/06/government-watchdog-warns-of-cost-and-technical-risk-for-next-gen-combat-vehicle-effort/