ImSAR LLC wins $$7.2M contract for work on RQ-21A unmanned aerial systems

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  23 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Le maintien de la BITD, enjeu stratégique pour la souveraineté française

  DEFENSE Le maintien de la BITD, enjeu stratégique pour la souveraineté française La question de la résilience et de l'autonomie stratégique de la filière défense française a été examinée dans le cadre du Paris Air Forum 2020, lors d'un débat réunissant Christian Cambon, président de la Commission des Affaires étrangères, de la Défense et des Forces armées au Sénat, le général Philippe Lavigne, chef d'état-major de l'Armée de l'Air et de l'Espace, Patrice Caine, PDG de Thales, et Elie Girard, directeur général d'Atos. Patrice Caine a souligné la bonne résistance de l'industrie de défense : «nous avons été capables de maintenir la continuité des opérations critiques, pour la défense notamment», a-t-il constaté. Thales est «assis sur un socle technologique transverse et puissant, qui s'appuie sur 30 000 ingénieurs et nous permet de servir différents marchés», a affirmé le dirigeant, soulignant que le défi pour la filière est de préserver la base industrielle et technologique de défense (BITD) et ses entreprises de la supply-chain. «Protéger la BITD au sortir d'une telle crise présente des difficultés spécifiques, au sens où les industries de défense de manière générale sont un secteur particulier. On peut imaginer qu'en l'absence d'un volet plan de relance bénéficiant aux industries de défense, les marchés en cours ne vont pas apparaître tout de suite pour soutenir les activités de nos entreprises», analyse pour sa part Christian Cambon, président de la Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées au Sénat. «Nous attendons une action ferme» a indiqué le sénateur : «nous comptons sur la mobilisation de l'État pour que même s'il n'y a pas de volet industrie de défense dans le plan de relance, on tente de maintenir la LPM». La Tribune du 23 novembre

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  15 mars 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Army plans to stop building newest CH-47 variant in FY20, except for special ops

  By: Jen Judson UPDATE — This story was updated to reflect the number of EMD Block II Chinooks under contract with the U.S. Army WASHINGTON — The Army is planning to stop procuring the newest version of the CH-47 F-model Chinook for the conventional force after fiscal year 2020, closing out the program at the end of the engineering and manufacturing development phase. While details on the plan are not yet available (more budget materials are slated to post March 18), the Army Under Secretary Ryan McCarthy told reporters, in a March 14 interview at the Pentagon, that the service will finish buying EMD versions of the Block II Chinook in FY20 and will only buy G-model Chinooks for Army Special Operations beyond that. Boeing is currently under contract to build three Block II EMD Chinooks. The Army decided to cut its production of Chinook Block II aircraft as part of a larger effort to find funding to cover major modernization priorities in the near-term including plans to design and bring online two new, state-of-the-art helicopters — a Long-Range Assault and an Attack Reconnaissance aircraft. Full article: https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2019/03/14/army-plans-to-stop-building-newest-ch-47-variant-in-fy20-except-for-special-ops/

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  28 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Terrestre

  Can Army Futures Command Overcome Decades Of Dysfunction?

  By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. ARMY S&T CONFERENCE: How broken is the procurement system the new Army Futures Command was created to fix? It's not just the billions wasted on cancelled weapons programs. It's also the months wasted because, until now, there has not been one commander who can crack feuding bureaucrats' heads together and make them stop bickering over, literally, inches. “I have not always been an Army Futures Command fan,” retired Lt. Gen. Tom Spoehr told the National Defense Industrial Association conference here. But as he thought about his own decades in Army acquisition, he's come around. How bad could things get? When he was working in the Army resourcing office (staff section G-8), Spoehr recalled, the Army signals school at Fort Gordon wanted a new radio test kit that could fit in a six-inch cargo pocket. The radio procurement programmanager, part of an entirely separate organization, reported back there was nothing on the market under eight inches. The requirements office insisted on sixinches, the acquisition office insisted they had no money to develop something smaller than the existing eight-inchers, and memos shot back and forth for months. At last, Spoehr warned both sides that if they didn't come to some agreement, he'd kill the funding. Suddenly Fort Gordon rewrote the requirement from “fit in a cargo pocket” to “cargo pouch” and the procurement people could go buy an eight-inch kit. That kind of disconnected dithering is what Army Futures Command is intended to prevent. “I had the money, but nobody really had control of all of this,” Spoehr said. As a result, he said, “we probably spent six months trading memos back and forth on the size of the radio frequency test kit.” Multiplying that by thousands of requirements over hundreds of systems, and the wasted time and money gets pretty bad. But what's often worse is when the requirements are unrealistic and no one pushes back. Most notoriously ,Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki demanded easily airlifted Future Combat Systems vehicles that weighed less than 20 tons but had the combat power of a 60-ton M1 Abrams tank. The designs eventually grew to 26 tons, and the performance requirements came down, but by then FCS had lost the confidence of both Congress and Defense Secretary Bob Gates, who canceled it in 2009. It was another casualty of overly ambitious requirements drawn up by staff officers in isolation from the people who'd actually have to build them. Army Futures Command is structured to force those two groups to talk to each other from the start. Full article: https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/can-army-futures-command-overcome-decades-of-dysfunction