3 septembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Mike Yeo
MELBOURNE, Australia — Japan's Defense Ministry has requested a budget of $50.5 billion for its next fiscal year, an increase of 1.2 percent over the previous year and the eighth straight year of an increase.
The funds will be used to acquire more Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, including Japan's first short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing F-35B, as well as increasing its Boeing KC-46A Pegasus tanker fleet to six aircraft.
The bulk of the budget request is for costs associated with U.S. military forces stationed in Japan, with $1.9 billion requested to pay the salaries of Japanese citizens employed by the U.S military, supporting training exercises, and performing maintenance on and improvements to U.S. military facilities.
The ministry's request includes $1.08 billion for F-35s, which is made up of $291.3 million for three conventional takeoff and landing F-35As and $795.3m for six F-35Bs.
These will be Japan's first F-35Bs, and it's expected the country will eventually order 42 "B" models, of which 18 will be acquired over the next five years, according to Japan's Mid-Term Defense Plan released late last year. It also has plans to eventually operate 105 F-35As.
The F-35Bs are to be operated from two Izumo-class helicopter destroyers. Japan announced last year plans to convert both ships, which are currently designed to operate helicopters, to be able to handle F-35Bs. Notably, the budget request asks for $29.1 million for “partial refurbishment” to enable F-35B operations.
According to other reports, modifications for the ships include improvements to the heat resistance of their flight decks as well as the installation of additional lighting for aircraft operations. Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya added that F-35B deck trials could be conducted with U.S. Marine Corps F-35Bs based in Japan following the modification work.
Beyond the jets
The budget request also asks for $1.05 billion for four more Boeing KC-46A Pegasus tanker aircraft, and $284.8 million for more Raytheon SM-3 Block IIA ballistic missile interceptors.
The request for funding for four KC-46As is a departure from normal procedure, Previously, Japan ordered one tanker each during the 2017 and 2018 fiscal years. According to the ministry, the batch order is a more cost-effective means of acquisition, resulting in $100 million worth of savings.
Given that Japan already awarded contracts to Boeing for two of the three KC-46As previously on order, the budget request for four more tankers suggests the ministry wants funding for the last aircraft and and for an additional order of three KC-46s. Defense News has sought clarification from Japan's Defense Ministry over whether this is the case.
The budget request also includes a number of acquisitions from Japan's defense industry, with $654.3 million for another Soryu-class diesel-electric attack submarine.
And should the budget pass, Kawasaki Heavy Industries will be able to keep its aircraft production lines open, with the ministry seeking funds to acquire three more P-1 anti-submarine aircraft and six C-2 airlifters at $213.4 million and $599 million respectively.
The ministry also wants money for more equipment destined for Japan's land forces: 33 Type 16 wheeled maneuver combat vehicles and seven Type 19 wheeled self-propelled howitzers. The Type 19 is a newly developed eight-wheel drive howitzer sporting a 155mm weapon mounted on the German MAN HX military truck chassis, and it's earmarked to replace the towed FH70 howitzer currently in service with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.
The Defense Ministry also wants to continue funding the development of indigenous electronic warfare capabilities.
Japan's next fiscal year begins April 1, 2020. The budget request is not necessarily the actual amount that will be allocated by the Finance Ministry.
30 novembre 2023 | International, Aérospatial
This contract includes a total of nine systems, each consisting of three unmanned aerial vehicles and one ground control station. Furthermore, two simulators will be supplied to train the Spanish...
2 décembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Mike Griffin Nov. 9 marked the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event followed within a couple of years by the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the freeing of the Eastern European vassal states. Francis Fukuyama thought we had reached “the end of history,” that global great power conflict was at its end and that the ascendancy of the Western liberal concept was the permanent future. “We won the Cold War” — it says so in all the history books. Winning is great, except for the part where the losers retreat, rethink, retrain and try again; while the winner thinks the race is won once and for all — which is why the United States now finds itself running from behind in certain aspects of today's great power rivalry. How did we get here, and what should we do about it? It turned out that Fukuyama was optimistic; Russia and China never accepted Western ideals as future standards. Their adherence to and promulgation of authoritarian values and behaviors was, at most, slowed by the ascendancy of the Western alliance after World War II. Russia's resurgence and China's rise offer the sobering reminder that individual freedom, property rights, free trade in open markets, transparency and accountability in government, the rule of law, and the sovereignty of nations are not universally accepted as foundational principles for human society. They are privileges to be purchased by every generation, at a high price in blood and treasure. Where possible, the United States has paid with treasure rather than with blood. This principle guided our Cold War policies. Knowing that we could not outnumber our adversaries, we invested to prevail technologically and sustained that discipline through eight presidential administrations. President Ronald Reagan won the Cold War by doubling down on the policies of the seven presidents who preceded him. Premier Mikhail Gorbachev lost because the Soviet Union could not keep up. What did we buy with those investments? First was the nuclear triad: our land-based intercontinental missiles, fleet ballistic missile submarines and strategic bombers. That force left no option for an adversary to surprise the U.S. and its allies with a decapitating first strike because the certainty of complete annihilation following such a strike was always there. Equally critical was the ability to prevail against a larger force in a conventional fight. The U.S. seized the advantage with precision, with a precise conventional strike, enabled by pattern-matching seekers. With a global positioning system to guide force projection to the right place, stealth technology to hide our aircraft from enemy radar, encrypted high-rate communications to enable superior command and control, electronic warfare to deny that advantage to our enemies, unmanned aerial vehicles for both reconnaissance and force projection, and the uncontested dominance of the space domain to tie it all together, we prevailed. These capabilities were transformational when first deployed, beyond the reach of any other society on Earth. But many are now available commercially, and others, such as electronic warfare and stealth, are now widely understood. Some potentially transformative technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, 5G, and microelectronics are driven not by defense but by commercial interests, and not solely by our domestic industrial base. In certain areas with no present commercial applications, such as hypersonic flight, we are simply behind. And in space — once the uncontested linchpin of the U.S. war-fighting advantage — we are challenged by Russian and Chinese determination, and capability, to deny that advantage. In brief, the United States no longer possesses the unquestioned technical superiority to dominate a future fight. At this juncture, we have not undertaken concerted defense modernization in more than a generation, and therefore have made marginal improvements to existing capabilities. These will not affect the outcome of a conflict for which our adversaries, knowing how we fight, have been preparing for a generation. We know what we need to do. The National Defense Strategy outlines the investments we must pursue: a revitalized nuclear triad, microelectronics, cybersecurity, biotechnology, 5G, space, hypersonics, artificial intelligence, directed energy, autonomous systems, networked communications, missile defense and quantum science, among others. Superiority in these technologies, woven into a war-fighting architecture that challenges our adversaries rather than reacting to them, is the key to deterring or winning future conflicts. The taxpayers have been generous with the defense budget, but it is insufficient to purchase more legacy systems while also creating the future force. So we must decide: What near-term risks are we willing to take, and what current systems are we willing to let go, so that we can invest in capabilities that will impose costs on our adversaries and deter them from starting a fight because they know they cannot win? This is the critical national security challenge of our time. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/pentagon-rd-boss-the-challenge-of-our-time
17 juillet 2024 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité